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The law of nuisance is notoriously one of the most 
confused branches of English Common Law. This study was 
conceived as a contribution to the task of unravelling this 
confusion. That distinguished jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jnr wrote that to understand what the law is, we must know 
what it was. In obedience to this prescription I have 
attempted to trace and describe the historical evolution of 
the concept of nuisance in English law from its earliest 
beginnings to the end of the nineteenth century in an attempt. 
to provide a framework for a critical evaluation of the 
modern law of nuisance. 
This study then is not an analysis of the modern law of 
nuisance. Its object is more modest, being that of essaying 
a narrative account of the way in which the foundations of 
the modern law were laid out and built upon. 
The end of the nineteenth century seemed a convenient 
point to end the narrative since by then the main outlines 
of what would become the modern law of nuisance had been 
sketched in. I have however appended a postscript which 
attempts to round off the narrative by providing an overview 
of trends in nuisance law in the present century. 
The materials upon which this study has been based are 
the reported cases listed above and the materials noted in 
the bibliography. To a large extent the cases represent 
the primary sources of this work since there is no great 
corpus of literature on the history of nuisance law. Sir 
William Holdsworth's monumental History of English Law treats-
of the topic only incidentally as does the classic work of 
Pollock and Maitland. The authors of the later general 
accounts of the history of English law perforce tend to' deal 
(1) 
only briefly with the subject. The first substantive 
attempt to trace the history of nuisance law was MacRae's 
(1) Particularly useful are Baker An Introduction to English 
Legal History Chap 19 and Potter's Hi stori ca 1' .Intro duct ion 
to English Law 420-5 in the edition prepared by 
Professor Kiralfy. 
xl. 
article 'The development of Nuisance in the Early Common 
Law', (1948) a useful if cryptic account of the early stages 
of the evolution of nuisance law which is over-shadowed by 
C H S Fifoot's learned and graceful chapters on nuisance in 
his History and Sources of the Common Law (1949). By far 
the most substantial and detailed examination of this early 
period is however Dr Janet S Loengard's doctoral dissertation 
Free Tenements and Bad Neighbours (197 0) to which I am much 
indebted. Professor A K Kiralfy's study of The Action on the 
Case (19 51) contributes much useful information about a 
somewhat later period in the history of nuisance, while 
Joel F Brenner's article 'Nuisance Law and the Indsutrial 
Revolution' (1973) completes the short list of specialist 
studies of the history of the English law of nuisance. 
Given the extended time-scale of this study I cannot 
pretend to have produced a complete history of nuisance law, 
nor can it be said that I have covered all its ramifications. 
However I hope that I have been able to show how it was that 
nuisance law came to be in the state which caused William 
Prosser to characterize it as an 'impenetrable jungle' and 
to have made some contribution to the task of taming the 
jungle. 
oOo 
C H A P T E R O N E 
ORIGINS (c.1166 - 1300 AD) 
A. INTRODUCTION : SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
The roots of nuisance go deep into English Common Law 
and in our search for them we are led into the dark places 
of English legal history. 
The only clue we have as to the exact origin of what 
would become the concept and law of nuisance is etymological. 
The word 'nuisance' is derived from the Latin root nocumen-
(1) 
turn and our earliest glimpse of 'nuisance' lies in the 
records of judicial proceedings for the redress of a set of 
wrongs identified as 'nocumenta1. 
'Nocumentum' first appears as a legal term of art in 
the records of the twelfth century. So scanty is our know-
ledge of the origins of the concept that we cannot say how 
or why men came to use so spacious a word to identify a par-
ticular type of wrongdoing. All we know is that in the year 
1166 and after it was the practice and convention to designate 
the harm.done by or to a collection of very and many utili-
tarian objects - ditches, dykes, hedges, walls, gates, houses, 
mills, mill-ponds, weirs, watercourses, paths, roads, 
orchards, ovens, markets, gallows - as nocumentum. 
(1) From nocere 'to hurt; harm or injure'. Nocere in Old 
French became 'nuire', the past particible of which was 
'nuisant' or nuisance'. In Middle English 'nuisance' 
became 'nusaunce' (Klein A Comprehensive Etymological 
Dictionary, of the English Language £19 6 7") sv nuisalTce) 
Nuisance only appears in the English language in the 
fifteenth century (Oxford English Dictionary sv nuisance) 
where it denoted 'hurt harm or injury'. 
The word 'annoyance', is often found being used as a sort 
of synonym for 'nuisance'. The word in fact derived from 
the Latin root 'odium' = 'hatred, animosity, aversion'. 
In old French it became 'anoiance' or 'anuiance' and in 
English 'annoyance'. (Klein op cit sv Annoyance). The 
word connotes more an emotion than a state of affairs 
and is usually used in the sense of describing a response 
to a condition which is a nuisance. It can however also 
be used as a synonym for 'nuisance' (see Oxford English 
Dictionary sv Annoyance). 
2. 
Social and 'Economic' 'Background 
The things to which the designation nocumentum came to 
be applied were common-place features of the social and 
economic physiognomy of medieval England as it emerges into 
full view after the Norman Conquest of the eleventh century. 
In seeking to understand something of the origins of the con-
cept and law of nuisance we must begin by examining the back-
ground in which we first glimpse the nocumenta. 
The landscape in which the nocumenta appear is that of 
a countryside long colonized but still largely forest, moor 
and marsh, pierced by the remnants of four great Roman roads. 
There is only one large town, London, and for the rest the 
inhabitants dwell in scattered village communities, on the 
edge of the forests and moors or clustered about some forti-
(2 ) 
fied stronghold. 
Politically the country is a feudal kingdom. The .land 
surface is parcelled out in large estates, the superior 
ownership of which is vested in the Crown from whom all other 
(3 ) 
title to the land is derived. Some of these estates are 
held by the King himself, a private domain of the Crown from 
which it derives its income and sustenance. Some of the land -
the foreshore, the highways, the navigable waters - is held 
by the Crown in behalf of the people for their advantage and 
(4) 
convenience. 
Lands not held by the king were parcelled out to feudal 
dignitaries in the form of manors. The manor is a defined 
(2) The historical evolution of the English landscape is 
traced in W G Hoskings The Making of the English Land-
scape . 
(3) Pollock & Maitland History (i) 232//. 
(4) The two types of land were not clearly distinguished,in 
the medieval law. As Pollock & Maitland put it 'Ct]he 
king's lands are the king's lands..: there is no more 
to be said' (History (i) 518). Nevertheless we can make 
the distinction since it was implicit in the scheme of 
things and, as we will see (below 24//) had a significant 
influence upon the evolution of the nuisance concept. 
3. 
district held by a lord 'of the king. In relation to the 
king the lord of the manor is a tenant, his tenement being 
the manor. In relation to the resiant community of the 
manor, the lord of the manor is the 'owner' of the manor and 
all rights in and to its lands are derived from him. The 
residents are thus the tenants of the land, their tenements 
being smaller parcels of land within the manor assigned to 
them by the lord. 
Physically a manor comprised the manor house, the resi-
dence of the lord; certain 'demesne' lands held by the lord 
for his own use, certain lands held by the lord's tenants in 
free-hold, and an area of 'waste' - forest, moor and swamp 
which supplied the lord and his tenants with a variety of 
(6) 
necessities. 
PLAN OF -A MEDIEVAL MANOR 
(5) Generally on the manor see Pollock & Maitland History 
(i) 59 4//; Maitland Domesday Book and Beyond 140//; 
Vinogradoff Growth of the Manor passim. 
(6) Pollock and Maitland History (i) 362-3, 597-600. 
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Superimposed on this physical entity are a number of 
legal powers and economic privileges. The lord of the manor 
is entitled to' maintain a court - the Court Baron - with 
jurisdiction over the affairs of the manor and its resiant 
. (7) . . 
community. In addition to the services due to the lord 
by his tenants, he enjoys other privileges of an economic 
nature. Some of these, such as the right to have the demesne 
( 8 ) 
land fertilized by the livestock in the manor, the right 
that the inhabitants of the manor shall bring their grain to 
(9 ) 
be ground in the lord's mill and their bread to be baked 
in the lord's ovens, are inherent in the lord. In addi-
tion the lord enjoys certain exclusive privileges such as the 
(11) (12) (13) 
right to maintain a dove-cot or to hunt and fish 
in the manorial wastes. Further the lord in the theory of 
feudal land law 'owned' the manorial waste and was thus en-
titled to licence persons to enclose and cultivate ('assart') 
portions of it. (7) The court was a private jurisdiction, an inevitable, 
incident of every manor, having as its object the main-
tainence of the rights of the lord against his tenants 
and the privileges of the tenants against the lord as 
well as the organisation of the affairs of the manorial 
community. See generally S & B Webb Manor and Borough 
13//; Pollock & Maitland History (i) 586-594. 
(8) The jus faldae. See H S Bennett Life on the English 
Manor 77; Maitland Domesday Book and Beyond 106. 
(9) Bennett 129//. Manorial tenants owed suit to the mill. 
The lord enforced this obligation by.a writ- Secta ad I 
Molendinum see Fifoot History and Sources 6 ad n 19. 
(10) Bennett op cit 135-6. 
(11) Doves were a great delicacy and the lord's monopoly was 
designed to protect them. The doves fed on the tenants' 
fields and thus constituted a constant source of annoy-
ance. No tenant was allowed to kill the birds or to 
maintain a dove-cot: Bennett op cit 93-4. 
(12) Bennett op cit" 94 
(13) Bennett op cit 94-5 
(14) As will be seen below (7-8) the inhabitants of the manor 
enjoyed certain customary rights to the common use of 
the waste. The lord's right to license assarting thus 
cut across these ancient rights and was a constant source 
of friction between lord and tenant. The Statute of 
Merton (123 6) sought to resolve this dispute by recog-
nising both the rights of common and the lord's right to 
licence assarts (see note 31 below). 
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In addition the lord of the manor might enjoy certain 
franchises - such as the right to hold a 'leet' court/1 5^ 
the right to establish a market or fair and receive tolls and 
fees therefrom - by grant from the Crown. 
Finally it should be noted that there rested upon the 
lord of the manor certain obligations of a public nature. 
It was an ancient and elementary principle that whenever lands 
were granted by the king to some man the land was burdened by 
the trinodas necessitas, the obligation to render military 
service (expeditio) and to repair bridges and fortresses 
(pontis arcisve constructio). The lord of the manor thus be-
came responsible especially for the repair and maintenance of 
. seei 
(18) 
• . (17) 
the bridges within his manor, an obligation which seems 
to have been extended to include the repair of roads 
The lord tended to discharge this obligation by visiting the 
(19 ) 
duties of repair upon the resiants of his manor. 
(15) On leet courts see below.69//. 
(16) These 'franchises' were aspects of the royal prerogative 
vested by the king as incidents of his royal office. 
In principle he might dispose of the privileges to his 
subjects (usually in return for a fee) in which event 
they became franchises or liberties enjoyed by the 
subject. See generally Pollock & Maitland History (i) 
571//. 
(17) In Anglo-Saxon times the trinodas necessitas was a per-
sonal burden imposed upon free-men. Later the obliga-
tion to repair bridges seems to have become a territorial 
burden (see W S McKechnie Magna Car"ta 300). See also 
C T Flower Public Works in Medieval Law (32 Selden Socy) 
xxiii//. Cap 23 of Magna Carta (1215) sought to limit 
the obligation, providing that neither 'village nor 
individual shall be compelled to make bridges ... except 
those who from old were legally bound to do so.* See 
McKechnie op cit 299//. 
(18) There is no clear evidence. J J Josserand English 
Wayfaring Life 37 states that the 'keeping of ... roads 
in repair ..- was part of the trinodas necessitas...' 
(19) See S & B Webb The Story of the King's Highway 7 
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The resiants of manors typically lived in villages, 
each manor in fact including one or more villages. z Like 
the manor, the village was a social and economic unit organ-
(21) 
ised according to a distinct scheme of things. 
The most characteristic type of village was that 
which was organised according to what is called the open 
field system of agriculture. ' This system contemplated 
the village as an integrated agrarian unit of dwellings, land 
and workers. Physically the village consisted in a collec-
tion of small houses standing upon small plots of ground 
('tofts') adjoining an enclosed or enclosable 'croft' where 
the villager cultivated vegetables and fruits. 
Two or even three large unenclosed fields surrounded 
the village. These were the arable lands of the villagers 
and were cultivated by the villagers according to principles 
dictated by custom. The fields were divided into large com-
partments (furlongs) each compartment being further divided 
into long demarcated strips (selions) of an acre or half-
acre in extent. At the head of each compartment, running at 
right angles to the strips, was an unploughed 'head land' 
through which access was gained to the strips. 
The fields, furlongs and selions were not enclosed by 
walls, hedges or fences. They are the famous 'open fields' 
cultivated by the villagers in rotation, one always lying 
fallow. The crops raised and the order of ploughing, sowing 
and harvesting are matters decided upon by the village com-
munity according to their ancient customs and by communal 
decision reached in open meeting. 
(20) See generally Pollock & Maitland History (i) 605//. 
(21) See generally Pollock & Maitland History (i) 560//. 
(22) Not all English villages were organised according to 
the system to be described. 
(23) See generally Vinogradoff Villainage in England ; 
The Growth of the Manor; Corwin & Corwin The Open Fields 
Homans English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century; 
Joan Thirsk 'The Common Fields' (1964) 29 Past and 
Present 3 et seqq. 
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Each villager is assigned a determinate number of acres 
in the common fields, the acreage consisting not in a 
separate block of land but rather a number of selions more 
or less randomly scattered about the fields and inter-
mingled with those of the other villagers. The villager 
cultivates his strips and reaps their harvest. After har-
vesting the field becomes a common pasture for all the cattle 
in the village who are turned into it to browse upon the 
stubble. 
(24) 
Adjoining the fields were the village meadows. 
These lands, usually situate on the banks of a water-course, 
like the fields were divided into selions. Here hay was 
grown. During the growing season temporary enclosures in 
the form of hedges (hayae, sepes) or low stone walls (fossata) 
were erected about the strips. After the hay was cut these 
enclosures were removed and the village cattle were pastured 
on the meadows. 
Surrounding the village, its meadows and fields, was an 
(25 ) 
area of wild uncultivated waste land of forest, ' moor or 
swamp. This waste was the common land of the village and 
constituted an important resource from which the villagers 
obtained turf, bracken, brush-wood, thatching grass, timber, 
( 9 fi } 
sand, clay, food-stuffs. " It was also a summer pasture 
for the live stock of the village. 
(24) See D M Stenton English Society in the Early Middle 
Ages 126-7; H S Bennett Life on the English Manor 
55-6. 
(25) Under feudal law a forest might be the peculiar personal 
property of the king. This happened if the king de-
clared a tract of land to be a royal forest. The effect 
of doing so was to diminish the rights of the owner of 
the land to hunt thereon or to cut the timber, disturb 
the coverts, or to pasture animals upon it or other-
wise exploit it. The forest fell under forest law en-
forced and upheld by the king's officers. See D M 
Stenton English Society in the Early Middle Ages 100-122. 
The leading treatise on forest law is J Manwood 
A Treatise of the Lawes of the Forest (1615). See also 
G J Turner's introduction to Select Pleas of the Forest 
(13 Selden Socy) 
(26) See H S Bennett Life on an English Manor 59-60. 
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The waste was common land. The villagers enjoyed it 
in undivided shares, ancient custom prescribing the manner 
(27 ) 
and extent of their enjoyment. 
The open field system of agriculture can be seen to be 
a highly complex method of distributing land resources. 
Under it the villager shares the land and its resources in 
a way that precludes any individual from obtaining the ex-
clusive use or control of any particular resource. Rather 
all men share equally in the land, the scattering of the 
selions ensuring that men share both good and poor soil, the 
common rights in the common waste providing equal access to 
the totality of resources to be found there. 
However underlying this scheme of things is a conception 
of individual ownership of lands. In the theory of feudal 
(28) law the villager who is a 'free-holder' has a separate 
and exclusive title to his land. 
His holding is a tenement and a tenement is a complex 
(29 ) 
of things corporeal and incorporeal. The corporeal part 
of a tenement is the villager's toft and croft and his acres 
in the fields. The incorporeal part of a tenement are the 
(27) Thus custom prescribed that they might only pasture beasts 
'levant et couchant' there , a rule which excluded some 
types of animals such as goats: see Vinogradoff 
Villainage in England 26 2. In time the various interests 
which custom afforded the villager would be separately 
identified under the generic rubric 'rights .of common': 
common turbary (the right to dig turf) common of piscary 
(right to fish) common of pannage (right to send pigs 
onto the waste to feed) common of estovers (right to take 
wood) and the all-important common of pasture (right to 
turn out beasts levant et couchant). See generally 
Digby Real Property 191//. 
(28) In medieval society men were either free or unfree. The 
unfree were in the nature of slaves, being bound to the 
lord of the manor and labouring upon his desmesne lands. 
They did not thus come within the scheme of things des-
cribed above which applied exclusively to those who were 
free men and thus entitled to occupy those village lands 
which were not part of the lord's demesne. The free men 
obtained their land by grant from the lord of the manor 
by a process known as livery of seisin (see Digby Real 
Property 146//) and they held it in return for certain 
services due to the lord, these services being of a dif-
ferent type according to the particular degree of free-
holding involved. See Digby Real Property 49, 136//; 
Pollock and Maitland History Ti) 35 6//. 
(29) See Pollock and Maitland History (ii) 148 who wrote that 
(continued on next page) 
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villager's interests in the common waste of the village and 
his easements. The villager thus has legal rights which 
entitle him to exclude others from his toft and croft or 
his acres in the field and meadows and which entitle him to 
demand that he be allowed access to the common and to take 
from it whatever the law or ancient custom regards as the 
(31) 
incidents of the rights m the common waste. In the 
m H _ 
(29) (Continued) 
the word 'tenement1 'first came into use for the purpose 
of comprising meadows, pastures, woods and wastes, for 
at an early time the word terra will hardly cover more 
than arable land. But tenementum will also comprise any 
incorporeal thing which can be holden by one man of 
another'. 
(3 0) Easements were the common law analogue of the Roman 
praedial servitude. The concept was known in the twelfth 
century though only vaguely. As Maitland put it, the 
common law 'is as yet vaguely liberal about these matters. 
It does not make any exhaustive list of the only 'praedial 
servitudes* there can be. Men are very free to strike 
what bargains they please....' (Pollock and Maitland 
History (ii) 145). Except for rights of way and rights 
to water 'medieval law did not" have much experience of 
easements' (Simpson Land Law 101) the focus being mainly 
on rights of common. For the medieval learning on 
'servitudes' see Bracton /220 (in Digby Real Property 
185//). An easement is however an incorporeal right of 
property and attaches to a tenement as such Pollock & 
Maitland op cit ibid. 
(31) '... the free holder's right of common is his several 
right, as much his several right as is his tenancy of his 
house.... The individual free holder addresses his lord 
and his fellows:- 'True it is that the waste is super-
abundant ; true that I am only entitled to turn out four 
oxen on it; true that were half of it enclosed I should 
be none the worse off . . . nevertheless I defy you to en-
close one square yard; I defy you severally; I defy 
you jointly; you may meet in your court; you may pass 
what resolutions you please; I shall contemn them; for 
I have a right to put my beasts on this land and every 
part of it; the law gives me this right and the king pro-
tects it': Pollock and Maitland History (i) 622-3. On 
the other hand the lord of the manor was the notional 
owner of the waste and claimed and exercised the right to 
enclose it or licence enclosures ('assarts'). The con-
flict between this right and the older concept described 
by Maitland in the passage cited above was resolved by 
the Statute of Merton ((1236) 20 Hen III -c 4) which pro-
vided that the lord might 'approve' the waste provided 
he left sufficient common for his tenants and allowed 
them free engress and egress. From this grew a distinc-
tion between the rights of common as against which the 
lord could approve and those against which he could not. 
The former were known as common appendant and were re-
garded as inseparable incidents of a free tenement. The 
(continued on next page) 
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medieval law a man's incorporeal rights in his property were 
as much 'things' as were his house and acres and fell to be 
protected by the same real actions as lay in respect of land 
It is from this social and economic milieu that the con-
cept of nocumentum emerges late in the twelfth century. It 
is encountered in various contexts. Sometimes it is seen as 
a complaint that a free holder has been disturbed or impeded 
in the full enjoyment of the incidents of his free hold tenure: 
that, for instance, his passageway from his house to the 
fields or meadows or waste has been blocked, or impeded or 
diverted; or that his common right in the village waste has 
been diminished by enclosures erected thereon; or that his 
meadow lands have been drowned as a result of the damming up 
of the village stream or the construction of a pond. 
Sometimes the term nocumentum is encountered in the 
context of complaints that a man has been deprived of or im-
peded in the full benefit of some ius in re aliena: that, 
for instance, he has been prevented from assarting in the 
waste as he was licensed to do; or that his neighbour who 
had granted him a right of way over his close had constructed 
a hedge or wall that made it impossible for his carts to use 
the way; or that the sheepfold upon his arable land had been 
interfered with. 
(31) (Continued) 
latter were known as common appurtenant and were regarded 
as artificial incidents of a free tenement to be acquired 
by grant or prescription. The distinction foreshadows 
that of. 'natural' rights of property and Jura in re 
aliena. See generally Holdsworth 3 HEL 143-151 and the 
authorities there cited; Pollock and Maitland op cit 
621-2. 
(32) See Simpson Land' '' Law 99//. As he points out the 
medieval lawyers held that an incorporeal right could 
be 'possessed' just as could land itself so that a man 
could complain that he had been dispossessed ('disseised') 
of his common of pasture or easements just as he could 
complain that he had been disseised of his arable or croft. 
As we will see (below 39) this resulted in nuisance 
remedies being available as much for interferences with 
incorporeal rights as for interferences with land itself. 
Indeed it is likely that the nocumentum concept evo.lvled 
to describe disseisins of incorporeals in contradistinc-
tion to disseisins of corporeals (below 39). 
1 1 . 
Sometimes the complaint of nocumentum suffered is 
brought by the lord of the manor in relation to the franchisal 
rights which he enjoys: that he has suffered some disturbance 
in the full benefit which he ought to derive from his market, 
or gallows, or ferry. 
In addition to complaints of nocumenta arising from the 
affairs of the manor community we encounter the term nocumen-
tum also in the form of complaints that the king's highway 
has been encroached upon or blocked or diverted or damaged. 
Or that a bridge has not been maintained in a proper state 
of repair. The term is also found being used in the context 
of the law of the forest to express certain types of inter-
ferences or disturbances of the forest and the beasts of the 
forest. 
And in the urban area which is London the term nocumentum 
is encountered as a description of infractions of the code of 
building laws. 
This diversity in the connotations attached to the word 
nocumentum is linked to the fact that in the twelfth century 
nocumenta were redressed in different courts having different 
jurisdictions and functions. In order to obtain a closer in-
sight into the basic nature of the medieval concept of nui-
sance it is thus helpful and indeed necessary to examine the 
various nuisance remedies afforded by the various courts en-
joying jurisdiction over nocumenta. 
B. THE NUISANCE REMEDIES 
1. Introduction 
The early beginnings of the nuisance concept are to be 
traced in the operations of two types of court: those of the 
king, the royal courts of justice originally established to 
administer the king's personal patrimony and royal interests 
and from which would ultimately develop the common law of 
England, and the courts of feudal magnates, courts of local 
jurisdiction applying local custom and local law. 
12. 
2. Nocumentum in the Royal Courts 
The royal courts of justice exercised both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction and an examination of their proceedings 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries reveals that nocu-
menta were the subject of proceedings in both of these 
jurisdictions. 
2.1. The Courts of Civil Jurisdiction 
2.1.1. The Writ System 
The evolution of the common law of England in the royal 
courts having civil jurisdiction was through the famous forms 
of action as established under the system of writs that was 
the foundation of the common law. 
Writs were written instructions emanating from the Crown 
directed to some executive official instructing him to per-
form certain acts. In time they came, to issue in response 
to some complaint by some suitor to the king. The writ so 
issued in essence sought to supply some redress .to the plain-
tiff. Our first glimpses of the nuisance concept are provided 
by writs in which the local official is instructed to take 
action in respect of the nocumentum complained of and des-
cribed in the writ. 
The early evolution of remedies by way of writ procedures 
(33 ) falls into two periods. Between 1066 arid 1154 writs 
issued ad hoc, usually as instances of royal interference in 
the work of the ordinary courts of local jurisdiction where 
all litigation not affecting the interests of the Crown was 
• (34 ) 
carried on. One such type of interference was a form of 
writ addressed to the sheriff or some feudal lord commanding 
him to take jurisdiction in a certain matter and to do justice 
(35 ) 
therein. > There is some reason to believe that during this 
(33) F W Maitland The Forms of Action at Common Law 16. 
(34) Ibid 
(3 5) Plucknett A Concise History of the Common Law 92. 
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period most of the cases which involved nuisances were 
/ o c \ 
handled by this method under the so-called viscontial writ. 
The second stage of development of the writ system oc-
curs during the reign of Henry II especially in the years 
(37) \ 
1154-1189. During this period a considerable apparatus 
of writs is developed which becomes available as a matter of 
course to litigants, each writ having a distinct form and 
initiating a distinct form of action. In this connection 
Henry II introduced a general principle that no litigation 
concerning freehold land could be instituted except under a 
(38) 
royal writ. This rule brought litigation concerning land 
within the control of the royal machinery for the administra-
tion of justice and, perhaps more important, brought all 
litigation concerning freehold land under the forms of action 
established by the writ apparatus. 
Under the developed system of writs pertaining in the 
reign of Henry II and afterwards interests in freehold land 
were asserted under two main forms of action. First, and 
earliest, was a form of real action designed to'vindicate 
title in the freehold estate. This so-called Writ of Right 
(identified by its operative word 'praecipe') was employed 
not only to protect title to the corporeal thing which was 
the freehold but also (through a variant form quod permittat) 
to vindicate such incorporeal interests as the rights of 
(39 ) 
common and other servitudes appurtenant to the freehold. 
Second, and an innovation of Henry II, was a form of posses-
sory action (designated the Assize of Novel Disseisin) de-
signed to effect the rapid restoration of lost possession 
('seisin') without enquiry into the matter of title. 
This form of action too allowed for the protection of seisin 
(41 
of incorporeal things such as right of common and servitudes. 
(3.6) See below 14.. 
(37) Maitland op cit 17. 
(38) Maitland op cit id. Cf Digby Real Property 67-8, 70-76. 
(3.9) See C H S Fifoot History and Sources 3-4. 
(40) Generally on the Assize see Sutherland The Assize of 
Novel Disseisin passim; Loengard Free Tenements Part I. 
(41) Sutherland op cit 11-12, 23-4; Fifoot op cit 4-5. 
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2.1.2. Viscontial Writ 
The viscontial writ of nuisance took the form of an 
instruction to the sheriff of a county to hear a complaint 
(42 ) 
concerning a nocumentum and to do justice to the parties. 
It has been argued that at one time all civil proceedings in-
volving nocumenta were handled by this procedure and thus 
that all cases of nocumenta were heard by the sheriff sitting 
(43 ) 
in the court of the county. However this may be it is 
clear that by the reign of Henry II the viscontial writ issued 
only in respect of certain nocumenta, namely those involving 
houses (domus) orchards (virgultum) mills (molendium) sheep-
(iii 
folds (ovileque) gates (porta) weirs (gurgites) ovens (furna). 
In this connection we are provided with a valuable in-
sight into the nature of the medieval conception of a nuisance. 
Proceedings under the viscontial writ required a 'count', an 
oral statement by the plaintiff of the nature of his com-
(45) 
plaint. Specimen counts for complaints of nocumenta have 
been preserved and from these we gain an insight into 
the circumstances which led men to' complain of nocumentum 
caused and suffered. 
(42) A thirteenth century specimen of such a writ reads as 
follows: 
'To the sheriff greeting. A has complained to us 
that B unjustly and without judgment has made a 
certain house, wall or fishery in such a vill to 
the nuisance of his freehold in that same vill ... 
And so we command you that you hear that suit 
[quod loquelam illam audias] and afterwards give 
the said A a just deliverance therefrom. Lest we 
hear further complaint for default of justice, etc.1 
E de Haas 'An Early Thirteenth Century Register of Writs' 
(1947) 7 U Toronto LJ 196 (cited Fifoot History 17). 
(43) G J Turner (ed) Brevia Placitata (66 Selden Socy) cxix. 
Cf Loengard Free Tenements 183-201 who traces in detail 
the origin of the viscontial writ of nuisance. 
(44) For the source of this limitation of jurisdiction see 35. 
(45) See Milsom Foundations 28-30; Pollock and Maitland 
History (ii) 604-5. 
(46) See Milsom (ed ) Novae Narrationes (80 Selden Socv). 
15. 
(47 ) 
From these we learn that a mill might be the sub-
ject of a complaint as a nuisance because the defendant 
erected it near the meadow of the complainant John. 
'by reason of which mill he has made a path across 
this meadow to go to and return from this mill where 
there never was a path before.' 
Alternatively the complaint might be that 
'people carrying their grain to be ground at the mill 
aforesaid with their pack-horses depasture the meadow 
... and ... trample down the meadow aforesaid so that 
whereas he used to mow this meadow twice a year, by 
reason of this mill he can mow it only once a year, 
or not at all. 
Alternatively the complaint might be that 
'by the sluices of this mill the water is so held 
back, that by this damming the water inundates a 
great part of the meadow aforesaid so that he cannot 
have his profit from it as he used to do ....' 
A writ charging a house to be a nuisance might in fact 
involve a complaint that the defendant 
'has erected a house ... which so overhangs the house 
of ... John that all the rain which falls on the 
house of the [defendant] ... runs down on the house 
of ... John, so that ... John cannot keep his house 
water-tight or it rots his beams; 
or the complaint might be that 
'whereas one roofing used to last without being 
mended for seven years , now by reason of this 
flooding he must repair it every year'; 
or the complaint might simply be that the house of the defen-
dant was erected so close to that of the plaintiff 




A writ complaining of a weir might involve the 
(47) Novae Narrations C106 (80 Selden Socy 202). 
(48) op cit C108. 
(49) op cit C110. 
16. 
'Whereas the water used to run strongly to his mill 
... by reason of the weir [constructed] ... it 
flows more slowly than it used, so that whereas his 
mill ... used to grind during a day and a night 
forty quarters of wheat, now in a day and a night, 
because of the nuisance of this weir, it can barely 
grind five quarters of wheat'. 
Or the complaint might be that the construction of the weir 
has interfered with the plaintiff's right of free fishery so 
that 
'whereas [the plaintiff] ... used ... to make from it 
one hundred shillings a year, now by the construction, 
of this weir the fish are so hindered from [getting 
there] that he can make ... only ten shillings a year'. 
It is not clear exactly what procedure was followed 
under the viscontial writ in dealing with the matter com-
plained of. The case was dealt with in the county court to 
which the free-men of the county owed suit. The wording of 
the writ could suggest that the sheriff rather than the 
suitors was to act as the judge in the matter. On the 
other hand it might have been the case that the suitors did 
perform their normal function of adjudicating after an in-
(51) ~ • 
quisition or recognition and that the sheriff did no 
more than ensure that they carried out their duty in respect 
(52) 
of the matter referred to him by the king. 
2.1.3. Writ of Right: Quod Permittat 
A free holder evicted from his tenement could obtain a 
writ ordering the party in occupation to restore it to him. 
The seminal writ of right however did not lie where the estate 
from which the plaintiff was evicted was incorporeal in its 
nature. Instead of the ordinary writ of right a plaintiff 
(50) Pluncknett Concise History 92. Fleta II 43 (72 Selden 
Socy 14 8) writing in the thirteenth century seems to 
support this version of the procedure: '... the 
sheriff when jurisdiction is delegated to him by writ 
... he, and not the suitors of the county is ordered to 
cause justice to be done'. (148) 
(51) Bracton / 2 3 3b seems to suggest this. 
(52) See 6 J Turner (ed) Brevia Placitata (66 Selden Socy) 
xliv. 
17. 
who complained that he had been evicted from his common of 
pasture or some servitude he enjoyed over another's land was 
awarded a variant writ of the praecipe type. The writ 
ordered the defendant that he permit (quod permittat) the 
(53 ) 
plaintiff to have his pasture, or right of way. 
The quod permittat writ might itself be varied so that 
where a plaintiff complained that he was deprived of his 
common of pasture or his servitude, as the result of some 
wall or fence or hedge or other obstacle which prevented the 
actual enjoyment of the right, the writ might order that the 
defendant permit the plaintiff to abate the obstruction 
(quod permittat prosternere murum). 
Since, as we will see, wall, hedges and other things 
which interfered with incorporeal rights were designated as 
nuisances, the writ quod permittat in its variant forms 
(514) 
amounted to an important species of nuisance remedy. 
2.1.4. Writ of Nuisance 
Undoubtedly the most significant of the original reme-
dies for the redress of nocumenta was that provided by the 
writ for initiating the process known as the Assize of 
Nuisance. 
(55 ) The Assize of Nuisance only emerged as a separate 
and distinct remedy for nuisance in the middle of the four-
teenth century (and then at a time when it was in the 
process of being supplanted by the remedy by way of the 
(5.3) See the specimen writ given by Glanvil 12.14: 
'The King to the sheriff greeting. I command you 
that without delay you command R that justly, and 
without dealy he permit H to have his easements in 
the wood and pasture of such a vill which he ought 
to have; and that you do not permit the aforesaid 
R ... to do him in this regard molestation or 
injury*. 
(54) See Fifoot History and Sources 4; Baker An Introduction 
to English Legal History 23 6. 
(55) Strictly speaking the Assize is the procedure initiated 
by the writ. It is convenient however to speak of both 
the writ and the procedure under the compendious title 
Assize of Nuisance. 
(56) See below 31-4. 
18. 
(57 ) 
Action on the Case for Nuisance). Its origins however 
go back to the twelfth century and from that time it affor-
ded a particular and special process for the redress of 
nocumenta. 
What in the fourteenth century would be called the 
Assize of Nuisance had its origins in the possessory action 
introduced in the reign of Henry II under the name of the 
Assize of Novel Disseisin. This remedy, in many ways 
analagous to the Canon Law Actio Spolii, was designed to 
achieve rapid and effective redress for free holders unlaw-
fully despoiled of their possession (seisin) of their free 
hold tenement. 
As such it would seem to have no necessary connection 
with nocumenta. However the first book on the common law 
of England - the book called Glanvil - tells us that the 
writ for obtaining restitution of possession under the Assize 
( C 4 \ 
of Nuisance is 'varied in diverse manner' and illustrates 
the point by citing a specimen writ in which the plaintiff 
complains not of a disseisin (dissaisina) but rather of a 
nuisance (nocumentum) 
(57) See below 58. 
(58) For discussions of the Assize of Novel Disseisin see 
the works cited above n 10. 
(59) Cf Maitland The Forms of Action 2 2-3; Sutherland The 
Assize of Novel Disseisin 20-26. 
| » d I — i — I — I I . . M l III m , . — , , „ . „ • , , . _ , . , , - ... ii. , 
(6 0) Tractatus de Legibus et ConsuetudLnibus regni Angliae 
(circa 1187) said to be the work of Ranulf Glanville 
justicar to Henry II. See Pollock and Maitland History 
(i) 162-3; Holdsworth 2 HEL 188-192. 
(61) Bk 13 cap 34. 
(62) op cit cap 35: 
'Rex vicecomiti salutem. Questus est mihi N: quod 
R. iniuste et sine iudicio levavit quoddam fossatum, . 
vel prostravit, in ilia villa ad nocumentum liberi 
tenementi sui in eadem villa post ultimam transfreta-
tionem meam in Normaniam. Et ideo praecipio tibi 
quod si praefatus N. fecerit te securum de clamore 
suo prosequendo, tunc facias duodecim liberos, etc. 
videre fossatum illud et tenementum, et nomina eorum 
imbreviari facias. Et summone per bonos summonitores, 
etc. , ut prius .' 
'The King to the sheriff greeting. N. has complained 
to me that R. unjustly and without a judgment has set 
(continued on next page) 
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It is not clear how this development came about. 
It seems likely however that the idea that men might seek 
redress from .nocumenta via the procedure and process of the 
Assize of Novel Disseisin was contemplated by those who 
drafted the constitutio which introduced the Assize of 
Novel Disseisin. 
But be this as it may, it is clear that from 1166 there 
existed a version of the Assize of Novel Disseisin (which 
could be distinguished as the Assize of Novel Disseisin for 
Nocumenta) which entitled men to complain of wrongs which 
were designated as nocumenta and which were redressed by 
essentially the same process as was employed to redress 
disseisins. 
(62) (continued) 
up, or thrown down, a certain dyke in such a vill 
to the nuisance of his freehold in the same vill 
since my last crossing into Normandy. And so I. 
command you that, if the aforesaid N. shall give 
you security for pursuing his claim, you shall then 
cause twelve free, etc. to view that dyke and free-
hold, and shall cause their names to be put in the 
writ. And summon by good summoners, etc., as above. 
(63) The problem is discussed at length by Loengard Free 
Tenements 173-183. 
(64-) The actual origins of the Assize are obscure. Bracton 
said that it had been 'thought out and invented through 
many wakeful nights' (f 164b) and the evidence is that 
this occurred no later than 1166 , the process being 
created by an enactment (constitutio) which is now lost 
to us. See Pollock and Maitland History (i) 145-6; 
R C van Caenegem Royal Writs in England from the Con-
quest to Glanvil (77 Selden Socy), Sutherland op cit 5-9. 
(65) Loengard op cit 15 0 suggests 'that the offence later 
called nuisance was provided for specifically, although 
not by that name, in the Assize of Novel Disseisin'. 
She does not accept that the variant writ given by 
Glanvil was the result of judicial extension of the 
original offence of disseisin: See at 181-183. 
Cf Sutherland op cit 11 '... the assize was directed 
from the first against nuisances as well as disseisins.1 
He cites cases from 1166, 1167 and 1168 brought under 
the Assize, which are all instances of what would later 
be regarded as nuisances : see at 11-12. 
20. 
In this form the assize was a central feature in the 
development of the concept of nuisance during the late twelfth 
and the thirteenth centuries. The main development occurred 
both in the application of the procedures by which nocumenta 
were redressed and by a subsidiary process which began in 
the thirteenth century and involved the gradual differentia-
tion of dissaiana and nocumenta ultimately leading to the 
recognition, in the mid-fourteenth century, of the Assisa de 
Nocumento as a remedy separate and distinct from the Assize 
J »T i T\ • . • (6.6) 
of Novel Disseisin. 
2.1.5. Other Writs 
Towards the end of the twelfth century a new form of 
writ began to appear. It summoned the defendant to appear 
and show why Costensurus quare') he had done something. 
This form of writ was important since from it developed the 
concept of trespass and with it the whole branch of the com-
( c 7 "\ 
mon law of torts. Originally the quare writs were very 
flexible and seem to have issued in a number of .cases.invol-
t 
ving nocumenta. This practice may have arisen because for 
( fi 8 } 
some reason or another the assize would not lie. They are encountered also in respect of acti ns br ught for nuisances 
•anch: 
(70) 
done to fran isal rights and in relation to actions for 
easements. 
(66) These developments are traced in Chapter "2 below. 
(67) See Plucknett Concise History 3 66. Cf Fifoot History 
and Sources 53-4; Milsom Foundations 211-12, 259. See. 
also Milsom (1958) 74 LQR 195. 
(68) Cf Woodbine 'Origins of the Action of Trespass' (1925) 
34 Yale LJ 344-8. Cf Loengard Free Tenements 313 who 
notes the 'numerous cases found in the plea rolls which 
begin simply the "X has been summoned to show wherefore" 
he did a specified act to the nuisance of Y's free tene-
ment. They are uncategorized quare writs, used for 
nuisance where an assize could not be - or perhaps simply 
was not - brought'. 
(69) The earliest examples of the use of the writ for this 
purpose are from the thirteenth century: 'quare mutavit 
mercatum suum de Sidemue sine licentia domini regis ... 
et levavit illus . .. ad nocumentum vicinorum mepcatorum' 
(12 2 0); 'quare levavit quandium feriam ... ad nocumentum 
bu'rgi sui'" (1228); 'quare levavit quoddam mercatum . . . ad 
nocumentum mercati s'ui' (123 3). See S F C Milsom Novae 
Narrationes (80 Selden Socy) c -
(70) Loengard op cit 423//. 
21. 
2.2- Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction 
More or less contemporaneously with the emergence of 
writs for the redress of nocumenta there sprang up a prac-
tice of pursuing certain nocumenta - mainly those involving 
the diversion obstruction or narrowing of ways - in the 
court of the sheriffs tourn. 
Among the duties of the medieval sheriff was that of 
undertaking a bi-annual progress, or turn ('toun' ) , through 
(71) 
the 'hundreds' of his county. Initially the purpose of 
the turn was to examine the workings of the police system 
(72) (73) 
known as the frankpledge and to hear pleas of the crown. 
When acting in this way the sheriff was the representative of 
the king and the court held during the turn was thus a royal 
court exercising the royal jurisdiction of the crown to pre-
serve and enforce public peace and order. 
The work of the tourn was carried out through a series 
of inquisitions. The men of the villages within each hundred 
were summoned to attend the court. There there was read to 
them a set of inquiries, the 'articles of the view', designed 
to establish whether the frankpledge was operating properly, 
and to elicit accusations against persons guilty of crimes 
(74 ) 
and misdeameanours. These accusations were made by a 
(71) See generally Holdsworth 1 HEL 76-82. 
(72) A police device involving a system of compulsory collec-
tive bail imposed upon groups of men ('tithings') to 
stand surety for the good behaviour of each other. All 
men were required to be enrolled in tithings and the 
original purpose of the tourn was to ensure that the 
system was working properly. See generally Holdsworth 
1 HEL 13-15; Pollock & Maitland History (i) 568-571, 
5 80-1. 
(7 3) Pleas of the crown originally denoted royal business 
concerning the king's estates revenues and the admini-
stration of his justice. This work was assigned to the 
sheriff (or vice-comes). Later these powers were conJ 
siderably reduced. (Cf cap 24 of Magna Carta and the 
commentary thereon by McKechnie Magna Carta at 304-3 21), 
(74) For the workings of the tourn see the authorities cited 
in note 7 2 above. 
22. 
jury comprising men of the district who were required upon 
their knowledge to 'present', to the sheriff such individuals 
who had transgressed against the code of conduct which was 
(75 ) 
the articles of the view. 
Individuals so presented were either remanded for trial 
before the king's justices (in the case of grave offences) 
or were summarily punished by the sheriff (in the case of 
lesser offences) by a fine or some other penalty (excluding 
( 7 R ) 
imprisonment). ^J These proceedings if not criminal in the 
strictest sense, certainly were criminal in their nature and 
fell to be classified as such. 
What is significant about this is that we discover 
among the articles of the view provisions calling for the 
presentment of conduct which we recognise as being substan-
tially identical to conduct which is redressed in the civil 
courts by writs of nuisance. Thus the Statute of Wales (1284) 
. . . . ". (77 ) 
which is a codification of the articles of the view, in-
cludes among the matters requiring presentment 
De cursu aquae diverso 
De via obstructa vel restricta vel arcatata 
De muris, domibus, portis, fossatis et marlebis 
levatis 
et factis juxta iter publicium ad nocumentum ipsius 
itineris et in periculum transeuntium de predicta 
levatibus et faciendibus.(78) 
(75) The jury of presentment was an innovation, of the reign of 
Henry II brought about by the Assize-of Clarendon (1166) 
(for this enactment see Stephenson and Marcham 1 Sources 
of English Constitutional History (1972) 76). See 
Hurnard 'The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of 
Clarendon' (1941) 56 E H R 374. 
(76) The penalty which the sheriff might impose was, in 
essence, a fine. Technically the fine was known as an 
'amerciament' (ie that the person presented was in the 
king's mercy and thus that his movable property was 
forfeit to the Crown; the forfeiture could be avoided by 
the payment of a sum of money termed an 'amerciament' 
(see McKechnie Magna Carta 285-294)). The amount of the 
fine was fixed ('affeered') by the jury of presentment. 
(77) See F J C Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiction in England (1908) 
23 for a discussion of this statute. 
( 7 8 ) C f Britton 1.30.3 (circa 1290). 
Of waters stopped or narrowed or turned from their 
course; 
Of roads stopped, narrowed or turned; 
Of boundaries removed or wrongfully altered; 
(continued on next page) 
23. 
It is difficult to now trace in detail how it came 
about that these nocumenta came to be included in the arti-
(79 ) 
cles of the view. However we do have a clue which en-
ables us to speculate with some confidence how this practice 
grew up. The clue lies in the medieval concept of the 
purp rest lire. 
Purprestures 
Purpresture is a word of French origin denoting an en-
closure. Its earliest usage seems to have been to describe 
encroachments (assarts) upon the royal demsne lands. As 
such they constituted an invasion upon the royal patrimony 
and called for redress by officials of the Crown who either 
(78) (continued) 
Of walls, houses, gates, marl-pits, ditches or 
other nuisances [on autres destourbences] 
raised or made in any common way to the annoyance 
[a la nusance] of the same way and to the danger 
of passengers; ...' 
See too Fleta 2.52 (72 SeldenSocy 176) (also circa 1290). 
'... concerning waters diverted from their 
courses or stopped. Also concerning dykes, 
walls, causeways, ponds and the like which 
are erected, knocked down or set up to the 
nuisance. Also concerning roads and paths 
wrongfully stopped or narrowed. 
(79) Neither Glanvil (circa 1180) nor Bracton (circa 1250) 
make any mention of the articles of the view. On the 
other hand both Britton and Fleta (circa 1290) give 
lengthy accounts of the articuli de visu francipledgii 
(see above note 78). The earliest version of a state-
ment of articuli dates from circa 1269 (see 'Articuli 
Intrandi' in F W Maitland (ed) The Court Baron (4 Selden 
Socy at 71). This seems to date the practice of drawing 
up articles of the view to the reign of Edward I. See 
Hearnshaw op cit 2 3//. 
24. 
caused them to be removed or who allowed them to remain 
4. xr * (80) 
upon payment of a fee. 
(81) 
But the royal domain included also such 'public' 
(82) facilities as the great 'royal' highways, navigable 
(83 ) 
waters and encroachments upon these were also classified 
(80) The twelfth century Dialogus de Saccario explains the 
purpresture thus: 'it happens sometimes through the 
negligence of the sheriff or his officials and also 
through the prolongation of a time of war that those 
dwelling near estates known as crown lands encroach 
upon some portion of the latter and treat it as their 
own property. When therefore the itinerant justices 
acting upon the oath of lawful men, have siezed such 
lands, they are valued separately from the 'farm' of 
the county...; these we call 'purprestures' or en-
croachments. When such lands are siezed, they are 
taken as has been said, from those in possession, and 
thereupon fall to the Treasury. But if the same man 
from whom the purpresture is taken by the doer of the 
deed, then at the same time he shall be punished by a 
heavy fine, unless the king pardon him.' 
In London encroachments upon the streets and highways 
were regarded as purprestures and suppressed or allowed 
to stand on payment of a fine to the king. Cf G A 
' Williams Medieval London 200. The oldest record of 
this dates from 1244: See H M Chew and M Weinbaum (eds) 
The London Eyre of 1244 at IJC and passim. 
(81) Cf above 2.. 
(82) See note 87 below. 
(83) The law on navigable waters at this time is obscure. 
Bracton /8 wrote: 'All rivers and ports are public ... 
The use of ... the river itself, is also public ... 
consequently everyone ... is free to navigate the river'. 
This seems to be more Roman law than English law and 
hardly reflects the state of the law at the time. See 
T E Lauer 'The Common Law Background of the Riparian 
Doctrine' (1963) 28 Missouri LR 60 at 66. The actual 
position seems to be that navigable waters were at the 
time much obstructed by objects and structures ('kyddels', 
weirs, fish-garths) placed for purposes of capturing 
fish. Magna Carta (1215) contained a chapter calling 
for the removal of obstructions from "Thames and Medway, 
and throughout all England' (see McKechnie Magna Carta 
343-6). (Generally on the state of rivers xn medieval 
times see Flower (ed) Public Works in Medieval Law (32 
Selden Socy)(vol 1 ) ; 40 Selden Socy (vol 2). See also 
Leconfield v Lonsdale (1870) LR 5. CP 657 at 644//. The 
'machinery for keeping the rivers navigable seems to have • 
been chiefly developed in the fourteenth century (1 Public 
Works xxviii and see Murphy 'English Water Law Doctrines 
Before 1400' (1957) 1 Am J Legal History 103 at 110) when 
the process of presentment by juries was most actively 
resorted to (Murphy op cit 133-118). 
25. 
( 84 ) 
as purprestures. 
The fact that a purpresture was an interference with 
the regalia clearly brought it within the jurisdiction of 
(85) 
the king's courts. "' And in the case of the purpresture 
upon the king's highways, it seems that the appropriate 
court for dealing with such a purpresture was the court which 
entertained the pleas of the crown. The pleas of the crown 
were the source of what was to become the criminal law of 
( 8 R ) 
England and the reason why purprestures against the high-
ways were assigned to these courts of criminal jurisdiction 
was because, in medieval eyes, they involved a breach of the 
king's peace. The notion of a purpresture as a breach of the 
king's peace flowed not from the quality of the act which 
made up the purpresture but rather from the fact that the 
king's highway was traditionally a place especially under 
( 87 ) 
the 'peace' of the king. 
(840 'A purpresture ... is when anything is unjustly encroached 
upon, as against the king; as in the royal desmesnes, 
or in obstructing public ways, or in turning public 
waters from their right course; or when anyone has 
built an edifice in a city upon the king's street'. 
Glanvil 13.34 
Encroachments in royal forests were also dealt as pur-
prestures but under the special provisions of the forest 
law. See G J Turner (ed) Select Pleas of the Forest 
(13 Selden Socy lxxx). 
(85) Glanvil loc cit: '... generally speaking ... the suit 
belongs to the king's crown'. 
(86) Milsom Foundations 354. 
(87) Stenton English Society in the Early Middle Ages 257: 
'From early times English kings had been interested to 
protect those who used the roads along which royal 
authority ran. Four roads in particular, Watling Street, 
the FQsse Way, the Icknield Way, and Ermine Street were 
in the peace of the king .... This conception of the 
king's peace running on a high road had spread by the 
twelfth century to cover all the land, but highroads 
still retained some special flavour of majesty. Custom 
had laid it down that the highway should be so wide that 
two loaded carts could pass each other ... that 16 knights 
fully armed could ride abreast. Encroachment on the 
king's highway must be reported to his judges ... so 
that the land thus taken could be restored to the road.' 
See also C K Allen The Queen's Peace 14-15. 
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The point to all of this is that however purprestures 
(op \ 
were defined men tended to indentify them with nocumenta. 
Indeed what was a purpresture when perpetrated against the 
king's desmesne land was a nocumentum when perpetrated 
against the lands of a free holder. Further, since the ob-
struction or diversion of a village path, lane or way was 
clearly a nocumentum for which assize or viscontial writ 
might lie there was no difficulty in conceiving the obstruc-
tion or diversion of a royal highway as being nothing other 
.., (89) . 
than a nocumentum. 
In this way, it would seem, the articles of the view, 
no doubt originally intended to deal with purprestures on 
the royal highway, came to speak of nocumenta in the highway 
and thus to draw the civil wrong of nuisance within the ambit 
of the emergent criminal law. 
It is clear however that these instances of nocumenta 
punished by criminal process were not originally seen as a 
form of 'public' nuisance. Nocumenta were punishable where 
they involved an encroachment upon royal interests in the 
highway. Where a nocumentum affected an entire community but 
did-not impinge upon royal interests then the remedy was by 
• 
way of the assize and not by way of any criminal prosecution. 
(88) Thus Glanvil loc cit supra wrote: '... generally 
speaking whenever a nuisance is committed affecting the 
king's lands, or the king's highway, or a city, the 
suit belongs to the King's Crown'. 
(89) Indeed the same act might simultaneously constitute a 
nocumentum and a purpresture. Thus a man who raised 
the level of his mill pond might not only flood his 
neighbour's meadows but might also flood the nearby 
king's highway. The Assize jurors were inclined to re-
port that the defendant's actions had caused a nuisance 
to the freeholder and a purpresture 'on the lord king'. 
See Rolls of the Justices in Eyre ... (1221-1222) 
(59 Selden Socy) 181. 
(90) See Loengard Free Tenements 240-244 who cites cases 
establishing tha£ prosecutions brought for nocumenta -
done to highways would not lie if the highway was not 
the king's highway and that constructions which were not 
only ad nocumentum liberi tenemento but, as one jury ex-
press ed~Tt (Loengard op cit 244-5) 
Similiter ad nocumentum omnium nominium manerii in 
eTadam villa' 
c6uld not be redressed except by the Assize brought by 
one of the affected individuals. 
27. 
3. Nocumentum in Courts of Local Jurisdiction 
A survey .of the judicial origins of nocumenta would be 
incomplete without some mention of its incidence in courts 
exercising a local or private jurisdiction. 
3.1. Court Baron 
(91) 
The Court Baron was the court of the manor. It 
seems likely that at one time this court would have exercised 
a jurisdiction in respect of nocumenta. or, at least, activi-
ties of the sort that would be designated as nocumenta in the 
royal courts. The evidence for this lies in the by-laws 
(93) 
(92) 
made for a village and enforced m the manor court, ' which 
seem to have regulated and redressed the type of wrongs 
which would be considered nocumenta in the royal courts. 
3.2. Borough Courts 
Certain towns and ports attained the special status of 
borough which among other things entitled them to hold their 
(9.4) • • 
own courts. The law applied in these courts was a form 
of local custom distinct and distinguishable from the common 
1 4T 4-V, 1 ^ (95) 
law of the royal courts. 
What is significant about all this for a study of 
nuisance is that borough custom provided another, albeit sub-
sidiary, source for the evolution of a nuisance concept. This 
(91) See above 4. 
(92) See W 0 Ault 'Some Early Village By-Laws* (1930) 45 EHR 20£ 
(93) Thus one such by-law provides that 'No-one shall have 
egress from his close over another man's land; and if 
his egress be over his own land he shall save his neigh-
bour harmless'. Another states 'No-one shall make paths 
to his neighbour's damage by walking or driving [beasts] 
or by carrying grain, be it by day or night or by other 
time'. Ault op cit 220-1. 
(94) On the evolution of boroughs see Pollock & Maitland 
History (i) 543 //; Maitland Domesday Book and Beyond 
213-263 Holdsworth 1 HEL 30-31, 138//; Webb Manor & 
Borough 121ii and passim. 
(95) See Holdsworth 3 HEL 269//; M Bateson (ed) Borough 
Customs (18 Selden Socy (vol 1 ) , 21 Selden Socy 
(vol 2)). 
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is of particular interest since it is in the boroughs and 
thus in borough customs there emerged a version of nuisance 
which reflected the circumstances and needs of urban exis-
tence and thus something rather different to the essentially 
agrarian concepts of nuisance emerging in the Assize and 
County. 
The evidence of the existence of borough custom con-
cerning nocumenta dates from about the turn of the twelfth 
(96) „, . _ T , (97) . . . , _ century. The custom of London is derived from a set 
of regulations for settling disputes between neighbours con-
cerning buildings and boundaries which, according to tradi-
tion, were first enacted in 1189. It is likely that this 
set of regulations preserves older custom but it is not 
possible to be certain about this. 
The London Assize of Nuisance 
It is not necessary for our purposes to explore in any 
detail the customs established in various boroughs for 
dealing with nocumenta. We may thus content ourselves with 
examining the Assize of Nuisance of London, probably the 
archetype of the custom of other places. 
The London custom concerning nocumenta is based on a 
set of building by-laws, said to have been enacted in 1189 
These regulations were aimed at protecting the city from the 
(99) 
(96) See Bateson op cit vol 1 244//. 
(97) See H M Chew and W Kellaway (eds) London Assize of 
Nuisance-. '' 
(98) See below. 
(99) The set of building regulations entitled the Assissa de 
Ed if iciis are said to have been enacted in 118~9 (see 
Chew and Kellaway op cit ix-xi). About these regulations 
grew up a procedure for their enforcement which came to 
be known as an assise of nuisance. The London Assize of 
Nuisance would seem to post-date the creation of the 
Assize of Novel Disseisin (Chew and Kellaway suggest it 
to be at least as old as the late twelfth century (op cit 
xii)) and we may assume that it was modelled after the 
Assize process of the royal courts. The significant 
difference lies of course in the nocumenta redressed by 
this assize process. They were not the nocumenta of the 
Assize of Novel Disseisin for Nuisance but rather deriva-
tions from the Assissa de Edificiis as developed and 
elaborated under the customary law of the city. See 
further below 29-30. 
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scourge of fire and thus in large part were concerned with 
prescribing the materials from which structures should be 
built. The As si's s a de Edificiis however also contained 
provisions to 'calm dissensions' and provide that 'whenever 
disputes arise between neighbours in the city concerning 
fences made or to be made between their lands, or the like, 
such disputes shall be settled according as was then pro-
vided and ordained.'' 
What had been provided and ordained was that a land-
holder with a complaint should bring it to the Husting. There 
a day would be set down (usually within the following week) 
for hearing the complaint. The hearing was by an assize of 
twelve aldermen, elected in Hustings, under the presidency 
of the mayor. On the appointed day this assize went to the 
site of the complaint and viewed it. The plaintiff would 
explain the ground of his complaint and the defendant (pre-
viously summoned) might defend himself. The assize might 
summon a jury of neighbours to advise it on the matters of 
dispute and, from the fourteenth century at least, there 
might be summoned professional 'viewers' - masons and carpen-
ters - to give expert opinion on technical matters. 
The assize pronounced a verdict. If the plaintiff failed 
he was liable to be amerced. If he succeeded the defendant 
was ordered, within forty days, to rectify the nuisance. 
Default might lead to amerciament and the sheriff would be 
(j 
ordered to terminate the nuisance at the defendant's expense. 
The nocumenta which came within the scope of the 
(101) 
Assize involved basically walls, gutters, windows, pits 
and paving. The Assisa de Edificiis contained lengthy and 
often elaborate instructions as to how and where walls, 
gutters, pits and so on were to be constructed, and many dis-
putes involved an interpretation and application of these 
regulations. But men might also complain in more general way 
concerning these matters: that a wall encroached or over-
hung lands, or was ruinous and dangerous, or was being damaged 
(100) See Chew and Kellaway op cit xii-xx. 
(101) op cit xx-xxvi. 
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C H A P T E R T W O 
DEVELOPMENT (1300-1600) 
A. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE ASSIZE OF NUISANCE 
I. The Assize of Nuisance 
1. Introduction 
For a period dating from 1166 until the seventeenth 
century the premier (though by no means only) remedy for the 
redress of nocumenta was the Assize of Nuisance. 
The remedy has a central significance in a study of the 
history of the evolution of the law of nuisance. It was under 
the regime of the assize that a basic structure of the concept 
of nuisance was evolved. The main components of the concept 
were shaped by the writ by which the assize was set in motion, 
while a concurrent development, in the form of a movement by 
which the idea of nocumentum was separated an differentiated 
from that of disseisin.sharpened and illuminated these basic 
structural elements. 
» 
2. The Rise of the Assize of Nuisance 
We have seen that there existed from earliest time a 
form of the writ for an assize of novel disseisin by which 
the plaintiff could allege not that he had been disseised of 
his free tement but rather that he had suffered a nocumentum 
(1) 
to his free tenement. But what the original point of dis-
tinction was, what it was that determined when a -man would seek the nocumentum form of the writ rather than the disseisin form, 
(4) 
(2) (3) 
cannot be established. It seems that 
nocumentum was regarded as being merely a form of disseisin 
though, paradoxically, the justices a: 
treated them as distinct conceDtions. 
nd jurors simultaneously 
(5) 
(1) Above 18-19. 
(2) The whole question is discussed at length by Loengard 
Free Tenements Part III. 
(3) See Loengard op cit 3 3 0-r6. 
(4) 'Disseisin ... meant ejection from a tenement or troubling 
of possession; it meant preventing the use of a common 
right; it meant creating a nuisance ....': Loengard 
op cit 339. 
(5) '... at no time was nuisance referred to simply as a 
disseisin....': Loengard op cit 340. 
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This meant that before the early decades of the thirteenth 
century the jurists did not think in terms of an assize 'of 
nuisance1; rather they thought of the assize of novel 
disseisin whose writs might vary in their terminology to fit 
( 6 ) 
the circumstances of the case. 
The first indications of a more discriminating approach 
and thus of the beginnings of a distinct concept of nuisance 
(7 ) 
are to be found in a case of 1216 where a plaintiff alleged 
that a ditch obstructing a way disseised him of his free 
tenement and was a nuisance to it. The jurors reported that 
the ditch did not work a disseisin but that it was ad nocu-
mentum. 
Although this case suggests no more than that a jury had 
refused to regard a nocumentum as being simply a disseisin 
by another name, it does mark the beginning of a process of 
separation and differentiation of nocumenta and disseisins. 
That this process was fairly well advanced is suggested 
( 8 ) 
by a case in 1235. The plaintiff brought the Assize in 
the nocumentum form complaining of a ditch raised to the in-
jury of her tenement. The jurors reported that the ditch 
'occupied' the tenement of the plaintiff 'in one place about 
a foot and in another about two feet.' The justices dismissed 
the action advising the plaintiff to 'seek her writ of novel 
disseisin if she wishes'. What this means is that the Assize 
(6) Cf Glanvil 13.3 4 who in introducing the writ for nocumenta 
(see above 18 ) wrote that the 'writs of Novel Disseisin 
are varied in diverse manner according to the diversity 
of the tenements on which the disseisins take place'. 
Cf Loengard op cit 349. 
(7) The case is in 4 Curia Regis Rolls 35 8 and is cited and 
discussed by Loengard op cit 351-2. 
(8) The case is cited by Loengard op cit^389 as follows: 
The assize comes to say if Mathew de Legiber unjustly 
etc. raised a certain ditch in Lasseford to the nuis-
ance of the free tenement of Eva who was the wife of 
William le Bretin in the same vill etc. And Mathew 
came and said nothing whereby the assize should stand 
over. The jurors said that the said Mathew had in 
fact raised the said ditch and occupied the land of 
the said Eva in one place about, a foot and in an-
other about two feet. Wherefore they said that he 
raised that ditch to the nuisance of the said Eva. 
For that reason it is considered that Eva take 
nothing by this assize and be in mercy for false 
claim and let her seek by a writ of novel disseisin 
if she wishes. 
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in the nuisance form failed because, as the jurors found, 
the ditch amounted to a disseisin. For this reason the 
justices suggested the plaintiff should seek relief by the 
Assize in its 'disseisin' form. The implication of this 
case is that the justices saw a very clear distinction be-
tween nocumentum and disseisin or, in other words, saw nocu-
mentum as being something else than a species of disseisin. 
These somewhat enigmatic decisions were leading to the 
adoption of a fairly precise point of distinction. In the 
years after 1235 there is evidence of a growing practice of 
distinguishing nocumenta and disseisins by reference to the 
locus of the thing which was the subject of the writ. If it 
was situate upon the land of the plaintiff the writ for dis-
seisin was appropriate; if it was situate on the land of 
the defendant the writ for nocumentum was the proper mode of 
proceeding. 
This test was institutionalized by Bracton in the mid-
thirteenth century when he wrote: 
' . . . if the level of a pond or weir be raised or 
lowered so as to cause an injurious nuisance, it must 
be seen whether this is done wholly on the tenement of 
the complainant.... In this case there will be a 
disseisin of his freehold rather than an assize of 
nuisance. But if it be raised or lowered wholly on 
the defendant's tenement, then there will be an assize 
of nuisance rather than a disseisin of the freehold, 
since the act is done wholly on another's land.'(10) 
(9) The emergence and growth of this practice in the cases 
is traced by Loengard op cit 381-394. Her conclusion 
is that 'by the 1230's there was a recognisable split 
between novel disseisin for free tenement and nuisance 
and that the distinction made between the two assizes 
frequently turned on the ownership of the land on which 
the offensive action took place. If one tore down a 
barrier on one's own land and allowed one's cows to eat 
a neighbour's grain, it was nuisance. If one tore down 
the barrier five feet away on the neighbour's land and 
sent the same cows over to pasture it was novel dis-
seisin'! op cit 395. 
(10) / 234b (see Fifoot History and Sources 21) 
34. 
The 'locus' test of course reflects an emerging concept 
of nuisance; that it is something other than a form of tres-
pass upon another's land. It is rather another'species of 
wrongful act characterized by a user of the defendant's 
(11) . . • 
land. And it marks the emergence and recognition of a 
distinct form of remedy to be known in future as the 'Assize 
of Nuisance' rather than as the 'Assize of Novel Disseisin 
(12) . 
for nuisance'. This happened only gradually. Fifoot 
notes that it 'was with reluctance ... that Nuisance was di-
(13) vorced from the context of Disseisin'. He shows that 
although at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of 
the fourteenth centuries lawyers 'spoke readily enough of 
'Writs of Nuisance'' they were not always consistent in 
applying the test for differentiating the two types of Assize, 
It was only in the mid-fourteenth century that a clear and 
consistent policy of treating Nuisance as something distinct 
(14 ) 
from Disseisin finally prevailed. 
3. The Assize Process 
The assize process as developed in relation to recent 
disseisins was essentially a judicial device for restoring 
a freeholder to possession (seisin) of his free tenement. In 
its nocumentum form it operated to bring about the removal 
or abatement of some thing which caused 'nocumentum' to the 
free tenement. 
(11) Cf Pollock & Maitland History (ii) 53: 'To meet that 
troubling of possession which is caused by nuisances as 
distinguished from trespasses, that is, by things that 
are erected, made, or done, not on the soil possessed 
by the complainant but on neighbouring soil, there has 
all along been an 'assize of nuisance'...' 
(12) Cf Loengard op cit 355 who from an examination of cases 
concludes that by 1290 'there were two different assizes 
with not only two different writs but also two different 
functions, based on two different sets of jurisdictional 
requirements and not interchangeable. If a plaintiff 
was confused and brought the wrong writ, that was his 
hard luck'. 
(13) History and Sources 10 
(14) Fifoot op cit 10-t.ll. 
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3.1. Scope of the Assize of Nuisance 
The Assize (and indeed the other nuisance remedies) lay 
however only in respect of a closed list of specified things. 
In the thirteenth century the things which would be denomin-
ated as nocumenta and for which the nuisance remedies would 
lie were described in mnemoic verses which read as follows: 
Stagno, fossato, sepe, viis, acqual diversa 
Hiis datur assisa. Mercatum, feria Banco 
Domus, virgultum, molendium, ovileque, porta 
Gurgites, et furna, vicomes placilet ilia.^5) 
This verse tells us two things. In the first place it 
defines the full range of objects which came within the 
medieval understanding of the idea of nuisance: mill-ponds, 
banks, hedges, ways (obstructed or narrowed) water courses 
diverted, markets and fairs, houses, orchards, mills, sheep-
folds, gates, watering places, gallows and ovens. Secondly 
it tells us that the Assize of Nuisance lay only in respect 
of mill-ponds (stagno), banks (fossato), hedges (sepes) , 
ways (viis) , water courses (acquae cursu). The other things 
mentioned are dealt with either in the king's court at 
Westminster (in banco) or by the viscontial writ. 
It is difficult to say why the scope of the Assize 
should have been restricted in this way ' and the point is 
not particularly important. It seems to rest on no distinc-
. . (17 ) 
tion of principle; at one time the Assize lay for a wider 
(18) 
range of objects than those mentioned in the verses and 
in the fourteenth century the limitation was effectively 
(15) The verse quoted above dates from circa 1310 (it is cited 
by Sutherland The Assize of Novel Disseisin 217). An-
other version dating from circa 13 84 ( and cited by 
Loengard Free Tenements 2 7 3-4) reads as follows: 
Foss [atum], stagnum, sepesque via, diversus curus 
aquarum 
Poscunt assisam; mercatum, feria Bancum 
Fabrica, furca, porta, domus, virgultum, gurges, 
molendium, murus, ovile 
Et pons, tradantur hec vicecojaitibus. 
See also the R J Whitwell 'Mnemoics on Nuisances' (1911) 
57 LQR 272; Milsom 'Legal Introduction' xcvii; E de 
Haas (ed) Early Register of Writs (87 Selden Socy) 260. 
(16) Cf G J Turner Brevia Placitata (66 Selden Socy) cxix. 
(17) Turner op cit ibid. 
(18) See Loengard op cit 272 if who carefully traces the early 
(continued on next page) 
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(19 ) 
abandoned when plaintiffs were given a right of election 
as to the forum in which they might proceed. The effect of 
this was probably to diminish the number of viscontial writs 
:o br: 
(21) 
for nuisance and for practical purposes to bring redress 
for all nocumenta under the assize procedure. 
This relaxation of the jurisdictional scope of the 
Assize did not however affect the nature of the medieval 
concept (such as it was) of a nuisance. From the point of 
view of the jurist of the thirteenth or fourteenth century 
a nuisance was not a generalized category of wrong : it was 
rather the closed list of specific objects for which the 
(22 ) 
Register of Writs had an appropriate form of writ. 
3.2. Procedure 
The Assize process involved two more or less distinct 
stages. The first involved the obtaining of a writ by the 
plaintiff. The writ for initiating the assize was in the 
questus est nobis form. The writ recited certain basic 
allegations : that the defendant had unlawfully ('injuste 
et sine judicio') erected ('levavit') or cast down ('pros-
travit') a wall or hedge or whatever or obstructed ('obstruxit') 
a way or watercourse to the nuisance of the plaintiff's free 
(18) (continued) 
scope of the Assize. She suggests that the limitation 
was imposed some time during the period 1195-1236, 
probably at the end of the reign of John. 
(19) By 6 Ric II c 3 (1383): 
All writs of nuisances commonly called viscontiel 
shall from henceforth be made at the election of the 
plaintiff, in the nature of the old times used, or 
else in the nature of the Assizes determinable before 
the king's justices ... or before justices of Assize. 
(20) Loengard op cit 14. 
(21) The distinction between viscontial writs of nuisance and 
the assize procedure certainly ceased to have any prac-
tical importance in the later law and is never heard of 
after the sixteenth century. 
(22) Typically a thirteenth century register of writs would 
contain the following sort of rubrics: 'Breve de nova 
disseisina' 'De communa pasture' 'De cursu ague trans-
tornate ' 'De muro levato ' 'De sepe levata' ' De f ossa'to 
levato' 'De stagno exaltato' 'De via obstructa'. 
Cf Loengard op cit 359. 
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tenement in a certain vill. The writ instructed the sheriff 
(to whom it was directed) to summon a jury of recongition to 
view the tenements involved. The writ further directs that 
after viewing the tenements the jury should be produced to 
(23 ) 
report to the justices of assize. At the same time 
justices are commissioned to 'take' the assize and do justice 
• +, + + (24) in the matter. 
The second stage of the process was the actual holding 
of the assize. The jurors, being empannelled, 'view' the 
(25 ) 
tenements and reach a conclusion. On the appointed day 
for holding the assize before the justices the defendant is 
(23) For a sixteenth century version of the writ see 
Fitzherbert Natura Brevium 183 (K): 
The king to the Sheriff, etc. A. hath complained 
unto us, that B. unjustly and without judgment hath 
raised a certain pool in C. in your county, to the 
nuisance of his freehold in L. in the county of H. 
after the first passage, etc. and therefore we com-
mand you, that if the aforesaid A. shall make you 
secure to prosecute his claim, then cause twelve free 
and lawful men of that neighbourhood to view that 
pool, and their names, to be put in the writ, and 
summon them by good summoners, that they be before 
our beloved and faithful R. and F. and those whom we 
have officiated unto them, at a certain day and 
place in the confines of the county aforesaid, etc. 
ready, etc. 
(24) Fitzherbert op cit ibid gives the following as the 
'patent' to the justices: 
The king to his beloved, etc. Know ye, that we have 
constituted you our justices to take the assise which 
B. hath arraigned before you by our writs against N. 
touching a certain pool raised in C. in the county of 
S. to the nuisance of his freehold in L. in the county 
of H. and therefore, etc. that at a certain day, etc. 
in the confines of the counties aforesaid which you 
shall appoint for this purpose, you take that assise, 
doing thereon what to justice belongs; for we have 
commanded our sheriffs in the counties aforesaid, that 
at a certain day and place in the confines of the said 
counties, whereof you shall give them notice, they 
cause the assise to come before you; in witness where-
of we have caused these our letters to be made patent. 
Witness, etc. 
(25) See Bracton f 234. Fleta 4.27 (89 Selden Socy 114) 
describes this part of the process as follows: 
'... in this case the plaintiff is to let the jurors 
view what is harmful: what kind it is, or how much, 
or by what metes, so that a specific matter may be 
brought to trial and so that it may be known whether 
(continued on the next page) 
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afforded the opportunity to take exceptions or raise de-
fences. The jury reports its findings to the justices 
and a judgment is pronounced. If it is for the-plaintiff 
it is in the form of an order to the sheriff to cause the 
(27) 
thing complained of to be abated. 
4. The concept of nuisance under the assize 
It cannot be said that in the thirteenth century there 
existed anything like a formal concept of nuisance. At the 
best there was only a shadowy outline, a set of elementary 
ideas, given some shape and substance by the writ by which 
the assize process was set in motion. We cannot say from 
whence these ideas emenated. They were the creation of some 
clerk who at some unknown time formulated and set down in 
some primordial writ a basic prescription for the redress of 
the complaint of some forgotten petitioner. All we can now 
say is that by the twelfth century there existed a standard 
form of writ containing a standard set of formal elements 
which came to be classified under the rubric ' de' nocumento * . 
The medieval idea of nuisance was that of a closed list 
of every-day objects which were seen to be the instruments 
of a certain type of harm and to the medieval mind it was 
the list of things rather than the harm that identified nui-
sance . 
(25) (continued 
the plaintiff put too much or too little in his 
view or even nothing, and the jurors can certify 
the justices thereof when they are asked, and also 
whether the nuisance is rightful or wrongful, great 
or small, or no nuisance at all, even though hurtful, 
- so that by these means it may be known whether or not 
a plaint is available to the plaintiff. 
(26) Fleta loc cit cap 28: 
'At the coming of the justices many enquiries have to 
be made so that it can be known whether or not a right 
of action is available to the plaintiff ... [W]hen the 
plaintiff has made his declaration, he of whom complaint 
.-'• is made can except against the plaintiff's declaration 
in many ways'. 
(27) On abatement see below 55. 
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Property Rights 
The medieval inclination to describe a nuisance as 
being a wall, house, hedge, weir or whatever concealed the 
fact that the basic objection to such things was that they 
interfered with a property right. This fundamental prin-
ciple was however implicit in the action itself: 
'Even at its most restricted, the assize lay for 
hedges, ditches and mill dams raised or thrown down, 
for water courses turned and for ways obstructed or 
narrowed. Of these, the last almost invariably re-
ferred to an easement, the right of way across an-
other's land. Cases involving hedges and ditches 
usually did, with the easement in question most often 
a right of way to pasture or another facility used in 
common. Only assizes concerned with mill dams and 
diversions of water habitually dealt with the inva-
sion of natural rights flowing from ownership. A 
raised mill dam or a water course turned into a new 
bed could mean a flood in a neighbour's meadow or a 
dearth of water for his mill'.(28) 
It has been suggested that the nocumenta idea evolved 
originally to deal with interferences with incorporeal 
property rights and only later came to redress interferences 
(29 ) 
with corporeal things such as the land itself. Such an 
evolution would be consistent with the gradual separation of 
(28) Loengard Free Tenements 412-3 
(29) Kiralfy (ed) Potters Historical Introduction 420 writes: 
'In Glanvil's time this remedy lay largely for loss 
of profit through the defendant's interference with 
incorporeal rights eg rights of way, water course or 
pasture, appurtenant to the plaintiff's land but 
exercised on other land. By Bracton's time we find 
it also used for interference with the enjoyment of 
the plaintiff's land by making that land unusable or 
uninhabitable'. 
The viscontial writs allowed men to complain of such 
matters of domestic convenience as obstruction of light 
or odours emanating from a latrine. See Milsom 'Legal 
Introduction' to Novae Narrationes (80 Selden Socy) 
xcviii. Similar sorts of complaints were recognised 
under the London Assize of Nuisance (see above 30 ). 
Complaints of this sort came from the late thirteenth 
and the fourteenth centuries. 
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nocumentum from disseisin : since disseisin would 
basically contemplate eviction from land nocumentum might 
have originally developed to deal with 'disseisins' falling 
short of actual eviction or, in other words, disseisin from 
things which had no corporeal existence. Bracton's 'locus' 
(31) 
test seems to tie in with this: a disseisin occurred 
when the thing complained of was situate upon the land of 
the plaintiff (ie actually trespassed upon his land); a 
nocumentum existed when the thing complained of was situate 
upon the land of the defendant (ie did not invade plaintiff's 
terra but rather affected the enjoyment of rights attached 
( 32 ) 
to his land). Later on the 'locus' test was abandoned, 
a development which may coincide with the extension of the 
(33) 
nuisance remedy to cover interferences with land itself. 
Damage 
Another conceptual feature of nuisance which can be 
gleaned from the Assize process is that a nuisance involves 
more than a mere invasion of a right: it is that which 
causes actual physical or economic harm or damage. 
This idea is in a sense self evident; the very nomen-
clature involved implies the principle. But, further, 
(30) Above 31/*; 
(31) Above 33. 
(32) Fifoot History and Sources II. He cites Anon (1359) YB 
Lib Ass 32 Ed 3 pi 2 (see Fifoot op cit 23 for the case) 
as marking the abandonment of the test. The case in-
volved the diversion of a watercourse by the construc-
tion of a ditch. It appeared that the ditch was made 
upon the plaintiff's land and the defendant argued, that 
'the proper remedy is by Assize of Novel Disseisin or 
by Writ of Trespass' but the court found for the plain-
tiff and ordered the nuisance abated. 
(3 3) The abandonment of the locus test imports a recognition 
that the essence of a nuisance is the nature of the harm 
done and not whether the harm is to incorporeal or 
corporeal things. 
(34) Cf Fifoot History and Sources 3: 'The very name -
nocumentum - suggests the damage which he has suffered 
by conduct which nevertheless fell short of an actual 
dispossession1. 
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there is actual evidence for the proposition derived from the 
differentiation of the Assize for Novel Disseisin and the 
Assize for Nuisance. Where the assize is brought for novel 
disseisin it is not necessary that any proof of actual dam-
(35 ) 
age be forthcoming. The invasion of the plaintiff's 
tenement being established reseisin automatically follows. 
But where the assize is brought in the nocumentum form the 
jurors must find that the plaintiff has suffered some actual 
damage before abatement will be ordered. In short, 
Novel Disseisin lies for vindicating a right (seisin); 
Nocumentum lies for damage caused and suffered. The damage 
required was physical harm to corporeal property or loss or 
inconvenience arising from interference with an incorporeal 
thin*.(37) 
(35) Loengard op cit 37 8. 
(36) Loengard op cit 213-6. Cf Britton 2.30.2: '... it be-
hoves every plaintiff in this case to show what damage 
is occasioned to him by the nuisance'. 
(3 7) The counts in viscontial actions illuminate the point: 
The man who sued because his neighbour's house overhung 
his own complained that his light was diminished or that 
rain water spilled from the roof of his neighbour's house 
onto his own roof so that he 'cannot keep his house water-
tight' or 'it rots his beams' or 'whereas one roofing 
used to last without being mended for seven years-, now 
by reason of this flooding he must repair it every year'. 
The man who complained of a way blocked or narrowed said 
that as a result 'he must now go two leagues around1. 
The man who complained of a market established said that 
because it attracted away his custom he 'loses the profit 
of his market of T aforesaid'. The man who complains of 
a weir unlawfully erected says that it has caused the 
water reaching his mill to flow more slowly 'so that 
whereas his mill ... used to grind during a day ... 
forty quarters of wheat, now ... it can barely grind f.ive 
quarters of wheat. See above 15-16. Cf Milsom 'Legal 
Introducton' xcviii. See too Loengard op cit 216. 
Counting did not, it seems take place in actions under 
the assize. The reason was technical. Counting was not 
necessary where a plaintiff complained of a disseisin 
(see Loengard op cit 37 8) and this rule seems to have 
been carried over to the Assize of Nuisance. On the 
other hand the damage element in actions for nuisance 
must have made necessary some explanation of the plain-
tiff's cause of action (as the viscontial courts show) 
and it here must have been some sort of counting or 
pleading under the assize. 
42. 
Unlawfulness 
In one respect the medieval idea of nuisance showed a 
remarkable conceptual development. In order to be actionable 
the nuisance, or at least the damage caused by it, had to be 
of a type selected by the law for condemnation. In short 
(38) 
the damage had to be unlawful. 
This requirement was postulated by the writ when it 
alleged that the defendant had acted 'injuste and sine judi-
(39) 
cio'. The presence of this allegation, of course, en-
abled a defendant to except to the assize on the ground that 
he had not acted injuste. 
In the Assize of Novel Disseisin the phrase 'injuste et 
sine judicio' served to indicate that the assize lay for 
disseisins which had taken place unjustly and without process 
(41) of law. 'Unjustly' here meant 'without right'. In the 
context of the Assize of Nuisance it came to infer inter-
ference with corporeal or incorporeal things that were un-
lawful. In a broad sense it distinguished the ways a man 
might use or exploit his land (by erecting walls, ponds, 
hedges or whatever) without becoming liable to an action 
(42) 
from cases in which he might not do such things. 
How it came about that jurors and justices construed 
'injuste' in this sense cannot be said for certain. It is 
(38) Cf Pollock & Maitland History (ii) 534: 'The nuisance 
(nocumentum) that is to be actionable must do both 
'damage' and 'injury' .... We see here an incipient 
attempt to analyze the actionable wrong; few similar 
attempts will be made for many years to come'. In a 
footnote (loc cit n 2) they add that nuisance is '[o]ne 
of the few words descriptive of wrong that obtains a 
specific sense in the age which we are dealing....1 
(39) The 'sine judicio' part of the formula was meaningless 
in relation to nocumenta: there was never a judicial 
direction that a person should make a nuisance. Jurors 
and justices disregarded the words. 
See Loengard Free Tenements 210. 
(40) Cf Britton 2.32.5: 
'With regard to the word 'wrongfully' contained in the 
writ, care must be taken to see whether the nuisance 
be wrongful or not; for if it be not wrongful, an 
exception thereby accrues to the respondent.' 
(41) Cf Pollock & Maitland History (ii) 52. Cf Van Caengem 
Royal Writs (77 Selden Socy) 26Iff; Sutherland The 
Assize of Novel Disseisin passim. 
(42) Cf Kiralfy Potter's Historical Introduction 420. 
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(43 ) 
most likely that jurors faced with the reality of having 
to order the abatement of some useful or economically sig-. 
(44) nificant thing simply because it caused damage to another, 
refused to say that the thing was ad nocumentum. Such a 
finding in the fact of the fact that actual damage was being 
suffered would suggest a distinction between damnum and 
injuria. 
This distinction was institutionalised by Bracton who 
(45) 
discoursed on damnum and injuria and applied the distinc-
tion specifically to the case of nuisance in the following 
(46) 
terms: 
'And it is to be known that of nuisances one is 
tortious and hurtful, and another hurtful but not 
tortious ; hence when a complaint is made concerning 
a nuisance, it ought to be enquired to what hurt 
does anything lead, and it is to be seen whether it 
is hurtful and tortious, and then it is to be removed. 
But if it be not tortious, although hurtful, then it 
must be supported . ...' ̂ 7 ) 
(43) Loengard op cit 267 notes that in nuisance '[m]ore than 
in any other assizes, a jury's prejudices and emotions 
influenced the results'. She cites cases which show 
that juries reached decisions simply because they be-
lieved a man ought to have a right of way, or ought to 
be entitled to prostrate a wall on his own land even 
though damage accrued to his neighbour or that a man 
ought not to be allowed to enclose common lands. 
Leongard op cit 267-271. 
(44) It is perhaps significant that Bracton in formulating 
his distinction between damnum and injuria (see below) 
chose to illustrate damnum sine injuria by the example 
of the establishment~of a mill (/ 220): 
'as if any one erects a mill on his own land, and 
diverts from his neighbour his own custom and that 
of the neighbours, he thereby does his neighbour 
harm but not injury, since he is not forbidden either 
by law or by covenant to have or erect a mill....1 
(45) See //,24b, 45b, 92b, 221. 
(46) / 231b (see Fifoot History and Sources 18) Cf Britton 
2.30.2: ~~ '" ""' : 7 
'Of nuisances, however, some are both tortious and 
hurtful, other hurtful yet not tortious; therefore 
it behoves every plaintiff on this case to show what 
damage is occasioned to him by the nuisance. And if 
the nuisance be found to be both hurtful and tortious, 
then matters are to be entirely restored to their 
former condition. If not tortious, it must be toler-
ated however hurtful it may be'. 
See also Fleta 4. 26 (89 Selden Socy 110). 
(47) See Loengard Free Tenements 217-8 who cites cases from 
1202 which indicate an application of the principle by 
the jurors and justices. 
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Bracton even attempted to explain when it was that a 
user of land might be both 'tortious and hurtful' and hence 
a nuisance and when not. Land, he noted, could be sub-
ject to various 'servitudes' which restrained the way in 
which the owner might use his land. Such a servitude, he 
said, might be imposed by grant or prescription or 'by law' 
for instance that no one should do on his own land . 
anything by which damage or harm should result to 
his neighbour.... [I]f he be not forbidden by law 
to do the act,, although he does harm and causes 
damage, yet the act will not be wrongful, for it is 
lawful for anyone to do upon his own land anything 
that will not cause wrongful damage to his neighbour, 
as if any one erects a mill on his own land and 
diverts from his neighbour his own custom and that 
of his neighbours, he thereby does his neighbour harm 
but not injury, since he is not forbidden either by 
law or covenant to have or erect a mill.' 
So too, he goes on, 
there are servitudes which are imposed by law on 
neighbouring tenements, as for instance that a man 
should not raise the level of the water in his pool 
so high as to drown the land of his neighbour.'50) 
Bracton thus seeks to explain a landowner's liability 
to be sued in nuisance for damage caused to a neighbour on 
the basis that the law imposes upon him a servitude not to 
. . . . (51) 
injure his neighbour. The point is neat but superficial. 
(see Digby Real Property 190) (48) 
(49) 
(50) 
In folio 221b  
Ibid. 
Cf f 23 2 (Fifoot op cit 19): 
'... if a servitude is imposed upon a man's land by 
the law ... whereby he is forbidden to do on his own 
ground what may harm his neighbour, as if he should 
raise the level of a pond on his own land or make a 
new pond whereby his neighbour is harmed, as for 
example if his neighbour's land is thus flooded, this 
will be.to the injurious nuisance of his neighbour's 
freehold....' 
(51) In effect Bracton has included under the head of 'servi-
tude ' what later generations of lawyers would call 
'natural rights of property'. To the modern mind this 
is misleading since natural rights and servitutal rights 
are distinct concepts. It was even misleading for 
Bracton's time since the distinction was then already 
appreciated: natural rights were things 'of common 
right' such as rights to the common wastes, incidents 
of a free tenement arising by operation of law rather 
than grant or prescription (see above 9 n 31. Cf Simpson 
(continued on next page) 
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It does not explain when the law imposes such a servitude 
(52 ) 
and when not, and nor does Bracton attempt to do so. 
Developing the Concept: Nuisances to Markets and Fairs 
The medieval approach to the principle that an inter-
(53 ) 
ference with a franchise right constituted a nuisance 
deserves special attention here since in it we find by far 
the most sophisticated formulation and application of the 
basic principles discussed above. 
(51) (continued) 
Land Law 101). But since the assize lay in respect of 
incorporeal rights generally (above 3 9 ) it would seem 
natural enough not to make a distinction between 
natural rights and easements. 
(52) Indeed no one did so until the nineteenth century when 
the distinction between easements and 'natural' rights 
was made more explicit. See below 230 n 5. 
(53) Interferences with franchise rights were redressed as 
nocumenta from early in the thirteenth century. 
Milsom (op cit xcvii) has noted an action brought 'de 
furcis [gallows] injuste levatis' dating from 1200; 
there is a case of a market established 'ad nocumentum' 
from 120 2 (cited by Fifoot History and Sources 15) and 
a case for a ferry established 'ad nocumentum passagii' 
from 1220 (see Loengard Free Tenements 319 n 124). 
(54) It is not entirely clear whether nuisances to franchise 
rights were the subject of assize proceedings. The 
mnemoic cited above (35 ) indicates that nuisance 
actions in relation to markets were heard 'in banco', 
that is before the King's Bench at Westminster. The 
reason for assigning these cases to that court probably 
was their 'royal' character (Milsom 'Legal Introduction* 
to Novae, Narrationes (80 Selden Socy) xcix). However 
it would seem that they were there dealt with by a 
process which Milsom (op cit ci) describes as being 
'in the nature of an assize'. Bracton ;f235a-b and 
Britton 2.3 2.7,8 discuss nocumenta to markets in the 
context of the Assize as does Fitzherbert N B 184A 
(and see Hale's note (b)). 
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Technically a franchise was a portion of royal power in 
(55) 
the hands of a subject. The franchises of interest to 
us are those involving the grant of some fiscal right of the 
crown such as the right of having a gallows, a 
(58) • . . _ . (5 9) _ .... . ferry or a market or fair. These privileges of 
course were valuable assets in that they entitled the holder 
to the fees, tolls, rents or other imposts payable in re-
spect of the facility. These revenues were however diminished 
where another competing facility was established sufficiently 
nearby to attract away custom or trade. 
The disturbance of the franchise of holding a market 
(wherein may be included fairs) was a matter which very early 
generated a relatively sophisticated body of legal rules. 
(60) „, . (61) , _ ... (62) ,, ,. ,, . 
Bracton, Fleta and Britton all discuss the sub-
ject as involving a form of nocumentum and in terms which 
are largely conceptual. Market franchises were usually con-
ferred under charter or grant, the award including the quali-
( 6 3 ) 
fication ita ut non sit ad nocumentum vicinorum mercatorum. 
(55) Pollock & Maitland History (i) 571. 
(56) Cf Pollock & Maitland op cit 575. 
(5 7) Furca and fossa (gallows and pit) was a privilege granted 
by the Crown, signifying the jurisdiction of punishing 
felons; men by hanging, women by drowning: Jacob's 
Law Dictionary s v 'furca'. See Pollock & Maitland 
History (i) 577, 582. Nuisance writs for gallows were 
fairly common. Milsom (op cit xcvii-xcviii) mentions 
that gallows 'belong with markets and fairs as franchise 
rights; and many early actions concerning them were in-
deed heard in royal courts and are found in the plea 
rolls....' Loengard Free Tenements 293 n 64 notes a case 
of an Assize of Nuisance brought for a gallows. 
(58) The privilege of having a boat for passage upon a river 
to carry men and horses for a reasonable toll. Jacob's 
Law Dictionary s v Ferry. 
(59) Markets and fairs were the main centres of medieval com-
mercial activity and the privilege of being allowed to 
establish or hold these was undoubtedly the most valuable 
franchise a private citizen could obtain. See Lipson 
Economic History of England (1) 211. 
(60) f 235b 
(61) 4.28 (89 Selden Socy 117-8). 
(62) 2.32.8. 
(63) Cf 2 Co Inst 40 6; 2 Wm Saunders 174 n (2). The grant 
was. Usually preceded by an inquisition under a writ ad 
quod damnum to determine whether the grant would cause 
harm to any existing market (see Fitzherberf Natura 
(continued on next page) 
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A complaint that a market was ad nocumentum an existing 
market, we learn from Bracton, ° fell to be decided by the 
application of two rules of law, namely, whether the rival 
market was held on the same day and, secondly, whether it 
( R R ) 
lay within a prescribed distance of the existing market. 
A market satisfying these provisions was ipso facto a nui-
sance; if it fell without them then, even though causing 
. .. . . . . . (66) 
harm, it was no nuisance being damnum sine injuria. 
What is interesting and significant about these rules is 
that they make the question whether the rival market is a 
nuisance or not depend upon a priori rule of law rather than 
(63) (continued) 
Brevium 225). The holding of the inquisition did not 
debar the Crown from subsequently repealing the grant 
nor did it prevent an action on the ground that the 
new market was ad nocumentum. 
(64) / 235b. 
(65) The clearest exposition of the rules is that of Britton 
(2.32.8): 
'In order to justify the removal of a market by this 
assise as a nuisance to another adjoining market, 
the plaintiff must assign the nuisance thus: that 
whereas he hath his market on a certain day of the 
week in such a town, he against whom the plaint is 
made has caused another market to be proclaimed and 
set up on the same day in the same town or in another 
town within six miles and a half and the third part 
of a mile from his market. For if the plaintiff say 
that he has set up a market on another day, or if he 
say that the markets do not adjoin by seven miles, 
he shall take nothing by his plaint'. 
For an interpretation of the exact distance involved in 
the rule see J G Pearse 'Some Early Cases on Disturbance 
of Market1 (1916) 32 LQR 199 at 204-5. 
(66) Cf Bracton f 235b: 
When therefore a market has been obtained within 
such a limit, it will have to be levelled, since 
it is a hurtful and tortious nuisance, because it 
is so near. But if it be beyond that limit, although 
it may be hurtful, it will not be tortious, because 
it is remote and not neighbouring. 
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upon the view and decision of an assize jury. In other 
words the rival market is a nuisance by definition of law: 
it invades an established proprietary right and'therefore 
is actionable whether or not it in fact causes damage. 
The corollary to this is a principle which was to be central 
to nuisance law: a land owner could prevent another from 
using his land in a particular way (in casu by setting up a 
market) by invoking the precept sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
, ,ae (69) * " " ~™~ " ~~ 
laedas. 
It is in connection with market nuisances that we en-
counter also for the first time a principle that was to at-
tain some significance in later nuisance law. Bracton ob-
serves that where the setting up of one market is to the 
nuisance of another, it must be seen which was set up first. 
That one, though, although causing a nuisance would not be 
injurious since it was established first ('ideo licet ad 
nocumenta, non tamen injuriosum quia primum'). This is the 
doctrine of 'prior occupation' in embryo which, as we will 
see, often served to render not unlawful what was otherwise 
a nuisance. 
(67) See Clinton's case (1339) YB 12 & 13 Ed 3 (Rolls Series) 
208. There the rival market was set up on the same day 
and within two miles. The defendant demanded a 'view' 
in order to establish whether his market was a nuisance, 
but the court denied the application, requiring him to 
plead. Pearse points out that the view was refused 
'because there could be no issue of fact as to whether 
a market so set up [ie upon the same day and within six 
.miles] was or was not a nuisance' (J G Pearse 'Some 
Early Cases on Disturbance of Market* (1916) 3 2 LQR 199 
at 201). See also Weston's case (1409) YB 11 Hen 4 / 5 
pi 13 where a rival market was set up on the same day 
as the existing market. The defendant could only plead 
that the plaintiff had no market on that day; there 
was no scope for an argument that his market did not in 
fact cause damage. The fact that it was held on the 
same day made it a nuisance per se and thus actionable. 
See Pearse op cit 201. 
(68) Cf Kiralfy Potter's Historical Introduction 420 (text to 
n 88); Pearse op cit 200. 
(69) Cf Pearse op cit 202. 
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5. The emerging principles of law. 
In addition to giving shape to the underlying concept 
of nuisance the assize process developed certain substantive 
rules governing its availability and application. Some of . 
these rules are worth noting since they shaped and influenced 
the later development of the common law of nuisan<^° 
(1) Misfeasance! 
The Assize, it seems, lay only for acts of misfeasance 
and was not available in respect of harm arising from non-
feasance. 
The point is somewhat controversial. The language of 
the writ seems to have contemplated only acts of misfeasance: 
it always alleged that the defendant has erected ('levavit' ) 
or cast down ('prostravit') some thing or that the thing had 
obstructed Cobstruxit') or diverted ('divertit') a way or 
watercourse, language which contemplated positive acts of 
commission rather than negative acts of omission'. 
This is not to say that the medieval law did not con-
template the possibility of a nuisance arising from acts of 
omission. Resiants of a community were very often placed 
under a duty to effect repairs, particularly to such public 
facilities as bridges and roads. It is probable also 
that this obligation extended to the repair and cleansing of 
(71) . 
water courses. ' Clearly the failure to perform such a 
duty in respect of some way, or bridge or water course could 
cause as much harm as the obstruction or diversion of these 
facilities. 
It is clear that the failure to perform duties of repair 
could lead to presentment in the sheriff's tourn under the 
(72) 
jurisdiction that court had for redress of nocumenta. It 
(70) Above 5. 
(71) Cf C T Flower Introduction to the Curia Regis Rolls 
(62 Selden Socy (1943)) 327-8. 
(7 2) See below 166. 
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is likely also that the manorial courts of civil jurisdic-
tion enforce the duty where it rested upon the members of 
(73) 
the manor community. But it seems unlikely' that a 
failure to repair could be the subject of a complaint under 
the Assize of Nuisance. 
It is true that during the thirteenth century the 
Register of Writs began to include writs relating to the 
omissions to effect repairs under rubrics such as 'De repara-
tione pontium vel stagnorum dirutorum ad nocumentum liberi 
(714) (75) 
tenement!, De Wallis vel Fossatis Reperenda, De Domo 
Ruinosa. " However these were writs of a viscontial type 
and were not framed in the Questus est nobis form of the 
(77) 
Assize writ. The conclusion thus seems to be that the 
Assize of Nuisance did not lie in respect of acts of mis-
(78) 
feasance. "'' On the other hand there is a passage in 
Bracton which points to the opposite point of view, but it 
(73) See eg Maitland (ed) The Court Baron (4 Selden Socy 
(1890)) 122-135. • 
(74) For this writ see Loengard Free Tenements 260 n 114. 
The writ reads as follows: 
Order A that he justly etc cause repairs to be 
made ... to a bridge or pool in such a vill which 
is destroyed to the nuisance of the free tenement 
of 0 in the same vill or another and which he 
ought and is accustomed to make. 
(75) For this writ see Loengard op cit 260 n 115. 
(7 6) For this writ see Loengard op cit 264; Kiralfy Action 
on the Case 64. The writ reads as follows (Loengard 
op cit 265-5): 
De domo ruinosa. Praecipimus tibi quod justices A 
quod iiiste etc reparari faciat quandam domum suam 
in P que muste [minatur] ruinam ad nocumentum liberi 
tenementi D in eadam villa sicut rationabiliter 
monstrare poterit quod lam reparari debeat ....' 
(77) Loengard op cit 2 61-26 5. 
(78) See Holdsworth 7 HEL 3 34; Kiralfy op cit 56; 
Loengard op cit ibid. 
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is difficult to say how accurate a reflection it is of the 
law of the time. 
(ii) Liability of successors in title 
The writ charged that the defendant had levied the wall 
or prostrated the hedge or obstructed the way. But what if 
the defendant could show that it was not he who had actually 
done these things? The rule was clear: the Assize would 
not lie. And this applied even where the defendant was 
the heir or successor in title to him who had erected, pros-
(81) 
trated or obstructed. (In this sort of case the plain-
tiff's remedy lay in the writ quod permittat brought against 
the defendant in occupation ordering him to permit the plain-
(82 ) 
tiff to prostrate that erected ad nocumentum ). However 
(79) In f 2 3 2b the following appears: 
And as a person may cause a tortious nuisance in 
doing a thing, so he may in not doing it, in his own 
[land] or that of another, as if he is obliged-by 
constitutio to obstruct and close, to clean and re-
pair, and he does not do it, when he is obliged to 
do it.' 
(The word constitutio is ambiguous: it may mean law or 
custom or even agreement: see Fifoot History and Sources 
20 n 62). Loengard (op cit 259 if) suggests that 
Bracton in this passage was expressing what he thought 
the law ought to be and not what it in fact was. 
Britton (2.30.7) follows Bracton: 
... a person may commit a disseisin by negligence 
without doing anything; as where one is bound to 
fence or repair or cleanse or the like, and lets the 
matter be without doing anything, which omission is 
prejudicial to the free tenement of his neighbour; 
and this neglect is punishable by the Assize. 
(80) Britton 2.32.1.: 
1... he may say that he did not commit any nuisance 
or raise a wall, or heighten a pond, or throw down 
the ditch, but that another person who is not named 
in the writ did it; and if this is verified or not." 
denied, the writ falls'. 
(81) Bracton / 23 4: 
'... the assize shall not proceed ... because heirs 
and successors are not liable for an offence of 
others....' 
(82) Bracton hints at this remedy in vague terms: 
'... they are liable to make restitution of the state 
of things, that a thing be replaced in its former 
(continued on next page) 
52. 
after 1285 some relief from the rule was afforded by the 
(83) 
provisions of chapter 24 of the Statute of Westminster I.I 
which held that the assize might lie against the occupier 
and the author of the nuisance provided the latter was 
..,. ,. (85) still alive. 
(iii) Availability: Plaintiff as successor in title 
Related to the rule just mentioned was the converse 
proposition that a plaintiff could not sue on the Assize if 
the hedge or wall or whatever which was a nuisance to his 
tenement had been erected or cast down before he had obtained 
(82) (continued) 
state ... not because they have done the tort, but 
because they hold the thing which is a nuisance. 
Cf Milsom Legal Introduction ciii and see Fifoot History 
and Sources 10 n 33 for a specimen of the writ. 
(83) 13 Ed 1 (12 85). For this enactment see Fifoot History 
and Sources 7 8. 
(84) The relevant provisions are as follows: 
In cases in which a writ is granted in the Chancery 
concerning an act done by some person, the complain-
ants shall not henceforth depart from the King's Court 
without remedy by reason of the fact that the tenement 
has been transferred from one person to another and 
no writ to meet that special case is to be found in 
the register of the Chancery. Thus, a writ is granted 
against him who builds a house or a wall or sets up a 
market; but if that house or wall or the like is 
transferred to another person the writ is denied. 
Henceforth, however, when a writ is granted in one 
case and in like case a corresponding remedy is needed 
[there shall be a writ]. Thus there is already this 
writ: 
A. has complained to us that B. unjustly etc., 
built a house or wall or set up a market, etc., 
to the nuisance, etc. 
Now if the things So built or set up shall be trans-
ferred to another person, there shall henceforth be 
this writ: 
A. has complained to us that B. and C. have built 
etc. 
(85) The death of the defendant in an assize action ipso facto 
terminated the assize (Pollock & Maitland History (ii) 
54-5). Thus if the author of the nuisance was deceased 
the plaintiff could not bring the Assize even under the 
Statute of Westminster II but must rely upon the quod 
permittat;Britton 2.32.10; Milsom op cit ciii. Cf 
G D G Hall 'The Early History of Sur Disseisin' (1967-8) 
42 Tulane LR 5 84. 
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seisin of the tenement. The rule applicable was stated by 
Bracton as follows: 
'And ... (as it seems) if at the time of the nuisance 
being worked the complainant had not a tenement to 
which the nuisance could be done, and accordingly be-
cause no tort worked against him, and concerning a 
tort done to another no one ought to acquire anything 
for himself, nor can he have an action or a complaint.'86) 
This rule seems to have been not affected by the provi-
(87) 
sions of the Statute of Westminster II. Thus in 1348 
(88) 
there is a dictum that a plaintiff 
'could not have the Assize because, at the time that 
the way was granted, he had not the freehold to which 
the way belonged, and the later purchase of the free-
hold could not sustain the action'. 
The effect of this rule is that a man who comes to an already 
established nuisance has no cause of action, a proposition 
which prevailed not only into the seventeenth century 
but indeed continued to be asserted well into the nineteenth 
(90) century. 
(iv) Free Tenement 
The Assize of Nuisance lay only in respect of the pro-
(91) 
prietary interests comprehended by the term 'free tenement'. 
This rule, derived from the Assize's primordial connection 
(86) f 234. Cf Britton 2.32.1: 
or he may say that the plaintiff had not the tenement 
to which the nuisance was done, at the time when it 
was first done, but another then held it, and more 
ought to complain of a wrong done to any except him-
self.' 
(87) Above 5 2 n 83. 
(88) Cf Sharshulle J in Smeteborn v Holt (1348) YB Hil. 21 
Ed III f 2 pi 5. The case is given by Fifoot History 
and Sources 2 2-3. 
(89) Below 100. 
(90) Below 3 45. The plaintiff's remedy lay in writ Quod 
Permittat; Milsom 'Legal Introduction' ciii. Cf 
above 51. 
(91) See Bracton / 234 (cited Fifoot History and Sources 20) 
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with the Assize of Novel Disseisin, substantially limited 
the value of the Assize as a nuisance remedy. 
The rule meant in the first place that the Assize was 
(92 ) 
not available to one holding land rights in villeinage. 
Nor was it available to one holding a tenement as a mortga-
(93 ) (94 ) 
gee or by term of years, since these forms of tenure 
did not constitute free tenement. 
Insofar as a plaintiff was a free holder the rule in-
volved a number of problems as to what exactly was included 
in the concept of free tenement. It seems that, for one 
thing, the Assize would only lie where the free holder held 
the land in demesne. Thus one who received rent for a tene-
(95 ) 
ment held by a tenant could not obtain the Assize. 
Further there was some doubt as to which incorporeal inci-
dents of a tenement fell within the protection of the Assize. 
For one thing it was not always clear whether rights of 
common fell within the concept of free tenement (and thus 
enjoyed the protection of the Assize) or not. Bracton said 
that where a man had a right of pasture in the common' waste 
and his way there was obstructed the Assize of Nuisance would 
lie if the obstruction occurred outside the waste. But if 
it occurred on or in the waste the plaintiff had his remedy 
by way of an Assize of Novel Disseisin for common. * 3 This 
would seem to suggest that rights of common could be included 
within the concept of free tenement. 
(92) See Loengard Free Tenements 56-60. 223. 
(93) Loengard op cit 60. 
(94) Loengard op cit ibid. 
(95) Loengard op cit 51. 
(96) / 23 2b. The Assize for Common of Pasture seems to have 
been a supplementary species of assize of novel dissei-
sin: see Pollock & Maitland History (i) 622. The re-
lationship between the Assize of Nuisance and the Assize 
of Novel Disseisin for Common of Pasture is discussed 
by Loengard Free Tenements 4 25if who sees the Assize 
for Common of Pasture as a sort of 'bridge action' be-
tween novel disseisin and nuisance. 
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The praedial servitudes (easements) which men might 
(98) 
(97) 
obtain too enjoyed the protection of the Assize. In-
deed Bracton regarded all incorporeal rights as servitudes 
(99) 
and held the Assize available for their protection. 
6. Redress provided by the Assize 
The successful plaintiff under an Assize of Nuisance was 
awarded redress in the form of an order for the abatement of 
that which had been adjudged to be the cause of the nuisance 
and in the form of an award of damages. 
6.1. Abatement 
The primary purpose of the Assize process was to effect 
an abatement of the instrumentality of the nocumentum. In-
deed it seems fairly clear that abatement was the primordial 
method for dealing with nocumenta. This is shown by the 
fact that the medieval law of nuisance admitted self-help as 




Bracton in his discussion of nocumentum observes 
'But if the owner of the land does something at the 
entrance whereby [a servitude holder] cannot enter 
at all or only less conveniently, as where the owner 
makes a wall, a ditch or a hedge, he commits an in-
jurious nuisance. And what has thus been done, while 
(97) For a discussion of early concepts of easements and the 
extent to which the Assize could lie for their protec-
tion see Loengard Free Tenements 412//. 
(98) See / 2 20, quoted, translated and commented upon in 
Digby Real Property 181//. 
(99) See / 23 1b: 'Nuisances are infinite ... and either 
they wholly impair servitudes or at least so impede 
them that they are less useful. 
(100) Self-help 'is the oldest kind of remedy, giving way only 
by degrees to litigation'. F H Lawson The Remedies of 
English Law 45. Cf C A Branston 'The Forcible Recaption 
of Chattels' (1912) 48 LpvR 262. 
(101) / 2 31b. 
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the injury Is still recent and flagrant, can be re-
moved and destroyed even without writ; but after a 
time not without a writ'. 
Later he remarks that constructions which are to the injurious 
nuisance of another can 
'by acting at once while the wrongdoing is still . 
flagrant,(102) be demolished or repaired, if the 
complainant is able to do so. If not recourse must 
be had [to a writ]*.(103) 
Self-help was certainly a standard feature of medieval nui-
sance law being commonly encountered as a defence to an 
action under the Assize, usually where the complaint was of 
a wall or whatever prostrated. The defendant excused his 
act by pleading that it had been done as an act of self-help. 
(ii) Judicial Abatement 
The outcome of the Assize process is described by 
n ..^ (106) ., , • Britton in these words: 
(102) Under the Assize of Novel Disseisin a man disseised was 
allowed four days within which to effect self-help. 
See Bracton f 23 3, Cf /6. There is however nothing to 
suggest that this rule applied under the Assize of 
Nuisance. 
(103) Cf Britton 2.30.8. 
'And although nuisances may be redressed by the assize, 
yet it does not follow that they may not be set right 
by another remedy, as by removing the nuisance im-
mediately upon the fact ....' 
(104) And indeed of the later law. See below 103. 
(105) See Loengard Free Tenements 247-253. Cf the case from 
129 3 in which the right seems to have been limited to 
diurual action: 
If Adam put a hedge where his neighbour has a right 
of way to his common of pasture, and the neighbour 
freshly on the placing thereof do abate it in the 
day time, he commits no tort; but it will be a tort 
if he abate it by. night although it was wongfully 
placed. 
YB 21 Ed I (RS) 462, quoted McRae 'The Development of 
Nuisance in the Early Common Law' (194 8) 1 U of Florida 
LR 2 7 at 33. 
(105 
(106) Britton 2.32.3. Cf Bracton /234b. 
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'The parties having pleaded to the assize, let the 
assize be taken, and if it pass for the plaintiff, 
then let the sheriff be commanded to cause the 
nuisance 'to be removed, and the place restored to 
the condition in which it used to be, at the cost 
of the trespassor, whether water is to be brought 
back into its ancient course, or the course cleansed 
and turned, or opened, or a ditch filled up or 
abated, or a pond lowered, or a wall or hedge re-
paired, or way enlarged, or any other such nuisance 
set right according to its former condition* 
6.2. Damages 
The Assize of Novel Disseisin after 1198 provided for 
(107 ) 
an award of damages to every successful plaintiff. 
This principle was carried over into the Assize of Novel 
Disseisin for Nocumentum and so to the Assize of Nuisance 
(10 8 ) 
proper. In conception the idea that damages should be 
awarded merely supplemented the primary object of the Assize 
- the restoration of seisin or, in the case of nuisance, 
(109 ) 
abatement of the thing causing harm. However the inci-
dence of this pecuniary redress no.doubt enhanced the Assize 
(110 ) 
as a form of redress for disseisin and the award of 
compensatory damages became a standard feature of the pro-
cess . 
It should perhaps be emphasised here that under the 
Assize of Nuisance the award of damages was not the primary 
purpose of the Assize. It was an action of a proprietary 
nature designed to remove that which interefefed_ with rights (107) Sutherlan The Assize of Novel D ss isin 52. Cf G E 
• Woodbine 'The.Origins of the Action of Trespass' (1923-
1)33 Yale LJ 799 at 806-7. 
(10 8) Loengard Free Tenements 210. Cf Flower Introduction to 
the Curia Regis Rolls 4 7 3-5. 
(109) Under the original process for Novel Disseisin the 
sheriff was supposed to ensure that movable property 
taken from the premises by a disseisor was restored 
together with the seisin of the tenement. Since it was 
often difficult to recover such chattels the practice 
grew up of awarding the plaintiff a sum of money as 
solatium for lost chattels. In time the award of the 
solatium became automatic the amount to be paid being 
assessed by the assize (Fifoot History and Sources 45-50) 
From this grew what would become to be known as an award 
of damages (cf Pollock & Maitland History (ii) 522 where 
it is said that 'an action for damages was a novelty .... 
It makes its appearance ... in the popular assize of 
novel disseisin'.) 
(110) Sutherland op cit 55. 
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in land by causing harm to the interests sustained by the 
right. It is only later, under the action upon the case, 
that the remedy for nuisance becomes more explicitly an 
action for damages and thus an action in tort rather than 
a real action. 
II. The Demise of the Assize of Nuisance 
1. Introduction 
Notwithstanding modifications the Assize of Nuisance 
had serious limitations as a remedy for nocumenta. The most 
important were that the remedy was available only to free-
(111) 
holders and in respect of free tenements and that it did 
. . . . . (112) 
not lie for injuries arising from acts of non-feasance. 
These lacunae were, in the event, not rectified by further 
modification to the Assize but rather by the emergence of a 
new form of action which instead of supplementing the Assize 
came to supplant it. The remedy was the Action on the Case. 
9 
2. The Action on the Case 
The origins of the remedy by way of action on the case 
(113 ) are obscure and the subject of controversy. At one 
time it was thought that the consimili casu provision of the 
(11ul (1*iR^ 
Statute of Westminster II was the source of the action, 
( 1 1 fi ̂ 
but this is no longer accepted. The true origin is said 
(111) See above 53. 
(112) See above 49. 
(113) The literature on the subject is collected and discussed 
by Fifoot History and Sources Chap 4. See too Milsom 
Foundations Chap 11 and generally Kiralfy The Action on 
the Case. 
(114) For which see above 52. 
(115) Cf Maitland The Forms of Action 53-4. 
(116) See Plucknett 'Case and the Statute of Westminster II1 
(1931) 31 Columbia LR 778. Cf Kiralfy op cit 24//. 
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(117 ) 
to lie in the emergence of the action for trespass. 
Trespass - Maitland's 'fertile mother of actions' - is the 
source of the English law of torts. It thus began and 
evolved as a personal rather than a proprietary (real) ac-
tion, being designed for the award of damages for a wrong 
suffered rather than for the assertion of some proprietary 
(118) 
right. As such it was conceptually very different to 
actions such as the Assizes of Novel Disseisin and Nuisance 
which were concerned with vindicating seisin or interests 
(119) in the nature of seisin. 
The Action for Trespass was initiated by a new type of 
writ in which the defendant was summoned to explain why 
(ostenturus quaere) he had caused damage to the plaintiff 
(120 ) 
by his wrongdoing. The types of wrongdoing for which 
the writ might be available were, theoretically, infinite 
and thus it was necessary for the writ to spell out the par-
ticular form that the wrongdoing had taken. In some cases 
a mere recitation of the facts was not sufficient since it 
might not appear ex facie these wherein lay the'wrongfulness 
of the conduct. Thus there came about a particular feature 
of certain trespass writs that they contained a clause in-
troduced by the word 'whereas' ('cum') explaining why the 
conduct of the defendant was wrongful. Trespass writs con-
taining the cum clause were designated as 'special' writs of 
trespass, the matter contained in the cum clause constituting 
the special case made out by the plaintiff for relief. These 
writs thus gave rise to the expression 'on the case', re-
flecting the idea that the writ had been drawn up to fit the 
(121) 
peculiar circumstances of the plaintiff's case. 
(117) Fifoot op cit ibid. 
(118) Milsom op cit ibid. 
(119) The link would appear to be the writs of quare by which 
certain nocumenta were redressed (see above 2 0 ) and 
which also provided the sources for the origin of the 
action for trespass. 
(120) Milsom op cit esp 259//. Cf above 20. 
(121) Milsom op cit 260-1; Fifoot OD cit 68. 
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There are two points of significance about the emergence 
of these actions on the case. The first is that they repre-
sent a break with the formalism of the older forms of action. 
The system of writs upon which the early common law was 
based meant that if a case fell within the scope of no writ, 
then in general there was no law by which a plaintiff could 
seek a remedy. The concept of the action on the case by 
allowing writs to be formed upon a particular case, broke 
this tradition and allowed for novel actions and the develop-
ment of 'new' law. 
The second point of significance is that the 'special 
action for trespass upon the case' contemplated and allowed 
actions brought on the ground that the wrongdoing involved 
a nocumentum. In this way there came into existence the 
action on the case for nuisance. 
3. The Emergence of the Action on the Case for 
Nuisance 
3.1. Introduction 
Actions on the case for nocumenta were indeed among the 
(12 
earliest instances of the emergence of the concept of Case. 
Although the action for trespass was personal rather than 
real, it emerged in a society where the land law was about 
all the law there was. The complaint of nocumenta suffered 
was very much an aspect of landholding and it is- thus not 
surprising that when actions on the case came to be allowed 
they more often than not were based on cases involving nocu-
menta which, for one reason or another, could not be redressed 
by way of the Assize of Nuisance. 
The details of this development are largely obscure for 
two reasons. One was that the whole institution of the ac-
tion on the case developed in the interstices of the older 
forms of action, largely ignored by the writers who tended 
to discourse on the primordial real actions of the feudal 
common law with only scant reference to the interloping 
(12 2) Kiralfy Action on the Case 55. 
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(123 ) 
action on the case. It is only in the late seventeenth 
century that this conspiracy of silence is broken and the 
action on the case is revealed in its full flower. The 
second cause of obscurity is that actions on the case for 
nuisance were couched in terms of 'transgressio' rather than 
'nocumentum' and it is thus often difficult to know whether 
a particular example is one of nuisance or trespass. It was 
not until 15 85 that the concept of an action on the case for 
(124) 
nuisance received explicit recognition. 
3.2. Origins 
The idea of obtaining a special trespass writ for re-
dress of a nocumentum evolved on the periphery of the 
existing law relating to nocumenta. One of the earliest 
instances of an action on the case dates from 1341 and 
involved what could be described as a species of nocumentum. 
The case involved damage caused by flooding of lands as a 
result of a defect in a sea-wall. Flooding of lands was 
something traditionally redressed by an Assize of Nuisance 
but in this case the Assize was not available since the de-
fendant's act was one of nonfeasance in that he had failed 
( 1 9 fi ) 
to maintain the wall. The general action of trespass 
was not available since the wall was upon the defendant's 
(127) 
land rather than that of the plaintiff. In the result 
the plaintiff obtained a special writ of trespass and, in 
the Court of first instance, succeeded in his action, damages 
K • A A (128) being awarded. 
(12 3) Kiralfy Action on the Case 1-2. 
(124) Kiralfy op cit 55. He cites Aston's case (1585) Dyer 
250b (for which see below 64 1 as marking the express 
recognition of an action on the case 'for nuisance'. 
(125) Bernardestone v Heighlyng (1341). For this case see 
Kiralfy op cit 23 and 20 8-9 (where the pleadings are 
reproduced). See also Flower (ed) 1 Public Works in 
Medieval Law (32 Selden Socy) 309. 
(126) Cf above 49. 
(12 7) Cf above 33,. 
(12 8) Kiralfy op cit 36. Proceedings in error were adjourned 
indefinitely. 
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Kiralfy suggests that it was 'along this channel, that 
of wrongful default, that the actions of trespass on the 
(12 9) 
case made its most important advances' and notes that 
in 'later years the forms of action for failure to maintain 
sea-walls and for failure to maintain fences and hedges were 
(13 0) 
familiar forms of the action on the case'. Wall, fen-
ces and hedges are of course prototype nocumenta and this 
suggests then that from an early stage actions on the case 
were granted to plaintiffs whose remedy under the Assize of 
Nuisance was barred by the principle that the Assize did not 
(13 1) 
lie for acts of non-feasance. In this way we see the 
action on the case emerging as a supplement to the Assize of 
Nuisance, being employed to fill the remedial gaps created 
by the form of the writ for Assize action. 
The other great limitation of the Assize action - that 
the Assize could lie only for wrongs to free holders and 
free tenements - also came to be filled by the action on the 
(13 2) case. 
3.3. Case comes to supplant the Assize 
During the fourteenth century the emerging action on the 
case for nuisance was regarded as complementary to the Assize 
(133 ) 
of Nuisance. The rule which was applied was that an 
(129) Action on the Case 36. 
(130) op cit 37. 
(131) See Kiralfy Action on the Case 59-61. 
(132) Kiralfy (ed) Potter's Historical Introduction 422. 
Cf Baker English Legal History 23 8. Fifoot History and 
Sources 93. In Rickhill v Two Parsons of Bromaye (1400) 
YB 2 Hen 4 f 11 pi 48 (for which see Fifoot op cit 83) 
an action on the case was refused because the parties 
were free holders. This suggests an appreciation that 
Case might be brought by non-freeholders, or in respect 
of unfree tenements. Kiralfy loc cit seems to suggest 
that Case was first resorted to by lessees (who could 
not obtain an Assize (see above 54 )), citing an 
anonymous case (1496) YB 9 Ed 4 f. 35 pi 10. He adds 
that 'freeholders must have envied them this simpler 
remedy and this led to the supercession of the assize 
of nuisance by case....' 
(13 3) Fifoot History and Sources 93-4; Baker op cit 238. 
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action on the case would not lie if the plaintiff could have 
his remedy by way of the Assize. Thus in 1400 'un briefe de 
Trespass' was not allowed on the ground that both of the 
parties were freeholders and thus their remedy was by way of 
(134 ) 
the Assize. This denial of concurrent remedies, Fifoot 
M q r \ 
observes, 'harmonized with medieval sentiment1 and 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the courts con-
sistently allowed actions on the case for nuisance only when 
the remedy of the Assize was not available. 
To this general doctrine one minor exception was allowed. 
In 14 55 it was laid down that if 'a man straitens my way, 
and does not stop it totally, no assise lies, but action 
(137 ) 
upon the case'. This is a curious decision since there 
is authority from Bracton's time that the Assize would lie 
(13 8 ) 
for via arctata and it is difficult to explain why this 
case now denied that an action under the Assize would lie. 
The rule was however followed in an anonymous case in 1522 
* (139 ) 
involving obstruction of a water course. Counsel ar-
gued that the Assize of Nuisance was the proper 'remedy. 
(140) 
Pollard J however rejected this contention, saying 
(134) Rickhill's case (cited above n 131). 
(135) Ibid 
(136) Fifoot op cit ibid; Baker op cit ibid. Cf Kiralfy 
Action on the Case 55-6. For the cases see Rolle 
Abr 'Nusans' (H). 
(137) (1455) 33 Hen 6 pi 10 /26 (cited Rolle Abr 'Nusans' 
/142 pi 16. Fitzherbert N B 183 N (a) cites 14 Hen 
4.31 as authority for a proposition that 'If a way be 
so stopped, that the party can pass but narrowly, an 
action -on the case lies; but if it be wholly stopped, 
on an assize.' 
(13 8) f2 3 3 where he speaks of the Assize lying for a road 
'obstructed or narrowed'. Cf /231b where he speaks of 
the Assize for waters diverted 'in whole or in part'. 
See also the discussion in Loengard Free Tenements 37,5. 
The point taken seems to be that the Assize lay for a 
total deprivation of enjoyment of a right - case being 
then allowed for the (lesser) offence of partial de-
privation. Cf Kiralfy Action on the Case 56; Fifoot 
History and Sources 94. 
(139) Anon (1523) YB 14 Hen 8 f 31 pi 8 (for which see Fifoot 
History and Sources 97). 
(140) Fifoot op cit 97. 
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'There is a difference where he stops all your way 
so that you cannot pass, for there you shall have 
an Assize of Nuisance and where he stops part only 
so that you can pass but narrowly, for there you 
shall have an accion sur votre cas; and so there 
is a difference where he withholds part [of the 
stream] and where he withholds all', 
With this all the justices agreed. 
(141) 
Then in 1585 m Aston's case it was held by the 
King's Bench that the action on the case and not the Assize 
lay where a way was totally obstructed. And in the next year 
(142 ) 
in Villet v Parkhurst, also involving total obstruction 
of a way, the court rejected an argument that the Assize 
should have been brought rather than case, it being reported 
that, upon many precedents shown by the clerks, judgment 
'was given that this action [upon the case] well lie, for it 
is at the election of the plaintiff to have either the one 
or the other'. 
These decisions had a fatal significance for the Assize 
of Nuisance. Case was no longer supplementary to the Assize; 
it was complementary and a plaintiff could elect which of 
them he would employ. The Court of Common Pleas in 159 6 
sought to root out this heresy, proclaiming in Beswick v 
P , (143) " " 
Cunden 
'... a man shall never have an action on the case, 
where he may have any other remedy by any writ 
founded in the register; for this is only given 
where there wants such a remedy.' 
But the Court of the King's Bench was committed to the new 
(144 ) (145 ) 
dispensation. Already in 1591.in Leverett v Townsend 
(141) (1586) 2 Dyer 250 n 88. 
(142) (1587) 2 Dyer 250. 
(143) (1596) Cro Eliz 520. 
(144) Kiralfy Potter's Historical Introduction 423 says that 
the movement to allow Case~to supplant the Assize began 
'probably, because the King's Bench had no jurisdiction 
in the older actions and the judges were anxious to ex-
tend their jurisdiction in this direction'. He cites 
in support (1443) YB 22 Hen 6 f 15 pi 23 where the King's 
Bench, which it will be recalled had an original juris-
diction over nuisances to franchise rights (see above. 45 
n 54), held that 'If I have a fair or market and another 
holds a fair or market on the same day in a neighbouring 
town I have either assize or action on the case'. 
(145) (1591) Cro Eliz 199. 
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it had rejected the old argument that a plaintiff who was 
a freeholder could not bring an action on the case being 
limited to the Assize. The Court, and Coke, who was counsel; 
held 'he might have one action or the other'. In the same 
year that Beswick v Cunden was decided, the Court of King's 
Bench in Alston v Pamphyn ' reiterated its position that 
a plaintiff could elect which action to employ. And Popham 
C J said,' 'he had seen it so in experience divers times'. 
The difference between the two courts was resolved in 
1601 by the Exchequer Chamber in the case of Cantrel v 
n, , (147) Church. 
The case involved the stopping of a way totaliter. The 
plaintiff succeeded in the court below and the case was 
brought on a writ of error to the Exchequer Chamber consis-
ting of all of the judges of England. The error assigned 
was that the plaintiff ought not to have had an action on the 
case but an Assize of Nuisance. The justices and Barons 
'after divers motions and considerations had of the books of 
8 Eliz Dyer 2 50b,( 1 4 8 ) 11 Hen i4,(14-9) 2 Hen 4 ( 1 5 0 ) and 
*-*, i i ,(151) others resolved 
'that the action was well brought, for he hath elec-
tion to bring either the one or the other: for al-
though ... where it is estopped but in part, and not 
totally, that there an action on the case lies, and 
not an assize; they conceived it not to be any 
difference, for he hath election to have either the 
one or the other action'. 
(146) (1596) Cro Eliz 466. 
(147) (1601) Cro Eliz 845. 
(148) Aston's case (1585) (supra n 141). 
(149) Cheddar v Dyer (1410) YB 11 Hen 4 f25 pi 48 (see 
Fifoot History and Sources 9 9 n 23). 
(150) Rickhill's case (1400) YB 2 Hen 4 f 11 pi 48 (for which 
see Fifoot op cit 83). Cf above n 131. 
(151) Baker Legal History 23 8 says there were two dissentients. 
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Strictly speaking Cantrel v Church perhaps decided no 
more than that where a nuisance was perpetrated by inter-
ference with a right of way the plaintiff could elect to 
bring either the Assize or an action on the case. But in 
practice it meant that for any type of nuisance a plaintiff 
could elect which action to bring. Thus in 1649 in Ayre v 
( -i c o \ 
Pyncomb we find an action on the case being brought for 
surcharging a common. The defendant argued that 'that an 
action of the case does not lie in this case, but an Assize1. 
Rolle C J however denied this contention and in so doing ad-
ministered the quietus to the Assize of Nuisance: 
'... the plaintiff may have an Assize or an action 
upon the case at his election, although here be a 
disturbance of the plaintiff's freehold, although 
that the ancient books say the contrary.* 
In short freeholders were no longer restricted to an action 
under the Assize of Nuisance and now could bring the action 
on the case if they pleased. Most did, for the action on the 
case was so much more convenient than the Assize and the 
chance of losing a case because of a technicality was so 
much less in actions on the case. After existing for four 
centuries the Assize of Nuisance was rendered defunct. 
B. COMMON NUISANCE 
1. Introduction 
We have seen that the medieval concept of nocumentum 
developed out of certain types "of interference with proprie-
tary interests of men holding land in free tenure, and re-
dressed by way of the action known as the Assize of Nuisance 
and later the action on the case for Nuisance. We have seen 
too how, almost accidentally, certain of the acts redressable 
by the Assize process came to be the subject of a form of 
criminal prosecution in the court of the Sheriff's Tourn. 
(152) (1649) Style 164. 
(153) See eg Anon (1657) 2 Sid 20. 
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This latter development thus created the phenomenon of 
certain types of nocumenta becoming the subject of complaint 
by public representations and being redressed at the hands 
of a court not exercising a civil jurisdiction. Strictly 
speaking this development reflects no more than the adoption 
of a special process for dealing with the special interests 
(15 4) 
of a specific individual. But at a superficial glance 
it seems to amount to the development of a principle that 
nocumenta may be the subject of public complaint and thus fall 
to be redressed by a process designed to vindicate the in-
terests of the public at large. 
The medieval response to this development was ambivalent. 
On the one hand there was an attitude that there was no such 
thing as a public action for nocumenta. Where the public at 
large was affected by a nocumentum perpetrated by an indi-
vidual, the medieval lawyer's response was to say that each 
individual severally affected by the nuisance might have his 
action against the perpetrator. In other words there was no 
conception of a. public interest which was affected by the 
nuisance. The public was simply the aggregate of indi-
viduals who made it up, and thus the proper course of action 
was for each individual to sue in respect of the harm done 
to his individual interest. 
On the other hand the medieval lawyer saw in the present-
ment in the sheriff's court of purprestures upon the royal 
highway an instance in which a nocumentum against the interests 
of the individuals using the highway for passage was vindi-
cated without the several individuals severally instituting 
legal action against the offender. Rather the users of 
(154) That is to say, it is a process for dealing with the 
special problem of protecting the royal domaine against 
purprestures. It is in other words, the king's special 
action for dealing with nocumenta perpetrated upon his 
personal domaine and jurisdictions. 
(155) See above 26. Cf however n 157 below. 
(156) The judges, as we will see, siezed upon the fact that 
purprestures to the highway were presented in the tourn, 
to deny to individual passengers the right to bring 
action for the harm suffered by them as a result of an 
obstruction of the highway. See below 87-9. 
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the highway could rely upon the jury of presentment to ini-
tiate a complaint and obtain restoration of the full right 
of passage. This suggested an idea of a public interest 
which might be affected by the nocumenta perpetrated by indi-
viduals which could, and should, be redressed by a public 
« . - , (157) official. 
However developments in this connection led to a rather 
different result. Instead of a principle emerging which en-
titled land owners to call upon some public official to take 
action to terminate a nuisance affecting them jointly, what 
happened was that there emerged a category of nocumenta, 
largely sui generis in nature, which were liable to redress 
ex officio rather than by action under the Assize or upon the 
Case. 
This tangential development was the result of a change 
in the status and the function of the court of the sheriff's 
tourn. 
(15 7) See Bracton (/ 232b) who argued that in the case of' the 
obstruction of the waters of a public stream in a 
manner which would not give rise to an action under the 
assize, 'on account of the public utility (which is 
preferred to the private) these things are to be re-
strained for the purpose of removing the public loss1. 
Elsewhere he mentions with approval the ability of the 
sheriff to clear an obstructed way 'for the common 
good lest travellers be impeded too long in going....' 
(/ 2 33). See also Britton 2.30.8 who speaks of 'some 
nuisances which sheriffs are authorized "to redress ... 
for the common benefit; as in the case of a way stopped, 
in order that passengers may not be too long deprived 
of their way, and in the case of several other nuisances', 
Fleta 4.2 8 (89 Selden Socy 115-6) writes somewhat 
cryptically of a distinction between 'private' nuisances 
and those affecting the public: 
'... a nuisance can be wrongful and damaging as re-
gards one person or several private persons and 
[constitute] a private nuisance ['priutam nocumentum]. 
A nuisance can be against the public welfare, which 
always and in every case is to be given preference 
over private welfare'. 
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During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the office 
of sheriff went into a decline. Coupled with this was the 
practice of th'e Crown, prevalent at that time, of granting 
franchisal rights to manorial lords to-lhold a court which 
performed the functions of the tourn. These franchisal courts 
(15 8) 
were known as Courts Leet ' "' and the grant of the franchise 
of holding such a court became a standard incident of a 
manor, its existence excluding the sheriff's power to hold 
his tourn within the manor. 
The Court Leet was destined to play a pre-eminent role 
in the development of the institutions of local government 
and the administration of local affairs in England. In the 
course of time it was to emerge especially as the main in-
strument of borough government in which context is achieved 
(15 9) 
its most elaborate development. 
2. The Rise of the Leet 
The sheriff's tourn was 'a valuable regality both in 
law enforcement and as a source of revenue' and feudal 
lords, eager to obtain its powers and revenues, sought and 
obtained the privilege from the king of holding a court 
having the jurisdiction and power of the tourn. These private 
franchises to hold a view of the frankpledge became wide-
spread in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Towards the 
end of the thirteenth century the word leet ('leta') became 
the common term for this type of private jurisdiction, al-
though the name visus francipledgii remained its formal and 
correct title. 1 6 1 
(15 8) Generally on courts leet see Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiction 
in England 11-17 and passim. See also 1 Holdsworth 
HEL 13 5 and below 
(159) Its role in this connection is exhaustively examined 
in S & B Webb The Manor and The Borough. 
(160) Allen The Queen's Peace 77. 
(161) Pollock & Maitland History (i) 581. 
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The leet, then, was the tourn in disguise, and it was 
conducted in the same way: 'The lord who had this franchise 
claimed to swear in a body of jurors - often they were the 
chief pledges or heads of the tithings - and to put before 
them those same "articles of the view" which the sheriff em-
ployed in his "turn"'. 
The leet though ostensibly a court of criminal juris-
diction came to perform legislative and executive functions. 
How this actually came about is obscure but it is clear 
that leets 'without challenge from Crown or lord's officials 
... assumed (or perhaps reasserted) a power to regulate 
their own affairs, by legislation which they themselves en-
forced'. In the same way the leet appointed 'whatever 
staff of public officers to attend to the government of the 
locality that custom required'. These included constables 
ale-tasters, pound-keepers, dyke and wall reeves, 'burley-
men' (bylawmen). In mercantile communities there might also 
be appointed officials for regulating weights and measures 
and the trading practices in the markets. In the larger .towns 
there would be appointed the ubiquitous town-cryer, scavengers 
of the street, pavers, dog-muzzlers and the like. 
(162) Pollock & Maitland History (i) 593! 
'In manors where the franchise to hold a leet court 
existed, the jurisdiction was usually exercised con-
temporaneously with the seignorial jurisdiction known 
as the Court Baron, with the result that.from an 
early stage there was considerable confusion of the 
two jurisdictions. Indeed it seems that in practice 
the courts 'leet' and 'baron' were held simultaneously 
with only the most elementary marks of distinction 
being observed'. 
'... the leet entries appear under the general heading 
'Entries del Courte Baron', the only thing which marks 
them off from the other entries being that they are 
collected together at the end, and are preceded by an 
inconspicuous sub-heading "xii pro rege"...'; 
Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiciton in England 35. 
Cf Webb Manor and Borough 13 n 1. 
(163) Webb Manor and Borough 27-8. 
(164) Dawson Lay Judges 202. 
(165) Webb op cit 28. 
(166) Webb op cit 28-9. 
71. 
Through these operations the Leet was able to set up a 
rudimentary machinery for the government of local affairs. 
But its chief 'role and function remained that of policing 
the conduct of residents. As Dawson puts it 'regula-
tion of conduct was carried much further in another way, 
without prior announcement of rules, through the court leet 
machinery of presenting jury. There is no discernible limit 
to the types of conduct that could be made the subject of a 
presentment'. The jurors inquired into and presented activi-
ties injurious to individual inhabitants - trespass to land, 
personal assaults, theft, even breach of contract. The 
juries dealt also with matters of more general concern - ob-
struction of pathways, watercourses, drainage ditches, sur-
charging of common pastures. So too they assumed the power 
to enquire into and present conduct which was a threat to 
the public peace and order or which was offensive to the 
moral convictions of the community. 
The leet in this form and guise was not exclusively a 
feature of manorial communities. It existed also in those 
communities which enjoyed the various privileges and fran-
chises that made up the institution of the borough. Indeed 
a court was as much a characteristic of a borough as of a 
manor and most boroughs acquired the franchise of holding 
a court leet which often, given its nature, was 'developed 
'(169) into the governing body of the borough. 
3. Leets and the Concept of 'Common Nuisance' 
•i 
3.1. Introduction 
The courts leet, in coming to replace the court of the 
sheriff's tourn, took over the prosecution of the nascent 
(167) op cit 203. 
(168) Pollock and Maitland History (i) 627-9; Maitland 
Domesday Book and Beyond 210-227. 
(169) Holdsworth 1 HEL 142-3. 
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public nuisance of obstruction of the king's highways. 
The leets however instead of developing a principle that the 
conventional nocumentum, when it affected the public at 
large, might be pursued by an ex officio complaint, began 
rather to develop a separate and distinct category of nocu-
menta which came to be designated as 'common* nuisances. 
3.2. The emerging concept 
As an instrument of local government the leet however 
tended to adapt the jurisdiction over highway nocumenta to 
(17 1) local needs. This was especially the case in the 
boroughs where the leet necessarily enjoyed jurisdiction in 
(17 0) The scope of leet jurisdiction in this connection is 
indicated by 'court-keepers guides', the earliest of 
which date from the beginning of the fourteenth century 
(see Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiction 37 3//). One such 
guide, entitled 'Capitula que debent Inquiri' (circa 1307) 
requires the leet to inquire, inter alia, of the following 
(Hearnshaw op cit 374): 
If any encroachment ['purprestura'] shall have been 
made, as of ditch, wall Cor] ploughed land upon the 
lord king or upon the lord of the court, or upon 
the neighbours. 
If any wall shall have been wrongfully extended or 
diminished 
If water shall have been diverted ... f 
Concerning roads and paths stopped or turned. 
(171) Cf 'Les Articules que Sount Opresenter' of the Court 
Baron (circa 1340) (Maitland (ed) The Court Baron 
(4 Selden Socy)) 93-4! ™ 
i 
Whether any purpresture has been made in the vill or 
fields , as for instance a dungheap placed in the high-
street to the nuisance of the country ['a noyance de 
pars'] or a wall raised by a neighbour upon [the land 
of] another or on the king's highway ... watercourses 
• • • 
Whether paths to the church, the mill, the common 
spring be destroyed and by whom.' 
At this time the jurisdiction of Leet and Court Baron 
was hardly kept separate (see n 162 above) and these 
articles are largely representative of the matters of 
concern to a manorial leet. 
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respect of all streets and thoroughfares. The result 
was that the purpresture - nocumentum of the sheriff's 
tourn in the hands of the Courts Leet, began to acquire a 
new dimension as the borough leet began to grapple with the 
peculiar and particular problems of the maintenance and 
sanitary condition of urban thoroughfares. 
Sanitary conditions in boroughs 
The urban thoroughfares of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries offered different problems to those encountered in 
the typical agrarian village. 
The medieval city was a tighter more compact world. 
The streets and lanes - the communis strata - were more clearly 
defined as a result of the houses , shops and buildings situate 
one next to the other and strung out along the line of passage. 
City dwellers were thus less likely to find themselves en-
tirely or even partially deprived of their right of passage 
as a result of a hedge or wall or gate placed across the 
street. It was more likely that they would be incommoded and 
annoyed by carts and waggons clogging the way and by heaps of 
refuse, domestic waste and animal ordure deposited on pave-
ments and streets. 
We have seen that in the medieval scheme of things the 
resiants of a community were.visited with a duty to maintain 
(17 3) 
and repair roads and highways. For the most part this 
(17 2) 'The walls, ditches, streets and open spaces of the 
borough were not as yet [temp Ed I] conceived to be 
'holden by' the community. They were still the king's, 
and he who encroached upon them committed a 'purpres-
ture' against the king'. (Pollock & Maitland History (i) 
653. Cf Glanvil 13.34 cited 25 n 84 above). Since 
all borough thoroughfares were 'royal' all encroach-
ments upon them were purprestures and thus the leet, by 
its nominal jurisdiction over purprestures, effectively 
acquired a jurisdiction over all streets and thorough-
fares . 
(173) Above 5. 
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duty involved an obligation to remove obstructions or en-
(174 ) 
sure that the way was not rendered dangerous or impassable. 
The enforcement of these duties was traditionally the 
function of the manorial courts - baron or leet. The 
jurisdiction was exercised also in the borough courts where, 
however, the different conditions generated different approa-
ches. To some extent the maintenance and repair of borough 
streets was regulated by by-laws enforced by the leet. There 
regulations in the form of by-laws, imposed upon householders 




before their dwellings while the roads themselves w
maintained out of tolls levied upon vehicles and horses 
and cleansed by rakers and scavengers appointed by the leet 
„. (179) court. 
(174) Roads and highways consisted in rights of way, easements 
of passage, imposing upon the owner of the soil only 
the obligation to allow the public to pass and repass. 
The duty of repair involved then no more than the duty 
to ensure that the passage way remained open, implying 
the obligation to remove obstructions that might occur 
or the duty to maintain drains and ditches which pre-
vented the flooding of the way. See generally Webb 
The Story of the King's Highway 5-7. 
(175) The customary duties were supplemented by legislative 
injunction. The Statute of Winchester (1285) (repro-
duced in Stephenson and Marcham Sources of English 
Constitutional History (i) 173)is the earliest example 
of English 'road' legislation. 
(17 6) Not always with success. Jackman The Development of 
Transportation in Modern England 4 writes: 
'Toward the end of the Middle Ages, we find in the 
Court Leet records of the manors a great many pre-
sentments of persons for offences in connexion with 
highways; and the almost wearisome repetition of 
these offences in all such court records would seem 
to indicate that conditions were much the same on 
most manors, and that non-compliance with the cus-
tomary regulations for preservation of the highways 
was very common'. 
(177) Salusbury Street Life in Medieval England 16-17; 
Clifford History of Private Bill Legislation (ii) 234-5. 
(178) Termed 'pavage'. See Salusbury op cit 20-22. 
(179) Salusbury op cit 26//. Clifford op cit 250. 
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For all this the leet remained active in presenting 
'purprestures' upon the highways. In the boroughs though, 
the encroachments that the leet dealt with were often not so 
much the traditional walls, hedges, gates, fences and houses 
that were the subject of tourn presentments. Rather they 
were dungheaps, refuse, ashes, soil and the other detritus 
of urban domestic life. 
3.3. Leet Jurisdiction expands the Nuisance 
concept. 
Sanitary nuisances 
What is often cited as the first piece of public health 
(18 0) 
legislation in England - a statute of 1388 provides a 
good introduction to an account of the state of urban thorough-
fares in the medieval English city. The preamble to the 
statute recites that 
'Item, for that so much dung and filth of the garbage 
and entrails as well of beasts killed, as of other 
corruptions be cast and put in ditches, rivers and 
other waters, and also within many other places, within, 
about and nigh unto divers cities , boroughs and towns 
of the realm, and the suburbs of them that the air 
there is greatly corrupt and infect, and many maladies 
and other intolerable diseases do daily happen, as well 
to the inhabitants, and those that are conversant in 
the said cities, boroughs, towns and suburbs, as to 
other reparing and travelling thither, as to the great 
annoyance ['grant anusance'] damage and peril of the 
inhabitants, dwellers, repairers and travellers afore-
said. . . . ' 
Dungheaps were a ubiquitous feature of the medieval city and 
complaints concerning them are recurrent. In 12 9 8 the mini-
sters of the king write complaining of the 'dung and dunghills 
and many other foul things placed.in the streets and lanes 
[of Boutham, Yorks] ... to the nuisance of the king's ministers 
' 1181 aforesaid and of others there dwelling and passing through. 
In London 'great dungheaps thrown out from the stables and 
not infrequently encroaching on the right of way were an 
(180) 12 Rich 2 c 13, Clifford op cit 279 n 1 says it is the 
first general Act, but is based on a local ordinance 
of 1362. 
(181) Calendar Close Rolls 1296-1302 218 (reproduced 4 English 
Historical Documents 8 54). Cf Fitzherbert Natura 
Brevium 185 (D). 
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(18 2) (183 ' 
almost constant cause of protest' and, Salusbury notes , "t 1' 
complaints 'against dungheaps in the streets and at the gates 
of towns continued into Tudor times ....' 
The activities of butchers, poulterers, fishmongers were 
an equally common cause of complaint. These fouled the streets 
and pavements, public ditches and drains, by casting there the 
entrails, offal, horns, feathers of slaughtered animals as 
well as spilling into the streets blood and the foul liquids 
A X 1A- (184) 
produced by scalding processes. 
The ordinary citizen was no less guilty of insanitary 
practices. Excrement, urine and other domestic waste was 
flung from windows into the streets. " Dead cats, dogs, 
swine and even horses were thrown into the streets and 
ditches. Livestock wandered the streets and alleys 
fouling the places and obstructing the passage. Perhaps no 
animal was more universally execrated than the pig. The 
ubiquitous swine, though it provided good service as the 
medieval scavenger of streets, by its own habits perpetrated 
as much inconvenience as anything. ' The ministers who com-
plained in 129 8 of dungheaps wrote of 'the pig-sties situate 
in the king's highways and the lanes of that town and ... 
[of] the swine feeding and frequently wandering about in the 
(188) 
(18 7) 
streets and lanes ....' Efforts to suppress the prac-
tice of keeping swine in the cities were numerous and doomed 
so that even well into modern times we still find city fathers 
wrestling with the intractable problem of the urban pig. 
(182) E L Sabine 'City Cleaning in Medieval London' (1937) 
12 Speculum 19 at 20. 
(183 ) op cit 73. 
(184) See E L Sabine 'Butchering in Medieval London* (193 3) 
^ Speculum 335 Salusbury op cit 73-6. 
(185) See E L Sabine 'Latrines and Cesspools' of Medieval 
London' (1934) 9 Speculum 303. " -" 
(186) Salusbury op cit 77-8. 
(187) See n 181 above. 
(188) Salusbury op cit 65-7. Cf Clifford op cit 234. 
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The cleansing of the streets of these various insani-
tary conditions was to some extent carried out under express 
(189} 
legislative injunction. More commonly however the task 
fell upon the jurors of the courts leet. They performed this 
task under the jurisdiction they enjoyed to present purpres-
tures upon the king's highway. The dungheaps and other 
accumulations of garbage and waste were equated with the 
hedges, walls and fences which were the traditional purpres-
i 
(191) 
(19 0 ) 
tures and presentments for causing nocumenta were brought 
against the citizens responsible for befouling the streets. 
This identification of nocumenta with insanitary condi-
tions in the highways was to have an important consequence. 
Up until this point the leet nocumenta were essentially the 
traditional nocumenta of encroaching walls, hedges, houses 
and the like. The linking of the word nocumentum with condi-
tions which by their insanitary nature were an annoyance to 
the public at large was to have the effect of adding a new 
dimension to the term nocumentum. By a sort of ellipsis men 
began to describe that which was insanitary or annoying as a 
nuisance, ignoring the primordial requirement that it should 
also involve an obstruction to the king's highway. 
(18 9) See Sabine op cit (nn 182, 184, 185 above). Cf Clifford 
op cit 277-280. 
(190) Cf Webb Statutory Authorities 317: 'If streets were 
not to become impassable, some way of dealing with 
these ... [heaps of soil, dung, dirt, ashes, garbage 
etc] had to be found. The first move was to treat the 
heaps as ordinary obstructions of the King's Highway, 
and to prohibit all citizens from casting, laying or 
leaving dirt, refuse or ashes on the surface of the 
street, exactly as they were forbidden to stand their 
carts or trade implements ... to the detriment of the 
free passage'. 
(191) Cf the report of a 'Ward-moot' jury in London in 1422 
(see Chambers and Daunt A Book of London English 1384-
1425 121) : " ~"~ " 
First, that the Master of Ludgate often puts out dung 
in the street gutter ... to the great nuisance of all 
the folk passing there.... Also William Emery, horse 
dealer, often lays much dung in the high street ... to 
the great nuisance and annoyance of all folk passing 
and dwelling thereabouts .... Also the taverners of 
St Bride's parish set their empty tuns and pipes in 
the high street to the annoyance of all fo3k passing 
there.' 
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This development was gradual. It is mainly seen in the 
(192) 
fifteenth century and after, in the emergence of new types 
of civic misdeamenours liable to presentment by the leet. 
These though not involving obstructions to the highway were 
nevertheless charged as nocumenta. Thus we find, for in-
stance, the leets coming to prohibit and prosecute as nocu-
menta such matters as 'the keeping of hogs in backyards, the 
washing of clothes in the streets, ... the fouling of wells, 
the throwing of fishy water into the market squares, and a 
dozen other odorous offences against his majesty's liege 
(19 3) " . 
subjects'. The most striking example of the manner in 
which the leets came to employ the term nocumentum to des-
cribe that which simply caused annoyance to others as opposed 
to that which involved obstruction or diversion of the high-
ways , is to be found in the leet offences of scolding and 
eavesdropping. 
Scolds and Eavesdroppers 
This species of leet offence first appears 'in the fif-
(194) (195) 
teenth century. In a court-keepers guids of that 
(192) The leets as we have seen were largely left free to de-
velop and expand the list of items included in the 
articles of the view (see above 71 ) and it is a feature 
of the operations of leets in the fourteenth century 
and later that the range and subject matter of the 
articles of the view expanded and contracted, new of-
fences being added, others being dropped 'so that the 
volume of individual personal activity dealt with was • 
always varying'. Webb Manor and Borough 26-7. 
(193) Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiction in England 109. Cf the 
presentments at the Nottingham sessions in 1496 (see 
English Historical Documents 9 81) where a woman is pre-
sented for exposing for sale 'meat and pies unwholesome 
and corrupt for human food ... to the grievous nuisance 
of the said lieges . . .. ' while another is presented be-
cause she allowed 'servants' to 'keep disorderly conduct 
and make outcries , so that her neighbours and other .* 
lieges ... cannot sleep in their beds, to the grievous 
nuisance of the lieges....' In 1497 Henry Gorall is 
presented from throwing out 'a dead and putrid horse 
into the streets ... to the grievous nuisance of the 
lieges . . . . ' 
(194) Cf Webb Manor and Borough 27. 
(19 5) The words cited in the text came from a manuscript 
court-keeper's guide dated circa 1440 and reproduced in 
4 English Historical Documents 548 at 5 52. 
(continued on next page) 
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time there appears an item, placed quite separately from 
the list of traditional nocumenta to common ways, which 
instructs that the jury should enquire 
'Also of all common chiders and brawlers to the 
nuisance of their neighbours, and eavesdroppers 
under mens walls and windows, by night or by day, 
to bear away tales or discover their counsel, to 
make debate and dissension among their neighbours, 
you shall let us know their names'. 
Some clue as to the thinking which led to the creation of 
the offence of scolding and its designation as a nocumentum 
can be gathered from the indictment as a scold of the for-
midable Alice Shelton "' ' before the mayor of London 
in 1375: 
'that all the neighbours, dwelling in the vicinity, 
by her malicious words and abuse were so greatly 
molested and annoyed; she sowing envy among them, 
discord and ill-will and repeatedly defaming, 
molesting and backbiting many of them, sparing 
neither rich nor poor; to the great damage of 
the persons and neighbours there dwelling and against 
the ordinances ' 198 ) 0f -^-iie city'. 
Presentments of women as common scolds were a usual 
feature of leet jurisdiction in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
(199 ) 
centuries the charge being that she was communis garula-
. • ,, +_ (200) 
trix ad commune nocumentum. 
(195) (continued) 
The various versions of the articles of the view dating 
from the fourteenth century contain no reference to 
eavesdroppers or scolds. Compare for example the so-
called Statutum de visu Francipledgii (1325) said to 
be declaratory of the common law relating to leet juris-
diction. (On the 'statute' see Hearnshaw op cit 24). 
(196) Riley Memorials of London and London Life 285-6. 
(19 7) The Articuli de Wardemote of London may have been the 
origin of the practice of punishing common scolds. 
These contained an item instructing the ward jury to 
present bawds, strumpets, gossips and the like (Riley 
Liber Albus 337-8) though not using the term nocumentum 
to describe these ladies of ill-repute. 
(198) Cf the borough ordinances of Leicester (1467) (see 
English Historical Documents 576) 
Also that all manner of scolds that are dwelling 
within this town, man or woman, that are found defec-
tive by sworn men before the mayor, that then it shall 
be lawful to the same mayor to punish them on a duckings-
tool. 
(199) Webb Manor and Borough 27. 
(200) See Holdsworth 2 HEL 383. 
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The designation of eavesdroppers as common nuisances was 
. . (201) 
based on similar ideas. Thus we read of the presentment 
in 1497 of John Clitherow, weaver, of Nottingham who 
1... upon divers other days and nights, at Nottingham 
aforesaid, is a common listener at the windows and 
houses of his neighbours to sow strife and discord 
among his neighbours, to the nuisance of his neigh-
bours . . . ' 
4. The Concept of 'Common' Nuisance 
From the earliest times the articles of the view required 
that the nocumenta that were to be presented there should 
be of a certain type. They had to be the walls, hedges, 
houses or'whatever that were 'ad nocumentum ipsius iterineris 
( 202 ) 
et.m periculum transeuntium' or which were upon 'chemm 
(203) 
common a la nusance de mesme le chemm et peril trespasauntz' 
, , , , , (204) , , . , (205) 
or 'en nusance del people' or 'a noyance de poi . 
By the fifteenth century these words of qualification 
have tended to be reduced to the curt formula 'to common 
( o n R ̂  
nu i s a n c e ' •'w - and it is the standard practice of the leets 
when presenting the various offences housed under the expan-
ded term nocumentum to charge that the scolding woman or 
(201) See 5 English Historical Documents 982. Cf Dawson 
op cit 270 who sees the offence as arising from the 
need for 'more intensive control over conduct' as a 
result of the closer daily contact between urban 
dwellers. He cites an amusing case of an amerciament 
of one Berchall 'for looking and herkinnge at the 
window of William Dobson' and of William Dobson 'for 
a chamber pott emptied and thrown out of his windowe 
into ye backside of Geo. Berchall, to ye great annoy-
ance of ye said George' (op cit 270 n 212). 
(202) Statutum Wallaie (1284) (cited above 22 ). 
(203) Britton (circa 1298) 1.30.3 (cited above 22 n 78 ). 
(204) 'Videnda de visu Francipledgii' (ms court-keeper's guide 
of circa 13 07 reproduced by Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiction 
in England 3 7 3). 
(205) ' Le Articules que sount a presenter' (circa 1340); 
(cited above 7 2 n 171). 
(206) The fifteenth century court-keeper's guide (cited 
above 7 8 n 19 5) required the leet jurors to present 
... all purprestures made on land or water or with 
blocks or stocks or any other thing in the highway, 
to common nuisance....' 
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eavesdropper or insanitary pavement is 'ad commune nocu-
. . . , (207) " ™ "~ 
mentum . 
It seems clear that the appellation 'common' nuisance 
originally served to indicate nocumenta which affected the 
resiant community which the court served. The court, whether 
(208) 
tourn or leet, was after all a local police court and it 
would thus be logical for it to be concerned with nocumenta 
affecting the people within its jurisdiction. 
Whether this also implied that common nuisances were 
conceived as nocumenta to be redressed by ex officio complaint 
brought on behalf of the public is not clear, certainly in the 
period preceding the sixteenth century. 
In the sixteenth century however the principle began to 
emerge that 'common' nuisances though ostensibly wrongs against 
the king's own interests were in fact offences against the 
public and sued for by the king on behalf of the public. 
This principle received its most elaborate expression in 
a line of constitutional cases concerned with the definition 
of the prerogative powers of the king and especially the power 
(209) 
to pardon offences or 'dispense' with penal legislation. 
The principle evolved here was that the king might pardon or 
dispense with that which was malum in prohibita he could not 
do so in respect of that which was malum in se. Significantly 
. . (210) 
the seminal decision on the matter illustrated the prin-
ciple in relation to that which was malum in s-e by observing 
that 
i 
... if the king were to wish to allow a man ..< to 
make a nuisance on the highway, a dispensation would 
be void.' 
(207) See above n 200. 
(208) Cf the remarks in Dewe11 v Sanders (1618) Cro Jac 491: 
'... the leet is to redress nuisances within the pre-
cinct thereof, and not to extend further...' (per 
Montague C J ) ; ' ... they ought to enquire of public 
nuisances made within the precinct of their leet, and 
not of nuisances made in the country out of their juris-
diction...' (per Doderidge J). 
(209) Generally on the dispensing power see Maitland The Con-
stitutional History of England 3 02-306; Holdsworth 6 
HEL 217//. 
(210) (1496) YB 11 Hen 7 pi 35 //11,12 (cited Holdsworth 
op cit 218-9). 
82. 
This instance of a restraint upon the king's dispensing 
power seems to be derived from a case in the reign of Edward 
(211) 
the Third where it was held that the king could not ex-
cuse a person under a duty to repair a bridge from performing 
(212 ) 
that duty. This decision was later construed to have 
laid down a principle that 
1... the reason of the common law ... allows many 
prerogatives to the king, yet it will never suffer 
them to hurt others. And therefore ... if a bridge 
is repairable by a subject, and it falls to decay, 
and the king pardons him from repairing it, yet this 
shall not excuse him, but he shall repair it not-
withstanding, because others, viz all the subjects of 
the realm have an interest in it'. 
Coke elaborated upon the principle in the Case of the 
Pardons (1609):( 2 1 3 ) 
'Nota, the law so regards the public weal, that 
although in actions popular the King shall have the 
suit solely in his own name for the redress of it, 
yet by his pardon he cannot discharge the offender, 
for this, that it is not only in prejudice of the 
King but in damage of the subjects ... as if a man 
ought to repair a bridge, and 'for default of repara-
tion it falls into decay : in this case the suit 
ought to be in the name of the King, and the King is 
the sole party to the suit, but for the benefit of his 
subjects'. 
Since the failure to repair a bridge was liable to presentment 
(214 ) 
in the leet as a common nuisance, the principle here 
formulated applied to all common nuisances, a proposition 
. . (215 "> 
enunciated in 1618 m Dewell v Sanders ' and more fully 
(211) Cited The Case of the Mines (1567) Plowden 319 at 334; 
The Case of the Pardons (1609) 12 Co Rep 30. 
(212) Nichols v Nichols (1576) 2 Plowden 477 at 487. 
(213) (1609) 12 /Co Rep 30. 
(214) A bridge being part and parcel of the king's highway. 
(215) (1518) Cro Jac 490 at 491: '...a common nuisance is 
to the prejudice of all people, and it is a continuing 
offence, and cannot be dispensed with.... ' 
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( 2*i c \ 
by Vaughan C J in the leading case of Thomas v Sorrell T 
'The King cannot dispense with a nuisance to the 
highways by 11 H 7,(217) and consequently, as some 
think, with no other publique nuisance, by Sir Edward 
Coke. For all common nuisances, as not repairing 
bridges, high-ways etc. the suit is the Kings', but 
he cannot pardon or discharge the nuisance or the 
suit for the same, the highways being necessary to 
support such of his subjects as are occasioned to 
travel them....' 
This developing idea that a common nuisance was a com-
plaint by the king brought on behalf of the public was linked '. 
with a concurrent development involving the differentiation 
of the 'private' and 'public' interests affected by nocumenta. 
This came about as a result of attempts to differentiate the 
jurisdiction of the courts leet and the courts of common pleas 
wherein actions by way of the Assize of Nuisance or upon the 
Case were heard. 
Leet jurisdiction 
It is probable that at the early stages the' jurors and 
lay judges of tcurn and leet would have dealt with cases in 
which an individual complained to the leet of harm caused 
(218) 
to him by a common nuisance. ' However by the reign of 
Henry IV the principle seems to have been established that 
the leet could not accept presentments of nocumenta which 
. (219) . (220) 
harmed only 'private interests'. A case m 1411 
held that the laying of dung or ordure against a man's wall 
was not presentable 'because it concerns private interest'. 
(216) (1674) Vaughan 330 at 339. 
(217) Above n 210. 
(218) See eg Leet Jurisdiction in Norwich (5 Selden Socy) 8 
where there is an instance of a presentment by a leet 
of one who constructed a watercourse 'to the nuisance 
of his neighbour, the aforesaid William'. 
(219) Nicholls in his translation of Britton reproduces (at 
40 3) a note from the manuscript which reads as follows: 
'It should be known that the sheriff ought not to re-
dress any nuisance presented at his tourn, if it be not 
wrongful and injurious to the community [a commune des 
gentz]. For nuisance done to a single person shall be 
redressed by a single suit and not otherwise'. 
(220) 2 Rolle Abr 83 pi 9. 
84. 
So also it was held that nuisances committed against the 
common lands of a vill could not be presented at the leet 
(221) 
since 'it is private, of which the Assize lies'. A 
(222 ) 
similar case is more fully reported from the year 14-12. 
The abbot of Rievaux was presented at the sheriff's tourn for 
allowing a water course to become so obstructed that the 
waters over-flowed 'ad commune nocumentum villatorium pre-
dictorum'. According to the report 'the present king [Henry 
IV] caused this presentment to come before him for determina-
tion' . It was held that since the presentment referred to 
the nuisance as caused 'to the townships', the proper remedy 
was an 'individual action by the said townships [which] is 
available by the law of the land against the abbot'. The 
matter was thus not one for the tourn since there 'the king 
does not take action except in the case of a common public 
nuisance [nocumento communi populari]' which was not what 
was charged by the juror's presentment. 
The principle stated in these decisions was institu-
tionalized in the sixteenth century in treatises, dealing 
(223 ) 
with the jurisdictions of the courts leet. 
Kitchin in expounding the jurisdiction of the courts 
leet repeated that presentments for the enclosure of common 
.(224) 
lands of the vill could not lie and also pointed out 
that while injuries made in the highway were presentable at 
the leet there could be no presentment of 'injuries in private 
(221) 2 Rolle Abr 83 pi 8. Cf Mary's case (1612) 9 Co Rep 
111b where the case is explained on the basis that there 
was here 'a private wrong to the particular inhabitants 
of this particular town, and no public common nuisance'. 
(222) Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench (88 Selden 
Socy) 211. 
(223) The first and most influential work in this connection 
was that of the 'methodically learned John Kitchin of 
1 Grays Inn Esquire and Double reader'. His work 
appeared in 1580 under the title le Court Leet et Court 
Baron .... In 1605 it appeared in an English transla-
tion Jurisdictions, or the Lawful authority of the Court 
Leet, Courts Baron, Court of Marshalsey, Courts of Pye-
powder and Ancient Desmesne. Altogether the book ran 
into some fourteen editions, the last appearing in 1675. 
See Webb Manor and Borough 10; Holdsworth 4 HEL 120 n 2. 
(224) Jurisdictions 46. 
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wayes; but the Party grieved shall have an Assize of Nui-
( o 9 c ) 
sance, or an action on the case....' So too, if 'one 
sow may private way to my meadow, I shall have an Assize of 
/ r\ r\ n \ 
Nuisance, and it is not presentable in Leet'. 
i(2?7) 
In 1588 it was argued m William Willoughby's case 
that there could be no presentment of one who had enclosed 
land in which others had a right of common 'because it con-
cerneth only the interests of particular persons, and was no 
common nuisance to the Queen's people and it concerning a 
private commodity of certain persons, and not of the Queen 
or her people in general, the parties grieved are to have 
their action upon the case....' And in Evington v Brimston 
(228) 
(1593) it was held by the court that one who had been 
presented for leaving a gate open 'ad nocumentum inhabitum' 
could not be properly amerced since 
'this is not a nuisance enquirable; for it is a 
private injury'. 
(229 ) 
So too in Dewell v Sanders (1618) it was held that the 
nuisance caused by doves from a dove-cot erected by a-land-
holder could not be presented at the leet 
'for nothing is enquirable there and punishable, 
but that which is a common nuisance to all people; 
but this erecting a dove-house cannot be a nuisance 
but to those only whose corn they eat, and not to 
all persons; and therefore no common nuisance en-
quirable there'. 
Underlying the insistence that the Leet exercised juris-
diction only in respect of common nuisances was the proposi-
tion insisted on especially by the treatise writers of the 
(225) op cit 69. 
(226) Ibid. 
(227) (1588) Cro Eliz 90. 
(228) (1593) Moo. KB 484.. ,. 
(229) (1618) Cro Jac 490. See also R v Dickenson (1680) 
1 Wm Saunders 13 5: '... the court leet can amerce for 
none but public nuisances, and not for a particular 




sixteenth century, that the leet was part of the 
(231) 
system of royal courts. 
(232) 
Thus Kxtchxn saxd, the stopping of the royal, high-
way was enquireable at the leet 
'for that is a common annoyance to all the subjects 
of the Queen'. 
On the other hand nocumenta perpetrated against the common 
lands of the vill could not be presented in the leet and 
should be tried in the Court Baron because, Kitchin said 
(233) 
(234) 
there was 'no common annoyance'. Hearnshaw explains 
Kitchin's distinction thus: 'The court leet was regarded, 
not as the court of the community of the manor or borough, 
but as the king's court for the community of the manor or 
borough. Thus the offences over which it had jurisdiction 
were not those done to the community, qua community, but to 
the community as composed of the subjects of the king'. 
In short the point made by Kitchin was that nocumenta 
were presentable in the leet only if they affected 'public' 
• . . (235) ' 
xnterests. 
(236) 
The Common law judges agreed with this. In Hayward's 
(237 ) 
case (1589) an indictment for obstructing the public 
highway 'ad nocumentum diversorum liegorum dominae regnae' was 
held bad 'because it was not "all the Queen's liege people"'. 
(230) Cf Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiction in England 37-8. 
(231) A principle which followed from the fact that the leet 
was the successor to the sheriff's tourn and the tourn 
was ab initio one of the royal courts. See Hearnshaw 
op cit 37-8. Cf Holdsworth 4 HEL 130. 
(232) Jurisdictions 45. 
(233) Jurisdictions 46. 
(234) op cit 111. 
(235) '[Djid a matter concern the whole resiant community of 
the king's subjects, then it was a leet matter; did it 
merely concern some section, large or small, then it 
was not a leet matter, and a remedy must be sought else-
where'*. Hearnshaw op cit 97. 
(236) The common law courts had jurisdiction to review pro-
ceedings of the leet courts. See Dawson Lay Judges 
257//. 
(237) (1589) Cro Eliz 148. 
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( 2 3 8 ) 
I n Hughe[s case (1618) an indictment that a nuisance was 
'ad grave nocumentum' was quashed because it did not say 
(239) 
'omnium ligeorum dommi regis'. In Pratt v Stearn (1614-) 
a presentment was said to be bad because it 
'doth not say in the presentment that it was 
ad nocumentum legiorum domini regis; which ought, 
to be in every presentment : and although the party 
hath here averred that it was ad commune nocumentum, 
yet that is not sufficient....' 
Assize Jurisdiction 
The nature of the concept of common nuisance is further 
elucidated by the question whether an action could lie under 
the Assize (or the action on the Case) for a nuisance which 
, , • (240) 
was a 'common' nuisance. 
The early rule, as we have seen, was that such an action 
(2i+l) 
could lie. This was so really because there was at 
that time no distinct idea that a nuisance might be common or 
public. Rather the attitude was that where a nuisance affec-
ted many each party so injured might severally bring an ac-
tion. 
The effect of this rule was however that a person per-
petrating a common nuisance was likely to be exposed to a 
multiplicity of private actions for damages, the only limita-
tion on his liability being the factual consideration that 
each plaintiff must be able to show that his freehold was in-
jured or, in actions in case, that he had suffered damage. 
(238) (1618) 2 Rolle Abr Indictment 83 pi 10. 
(239) (1614) Cro Jac 382. 
(240) For this purpose 'common' nuisances were usually only . 
those involving purprestures upon public highways. 
There seems to be no case in which a party attempted 
to sue under the Assize for one of the common nuisances 
developed by the Leets as, for example, scolding or 
eavesdropping. 
(241) Above 26. Cf Loengard Free Tenements 246. Kiralfy 
Action on the Case 69 cites a case of 1354 'which has 
the elements of a private action for public nuisance for 
dumping offal on a quay....' He notes too that 'in the 
time of Edward III and Richard II Registers of Writs 
gave an action for sinking a ship by a nuisance to navi-
gation' . 
88. 
This consideration seems to have led to the emergence, 
in the fifteenth century, of a rule that there could be no 
civil action for a nocumentum which was liable to present-
(24-2 ) ment at the leet or tourn. The rule was stated by 
(243) 
Heydon J in 1466 in these terms: 
'if there be a common way which is not repaired, 
so that I am damaged by the miring of my horse, I . 
shall never have an action against him who ought to 
repair the way, but the complaint is concerning a 
matter which affects the public; and in such a case 
no man shall have his action for this , but the remedy 
is by way of presentment'. 
This principle is found repeated in 1535 in Sowthall v 
(244) Dagger by Baldwin CJ who explained the reason why an 
action on the case could not lie for a stoppage of the king's 
highway 
'for the king has the punishment of that, and he 
[plaintiff] has his plaint in the leet and there his 
redress, because it is a common nuisance to all the 
king's lieges, and so there is no reason for a private 
particular person to have an action sur son cas, for 
if one person shall have an action for this'by the 
same reason every person shall have an action, and so 
he will be punished a hundred times on the same case1. 
The rule that a private individual could not sue in the 
Assize or by the action on the case for a nocumentum which 
was a 'common' nuisance became firmly established in the com-
(24-5 ) „ 
mon law. The most comprehensive statement of the rule 
is found in Robert Mary's case (1612) where it was said: 
(242) (1410) YB 11 Hen 4 pi 28; (1455) YB 33 Hen 6 f26 pi 10; 
(1463) 2 Ed 4 /9 pi 2. 
(243) (1466) YB 5 Ed 4 pi 24 (cited Holdsworth l'O.HEL 314). 
(244) (1535) YB 27 Hen 8 pi 10 /27 (cited sub nom Anonymous 
Fifoot History and Sources 98; see also Holdsworth 10 
HEL 424T! Kiralfy Action~on the Case 69 identifies the 
case and (at 210) reproduced the pleadings. 
(245) 'A man shall not have an action on the case for a nuisance 
done in the highway, for it is a common nuisance': 
William's case (1592) 5 Co Rep 72b. See also Fineux v 
Hovenden (1599) Cro Eliz 664; Cf 'Co Lift 56b. 
(246) (1612) 9 Co Rep 111b. 
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1... for a nuisance in a highway without special 
damage/24 7) none shall have a private action, for it 
is not damnum privatum, but damnum commune, and there-
fore ought to be only punished and reformed at the 
King's suit; for a public nuisance shall not be re-
formed at the suit of a private party; but privatum 
damnum sive nocumentum shall be reformed by the action 
of the private party grieved, and commune nocumentum 
at the suit of the King who is the head of the whole 
commonwealth'. 
Classification 
By the end of the sixteenth century then there existed 
ample authority for a proposition that certain nocumenta were' 
in their nature such as to affect the public at large and as 
such were properly redressed by an action brought in the court 
leet, such action being in the name of the Crown and on the 
public behalf. 
The only attempt to establish a formal classification of 
nocumenta at this time was that of Coke who, in his Insti :*\ 
.. . (248) , . , . . , .. . tutes, laid it down that 
'Nocumentum est triplex; 1. publicum sive generale. 
2. Commune. 3. Privatum sive speciale. Publicum, 
ad nocumentum totius regni; commune, ad commune nocu-
mentum transeuntium; privatum, to a house, a mill 
"etc.C24y) ' 
(247) Where a private person suffered special damage from the 
common nuisance he was allowed an action. This excep-
tion (discussed below 145-8)stems from Sowthall v Dagger 
(1535) (above n 244). It was much relied upon by 
Vaughan CJ in Thomas v Sorrell (1674) Vaughan 330 as the 
ratio for the doctrine that the crown could not dispense 
with a common nuisance: '... the reason is,because the 
parties particularly damaged by a nuisance, have their 
actions on the case for this damage, whereof the King 
cannot deprive them by this dispensation1 (at 335) 
'... the reason why the King cannot dispense in such 
cases, is, not only as nuisances are contra bonum publi-
corum, but because if a dispensation might make it law-
ful to do a nuisance ... the person damaged by it would 
be deprived of his action, for an action cannot lye for 
doing that which was lawfully done' (at 3 41). 
(248) 2 Inst 406. 
(249) This tripartite division may have been suggested by the 
classification of the 'nuisances of the forest' by John 
Manwood in his Treatise of Forest Law (1580) Chap 17 s 2 
(on forest law see above 7 n 25): 
(continued on next page) 
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This formulation is significant as indicating the 
recognition of what would become the traditional distinction 
between public and private nuisances. The division of the 
former category into nuisances 'commune' and 'publicum' 
would seem to be a piece of medieval pedantry '" which was 
( 1} r A \ 
to be discarded in later centuries. 
(249) (continued) 
Of nuisances of the forest, there are three sorts of 
them: The first is called Nocumentum commune, or 
common nuisance; and this sort of nuisance or annoy-
ance is that, which is a general hurt or annoyance, 
as well unto all the inhabitants or dwellers within 
the forest ... as for example, if any man that ought 
to make or repair any bridge ... for common passage 
... so that by reason thereof men cannot have their 
passage in the common highway.... 
The second sort of nuisance is called nocumentum 
speciale, or special nuisance, because this sort of 
nuisance tendeth especially ad nocumentum ferarum.... 
The third sort of nuisance or annoyance may well be 
called Nocumentum generale, because it stretcheth to 
the general hurt and annoyance of the whole forest.... 
(250) Cf Garrett Nuisances 1: 'The distinction between the 
first two classes would seem arbitrary, being a question 
of degree, and not one of principle'. Certainly it is 
not quite clear what exactly was the distinction between 
these two species of nocumentum. The terminology has 
overtones of the Romanistic distinction between res 
communes and res publicae which Bracton had taken over 
T//7-8) and which was repeated by Britton (2.2.1) and 
Fleta (3.1. (89 Selden Socy 1)). In the cases the terms 
are often used as synonyms (see eg Mary's case above ad 
n 246). In the eighteenth century the distinction seems 
to have been more clearly realised, perhaps under the 
influence of Coke's trichotomy: thus in R v Saintiff 
(1705) 6 Mod 256 there is a dictum by Holt CJ that 
'the word "publicus", which is of wider extent than 
"communis", for there is common for two, three or more; 
and It will be hard to understand the word "common" to 
be universal....' This suggests that a public nuisance 
was that which was universal while a common nuisance 
was that which affected more than one person but not 
all people. Cf R v White and Ward (1757) 1 Burr 333 at 
33 6 where counsel remark that 'this indictment of ours 
is laid extensively enough to be a common nuisance; 
though not a public one : nor did it, in fact, affect 
other persons than those living and passing by. 
(251) See below 218. 
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C H A P. T E R . T. H R E E 
ELABORATION: PRIVATE NUISANCE (1500-17 00) 
1. Introduction 
By the seventeenth century the premier remedy for the 
redress of nocumenta was the Action on the Case for Nui-
(1) . . (2) 
sance. Conceptually this action was an action m tort 
providing redress in damages only. As such it differed in 
character and purpose from the Assize of Nuisance which was a 
(1) Cf above 65-6. The Assize of Nuisance slipped into 
desuetude (cf n 66 below) and was finally abolished 
(together with the writ quod permittat and the Assize of 
Novel Disseisin) in 1834 by the Real Property Limitation 
Act 3 & 4 Will 4 sec 3 6 (on-which see Maitland The Forms 
of Action 6, 65). 
(2) Technically the -action on the Case (for nuisance) was an 
action for trespass (see above 58-61) and as such falls 
to be classified as a tort action. The distinction be-
tween the action for nuisance and the action for direct 
trespass (trespass to land) was not always clear. The 
action for trespass to land required that the wrong be 
done 'vi et armis' and 'contra pacem'. It came to be 
realised that where a man, for instance, broke a dam wall 
on his own land so that his neighbour's property was 
flooded it could not be said that he had acted 'vi et 
armis' or 'contra pacem' and thus that the appropriate 
form of action in this situation was the action upon the 
Case for nuisance rather than the action for trespass 
(see' Shury v Pigot (1625) Poph 166 per Doderidge J; 
Preston v Mercer (165 6) Hard 60. Cf Kiralfy Action on the 
Case 58). The distinction between the two forms of action 
was thus said to be in the' question whether. the damage 
suffered was direct or consequential: 'Trespass upon the 
case, and trespass vi et armis, are different in name and 
their nature; for the one [trespass upon the case] is 
called an action for a nuisance and the other are [sic] 
called actiones injuriarum; the one [trespass vi et a*rmis] 
must be brought for a wrong done immediately to the per-
son or his possession, the other for consequential 
damage.... If logs are laid in the highway by which a 
person is hurt, he must bring case; but if the hurt is 
received by logs thrown at the person, he must bring 
trespass vi et armis' (per Fortesque J in Reynolds v 
Clark (172 5) 8 Mod 2 72). 
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real action providing a remedy by way of abatement of nui-
(3) 
sances. Yet for all this the concept of nuisance under 
case 'though enlarged in scope, retained its original charac-
(4) • 
ter'. It retained its original character because the 
action on the Case was essentially parasitical in nature. 
evolving and developing on the fringes of the existing forms 
(5 ) 
of action. At the same time, under the regime of case, 
the nuisance concept enlarged its scope, mainly because the 
. ction on the Case allowed for novelty in the framing of 
( 6 ) 
causes of action, a feature fully exploited in the seven-
teenth century as a new social and economic milieu threw up 
new ideas as • 
land-holding. 
new ideas as to the nature of the amenities attached to 
(7) 
2. The Nuisance Action under the regime of Case .. 
2.1. Introduction 
The action on the Case for Nuisance was the earliest 
(8 ) 
example of an action upon the case, evolving,- as we have 
(9) . 
seen, to supplement the existing remedy of the Assize of 
Nuisance. Consequently it tended to develop by way of an-
alogy derived from the Assize of Nuisance. Actions on the 
(3) See Kendrick v Bartland (1679) 2 Mod Rep 253 where the 
Court of Common Pleas 
'took this difference between a quod permittat or an 
assise for nuisance, and an action on the case for 
the same; for the end of a quod permittat or an 
assise was to abate the nuisance, but the end of an 
action on the case was to recover damages'. 
(4) Fifoot History and Sources 95. 
(5) See below 93. 
(6) Kiralfy Action on the Case 9. Cf Fifoot op cit Chap 4. 
(7) Below 109, 115. 
(8) Kiralfy op cit 44. Cf at 17. 
(9) Above 58-62. 
(10) The use of analogy in formulating actions upon the Case 
was one of the chief features of the development of the 
remedy (Kiralfy op cit 15-16). 'It is' Kiralfy writes 
(ibid) 'this element of Analogy which prevented the Action 
on the Case from becoming a real entity, with general 
rules common to all its forms and differing from those 
applicable to all other forms of action. Almost the only 
sign of an action on the case, is the "quod cum" or 
"quare cum" of the writ [cf above 59] ....' 
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of nuisance' while declarations were drafted in imita 
tion of the various nuisance writs 
Thus it is that under the regime of case we find many 
of the familiar medieval types of wrong doing being redressed: 
actions on the case for nuisance are brought for the diversion 
(13) 
of water-courses; the obstruction or narrowing of rights 
(14) 
of way; the interference with the franchises of markets, 
- • A ~ (15) fairs and ferrys. 
So too the action on the Case for Nuisance required that 
the plaintiff should prove damage in order to be entitled to 
redress. And, as under the Assize of Nuisance, damage 
only gave a cause of action if it was of a type which the 
(17) 
law deemed to be wrongful. 
(11) As in Stapelton's Case (1355) YB 29 Ed 3 / 32 (cited 
Kiralfy op cit 15). 
(12) See Kiralfy op cit 63-4 for examples. 
(13) Kiralfy op cit 67. See also Russell and Hanford's Case 
(1583) 1 Leo 273 and the discussion below,139. 
(14) Kiralfy op cit 65-6. Cf above 63-5. 
(15) See Baker English Legal History 242-3. See The Prior of 
St Nedeport's Case (1443) YB 2? Hen 6 / 1 4 prTTTrepro-
duced in Fifoot History and Sources 96) and Yard v Ford 
(1670) 2 Wms Sand 172 where the medieval rules (above 
4 7-8) are substantially repeated. 
(16) Being an action for damages this was a natural element of 
the action on the case. See Kiralfy Action on the Case 
12-14 for a discussion of damage as an element of actions 
on the case. The early examples of actions on the case 
'in the manner of nuisance' being usually brought on the 
grounds of non-feasance, the element of damage received 
especial emphasis. See the cases cited by Kiralfy op cit 
ibid. On the action for 'special' damages arising from 
a public nuisance see below 145-8. 
(17) See Fitzherbert Natura Brevium 184A(a): '... Case does 
not lie, nor an Assize of Nuisance where it is damnum sine 
injuria'. Fitzherbert cites as authority the famous " 
Gloucester Grammar School Case (1410) YB 11 Hen 4 /47' pi 
21. There it was held that no action could lie in re-
spect of a school set up in competition to an existing 
school with the result that the plaintiffs lost income. 
Hankford J in rejecting the action observed that 'Damnum 
may be absque injuria, as if I have a mill and my neigh-
bour build another mill, whereby the profit of my mill is 
diminished, I shall have no action against him though it 
is damage to me.....' Cf the unreported Serjeant Jeffreys 
(continued on the next page) 
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2.2. The Rules of Liability 
2.2.1. Introduction 
The action on the case was developed for the specific 
purpose of supplementing the defects of the old forms of 
action. In the field of nuisance these defects were that the 
(18 ) 
Assize was not available to one who was not a freeholder, 
nor did it lie at the instance of a freeholder who was not the 
. . . . . (19) 
original victim of the nuisance. So, also, it did not lie 
against one who was not the actual author of the nuisance. 
One of the significant features of the action on the case for 
nuisance was the way in which it came to redress these defects 
in the law. 
2.2.2. Availability of the Action on the Case 
Generally 
By the seventeenth century there was no evidence of the 
old principle that the action for nuisance lay 'only for those 
who were the holders of a free tenement. In order to succeed 
(17) (continued) 
Case (c 1470)(cited Baker English Legal History 241 n 9) 
in which a Serjeant at law brought an action on the case 
against a schoolmaster because the "gabber de boys" 
disturbed the quiet of his chambers. The action failed 
'apparently on the ground that it was lawful to set up a 
school anywhere' (Baker op cit 241). Generally on wrong-
fulness as an element of Actions on the Case see Kiralfy 
op cit 9-1.2. 
(18) Above 53. 
(19) Above 51. 
(20) Above 52. 
(21) The action on the Case was allowed to a lessee (by defi-
nition a non-freeholder (see 54 above) as early as 1469 
(see YB 9 Ed 4 ;f35 pi 10) . The landlord was allowed his 
action on the case where the nuisance threatened his re-
versionary Interest (as for example where the defendant 
by befouling waters caused the plaintiff's tenants to 
leave his houses: The Prior of Southwark's Case (149 8) 
YB 13 Hen 7 j 26 pi 4 reproduced Fifoot op cit 87) see 
Bedingfieid v Onslow (1685) 3 Lev 209 where It is held 
that an action on the case for a nuisance could lie at 
the instance of the landlord 'in respect of the prejudice 
done to the reversion' and of his tenant 'in respect of 
the possession'.' 
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in an action on the case the plaintiff had- to show only that 
(22 ) 
he was entitled to the property affected by the nuisance; . 
the nuisance; -the fact thatithe defendant had caused the 
nuisance;, and the damage suffered. 
The Authorship of the Nuisance 
Plainly the defendant in order to be held liable had to 
have created the nuisance. Under the regime of the Assize 
of Nuisance this elementary proposition had led to the rule 
that a successor in title to the author of the nuisance could 
not be sued since he could not be said to have created the 
(23) 
nuisance. 
This proposition was abandoned under the regime of the 
action of the case, the judges invoking the concept of a 
nuisance as a 'continuing' harm to achieve this end. In 
essence this involved the finding that where a structure or 
thing which caused nuisance damage was not abated but allowed 
(24) 
to continue to cause harm, then each day it continued pro-
vided a fresh cause of action for which the plaintiff could 
(25 ) 
bring successive actions. On this basis it then became 
possible to say that where the author of the nuisance alienated 
the premises to another, that other could be sued in case, not 
( ? fi ) 
for the erection of the nuisance but for the continuance. (22) Cf Comyns Digest 'Action upon the case for Nuisance' 
E(l): 'In an action upon the case for a"nuisance, the 
plaintiff must show himself entitled"to the thing, to 
which the nusans was done, at the time of the nusans'. 
(23) Above 51. 
(24) This became a common situation under the regime of case 
since the action resulted only in an award of damages 
only, no order of abatement (as was the case under the 
Asize process (above 55 ) being made. Thus unless the 
plaintiff resorted to one of the ancilliary remedies 
(for which see below 101) the defendant was free to pay his 
damages and allow the offending thing to remain in situ. 
The usual example of this was a house or other building 
erected to the nuisance of 'ancient' lights (below 120). 
It is noteworthy that it is mainly connected with this 
type of nuisance that the equitable remedy by way of in-
junction evolved (see below 232). 
(25) See below 26. 
(26) Cf Beswick v Cunden cited.below n.43. 
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Liability of Successors in title to the author of the 
nuisance 
(27) 
:. In Moore v Browne (1572) the defendant, the heir of 
her deceased husband, was sued for the diversion of a water-
(28) 
course. The 'diversion' took the form of drawing water 
from a tap in a conduit, the tap having been inserted by the 
deceased husband. The defendant argued that she could not be 
sued since 'she was not the first who diverted' but it was 
held that since she had used the tap 'that may be called in 
her a new diversion'. 
This decision reflects a judicial tendency to find in 
the conduct of the successor in title to the author of the 
nuisance or in the actual state affairs something which could 
be seen to constitute a 'fresh' nuisance and thus to give the 
(29) 
plaintiff a 'fresh' cause of action. This is perhaps 
(27) (1527) 3 Dyer 319; Ben 215. 
(28) Under the Assize of Nuisance as extended by the Statute 
of Westminster II an action would have lain against the 
wife and the husband had he still been alive (see above 
52 ). It is noteworthy that in Moore v Browne nothing 
was made of the fact that the husband was deceased, a 
clear indication that the old rule was no longer con-
sidered applicable. 
(29) Perhaps the seminal instance of this practice is the 
early case of Daulby v Berch (1331) (4 Ed 3 f36 cont 5 
Ed 3 /43 pi 36 cited Liber Assize anno 4 / 6 pi 3 (see 
Rich v Basterfield (1847) 4 C B 783 at 805 n (a)). The 
case is quoted by Gale Easements 489). There it was held 
that a writ quod permittat prosternere could lie against 
the son and heir of he who erected a lime-kiln which 
damaged the plaintiff's fruit trees. Herle J said that' 
"It might be he [the father] had the kiln there, but 
did not use it, and the tort began with the user; 
or that the tort was begun, and then discontinued, 
and renewed again, after he was possessed of the frank 
tenement; and then he shall have his assize. Thus, 
if my father had a right of way, which was stopped by 
hedge or by a ditch levied across it, and the tort was 
submitted to without debate all the lifetime of my 
father, and after his death I find the way open, and 
'enter and use it, and am afterwards disturbed by the 
feoffee of him who levied the hedge, I shall have an 
assize of nuisance. 
"So here, although we have the kiln before, etc., and 
the tort begun, if afterwards such tort be discontinued, 
and then in his [plaintiff's] time it begin [again] to 
burn, he shall have an action for such tort". 
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best seen in Penruddock's case (159 8) where a house had 
been!-built with eaves overhanging adjoining land so that the 
rain fell upon the plaintiff's roof. It was held that the 
plaintiff could have his remedy against the defendant, who was 
the successor in title to the man who built the house, because 
'the dropping of the water in the time of the [successor in 
title] is a new wrong'. 
Liability of Lessees 
The question of the liability of a successor in title 
to be sued for nuisances created by the predecessor in title 
turned essentially upon the consideration whether one who was 
not the author of a nuisance could be sued for the damage 
caused by the nuisance. The question arose in this form in 
the situation in which the lessee of premises was sued in re-
spect of damage caused by a nuisance not created by him but 
existing upon the premises at the time he came into occupa-
tion. 
(32) 
The question appears to have first arisen in Ryppon 
(33) v Bowles (1615). There the defendant became the tenant of 
premises upon which there was a structure, previously erected 
by the landlord, which obscured the lights of the plaintiff's 
house. The plaintiff brought an action on the Case and the 
defendant argued 
(30) (1598) 5 Co Rep 100b. The case actually involved a writ 
of quod permittat prosternere, but this does not affect 
the principle involved. 
(31) In Penruddock's case the court cited Rolfe v Rolfe (15 82) 
.(unreported) where on.^essentially similar facts 
'it was adjudged that the action was maintainable, 
because the def. on request made, did not reform 
the nuisance which his father made, but suffered it 
to continue to the prejudice and damage of the 
plaintiff, son and heir to him to whom the wrong was* 
done'. 
This suggests that the defendant's liability rested upon 
his failure to abate the nuisance when requested to do 
so. Cf below 105. 
(32) Under the Assize a lessee could not be sued (per Danby J 
in (1496) YB 9 Ed 4 pi 10 / 35). Neither of course would 
the Assize be in favour of a lessee, since he was not a 
free-holder (see above 54). 
(33) (1615) Cro Jac 374. 
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'that this action lies not against the defendant, 
for although an action lies against him who erected 
it (as was agreed by all the court) yet against the 
defendant, who is only for years, and inhabits only 
therein, and who hath committed no other act to preju-
dice the plaintiff, and who hath not authority to a-
bate it (but if he should, would be chargeable in an 
action of waste), the action is not maintainable 
against him'.(34) 
No judgment was given on this argument the report merely 
noting that 'to that opinion Coke, Chief Justice, inclined; 
though the other justices doubted therein'. The point came up 
(35 ) 
again in 1619 in Brent v Haddon. There the owner of land 
erected on it a mill weir which caused the plaintiff's meadow 
to be flooded. Thereafter the mill was let to the defendant 
Haddon who was sued in an action on the case for the nuisance. 
The defendant argued that the action should not lie against 
him since 'he hath not authority to abate it, being done in 
the time of his lessor ... nor was it any nuisance erected by 
him'. This time though the court was certain of its view, 
and allowed the action 
'for the continuance is a nuisance by him, against 
whom the action well lies'. 
These cases were followed by that of Roseweil v Prior 
(1701) which still stands as a definitive decision. The case 
arose from the erection of a building which obscured the 
plaintiff's ancient lights. This was held to constitute a 
nuisance and judgment was given for the plaintiff. There-
after the defendant leased his premises to one Shuttleworth 
without abating the nuisance. The plaintiff thereupon insti-
(37 ) 
tuted a fresh action (on the case), not against Shuttle-
worth, but against the lessor Prior. What was unusual about 
(34) Defendant also made the point that there was no continuing 
of the nuisance by him as in Moore v 'Browne (supra n 27). 
(35) (1619) Cro Jac 555. 
(36) Roseweil v Prior (1701) 6 Mod 117; Comb 481; 2 Salk 459; 
1 Ld Raymond 3 92. According to Lord Raymond's report of 
the case the matter was argued 'two or three times' and 
the court held for the plaintiff after 'great consideration1 
( 3 7 ) Roseweil v Prior (1701) 12 Mod 635; 2 Ld Raymond 713; 
2 Salk 460. This case too 'was often argued': 12 Mod 
635 cf 2 Ld Raymond 713. 
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this was that the action was brought against the defendant 
who though creator of the nuisance, was not the occupier of 
the premises. -And, as the one report of the case puts it, 
'whether it lay? was the question, which was often argued1. 
The defendant advanced four main contentions: 1 That 
the action properly lay against the tenant in occupation 
(citing Ryppon v Bowies and Brent v Haddon), 2. That the quod 
permittat would lie against the tenant (although not an Assize) 
and this rule 'will govern the present case, being an action 
on the case', 3 That the defendant although creator could 
not be liable for the continuance of the nuisance by the 
tenant. 4 That if he was liable as creator, his liability 
had been discharged by the damages awarded in the first action. 
The plaintiff replied that by erecting the nuisance and 
then leasing the premises, the defendant had continued the 
(38 ) nuisance. Further, that there could be no action against 
Shuttleworth who, on the authority of Ryppon v Bowles, could 
not abate the nuisance. Also, that it was against the 'justice 
of the law' that the defendant be allowed to deprive the » 
plaintiff of his remedy by leasing over the premises. And, 
finally, that the defendant was in receipt of rent for the 
premises which amounted to a 'consideration of this nuisance' 
and it was thus only just that he should bear liability for 
it. 
The Court found for the plaintiff, holding the action 
well brought against the defendant as erector of -the nuisance 
'for before his assignment over he was liable for all 
consequential damages; and it shall not be in his 
power to discharge himself by granting it over; and 
more especially here, where he grants over receiving 
rent, whereby he agrees with the grantee that the nui-
sance should continue, and has a recompense, viz the 
rent, for the same .... And if a wrong-doer conveys 
his wrong over to another, whereby he puts it out of 
his power to redress it, he ought to answer for it.(39) 
(38) 'Erecting and continuance are several offences, and every 
day's continuance of the nuisance is a new nuisance; for 
it is the possession and usage of this nuisance, to the 
damage of another, is the cause of the action, and that 
is done by the [defendant].'(12 Mod 63 5 at 638). 
(39) 12 Mod 635 at 640. 
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However, although finding the defendant liable to have the 
action brought against him, the Court added that it could 
equally be brought against the lessee since it was his 'fault 
to contract for an interest in land on which there is a 
nuisance'. 
In the result then, it was the view of the Court that 
this action might have lain either against the lessor or the 
lessee 'the plaintiff having his election against which of 
them to bring it....' 
Successor in title as Plaintiff 
Under the Assize the action for nuisance would not lie 
at the instance of a plaintiff who was the successor in title 
to the original victim of the nuisance. In other words one 
who came to an already established nuisance could have no ac-
tion against the perpetrator. 
The reason for this rule was that the successor in title 
was not a freeholder at the time the nuisance was perpetrated 
(41 ) and thus could not bring the Assize. In the sixteenth 
century Gawdy J sought to overcome this technicality by holding 
that 
'an action of the case declareth the whole matter, so 
that it is not material when the nuisance was erected, 
for he that is hurt by it shall have an action.'^2) 
However the other judges approached the question more cautiously 
suggesting that the action could lie where the nuisance was of 
a continuing nature since 'the continuance of it after [the 
plaintiff obtained titlel is a new wrong for which the action 
lieth'.(43) 
(40) Above 5 2-3. The defendant's remedy lay in a writ quod 
permittat prosternere (see above 16-17). 
(41).See above 53. 
(42) Westbourne v Mordant (1590) Cro Eliz 191. 
(43) See the report of the same case (sub nom Westborn and 
Mordant's Case) in 3 Leonard 174. Cf 2 Leonard 103. A 
similar line was taken in Beswick v Cunden (1596) Cro Eliz 
402. There Clench and Fenner JJ upheld the old rule that 
'the tort before made is extinguished' by the conveyance 
(continued on the next page) 
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2.3. Abatement of Nuisances under the 
Regime of Oase . 
Since the action on the Case afforded a remedy in damages 
only and since the abatement of a nuisance was often the end 
desired by a victim of a nuisance there was an inevitable 
need in the seventeenth century for ancillary remedies for 
nuisance which brought about the abatement of the harmful 
state of affairs. 
Assize and Quod Permittat 
The action by way of the Assize of Nuisance was not for-
(44) 
mally abolished until 1834 and thus a plaintiff could al-
ways have recourse to this remedy when intent upon obtaining 
K H- + (45) abatement. 
Recourse to a writ of quod permittat prosternere was 
fairly common during the seventeenth century. The leading 
(47 ) 
case of this time was Penruddock's case (159 8) where it 
was held that the writ would lie against the author of a 
nuisance without any prior request made for the abatement of 
(43) (continued) 
to the plaintiff. Popham CJ argued that the question de-
pended upon whether the nuisance left any 'profit' to the 
land which could be conveyed over. If there was not 'none 
shall have the action but he to whom it was done'; but 
if there was 'and is taken ... by the continuing of the 
nuisance, they shall have their action'. (What appears to 
have been a different action between the same parties was 
heard by the Court of Common Pleas in Beswick v Cunden 
(1599) Cro Eliz 520. There the old rule seems to have 
been again upheld but the decision is not very satisfac-
tory (see the remarks in Gale Easements 493 (z). This 
was the case in which the Court of Common Pleas sought to 
repel the incursions of the Action on the Case upon the 
Assize of Nuisance (see above 64). 
(44) Above 91 n 1. 
(45) Blackstone writing in the eighteenth century (3 Commen-
taries 222) noted that both Assize of Nuisance and quod 
permittat prosternere 'have been long out' of use' but 
conceded that where 'a man has a very obstinate as well as 
ill-natured neighbour : who had rather continue to pay 
damages, than remove his nuisance ... in such a case in-
deed recourse was had to the old remedies, which did 
. effectually conquer the defendant's perversness, by 
sending the sheriff with his posse comitatus ... to 
level it'. 
(46) On which see above 16. 
(47) (1598) 5 Co Rep 100b. See also Baten's case (1610) 9 Co 
Rep 5 3b. 
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the nuisance. On the other hand, the writ would not lie 
against one who was not the author of the nuisance, but merely 
the occupier of the premises upon which the nuisance was, un-
til a request had been made (and refused) for the abatement of 
.^ • (48) 
the n u i s a n c e . 
Successive actions for damages 
Under the Assize of Nuisance a structure or thing found 
to be a nuisance was ordered abated. Since the action on the 
ase led to an award of damages only, there emerged under the 
regime of case the problem of the continuance of nuisance. 
That is to say that it might happen that plaintiffs who sued 
successfully under Case might find that the defendant, having 
paid the damages awarded, permitted the offending structure or 
thing to remain as before. 
To deal with this problem the judges developed the notion 
of the 'continuing' nuisance, drawing the distinction between 
the 'erecting' of the nuisance and the 'continuing' of it 
(i.e. the failure to abate it). A continuing nuisance, 
they said, gave a fresh cause of action, thereby placing 
the victim of an unabated nuisance in the position to bring 
successive actions for damages in order to compel the defen-
(51) dant to voluntarily abate the nuisance. 
(18) In Shalmer v Pulteney (169 6) 1 Ld Raym 2 77 it was held 
that the writ lay against any occupier who continued a 
nuisance, whatever the nature of his occupancy, 'for the 
prejudice to the plaintiff is the same'. Cf Palmer v 
Poultney (1696) 2 Salk 459. 
(49) Cf Beswick v Cunden (1595) Cro Eliz 402. There the de-
fendant erected a weir in a water-course which caused a 
permanent flooding of the plaintiff's meadows. The action 
lay, Gawdy J held, 'for the continuing of the first nui-
sance, [the flooding] but not for the levying thereof [the 
erection of the weir]'. See also on this case above 100 n 43. 
(50) Cf Penruddock's case (159 8) 5 Co Rep 100b where it was 
held that the defendant could sue in respect of overhang-
ing eaves of the defendant's roof because each time rain 
water dripped therefrom there was a fresh nuisance. (Cf 
Lord Holt in Fetter v Beale (1701) 1 Salk 117'Every new 
dropping is a new nuisance'). 
(51) Blackstone writing in the mid-eighteenth century expressed 
what was probably the law a century before: 
(continued on the next page) 
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Self-Help 
Medieval nuisance law contemplated self-help as a legi-
(52 
timate means of bringing about the abatement of a nuisance. 
The action under the Assize and the writ quod permittat, by 
establishing a judicial procedure for achieving the abatement 
(53 ) 
of nuisances, must have tended to diminish the need to 
resort to self-help. It is however plain that self-help never 
ceased to be recognised as a legitimate method of dealing with 
( 54 ) 
nuisances and, the demise of the old forms of action for 
judicial abatement in the seventeenth century saw something of 
a renaissance in the remedy by way of self-help. (51) (continued)
Indeed every continuance of a nuisance is held to be 
a fresh one [citing Beswick v Cunden (supra)];' and 
therefore a fresh action will lie, and very exemplary 
damages will probably be given, if, after verdict 
against him, the defendant has the hardiness to con-
tinue it .l 
This continued, and still continues, to be the principle 
of the English law. See e g Battishell v Reed (185'6) 
18 CB 69 6. 
(52) Above 55-6. 
(53) Cf above 5 6-7. 
(54) In 0469) YB 8 Ed 4 f 5 it was decided that 'if water runs 
through the land of M and he stops the water in his own 
close, so that it surrounds my land, I may enter on his 
close to remove the obstruction, and he shall not main-
tain an action'. In (1470) YB 9 Ed 4 f3S it was held 
that 'If a man makes a ditch in his land, by means of 
which the water which runs to my mill is diminished, I 
may myself fill up the ditch'. Rolle 2 Abr 'Nusans' (5) 
cites this case for a proposition that 'If a man in his 
own soil erects such a thing which is a nuisance to my 
mill, house or land etc I may stand in my own land and 
fling it down. So I may enter upon his soil and deject 
the nusance, and justify it in a writ of trespass'. 
In Raikes v Townsend (1804) 2 Smith KB 9 these placita 
were cited in an attempt to argue that the right to abate 
was restricted to mills, houses or land, but Lord Ellen-
borough CJ said that they 'are only put as instances' of 
the principle. 
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The right of the victim of a nuisance to resort to self-
help was asserted by Coke in the seventeenth century. 'No.ta 
(55 ) 
reader', he wrote in a note to Eaten's case (1610) 
'there are two ways to address [sic] a nusance, one 
by action, and in that he shall recover damages, and 
have judgment that the nusance shall be removed, cast 
down, or abated, as the case requires; or the party 
aggrieved may enter and abate the nusance himself...' 
/ r r- \ 
^n James v Hayward (1630) it was held that a private indi-
vidual might abate a nuisance to a public highway. In William-
(57) ' 
son v Coleman (1655) it was held that a man could justify 
the throwing down of a bank or the filling up of a ditch which 
obstructed his way to his common. In Howard v Fryth (1666) 
it was said that a nuisance to an 'ancient' water-course could 
(59 ) 
be abated by self-help. In hodie v Arnold (1697) it was 
held that a man could justify the pulling down of a house built 
across a way because it was a nuisance. In R v Rosewell 
(1699) it was said that if a man 'builds a house so near mine 
that it stops my lights, or shoots water upon my house, or 
is in any other way a nuisance to me, I may enter upon the 
i 
owner's soil and pull it down. 
In recognising the right to abate by self-help the judges 
displayed no great anxiety to contain the manner of exercise 
of the right.(61) In Lodie v Arnold(62)(1697) the defendant 
threw down a house and the materials rolled into the sea. The 
court viewed this with some equanimity observing that 
i 
when H has a right to abate a public nuisance, he is 
not bound to do it orderly, and with as little hurt, 
in abating it, as can be; and therefore was not answer-
able in this case for the rolling into the sea'.(63) 
(55) (1610) 9 Co Rep 53b. 
(5.6) (1630) Cro Car 184; W Jo 221. 
(57) (1655) Sty 470. 
(58) (1666) 2 Keb 58. 
(59) (1697) 2 Salk 458. 
(60) (1699) 2 Salk 459. 
(61) For the attitude in later centuries see below 
(62) (1697) 2 Salk 458. 
(63) It is not clear whether in Lodie v Arnold the nuisance 
complained of ('a house built across the way') was a 
(continued on the next page) 
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They did however insist that self-help could only be 
employed in respect of existing nuisances and could not be 
resorted to to prevent an anticipated nuisance. 
Further it seems that self-help could be resorted to 
without previous notice to the offending party, except 
where the premises had passed into other hands since the erec-
tion of the nuisance. 
(63) (continued) 
public nuisance or not. Certainly the rule there stated 
is usually said to apply to public nuisances. But there 
is no evidence of a special rule in the seventeenth cen-
tury applying to private nuisances. The nearest to such 
a principle is found in Comyn's Digest 'Action upon the 
Case for Nusance' (D4) where it is said 'Nor, cut down, 
or do any Damage ... in the Abatement, unless necessary'. 
For this James v Hayward (163 0) as reported in W Jones 
2 20 is cited. There it is reported that the court said 
that 'a nusance must be abated, in such a convenient 
manner as it can be: if a house be levied to nuisance 
- the whole house shall be abated; if a part, that part 
only shall be abated; but, as to the house, when the 
nuisance is abated, it is not lawful to destroy the 
materials, but they shall, after abatement, remain to the 
owners of them, and to him who did the nuisance'. James 
v Hayward was a case on the abatement of a public nui-
sance and these principles could be said.to apply only to 
the abatement of such nuisances. 
(64) See Morris v Baker (1616) 1 Roll Rep 393; 3 Bulst 196 
(sub nom Morrice v Baker). There it was held that a man 
could not lawfully cast down the scaffolding for the con-
struction of a house in anticipation of the fact that 
when erected the house would be a nuisance to the actor's 
premises. Croke J also let fall the dictum that 'If the 
branches of your trees grow over my land, I can cut them 
off, but I cannot justify cutting them off before they 
grow over my land because I have the fear of their doing 
so'. Cf R v Wharton (1701) 12 Mod 510 where Holt CJ is 
reported as saying rif one sees his neighbour erecting a 
thing which will be a nuisance, he cannot abate it till 
it becomes an actual nuisance'. 
(65) The authority usually cited for this is Penruddock's case 
(159 8) 5 Co Rep 100b (see e.g. Comyns Digest loc cit). 
There it was held that a writ of quod permittat prostec-
nere could lie against the author of a nuisance 'without 
any request made, for the law doth not require any request 
to be made to him who doth the wrong himself'. 
(66) This too derives from Penruddock's case where it was held 
that where the writ quod permittat was brought against the 
occupier of premises who was not the author of the nui-
sance abatement would only be ordered where he had been 
requested to 'reform' the nuisance and had failed or re-
fused to do so. 'Cf Brent v Haddon (1619) Cro Jac 555. 
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According to Coke the exercise of the right to abate by 
self-help destroyed any right of action for damages arising 
from the nuisance. In Kendrick v Bartland (167 9) how-
ever it was held that the action for damage lay in respect of 
the harm sustained before self-help was resorted to. 
Injunction 
In the Reports or Causes' in Chancery collected by Sir 
George Cary from 1557-1602 there appears a notation that 
where an action upon the case for a nusans and damages 
only are to be recovered, the party may have help here 
to remove or restore the thing itself'. 
In 1583 one Osburne brought a bill in the court of chancery 
'to be relieved of a nusance' committed by the erection of a 
(67) Baten's case (1610) 9 Co Rep 53b, where Coke after noting 
the existence of the remedy of self-help (cf above 103) 
adds , 
'but then he shall not have an action, nor recover 
damages, for in an assize of nuisance, or quod per-
mittat prosternere etc., it is a good plea, that the 
plaintiff himself either before the writ brought, or 
pending the writ, has abated the nuisance: for in an 
assize or quod permittat, he shall have judgment of 
two things, s_c to have the nusance abated, and to re-
cover damages [cf above 57.1, and he has disabled him-
self by his own act to have judgment for one of them 
sc to have the nusance abated, and therefore the ac-
tion does not lie.' 
This dictum of course states the law under the old Assize 
action and does not deal with the question whether the 
Action on the Case for Nuisance would likewise be pre-
cluded. Kendrick v Bartland (infra) allowed an action 
on the case in limited circumstances. 
(68) (1679) 2 Mod Rep 253. There the court after distinguish-
ing between action under the Assize and upon the Case said 
that as 'the end of an action on the case was to recover 
damages; therefore, though the nuisance was removed, 
the plaintiff is entitled to his damages that accrued be-
fore. ... ' This suggests partial acceptance of the rule 
laid down in Baten's case (supra). 
(69) Cary 20. 
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mill. The cause was dismissed because the plaintiff later 
proceeded by way of an Assize of Nuisance. In 1604 one 
(71) 
Swayne 'a professor of the law* brought his action for 
the interference with his mill in the court of chancery "and 
exception taken that the court should not hold plea thereof 
(sed contrarium adjudicatum) many causes of the same manner 
ended here'. 
These precedents mark the beginnings of what was to be-
come the most effective of all nuisance remedies, the issue 
• • • (72) (73) 
of an injunction out of a court of equity prohibiting 
the creation or continuance of a nuisance. The practice how-
ever did not become firmly established until early in the 
nineteenth century. 
(70) Osburne v Barter (1583) Choyce Cases 176. 
(71) Swayne v Rogers (16 04) Cary 26. 
(7 2) The practice of the Courts of Equity of issuing injunc-
tions dates from the reign of Henry VI (1422-1461) and 
was the subject of much controversy (Holdsworth 1 HEL 459) 
The matter came to a head in the reign of James I when 
the power of the courts of equity to issue injunctions 
was confirmed (Holdsworth op cit 461-4). 
(73) The common law in fact allowed for remedies of a similar 
nature. The writ of prohibition was essentially a type 
of injunction (Pluncknett Concise History 67 8) and as 
Hazeltine has pointed out ('Early Equity' Essays in Legal 
History 282) the jurisdiction was not narrow: 
'Parties were ... ordered not to commit waste, not 
to commit nuisance, not to sell land ... [Plarties 
were ordered to repair walls and buildings ... to 
place property in the same condition in which it 
had been, and to remove existing nuisances'. 
There are Instances of the use of prohibition in the 
seventeenth century to suppress public nuisances. See 
below 149. Cf also Fitzherbert Natura Brevium 185 D. 
(74) See below 231. 
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3. The Transformation of the Nuisance Action 
3.1. Introduction 
So far our discussion of the action for nuisance under 
the regime of the action upon the case has shown the action 
as being more or less a surrogate of the Assize of Nuisance, 
applying, albeit with some supplementation, the basic con-
cepts and principles of the medieval remedy. To some extent 
this is a misleading picture. The fact is that diiring the 
sixteenth and, more particularly, the seventeenth centuries 
basic features of the nuisance concept were significantly 
transformed under the influence of a new social and economic 
milieu. 
Of particular importance in this regard was the social 
and economic revolution known as the enclosure movement which 
radically transformed the concept of land and thus ideas as to 
the nature of the rights incident to land ownership. The 
medieval idea of land ownership,as a collection of rights, 
powers and duties projected onto ah assemblage of dispersed 
physical components, gave way to the idea of land as a single, 
enclosed, three-dimensional physical unit within whose actual 
and notional boundaries a man exercised exclusive, autonomous 
rights. Cultural changes within English society led to the 
formulation and recognition of new interests of land holding, 
involving mainly claims to the integrity of the land unit 
and the comfort and physical welfare of its occupants. These 
new interests received judicial acceptance and were incorpor-
ated into the law in the form of additional incidents of the 
tenure of land. 
These developments had important effects upon the con-
cept of nuisance. For one thing they caused it to become not 
merely an action for protecting the seisin of land but also 
a remedy for the protection of more abstract interests sucii 
as the personal physical welfare and well-being of the human 
organism. This widening of the range of interests, redressed 
by the action for nuisance, in turn created the need for the 
formulation of a broader conceptual premiss for determining 
the availability of the action. The outcome of this process 
was to confer upon the action the explicit character of an 
action for tort lying for the redress of a wide and largely 
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unspecified range of harms to interests in land. 
3.2. The Background 
(a) Enclosure movement 
By the seventeenth century important and fundamental 
changes had occurred in the social and economic milieu in 
which the nuisance concept flourished. 
The most fundamental change that had come about was that 
which saw the large-scale destruction of the open fields and 
common wastes. This occurred as a result of the movement 
(75 ) 
towards the 'enclosure' of lands, a process which denoted 
that 
[t]he enclosed lands of the common and open field 
were to become enclosed property; the scattered 
plots were to be joined together; the undivided 
fields portioned out into compact estates that would 
be entirely independent of one another, and surrounded 
by continuous hedges, the sign and pledge of their 
autonomy.(76) 
Although the movement for the enclosure of open lands 
(77) . 
had begun well before the Tudor age, it became more wide-
spread at this time so tending to promote a new approach to 
the concept of land and land-holding. 
(75) The literature on the enclosure movement is vast. A 
useful guide is found in Mantoux The Industrial Revo-
lution in the Eighteenth Century 512-4. 
(76) Mantoux op cit 15 6. 
(77) It is not necessary for our purposes to consider the 
reasons which gave rise to enclosure. In essence they 
were economic. The open field system of agriculture 
(above 6/f) by its very complexity was an inefficient 
method of land use and exploitation. Enclosure of the 
open fields improved methods of tillage, while the en-
closure of commons and even the arable land allowed for 
a shift to a pastoral type of agriculture. Enclosure 
undoubtedly increased wealth while also working con-
siderable hardship upon the peasantry. We have seen 
(above 9 n 31) that even in the thirteenth century 
manorial lords tended to allow a form of enclosure 
('approvement') of the manorial waste, a process per-
mitted and regulated by the Statute of Merton (1235). 
Enclosure was carried on under the provisions of this 
statute until the seventeenth century when the first of 
what was to become a flood of enclosure acts was enacted 
(continued on the next page) 
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Enclosure involved the 'dividing, allotting and en-
(78) 
closing' of lands. It created a new system of land 
tenure in which men held their land all of one piece; arable, 
residential and pasture land was now a single, distinct, 
autonomous physical unit demarkated by the surrounding fences, 
T, A (79) 
walls or hedges. 
Enclosure thus signalled the destruction of the old 
system co-operative agriculture under which the manner 
in which a man might use and exploit his land was regulated 
by the custom and regulations of the manorial community. 
Enclosure meant that men became entitled to do as they pleased 
with their land, to cultivate it when they chose, to raise 
whatever crops they chose, without regard for what his neigh-
bours were doing. It meant the end of shared pastures and 
common rights; it postulated exclusive rights and interests 
• , ,, (81) in land. 
(77) (continued) 
((160 6-7) 4 Jac 1 c 11). The.enclosure movement reached 
its apogee in the reign of George III (17 27-17 60) when 
some 1532 enclosure acts were passed, enclosing nearly 
three million acres of land. 412 2 enclosure acts were 
passed in the period 1719-1845. By 1876 the process 
had almost run its course, stringent conditions upon 
enclosure being imposed by the Commons Act of that year 
(3 9 & 40 Vict c56). See generally Mantoux op cit 
Chapter 3. Clifford History of Private Bill Legislation 
(i) 13-27 provides details concerning the enclosure acts. 
(7 8) Typically the long title of an enclosure act recited 
that it was 'an act for dividing, allotting and enclosing 
the open lands and common fields, meadows, pastures and 
common and waste lands in the parish of ...'. 
Mantoux op cit 14 5. 
(79) It is noteworthy that it is about this time that the 
maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum makes 
its appearance in the case law. See below 111. 
(80) Described above 6ff. 
(81) Cf Mantoux op cit 150; Harwood English Land Law 34-5. 
Clifford op cit 2 2 sums up the effect of the enclosure 
acts thus: 'By enclosures privately authorized, and 
by general legislation in aid of them, these rights 
of the community were to a large extent extinguished, 
and exclusive rights in the soil given to individuals. 
It was the substitution over the whole country of in-
dividual interests In place of common interests, as a 
means of furthering agriculture....* 
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The enclosure movement of the seventeenth century was 
a 'part of the great economic development that opened the 
(82 ) 
modern era'. It marked the beginnings of laissez faire 
capitalism in relation to land-use and exploitation and, as 
such, saw the beginnings of a principle of self-interest as 
the basic premiss governing the right to use and enjoy real 
+ (83) 
property. 
(b) Redefinition of land 
In 1586 in the case of Bury v Pope 
'It was agreed by all the justices, that if two 
men be owners of two parcels of land adjoining, 
and one of them doth build a house upon his land, 
and makes windows and lights looking into the 
other's lands, and this house and lights have con-
tinued for the space of thirty or fourty years, 
yet the other may upon his own land and soil law-
fully erect a house or other thing against the 
said lights and windows, and the other can have 
no action; for it was his folly to build his 
house so near to the other's land: and it was 
adjudged accordingly.' ' , » 
To this the reporter added the annotation 
i 
Nota. Cujus e s t solum e jus e s t summit as- usque ad 
coeilum. Temp . Ed . 11 <• 35") 
It is surely no coincidence that the cujus est solum 
maxim should make its appearance in the English law at the 
same time as enclosure was changing the physical character 
of the system of land-tenure. The maxim Is usually under-
stood to establish a concept of land as a three-dimensional 
(82) Mantoux op cit 156. 
(83) Cf Barwood op cit (n 81 above) 35. See also below 252//. 
(84) (1586) Cro Eliz 118. 
(85) There j.s no real evidence that the maxim had any prac-» 
tical recognition as early as the reign of Edward I 
(1272-13 07), or any time thereafter until the seventeenth 
century. See Sweeney 'Adjusting the Conflicting In-
terests of Land-owner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law' 
(1932) 3 Jo of Air Law 329 at 355-358. 
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unit of space " and to connote exclusive powers of use 
( 87 ) 
and enjoyment of all that is within the spatial unit. 
It is encountered in this connection a few decades 
after Bury v Pope when Coke, in his Commentary upon Littleton 
_____ 
(1629), discussed the nature of 'terra': 
'Terra, land, in the legal signification, comprehen-
deth any ground, soil or earth whatsoever .... It 
legally includeth also all castles, houses, and other 
buildings ... so as passing the land or ground the 
structure or building thereupon passeth therewith. 
Also, ... the land whereupon the water floweth or 
standeth ... and lastly, the earth hath in law a great 
extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been said, 
but of air and all things even up to heaven; for 
cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum'.(°9) 
Hereafter the maxim becomes a standard English legal 
dogma, being principally cited by the writers to describe the 
nature and extent of land. However it was invoked in 
(86) See generally Ball 'The Jural Nature of Land' (1928-9) 
23 Illinois LR 45. . . 
(87) See Ball 'The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land 
(1927-8) 76 U of Pennsylvania LR 631. 
(88) Co Lift 4a. 
(89) In the medieval law terra connoted little more than 
arable land (cf above 8 n 29). Gradually its meaning 
was extended to include all things terrestial (cf 
Sheppard's Touchstone of Common Assurances (1648) 91: 
'The word land strictly doth signify nothing but 
errable land, but in a larger sense it doth comprehend 
any ground, soile or earth whatsoever'.) The final 
stage in this evolution Is to include in the concept 
the space super- and sub-jacent to the surface of the 
earth. This is effected by invoking, as Coke does, 
the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum (the 
addition of the phrase 'et usque ad inferos' completes 
the idea). 
(90) See Sheppard Touch-Stone of Common Assurances (1648) 90 
'By the grant of the land, or ground it selfe, all 
that is supra, as houses, trees, and the like is • 
granted, for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, 
•also "all--that .is infra, as mines, earth, clay, 
quarres, and the like'. 
A century later Blackstone, 2 Comment"arIes .18 (17 66) 
substantially repeats this 
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an in-
definite extent, upwards as well as downwards. Cujus 
est solum, ejus est usquer ad coelum, is the maxim 
of the law ... [T]he word "land" includes not only 
the face of the earth, but everything under it, or 
over it . . . .' 
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another sense to express a principle that a man should not 
(91 ) 
be interfered with in the enjoyment of his land. In-
deed it is in this connection that the maxim is cited in 
(92 ) 
Bury v Pope (1586) where, it will be recalled, it was 
held that a man 'may upon his own land and soil lawfully 
erect a house' without concern for its effect upon a neigh-
(93 ) 
bour's 'lights'. In Hughes v Keene (1610) the same prin-
ciple is asserted, without citation of the maxim, holding 




best benefit of it' by erecting a house thereon. The 
same rule is found being stated in Wilde v Minsterley 
(1639) where it was held that a man could not be prevent d 
'from making the best use of his own land that he can', as 
.. (96) by excavating upon it. 
(91) Cf Goudy 'Two Ancient Brocards' Essays in Legal History 
(ed Vinogradoff) 215 at 229: 'By our older British 
lawyers the maxim is usually cited ... in describing 
the nature and extent of property generally ... [and] 
in asserting the legal right not to have one's uses of 
one's own land prevented or restricted by one's neigh-
bour ...'. Cf Selden Mare Clausum (1652) Bk 1 chap 21: 
'... surely we are owners of the ground, house and 
space which we possess in several as owners, that 
everyone for his best advantage, may freely and 
fully use and enjoy his own boundering air (which 
is the element of mankind) how fitting so ever it 
be, together with the space thereof in such a 
manner, and restrain others thence at pleasure, 
that he may be both reputed and settled owner 
thereof in Particular.' 
(9 2) Above 111. 
(93) (1610) Calth 1. 
(94) '... if the houses had been new erected houses, or 
otherwise windows had been newly made windows in that 
ancient house, the erection of the new house upon that 
void space of ground would have been lawful, notwith-
standing that the windows and lights be stopped up; 
for it shall not be in the power of the owner of the 
ancient house by setting out his new windows to prevent 
him, that hath the void piece of ground from making the 
best benefit of it.' 
(95) (1639) 2 Rolle Abr 564. 
(96) Wilde v Minsterley (supra) marks the origin of a right 
to lateral support of land. The earlier authorities 
had considered the question whether a house could be 
liable to support a neighbouring structure (see Anon 
(1508) Keilw 98 cf Edwards v Halirider (1594) 2 Leo 93; 
Poph 46; Cro Eliz 285). In Slingsby v Barnard (1616) 
(continued on the next page) 
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3.3. The Recognition of New Amenities of 
Landholding 
3.3.1. Introduction 
A significant social effect of the enclosure of lands 
was depopulation of rural areas and a drift of people to the 
. . (97) 
cities and towns. This, coupled with a steadily increa-
sing growth of the national population, wrought significant 
changes in urban conditions. The inevitable demand for 
accommodation led to the sub-division of existing buildings, 
the conversion of stables, sheds, cook-houses and other out-
buildings into residential accommodation. Finally there 
occurred a wave of construction of new buildings on the open 
spaces in the cities. Orchards, gardens and fields disappeared 
as entrepreneurs erected as many multi-storey buildings as, 
(99 ) 
available space would allow. 
(96) (continued) 
1 Rolle Rep 43 0 it was held that a man who excavated' on 
his land so causing, his neighbour's house to collapse 
was liable for the damage caused. Wilde v Minsterley, 
without referring to Slingsby's case, took the opposite 
position: 
• If A ... erect a new house on his copyhold land 
and ... if B afterwards digs his land so near the 
foundations of A's house that thereby the founda-
tion of the house, and the house itself, fall into 
the pit, yet no action lies by A against B, be-
cause it was A's own fault that he built his house 
so near B's land; for he by this act cannot hinder 
B from making the best use of his own land that he 
can. ' 
On the other hand the court seems to have been of the 
opinion that a man could be obliged to support his neigh-
bour's land (as opposed to his house) saying 
'But semble, that a man who has land next adjoining 
my land cannot dig his land so near mine that 
thereby my land shall go into his pit; and, there-
fore, if the action had been brought for that, it 
would lie.' 
(97) Mantoux op cit 180-185. 
(98) The population of London in 1500 was about 5 0 00 0. By 
1600 it was 250 000 (a 500 per cent increase) and by 
1689 it stood at 530 000. See Barnes 'The Prerogative 
and Environmental Control of London Building in the 
Seventeenth Century' (1970) 5 8 California LR 13 32 at 13 3 5 
Cf Mantoux op cit 2 50-1. 
(99) Barnes op cit 133 6. The process was not new. It had 
(continued on the next page) 
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These changes to the nature of the urban environment 
are of significance insofar as they co-incide with a re-
naissance in matters of domestic comfort and convenience. By 
the Tudor Age men had ceased to design their houses on the 
grim model of the medieval fortress. Rather houses were 
(101) 
built with large windows which let in floods of light 
(102 ) 
and which afforded the dwellers with a prospect of the 
world without. 
(99) (continued) 
begun as early as the thirteenth century when, we are 
told, Cb]uilding, re-building, enclosure and sub-division 
was a continuous process ... waste sites were taken up 
wholesale.... Enclosures of streets and lanes ... 
followed by intensive building reached such proportions 
that they ate into highways and common land^ Williams 
Medieval London 17. The acceleration of this process in 
the seventeenth century was so great as to cause serious 
concern to the government and to cause it to adopt a 
variety of strict measures to regulate building within 
the city. These measures are described by Barnes op cit 
passim. It is interesting to note that one device em-
ployed to prevent excessive building was that of common 
nuisance. See Barnes op cit 1350, 1359. 
(100) Andrew Boorde's The book for to lerne a man to be wyse in 
buylding of his house for the helth of body (c 1540") 
(see F J Furnivall (ed) Andrew Boordes Introduction and 
Dyetary 23 3-242) provides a contemporary view of the ideas 
prevalent at the time concerning the essential 'commodi-
ties' of a house. For judicial recognition of some of ' 
these commodities see below. 
(101) 'Lightsome ... is a favourite word in these years, when 
men were at last secure enough to be able to open the 
walls of their houses to the light and the scene, with-
out fearing an enemy.': Buxton Elizabethan Taste 72. 
(102) A house should be built, Boorde advised, so that 'the 
prospect to and fro the place be pleasant, fair, and 
good to the eye .... For the commodious building of 
a place doth not only satisfy the mind of the inhabitant, 
but also it doth comfort and rejoice a man's heart to 
see it, especially the beautiful prospect.' For judi-
cial attitudes toward 'prospect' see below 117. 
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Within the house the desire for privacy and 
physical comfort came to replace the medieval practice of 
communal existence in large, draughty odiferous murky rooms. 
(104 ) 
Chimneys led off the sulphrous smoke of 'sea' coal while 
rudimentary sanitary practices reflected a growing preference 
+. • (105) for pure sweet air. 
(103) 'The first radical change, which was to alter the form 
of the medieval house, was the development of a sense 
of privacy. This meant, in effect, withdrawal at will 
from the common life and common interests of one's 
fellows.' Mumford The City in History 328. 
(104) The use of coal in hearths, ovens and furnaces consti-
tuted a serious environmental problem even in the 
seventeenth century. By 169 0 nearly three million tons 
of coal were being produced, the greater portion of 
which was consumed in London (see Barnes op cit (n 98 
above) at 13 33). Attempts to prevent its use go back 
as far as 13 0 7 (see Salzman English Industries of the 
Middle Ages 6; Nef The Rise of the British Coal 
Industry (i) 157). In the sixteenth century the intro-
duction of chimneys as a standard incident of domestic 
residences made the use of coal more popular as a fuel 
(Trevelyan Social History 98) while exacerbating the 
atmospheric pollution resulting from its use. By the 
seventeenth century the problem was sufficiently 
severe to induce various individuals to seek methods 
for purifying the air. The best known of these was 
the diarist John Evelyn who wrote a tract Fumifugium; 
or the inconveniency of the Aer and Smoke of London 
dissipated Cl661) (Nef op cit 157 cf Barnes op cit 
13 33). It seems however that after 1641 the government 
ceased to make any effort to suppress the use of sea 
coal (Nef op cit 157 n 6). 
(10 5) Boorde devoted the third chapter of his disquisition 
to advising 'a man to build his house in a pure and 
fresh air, to lengthen his life'. The air, he said 
'cannot be too clean and pure' and if it be so 'about 
the house and mansion, it doth conserve the life of 
man, it doth comfort the brain'. He warned against 
'much people in a small room lying uncleanly, and being 
filthy and sluttish' and that there 'must be much cir-
cumspection had that there be not about the house or 
mansion no stinking ditches, gutters, nor canals, nor 
corrupt dunghills, nor sinks ....' As will be seen • 
below a claim to be entitled to ' salubritas 'aeris ' 
became a central characteristic of nuisance actions in 
the seventeenth century. 
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3.3.2. The Amenities 
This growing appreciation of the amenities- of domestic 
habitation was undoubtedly sharpened in the seventeenth cen-
tury by the over-crowding and over-building occurring in the 
urban areas. Men found that the multi-storeyed buildings 
erected by speculators and others cut off the light to win-
dows, that the proliferation of buildings on previously open 
sites obstructed the prospect from houses, while the increa-
sing proximity of buildings subjected habitations to the 
stenches and odours of domestic and industrial activity. The 
judges found themselves confronted with complaints concerning 
the obstruction of natural lights, of prospect and of the 
personal discomfort suffered as a result of the dissemination 
of noxious and offensive odours. Their response was to for-
mulate more closely the incidents of land ownership, particu-
larly in relation to the amenities of domestic habitation. 
A man's home, they said 'is to him as a castle and a fortress 
as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for 
his repose'. He was entitled to certain basic amenities 
(107 ) 
of habitation, which they said to be 
t 
habitatio hominis, delectatio in habitantis, 
necessitas luminis et salubritas aeris? 
'Air for his health, light for his profit, prospect for his 
pleasure' they pro 
ties of a house'. 
(10 8) 
claimed to be the 'three great commodi-
(a) Prospect 
Although the Tudor judges conceded that 'it is a great 
commendation of a house if it has a long and large prospect, 
(106) Semaynes Case (1604) 5 Co Rep 91a. 
(107) Aldred's Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b. 
(108) Hughes v Keene (1610) (infra n 124). 
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(109) 
unde dicitur, laudaturque domus longas qui prospicit argos' 
they refused to accord this amenity legal recognition. As 
early as the twelfth century the building by-laws of London 
had expressly provided that a landowner with impunity could 
build so as to obscure the prospect from the windows of a 
v B ( H O ) house. 
In the seventeenth century the judges took a similar 
approach, refusing to hold that the obstruction of prospect 
(111) 
could be actionable. In the seminal case Bland v Moseley 
(1586) Wray CJ said 
'that for prospect, which is a matter only of delight, 
and not of necessity no action lies for the stopping 
thereof .... [T]he law does not give an action for 
such things of delight.' 
This principle was approved and followed in Hughes v Keene 
(112 ) (1611) where it was said that although prospect was one 
of the 'commodities' of a house - 'prospect for his 
pleasure' -
'if there be hinderance only of the prospect by the 
new erected house, and not of the air, not of the 
light, then an action of the case will not lye, in-
somuch that the prospect is only a matter of delight, 
and not of necessity.' 
(113 ) 
In Knowles v Richardson (1670) this principle was applied, 
it being held that an action could not lie for the erection 
of a wall which hindered prospect, there being no cause of 
action in such a complaint the plaintiff 'being not stopt of 
(114' 
any necessary light, nor darkened....' In Arnold v Jefferson 
(1697) Holt CJ likewise adopted the principle in a dictum that 
(109) Bland v Mosley (1586) cited 9 Co Rep 58a. 
(110) The Assissa de Edificiis (on which see above 28) stated 
'.. / if anyone has windows looking out on his neigh-
bour' s land, although he may have been for a long 
time in possession of the view [de visu] from such 
windows ... nevertheless, his neighbours may rightly 
block the view from such windows by building opposite 
them. . . . ' 
(111) Supra (n 109) 
(112) ( 1 6 1 1 ) C o l t h 1. 
( 1 1 3 ) ( 1 6 7 0 ) 2 Keb 6 4 2 . 
( 1 1 4 ) ( 1 6 9 7 ) H o l t KB 4 9 8 . 
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'Though stopping of lights is a nuisance, the stopping of 
prospect is not.' 
It seems that Lord Jefferies LC in 168 6 granted injunc-
tions restraining the raising of buildings which would have 
interfered with the prospect from Grays Inn gardens, 
but his practice was later repudiated by Lord Hardwicke 
who said that Lord Jefferies 'was too apt to do things in an 
extraordinary manner, fortiter in modo as well as in re',. 
and laid it down that there was 
'no general rule of common law, which warrants that, 
or ways, that building so as to stop another's pros-
pect is a nuisance.' 




The claim of a householder to the privacy of his habita-
tion, on the other hand, was afforded considerable recognition 
in the medieval law. Under the London Assize of Nuisance 
actions were allowed for the opening of windows which over-
looked another's house or gardens and there is reason to 
believe that the viscontial action for nuisance could be 
(119) 
brought for invasions of privacy. However the seventeenth 
(115) The decisions were not reported. They are mentioned in 
Attorney-General in relation Gray's Inn Society v 
Doughty 2 Ves Sn 453. 
(116) Doughty' s Case (supra). 
(117) See also below 410, 425 n 32. 
(118) See Chew and Kellaway (eds) The London Assize of Nuisance 
In 1348 the assize granted redress to one who complained 
that his neighbours had 'six windows and two apetures 
... through which they can see his private business'. 
(op cit 100 No 407). So too in 1350 redress was granted 
on a complaint that a neighbour 'has two windows through 
which she and her servants see the private business of 
the plaintiffs' (op cit 103 No 419. See also ibid 
Nos 420-423). 
(119) See Novae Narrationes B149 (80 Selden Socy). Milsom 
comments on the precedent that it 'seems to come from 
a real case ... which suggests that at any rate by local 
custom there might be a natural right of privacy':. 
'Legal Introduction' xcviii. 
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century preference for large lightsome windows seems to have 
persuaded the judges that a householder had no general right 
to privacy. In 1694 Holt CJ advised a plaintiff who com-
plained of windows overlooking his land to 'fence your own 
(120 ) 
yard' for he could have no action. Hereafter nothing 
is heard of an action on the case for invasions of privacy 
(121) 
until the nineteenth century. 
(c) Light 
Claims to the commodity of natural light became prevalent 
(122 ) in the seventeenth century. They took the form of a 
claim that a man should be entitled to open windows in the. 
walls of his house and that these 'lights' should not be 
obscured by buildings or other 'blinds' erected upon adjoining 
premises. 
(120) Richardson v Taylor (1694) 2 Keb 642; 1 Mod 55. 
(121) See below 408. 
(122) Actions concerning natural light were not unknown i«n 
the medieval law. There is a specimin count in the 
Novae Narrationes (see 8 0 Selden Socy C108) in which 
the obstruction of lights by the erection of a house 
is alleged to be ad nocumentum. The London Assize of 
Nuisance also seems to have lain for buildings which 
obstructed the light reaching neighbouring houses (see 
Chew arid Kellaway (eds) The' London Assize' of Nuisance 
xxvi). Counsel in (1443) YB 22 Hen 6 pi 23/ 14 conten-
ded that an assize of nuisance would lie if 'one erects 
a house that stops the light of my house....' (cited 
Kiralfy Action on the Case 68). Actions for obstruc-
tion of light were however not common during the medi-
eval period, no doubt because prior to the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries houses were seldom built with 
windows intended for the admission of light. Medieval 
windows were usually mere apertures in the wall covered 
with oiled paper or lattice (see Chew and Kellaway 
op cit xxvi). It was only In the seventeenth century 
that narrow perpendicular apetures were repla.ced by 
large glazed windows which 'let floods of light into 
pleasant chambers and ... galleries' (Trevelyan 2 
English Social History 50). 
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The judicial response to these claims was to readily 
concede that a householder could have such an interest. In 
(123 ) 
the seminal case of Bland v Moseley (1587) Wray CJ ob-
served that light was a necessary commodity of a house 
'for it is said, et vescitur aura aetherea', 
(124 ) while in Hughes v Keene (1610) it was said that 
'the light which cometh in by windows, being an 
essential part of the house, by which he hath three 
great commodities, that is to say, air for his health, 
light for his profit, prospect for his pleasure, may 
not be taken away ....' 
In Yelverton's report of the case the existence of the right 
is rationalised by the observation that buildings should not 
obscure lights 
'for by that means men may loose all their lights, 
which may any way come into their houses, if they 
may be environ'd on every side with new houses, and 
by this stratagem live in tenebris which the law 
will not allow.' 
Recognition of an enforceable .right to light was however 
complicated by the practical consideration that the corollary 
to such a right was that a neighbour could not erect struc-
tures upon his own land if their effect would be to obscure 
the windows of existing houses. In Bury v Pope (1586) 
the judges of the King's Bench, apparently relying upon the 
maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, " held 
(123) (1587), cited in 9 Co Rep at 5 8a. The declaration is • 
given by Kiralfy Action on the Case 213. 
(124) (1610) Calthorp 1. The case is also reported in 
Godbolt 183; 1 Bulstrode 115; Yelverton 216. Kiralfy 
op cit 68 notes that the judgment in the case 'was 
adjourned for eight terms, probably for discussion of 
the case in Serjeant's Inn, so the point was considered 
to be of first importance'. 
(125) (1586) Cro.Eliz 118. 
(12 6) See above 111. 
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that a man 'may [upon his own land and soil lawfully erect a 
house or other thing against the said lights and windows, 
and the other can have no action'. But in the seminal de-
(127 ) 
cision in Bland v Mo.seley (15 87) Wray CJ over-came this 
difficulty by holding that a right to light could exist in 
the form of an easement restraining a neighbour from building 
(12 8) 
in a way which obscured the plaintiff's windows. Indeed 
the plaintiff had claimed the lights in question as easements 
and this form of pleading was followed in all subsequent 
(129 ) 
cases. and it became the settled rule of English law that 
(127) (1586)cited 9 Co Rep 58a. 
(12 8) 'It may be, that before time of memory the owner of the 
said piece of land has granted to the owner of the said 
house to have the said windows, without any stopping 
of them, and so the prescription may have a lawful 
beginning.' 
The case of Bury v Pope afterwards came before the Court 
of Exchequer Chamber (sub nom Bowry and Pope's Case 
(158 8) 1 Leon 16 8) and the decision confirmed though 
on the particular ground that the windows in question 
were 'but late erected'. If,' the court said, 'it were 
an ancient window time out of memory etc there the 
light or benefit of it ought not to be impaired by any 
act whatsoever; and such was the opinion of the whole 
Court.' 
(129) See Kiralfy Action on the Case 68. It is difficult to 
say whether the right to light was characterized as an 
easement in order to make it possible to invoke nuisance 
remedies or whether there existed some a priori principle 
of policy which postulated a right to light as existing 
only as an easement to be acquired by grant or prescrip-
tion (see also below 123). It is possible that the 
latter was the case. The London Assize of Nuisance for 
instance seems to have admitted actions for obstruction 
of light only where the plaintiff could show that he 
had . acquired a right to light as an easement. There 
is, for example, a case from 13 31 where the plaintiff 
sues for the obstruction of the 'view, opening, light, 
air and clarity of a window' which was granted under a 
deed. (See Chew & Kellaway London Assize of Nuisance 
7 3 No 312). In some cases the grant was in the form 
of an undertaking not to build upon adjoining land (see 
op cit 89 No 370. Cf also op cit 103 No 417 for a case 
of a dispute whether an easement of light was actually 
created),1 In Bland v Moseley (above ad n 12 7) the 
plaintiff's declaration asserted that he had a right to 
light as an easement acquired by long enjoyment ('pro 
se et tenentibus ejusdem mesuagii diversa salubria et 
necessaria AESIAMENTA et C0MM0DITATES •ratione aperti 
AERIS et LUMINIS in et" per luminaria vel fenestras 
praedictas splendentis et intrantis etc habuerunt ... 
(continued on the next page) 
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a landowner could only be entitled to claim a right to light 
if he could establish that the right had been acquired as an 
Q , (130),(131) 
easement. 
(d) Pure Air 
In 1611 William Aldred complained in an action on the 
case of the 'foetidos et insalubres odores* of his neighbour's 
(132 ) 
pig-sty. Although the defendant argued robustly that 
'one ought not to have so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear 
the smell of hogs', the court of King's Bench resolved that 
the action was maintainable. It supported its view the the 
observation that 
'in a house four things are desired habitatio hominis 
delectatio inhabitantis, necessitas luminis, et 
salubritas aeris.' 
(129) (continued) 
in mesuagio praedicto a tempore cujus memoria hominum 
non existit habuerunt et habere consueverunt etc septem 
fenestras vel luminaria . . . . '• See Kiralfy Action on 
the Case 213. Cf however Palmer v Fleshees (16~6~3) 
1 Sid 167; 1 Keb 625; 1 Lev 122 where the notion of 
light as an easement is apparently adduced by analogy 
from the right to support of 'ancient' buildings (see 
the remarks of Field J in Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 AC • 
740 at 7 57). .. 
(130) See Bowry and Pope's case (1588) (n 123 supra) Hughes 
v Keene (1611) 1 Bulst 115; Yel 216; Godb 183. Judg-
ment in this case was adjourned for eight terms sugges-
ting that the point was considered to be of first im-
portance: Kiralfy op cit 68); Palmer v Fleshees (1663) 
(supra n 129). The question of whether a man had a 
right to light was also governed by the custom of some 
cities. The custom of London, for instance, allowed 
houses built upon 'ancient' foundations to be built to 
any height even though they obscured 'ancient' lights. 
See the discussion in Calthorpe's report of the case of 
Hughes v Keene (Calth 1) and cf Plummer v Bentham (17 57) 
1 Burr 247. See also the custom of York as pleaded in 
Bland v Moseley (supra n 127). 
(131) There was a certain logic in characterizing the right 
to light as an easement. The coelum was a sort of 
channel through which the light travelled (cf Selden 
Mare Clausum loc cit (n 91 above) who characterizes the 
'space which confines a hous from the foundations up-
ward' as 'a chanel to the whirling aer'). A man who 
sought a right to light in effect required that his 
neighbour should allow the light unobstructed passage 
through the coelum. Since the neighbour was, on the 
cujus est solum principle, the owner of the space, what 
was being sought was a right analogous to a right of way 
across land, by definition an easement. 
(132) Aldred's Case (1611) 9 Co Rep 57b (reproduced with anno-
tations in Fifoot History and Sources 99). 
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(133 ) 
Bland v Moseley, the Court went on, established that no. 
action in nuisance could lie for interference with prospect 
or other matters of delight. But that case had held that 
the action could lie for the stopping of light and air, 
and if the stopping of the wholesome air etc gives 
cause of action, a fortiori an action lies in the 
case at Bar for infecting and corrupting the air ... 
and this stands with the rule of law and reason, sc. 
Prohibetur ne quis faciat in suo quod nocere possit 
alieno : et sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.' 
(134) 
The right to pure air, thus established, was not 
conceived, like the right to light, as being in the nature 
of an easement. It seems rather that the judges saw 
the subjection of a landowner to noxious odours as a species 
of disseisin and allowed the action for nuisance to lie for 
., • (136) 
this reason. 
(133) Supra n 127. 
(134) There was at this time also some consideration of the 
question of a landowner's right to the access of air. 
In Traherne's case (1613) Godb 23 3 and Goodman v Gore 
(1613) Godb 115 buildings which obstructed the stream 
of air to windmills were adjudged to be a nuisance and 
ordered abated. (The action was brought by way of an 
Assi-ze of Nuisance). A similar decision was given in 
Anon (1621) Win 3. (It may be that these are reports 
of the same case. See Gale Easements 33 3 whose editor 
remarks that there 'must have been something in the 
air if, at that particular time, three or even two men 
took It into their heads to build their houses close 
to windmills; an eccentricity which found no imitator 
until 1859, when Webb built his school-house close to 
Bird's mill [see below274-5]' ) . 
(135) Cf below 130. 
(13 6) The form of declaration in case for an action for nui-
sance by fedites commonly alleged that the odours in-
vading the plaintiff's land or house rendered it un-
inhabitable. In Sowthall v Dagger (1539 (cited Kiralfy 
op cit 211) a complaint concerning offal deposited in 
the highway near the plaintiff's house, stated that 
plaintiff's 'servienties et famuli sui in codem mesuagio 
manentes et inhabitantes per Aer'is Infeccionem huj;usmodi 
sondidorum in magno periculo mortis ...'. In Smith v 
Moram (16070 (unreported, cited Kiralfy op cit 64) the 
court alleged that the plaintiff 'per insalubrem 
fetorem in mesuagio morari non potuit'. UT Aldred's 
case (1611) 9 Co Rep 57 the count was 'quod per insalu-
bres odores idem Willelmus in mesuagio suo contmuare 
non potuit'. 
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The action for fedites became a common feature of 
(137 ) 
seventeenth century nuisance law. It was brought against 
. . , (138) . (139) . , .. .., (140) Jn . (141 butchers, brewers, blacksmiths, candlemakers, 
(142) (143 ) 
tallow and lead smelters. It would lie, it was 
(144) said, against dyers, tanners and glovers. It was brought . . -. , • (145) . . . (146) , , m respect of leaky privys, pig-sties, wash-houses 
( "1 ti *% ' ( 1 h, R ) 
and stables, ' "bad cheese. It was even suggested 
that it should lie against persons suffering from 'a horrible 
• (149 ) 
sicknesse' who infected the air.. 
Very commonly the defendant in an action for fedites was 
one who carried on some trade or industry. Inevitably their 
defence to the action tended to be that their trade was law-
ful and of public benefit and thus ought not to be condemned 
re-
(151) 
as a nuisance. For the most part the Tudor judges -
fused to allow the utility of the trade to be a defence, 
(137) Baker English Legal History 240 relates its prevalence 
to the absence of public health services. Prosecutions 
for common nuisance arising from the conduct of noxious 
trades were not uncommon at this time. See below 
(138) Sowthall v Dagger (supra n 136). 
(139) Jones v Powell (1628) Hut 135; Palm 536. 
(140) Bradley v Gill (1688) 1 Lut 69. 
(141) Rankett's Case (1606)2 Rolle Abr 139. 
(142) Morley v Pragnell (1638) Cro Car 510. 
(143) Boynton v Gill (1640) 1 Rolle Abr 89 pi 7. 
(144) Aldred's case (1611) (supra) . 
(145) Jones v Powell (supra). '. 
(146) Aldred's Case (supra). 
(147) Hewet v Copland (1691) 1 Lut 91. 
(148) Cf Wiseman v Penham (1623) Palm 341; Ley 69. 
(149) Hale's Case (c 1560) cited Baker English Legal History 
240 n:7. 
(150) The defence succeeded in Rankett's Case (1606) (2 Roll„e 
Abr 13 9) where it was held 
'Si homme facit candells deins un vill, per que il 
cause un noysome sent al inhabitants, uncore ceo 
vest ascun nusans, car le needfulness de eux dis-
pensera ave le noisomeness del smell.' 
(151) In Aldred's case (1611) 9 Co Rep 57 the court held that 
'... the building of a lime-kiln is good and 
profitable; but if it be built so near a house, 
that when it burns the smoke thereof enters into 
(continued on the next page) 
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(15?) 
holding that if the trade caused damage it was actionable 
and that the defendant should not carry on such trades in 
the urban areas but rather in remote places. 
3.3.3. Evaluation 
The judicial recognition of the amenities of light and 
pure air as incidents of a landowner's proprietary rights 
capable of vindication through the action for nuisance, was 
a development of historic importance in the evolution of the 
nuisance concept. The significant point was that claims to 
pure air and necessary light (like the claims to prospect 
and privacy) were in essence claims to interests of person-
(154 ) ality. This was concealed by the fact that the interests 
(151) (continued) 
the house so that none can dwell there, an action 
lies for it. So if a man has a watercourse ... 
for his necessary use; if a glover sets up a 
lime-pit for calfe skins and sheep skins so near 
the watercourse that the Corruption of the lime 
pit has corrupted it for which cause his tenant 
leave the said house, an action for the case lies 
for it, as it is adjudged in [the Prior of South-
wark's Case (1498)] 13H.7. 26.b. [for which see 
Fifoot History and Sources 87]. 
(152) See Aldred's Case (supra); Morley v Pragnell (1638) 
Cro Car 510. 
(153) See Boynton v Gill (1640) 1 Rolle Abr 89 pi 7 where it 
was said of a lead-smelting works 
'though the trade was legal, and for the benefit of 
the public and necessary, the action lay, because 
the trade might be carried on in waste places, and 
large commons remote from inclosures, so that no 
loss or damage would arise from it to the owners of 
adjoining land.' 
See too Jones v Powell (1628) Hut 135 where Hide CJ ob-
served that brew-houses and glass-houses 'ought to be 
erected in places convenient for them'. In R v Pierce 
(16 83) 2 Show 327 it was held that noxious trades could 
be suppressed as common nuisances 'for that such trades 
ought not to be in the principal parts of the city, but 
in the outskirts'. 
(154) The modern law conceives of the interests of personality 
as including a claim to reputation; a claim to the 
immunity of the feelings and susceptibilities; a claim 
to privacy; a claim to personal phusical integrity (see 
generally Pound 'Interests of Personality' (1915) 28 
Harvard LR 343 ; Stone Social Dimensions of Law and 
Justice 200//). The claim to physical integrity includes 
(continued on the next page) 
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in issue were characterized as being property rights. 
In this way the scope of the nuisance action was widened so 
as to encompass harms which were personal rather than pro-
prietary. More particularly this development made explicit 
(154) (continued) 
what Pound describes as ' immunity of the mind and the 
nervous system from direct or indirect injury and the 
preservation and furtherance of mental health - free-
dom from annoyance which interferes with mental poise 
and comfort' (op cit supra at 356). In the language 
of nuisance law the pollution of the ambient air and 
the interference with natural light are traditionally 
called 'annoyances' (cf above 1 n 1). On analysis 
these annoyances can be seen to constitute the sort of 
interferences with mental poise and comfort' that would 
bring them within the scope of Pound's formula. It is 
perhaps worth noting that Brandeis and Warren in their 
classic manifesto 'The Right to Privacy' ((1890) 4 
Harvard LR 193 at 194) saw as a rudimentary instance of 
the 'recognition of the legal value of sensatons', the 
'qualified protection of the individual against offen-
sive noises and odours', pointing out in a footnote 
(op cit 194 n 2) 'the recognition of the right to have 
property free from interference by such nuisances in-
volves a recognition of the value of human sensations'. 
(155) On the face of it the so-called amenities of domestic 
habitation were claims to some sort of individual in-
terest in the natural elements of light and air. 
(Philosophically it is possible to construe the right 
to the use of these natural media of existence as an 
interest of personality. See Pound op cit (n 154 above) 
at 3 52-3). Strictly speaking the natural light and the 
ambient air were classified as res communes (thus 
Bracton f 7; Fleta 3.1. (89 Selden Socy 1) Britton 
2.2.1 following Justinian's Institutes 2.2.1) and thus 
not susceptible of individual or private ownership, (on 
the question whether flowing water' was res communes see 
below nn 203-4). The Tudor judges however ignored this 
principle. By recognising 'rights'- to necessitas liminis 
and salubritas aeris as incidents of landownership (as 
the 'commodities' of a 'house') and by permitting their 
vindication by the nuisance action (traditionally an 
action for the protection of proprietary interests (cf 
above 39) they conferred upon them the quality of indi-
vidual rights of property (cf Baker English Legal His-
tory 239). By this device it was possible to award 
'parasitic' damages for interferences with what were, 
in essence, rights of personality (on the recognition 
of rights of personality through the device of parasitic 
damages see Pound op cit 359 if. Cf Stone op cit (n 154 
above) 210. See also Fleming An Introduction to the 
Law of Torts 18 6-7 who notes the various types of para-
sitic interests protected under the nuisance action. 
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the primordial role and function of the nuisance action: 
that of securing an individual's claim to enjoy the amenities 
of his land unimpaired by any interference falling short 
of direct physical intrusion or ouster (the traditional con-
cern of the Assize of Novel disseisin and, later, the action 
* + i *\ (157) 
for trespass to land). 
3.4. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas 
The judges in formulating the legal concept of land con-
( -1 C O \ 
ceived of it as a three-dimensional unit of space. The 
rights of ownership therein they expressed in the language 
(159 ) 
of laissez faire individualism. A man was entitled to 
use and exploit all that was on or in his land and could not 
be restrained therein by his neighbours. 
Insofar as these statements of principle tended to imply 
that landownership rights in English law involved, in Black-
stone's phrase 'sole and despotic dominion' which could be 
neither limited nor restrained they were misleading. The 
action for nuisance from its very earliest beginnings had 
been predicated on a principle that a man might be restrained 
in the manner in which he used and enjoyed his land if in so 
doing he caused wrongful damage to his neighbour. As we have 
seen a nuisance was conceived of as something that occurred 
( A C. A \ 
on the land of the defendant or, in other words, as 
arising from a user of his own land by the defendant. The 
nuisance actions by designating a particular type of use to 
be a nuisance and ordering its abatement thus effectively 
operated as mechanism for controlling land-uses, or, in other 
words, for limiting the dominion of the owner of land. 
(156) Not every conceivable type of interference fell to be 
redressed. The refusal of the judges to countenance 
actions for invasion of privacy or interference with 
prospect demonstrate this. The reasons for refusing 
recognition to these claims were however pragmatic rather 
than conceptual. See Lord Blackburn in Dalton v Angus 
[1881] 6 AC 740 at 824. See further below 410. 
(157) See Fleming op cit (n 155 above) 186. 
(158) above 111-2 
(159) Above 110-111 
(.160) Above 113 
(161) Above 33. 
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When the judges of the seventeenth century came to 
recognise the various amenities of landholding they thus 
found themselves confronted by a paradox. Each of the various 
amenities claimed for a house required the imposition of some 
restraint upon the ownership rights of neighbouring land-
( "1 P 0 ̂  
owners. ' Such restraints (which in principle could be 
imposed by invoking the action for nuisance) contradicted the 
concept of autonomous landownership rights as postulated under 
the cujus est solum ... maxim. 
The judges first confronted this paradox directly when 
they came to recognise and formulate the right to necessitas 
luminis. They resolved the difficulty by invoking the con-
cept of easements. °J A landowner, they said in effect, 
was entitled to use his land by building thereon as and where 
he pleased. His power to do so was limited in one respect 
(162) Insofar as claims to prospect, privacy and light were 
concerned the implied restraint was upon a neighbour's 
right to build upon his land, in a way which either 
interrupted prospect or obscured windows or enabled 
premises to be overlooked. Cf above 118-123.- The claim to 
salubritas aeris Implied a restraint upon activities 
which caused pollution of the ambient air. 
(163) Cf above 123. The concept of an easement by this time 
had undergone some refinement. As we have seen (above 
44) Bracton tended to bring all interests in land under 
the term easement. In this he was expressing more the 
notion that an easement was some right or priviledge 
which inured to be 'ease' or advantage or profit 
^'commodum') of the holder of land rather than the idea 
of a right in the nature of the Civil Law servitude or 
ius in re aliena. By the seventeenth century however 
'the learning of easements was becoming more familiar 
to the lawyers' (Holdsworth 7 HEL 322). A distinction 
has been drawn between easements and profits a pondre, 
the latter term describing most of the rights 'of com-
mon' evolved under the old manorial system of agricul-
ture (cf Holdsworth op cit 318/'/).Easements were thus 
more clearly perceived as being iura In re aliena (in 
the Termes de la Ley (1520) an easement is defined as 
'a priviledge that one neighbour hath of another ... 
without profit, as a way or sink through his land or 
such like'. Cf Peers v Lucy (169 5) 4 Mod 3 62 at 3 65-6). 
It was not however until the nineteenth century that 
anything like a fully developed body of principle was 
evolved for the law of easements (see below 230)• 
Generally on the early history of easements see Holdsworth 
3 HEL 153// 7 HEL 321//. See also Sims *A Study of 
Rights Incident to Realty' (1920-1) 7 Virginia LR 327. 
See also Simpson History of the Land Law Chap 5. 
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only: where he had voluntarily ° accepted a limitation 
by conferring an easement upon his neighbour entitling the 
latter to demand that structures should not be erected so as 
to obscure the light reaching his windows. Similarly they 
decided a man had the autonomous power of excavating in his 
land, a power which could be limited by an easement in favour 
of his neighbour for the support of houses or buildings upon 
the neighbour's land. 
However when the judges came to admit that a householder 
was of natural right entitled to the amenity of salubritas 
aeris they adopted a rather different approach. The right 
to pure air, like the right to necessary light, implied a 
restraint upon the manner in which another might use his own 
land. The corruption of the ambient air, more often than not, 
was the consequence of the carrying on of some trade or in-
dustry which discharged noxious or offensive odours into the 
atmosphere. To recognise a right to salubrious air was to 
confer upon its holder the legal right to demand that another 
should not use his land as the site for noxious'or offensive 
. , (166) trades. 
A number of options were open to the judges: they 
could have refused (as they had done in the cases of prospect 
(164) An easement, in principle, was acquired by grant of the 
owner of the servient tenement. By the seventeenth 
century it was accpeted that an easement could be ac-
quired by implied as much as by express grant (see 
Holdsworth 7 HEL 334). Easements could also be acquired 
by prescription. In the seventeenth century cases of 
light and support prescription was much relied upon as 
the basis for the acquisition of the right to light. 
This was undoubtedly the result of the fact that there 
would have been very few instances of express grants to 
light. The courts, in order to ensure that men should 
not loose all their lights by houses being built all 
around them (cf Hughes v Keene cited ad n 124 above) 
readily allowed the allegation that a right to light 
had been acquired by long enjoyment to suceed. (The 
technical problem of how a negative servitude of this 
nature could be acquired by prescription was conven-
iently ignored. Cf Holdsworth op cit 330-341. See also 
Radcliffe 'The Easement of Light and Air and its Limi-
tations under English Law' (1908) 2 4 LQR 120 at 121-4). 
(165) Above 113 n 96. 
(166) Cf above 12 5. 
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and privacy) to recognise the amenity at all; they 
could (as they had done in the case of light) postulate some 
sort of easement of pure air; or they could recognise a 
right to pure air as an amenity of land and accept that men's 
rights to carry on trades upon their own land could be limi-
ted to the extent that such activity invaded a neighbour's 
right to pure air. 
As we have seen, they adopted the latter approach. 
The right of a householder to have the air upon his land pure 
and uncorrupted, they said, was pre-eminent over the right to 
. , (17 0) .. , , , , 
carry on noxious trades. Men who would carry on such 
trades must either do so in places where there were no habi-
tations ; they could not be carried on at all in places where 
they corrupted and infected the air reaching the houses of 
-^ (171) other men. 
Committed then to a principle of restraining the rights 
of landowners the judges naturally enough turned to the ac-
tion for nuisance. In doing so they found it necessary to 
(167) Above 117-120. 
(168) By reasoning that since the landowner owned the coelum 
above his land he was free to discharge into smoke 
vapours and stenches and that this exercise of a owner-
ship rights could not be restrained by a neighbour. 
Cf above 112. 
(169) Above 12 4. The judges probably baulked at regarding the 
right to pure air as an easement because of the diffi-
culties inherent in proving the acquisition of such a 
right especially by prescription. The right to light 
could be expressed in physical terms as the existence 
of so many windows which had been opened for the requi-
site period of time. The right to pure air had however 
no similar physical frame of expression. It would be 
virtually impossible to establish objectively how long 
a man had enjoyed pure air or for that matter the de-
gree of freedom from corruption of the air that he had 
enjoyed by long user. Cf the difficulty of establish-
ing the amount of light that a man could be said to have 
acquired by his easement of light (Holdsworth 7 HEL 340). 
(170) 
(171) 
Above 126 n 153. 
Ibid. 
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refine the conceptual premisses of the action. Tradition-
ally the action had seemed to be a remedy for the vindication 
(172 ) 
of easement rights. But since the right to salubritas 
aeris had not been constituted as an easement, it became 
necessary to explain the basis upon which the holder of a 
right to pure air should formulate his action for asserting 
the right. An action for infecting and corrupting the air, 
(17 3) 
they said m the seminal decision in Aldred's Case 
rested upon 'the rule of law and reason' sic utere tuo ut 
(174 ) 
alienum non laedas. 
(172) Above 39. 
(173) (1611) 9 Co Rep 57b. See above 123. 
(174) The origins of this most famous maxim of the law of 
nuisance are obscure. The essential proposition was 
stated by Bracton in a sentence which reads 'prohibitur 
nequis faciat in suo per quod nocere possit vicino' 
(/ 23 2; Fifoot History and Sources 19 translates this 
as: '[It is] forbidden to do on his own land what may 
harm his neighbour'). The earliest reported mention of 
the maxim I have found is in Leonard's report of the 
case of Edwards v Halinder (1594) 2 Leon 93 where • 
counsel, arguing that defendant was liable for damages 
resulting from the over-burdening of the upper story of 
a building , says 
'by the laying of wares there, a wrong and damage 
follow to the plaintiff, the defendant shall be 
punished; for the rule is sic utere tuo, ut alienum 
non laedas'. 
The maxim was classically stated in Aldred's Case (1611) 
(supra) where it is run into Bracton's words, appearing 
in the judgment as 
'Prohibetur ne quis faciat in suo quod nocere possit 
alieno, et sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas'. 
For all its Latinity the maxim seems a home-grown pro-
duct of English common law. Philosophically it has 
links with Ulpian's precepts: 'honeste vivere alterum 
non laedas; suum quique triburere' (Digest 1.1.10) 
Tcf Baker English Legal History 23 9; Yiannopoulos 
'Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage' 
(19 7)4) 4 8 Tulane LR 193 at 20 2) but there is no exact 
equivalent of the maxim in the Roman Law (Sims 'A Study 
of Rights incident to Realty' (1921-2) 8 Virginia LR 
317 at 335). Although Sir Edward Coke was a notorious 
coiner of maxims the appearance of the maxim full-blown, 
in Edwards v Halinder (supra) suggests that Coke was 
not the author of the maxim (Aldred's case was decided 
some seventeen years later. Coke was however one of the 
counsel in Edward's case (see Croke's report of the 
case)). 
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In the seventeenth century cases the judges invoked the 
sic utere maxim not so much as a substantive rule of law 
but rather in order to justify and explain some restraint im-
posed upon the notionally unlimited rights of dominion of a 
landowner. It is in this sort of context that the maxim is 
first encountered in Edwards v Halinder (1594). There 
the defendant occupied a shop over a cellar occupied by the 
plaintiff. The floor of the shop collapsed into the cellar 
breaking a number of wine vessels belonging to the plaintiff. 
He then sued the defendant in Case alleging that the floor 
had collapsed as a result of excessive weight being place upon 
it by the defendant. 
Counsel for the defendant took the line that what the 
defendant had done in placing things upon the floor of his 
shop was an exercise of his normal rights of ownership: 
Where a doing of a lawful act, by a mishap a damage 
cometh to another, against the will of the doer, no 
punishment shall follow: ... he may uti jure suo, 
- although it be to the prejudice of another! <• I'/V'j'/" 
On the other side the plaintiff argued that the defendant's 
liability arose because he had caused damage to another: 
Where injury or wrong is done unto any, the law gives 
remedy to the party grieved; and although that the 
shop was let unto him to lay wares there, which he 
has done, and it was not his intent to surcharge the 
said warehouse, ... yet forasmuch as by the laying of 
wares there, a wrong and damage follow to the plain-
tiff, the defendant shall be punished; for the rule 
is sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.(17 8) 
(17 5) Insofar as the maxim implied that any damage to another's 
property was actionable it was, even for the seventeenth 
century, inaccurate. As we have seen (42//) since 
Bracton's time it was well established doctrine of nui-
sance law that damage to another might be damnum sine 
injuria and thus not actionable. The maxim provided 
no guidance as to when damage was actionable and thus 
cannot be seen as expressing any more than the truism 
that if a man causes unlawful damage to his neighbour 
he would-be liable to an action. 
(176) (1594) 2 Leon 93. 
(17 7) 12 Leon 94. 
(178) 2 Leon 93. 
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(17 9) 
-*-n Aldred' s case (1611) the maxim is cited by the court 
in the same sort of context. In reply to the defendant's 
contention that his pig-styes were necessary for the susten-
ance of man and could not be unlawful, the court cited a 
number of authorities showing that an action could lie against 
those who carried on lawful and necessary trades where the 
(18 n) 
result was to cause damage to another, adding that 'this 
stands with the rule of law and reason, sc Prohibiter re ques 
faciat in suo quod nocere possit alieno : et sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas'. 
(181) 
In the same year the maxim was cited in Hughes v Keene 
to explain why a landowner could not build on his land and 
so obscure the 'ancient' lights of an adjoining building. In 
,(183) 
(18?) 
1627 it s cited to explain Why a man should be held 
liable for diverting the waters flowing to an 'ancient' pond J. 
In Jones v Powell (162 8) it is used to explain why a bre\ 
should be held liable for the stenches from his brewery and, 
in Morley v Pragnell (1638), why a tallow-smelter was 
liable for the stenches emanating from his factory. 
(17 9) See above 123. 
(180) Above 125. 
(181) (1611) Calth 1: '... it is not lawful to erect a new 
house ... whereby the old lights of an ancient house 
may be stopped up; for the rule of equity, and law, 
saith, utere tuo ut alienum non laedas'. 
Cf Rosewall v Prior (1701) 12 Mod 635 at 640. 
(182) Duncombe v Randall (1627) Het 32. 
(183) '... for sic utere tuo ut ne laedas alieno. 
(184) (1628) Hut 69: '... brew houses are necessary, yet the 
rule in law is, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas...' 
(185) (1638) Cro Car 510: 'Germyn, Serjeant, moved ... that 
an acton lies not, for he, being a tallow-chandler, 
ought to use his trade, which cannot be said to be a 
nuisance. But all the court held, that ... the action 
is maintainable; for everyone ought sic uti suo, quod 
alienum non laedat.' 
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Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas was thus a ge"neral 
precept, a 'rule of law and reason, " of 'equity and law' 
under whose banner the courts were to develope various sub-
stantive doctrines and rules for regulating the conflicting 
(18 8) 
interests of landowners. Although the substantive rules 
of the doctrine of nuisance which developed under the sic 
utere maxim only emerged with clarity in the nineteenth cen-
( i p q \ 
tury, their outlines can be perceived in at least one 
seventeenth century decision under that of Jones v Powell 
(19 0) 
(1628). The action was brought in respect of the de-
fendant's brew-house for the 'stench smoke and unwholesome 
vapours' that emenated therefrom and rendered the plaintiff's 
house so insalubrious that his family could not dwell therein 
'without danger of their health'. 
The mere carrying on of a trade, the court held, was not 
(191) m itself a nuisance and people had to tolerate certain 
. . (192) 
effects of lawful industrial activity. On the other 
hand the fact that a trade was of public importance did not 
( 1 8 6 ) Aldred's case (n 17 9 above). 
(187) Hughes v Keene (n 180 above). 
(18 8) Cf Terry's characterization of the role and function of 
the sic utere maxim: 
'much the greater part of the work of the courts 
has been done by taking what were really extra-
legal principles, of justice or policy proper for 
the consideration of the Legislature, treating them 
as rules of law, and then, under the pretence - not 
always consciously false '-.of interpreting them and 
applying them to particular cases, making new rules 
of law based on them ... sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas is ... of the same character. ~... [TJhe 
principle expressed in the maxim has been the guiding 
principle in the evolution of many more special 
rules forbidding various kinds of conduct which are 
likely to produce harm to others'. 
Terry The Leading Principles of Anglo American Law 
s 10-11. 
(189) See Chapter Six below. 
(190) (1628) Hut 135; Palm 536. 
(191); 'The erecting of a common or private brew-house is not 
of itself a nuisance, nor the burning of sea-coal in 
it ...' (per Curiam). 
(192) '... if a man is so tender-nosed that he cannot endure 
sea-coal, he ought to leave his house' (per Doderidge J) 
136. 
(193 ) 
excuse any nuisance caused by it. Stenches were only 
(194) 
actionable where they were excessive and thereby caused 
(19 5 ) 
adjoining landowners damage. 
In this we see the court doing more than merely deciding 
that a man who uses his land in a way which causes damage to 
a neighbour is ipso facto liable. Rather the court is groping 
towards a doctrine of accommodation of the conflicting in-
terests of both landowners, a doctrine which will allow the 
brewer to carry on his trade and the householder to enjoy 
salubrious air. The principle which the court uses to express 
this doctrine is that of mutual limitation of rights, in terms 
of which the brewer may brew provided he does not cause ex-
cessive harm to the householder and, conversely, that the 
householder must tolerate a certain measure of discomfort 
arising from his neighbour's trade, a right of action only 
accruing where the discomfort becomes excessive. 
4. The Nuisance Action and the 'Natural' Rights of Property 
4.1. Introduction 
In the nineteenth century the action for nuisance was to 
become, in essence, a device for accommodating the mutually 
(19 6) 
conflicting interests of adjoining landowners. To this 
end it would acquire a set of unique rules and doctrines, 
(193) 'A tan-house is necessary, for all men wear shoes, and 
nevertheless it may be pulled down, if it be erected 
to the nuisance of another ...' (per Hide CJO'. 
(194) 'To burn sea coal is not a cause of action; but if it 
is burnt in an excessive manner an action lies' (per 
Jones J ) ; 'the excessive use of sea-coal which is a 
nuisance to neighbours, gives an action' (per Doderidge 
J ) . ., 
(19 5) "... if it is erected so near the house of another that 
his goods are thereby spoilt, and his house made unin-
habitable by the smoke, an action lies' (per curiam). 
(196) See Chap Six. 
137. 
many of which were presaged in the judgements in Jones v 
(197) 
Powell. A preliminary stage in this development in-
volved the closer identification of the nature and dynamic 
of the action for nuisance. This came about in the seven-
teenth century with the emergence of the idea that the action 
for nuisance lay for the protection of what came to be termed 
the natural rights of property. 
In the medieval law there was a tendency to describe all 
rights incident to landholding as 'servitudes'. Since 
the action for nuisance lay for the protection of most of 
these rights, it seemed as if the scope of the nuisance ac-
tion was that of the vindication of servitutal rights and 
especially the servitudes known as easements. However 
Aldred' s case showed that a right (to s_alubritas aeris) 
though not an easement could nevertheless be asserted by way 
of the action for nuisance. We have seen too that the nui-
sance action was awarded in such instances on the ground of 
an infraction of the general precept sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas. What was not clear however was the nature or 
character of the interests or rights which were vindicated 
under this new dispensation. The answer which emerged in 
the course of the seventeenth century was that the rights in 
issue were the so-called 'natural' rights of property. 
4.2-. The Concept of Natural Rights of Property 
Bracton, we have seen, hinted at the concept of a natural 
right of property when he spoke of servitudes imposed by law. ^ 
(19 7) Above ad n 189. 
(19 8) Certainly this was Bracton's attitude (see above 44). 
The truth is of course that_the medieval lawyers made no 
attempt to classify the various rights incident to 
realty (cf Sims 'A Study of Rights Incident to Realty' 
(1920-1) 7 Virginia LR 327 at 328-9). They simply 
lumped together what in later times would be classified 
as 'easements' and * natural' rights of property. So 
long as the action for nuisance lay indifferently in 
respect of each type of right there was no need to bring 
about any such classification. _ Cf Holdsworth 3 HEL 156; 
Simpson History of the Land Law 101. 
(199) Above 44. Cf Holdsworth 3 HEL 155 n 2.1. 
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The concept was also implicit in the distinction of the 
medieval law between rights of common that were appurtenant 
and those Which were appendant. The notion was reflec-
ted in the medieval law as involving those rights to the use 
and enjoyment of property which could be exercised only if 
acquired by prescription and those which could be exercised 
. . (201) 
without prescribing therefor. 
Formal recognition of the concept of a natural right of 
property however first occurred in relation to running 
(202) _ , . . . _ . , 
waters. Bracton classified running waters as res com-
(2 03) 
munes but later writers excluded this interest from the 
(2 04) 
list of things common to all men. ' This implied that 
(200) Above 9 n 31. 
(201) See eg (1469) 8 Ed 4 pi 14 where it is pointed out that 
a man was entitled to abate a nuisance to his land with-
out first acquiring the right to do so by a prescriptive 
title: 
"... if I should prescribe, when a man builds a 
house so that from the house the water runs onto, 
my land, that I can abate that which causes the 
water to run on my land, such prescription is 
void; for by the common law I can do this well 
enough.' 
In other words, as the case said, '[A] man has no need 
to prescribe for things which are of common right'. 
The term 'of common right' was 'a phrase roughly equiva-
lent to the modern 'by the law of the land' (Simpson 
History of the Land Law 105). See Holdsworth 3 HEL 
168-9, cf Simpson op cit 105-6. 
(202) Interferences with watercourses, as we have seen (above 
15-6) from earliest times gave rise to an action for 
nuisance. (Under the Assize procedure the plaintiff 
could obtain a writ quaere divertit cursum aquae and a 
writ quod permittat reducere cursum aquae would lie for 
those unable to obtain'the assize. Diversion of public 
rivers could amount to a purpresture to be redressed at 
tourn or leet (above 24)). Actions on the case were 
allowed for the diversion or obstruction of water 
courses in the fifteenth century and after (see Kiralfy 
Action on the Case 67). Generally on the historical 
evolution of the law relating to running waters see 
Weil 'Running Waters' (1908-9) 22 Harvard LR 190; Lauer 
'The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine' 
(1963) 28 Missouri LR 60. 
(203) f 7. 
^204) Fleta (3.1), In enumerating the res communes omits 
aqua profluens. Britton (2.2.1) seems to do the same. 
(continued on the next page) 
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landowners could acquire exclusive proprietary interests in 
running waters, a doctrine promoted by Coke in the seventeenth 
century when expounding on the nature of land in the context 
of the principle cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. 
The case law of the time reflects a somewhat anomalous 
attitude towards the nature of the interests of riparian 
owners in the waters flowing to and over their land. It seemed 
that riparian owners could acquire the right to divert and 
take such waters as an easement conferred by custom or ancient 
user. This is shown by the form of pleadings used in actions 
brought for the diversion of watercourses providing the motive 
power for water-mills. The plaintiff in order to succeed in 
his action had, it seems, to allege and prove that the waters 
( o n £ *\ 
'currere solebat et consuevit' to his land. 
The effect of this was thus to suggest, if nothing else, 
that rights in running waters, like the right to necessary 
light was an easement, falling to be asserted not under the 
sic utere principle but on proof of acquisition of the servi-
tude and an interference with it. 
(204) (continued) 
For a possible explanation of their approach see Weil 
op cit (n 201 above) 193. 
(205) Sele above 112. See also Lauer op cit (n 201 above) at 
74-7. It is worth noting that the chief seventeenth 
century authority on waters , Robert Callis in his 
Reading on the Statute of Sewers (1647) 56 disputed 
whether there could be 'property' in 'the bare running 
water'. Cf Weil op cit 193-4. See further below 257. 
(206) See the form of pleadings in Shury y Piggott (1625) 3 
Bulst 3 39. Cf Weil op cit 19 5. The general attitude 
of the law is reflected by Russell v Handford (1583) 
1 Leon 273; Luttrell's "case (1600) 4 Co Rep 86b. For 
discussion of these decisions see Lauer op cit (n 201 
above) at 83-4 who concludes that in 1600 'the English 
rule was that one acquired rights to the flow of a 
watercourse only by means of ancient use or prescription 
.... [I]n the absence of a grant the fact that a man 
had built a mill or used water to power Its wheel for 
ten or fifteen years meant nothing; any person might 
build a mill higher on the stream, and interfere with 
the flow of water ... and no relief was available from 
the courts .' 
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The point came up for decision in a crisp form in the 
case of Shury v Piggott (1626). The plaintiff claimed that 
his water course had been stopped by his neighbour. At some 
earlier time the two tenements in the case had been united 
and the defendant now ingeniously argued that the unity of 
possession had extinguished the plaintiff's rights to the 
water course, implying thereby that the right in the waters 
was a mere easement capable of being extinguished by merger 
of title. 
(207 ) 
The case, as Lord Blackburn observed, appears to 
have 'excited a good deal of attention'. It 'was reported in 
1(208) 
six different reports and it is clear from these that 
the question was not considered to be a simple one, the point 
being 'argued at the Bar, and much debated, and for further 
(209 ) 
argument ... was adjourned to another time'. When it 
(210 ) 
came up again it 'was argued at large by all the judges' 
who, in the event, found in favour of the plaintiff. 
For the defendant it had been argued that a 'watercourse 
may well be compared to the ease of a way' and as such was an 
easement to be extinguished by unity of possession. The 
plaintiff disputed the analogy on the ground that 'where the 
thing hath a being and existence, ... there it is not destroyed 
by the unity'. In effect it was the plaintiff's contention 
that he had a natural right to receive the water that flowed 
naturally to his land and that it was an actionable nuisance 
for his neighbour to deprive him of this right. This propo-
sition appealed to the judges who expressed it in various ways 
and approved it for various reasons. 
(207) Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 AC 740 at 825. Cf Lauer op cit 
(n 201 above) 87. 
(208) (1626) 3 Bulst 339; Latch 153, Noy 84; Palm 444; 
Poph 169; W Jones 14 5.. 
(209) 3 Bulst 339. 
(210) Ibid. 
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Whitlock CJ perhaps perceived the central issues most 
clearly: 
'... the question here is of aqua profluens, and I 
conceive that there needs no prescription or cus-
tom in this case, for water hath its natural course, 
and ... natura sua descendit, it may be called usu-
captio or usage.' 
Ways and rights of common were different, he went on, that 
'are called servitutes' and begin 'by grant or prescription', 
'but in our case the water-course doth not begin by 
the consent of the parties, nor by prescription, but 
ex jure naturae, and therefore shall not be extinguished 
by unity 't211) 
. . . . (212) 
The decision in Shury v Piggott thus established that 
a landowner could claim to have and be entitled to certain 
(211) 3 Bulst 339 at 340. The other judges were rather less 
certain of their reasons. Jones J agreed that unity 
could not extinguish the right because, inter alia, 'if 
such a unity by construction of law should extinguish 
water-courses, it would be too dangerous'.-
Doderidge J too was inclined to invoke reasons of policy, 
observing that unity did not extinguish. 'For the 
necessity of the thing', 
'and this is the reason that common appendant by 
the unity of possession shall not be extinguished 
for it is appendant to ancient land-hide ... which 
is necessary for the preservation of the common-
wealth: and as in this case there is necessity of 
bread, so in our case there is a necessity of 
water ....' 
He gave as a further reason 'the nature of the thing 
being a water course which is a thing running': 
'From the nature of water, which naturally descends, 
it is always current, et aut invenit aut facit viam, 
and shall such a thing be extinguished which hath its 
being from the creation.' 
(212) The decision in Shury v Piggott was followed in later 
water cases. In Sands v Trefusis (1639) Cro Car 57 5 
it was held that the plaintiff could succeed in an 
action for diversion of the water-course to his mill 
even though he did not allege that it was an 'ancient' 
mill or an 'ancient' watercourse. The court held that 
his action lay since he was 'lawfully in possession, and 
the stopping of the water is tortious, and a damage to 
his mill'. This case was approved by Lord Hale in Cox 
v Matthews (167 3) 1 Vent 2 37, saying that a man might 
bring an action for the diversion of the water course 
to his mill 'and not say antiquum mo.lendinum'. See 
also Nulmes v Hoblethwayte (1683) 3 Lev 133 a decision 
(continued on the next page) 
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incidents to the ownership of land without having to first 
prove that he had acquired the right by way of express grant 
or acquisitive prescription.. The corollary to this was his 
(213 ) 
action sounded in tort and liability followed upon proof 
of damage suffered. And, generally speaking, such liability 
arose from the defendant's failure to observe the prescription 
(214 ) 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 
(212) (continued) 
at Common Pleas upheld in the King's Bench (sub nom 
Keblethwait v Palmes (1686) Comb 9; 2 Show 2 43 ;Carth 
85;,Skin 65, 175' notwithstanding a strong dissent by 
Holt CJ. The position thus was that, by 167 3 and after, 
man whose watercourses were diverted or interfered with 
were obtaining their action without having to show that 
they had acquired a right to the flow of the water by 
long enjoyment or prescription. Their cause of action 
was, as said in Sands v Trefusis, (supra) a disturbance 
of their possession which caused damage. Cf Lauer op 
cit (n 29 above) 92. 
(213) Cf Sands v Trefusis (1639) Cro Car 575 where the court 
allowed an action for diversion of waters without proof 
of prescriptive title, saying that 'the stopping of the 
water is tortious, and a damage to his mill'. Cf 
Tenant v Goldwin (17 04) 6 Mod Rep 311 at 313 where 
Holt CJ pointed out that 'there is a difference between 
charging a wrongdoer and the tenant of the land; for 
to charge the terretenant one must make title by grant 
or prescription, but none need be made against a wrong-
doer . . . . ' 
(214) See Tenant v Goldwin (1704) 1 Salk 21, 360; Holt KB 500; 
2 Ld Raym 1089; 6 Mod Rep 311. There the plaintiff 
sued in case for the escape of 'filthinesses and nasty 
things' from the defendant's 'privy-house of office' 
onto the plaintiff's premises. The defendant excepted 
to this on the ground that it could not be proved that 
he was under prescriptive obligation to maintain the 
wall of his house so as to prevent such escapes (see 5 -
Mod 3.11 in fine). Salkeld, arguing for the plaintiff, 
rebutted this saying that there were cases (citing, inter 
alia, Sand v Trefusis (supra n 212)) where a duty was 
placed 'in as general a manner as this, without shewing 
any title' (2 Ld Raym at 1090) or, in other words, that 
the action was 'for a tort to his possession' (6 Mod at 
312) and thus lay without the need to show any prescrip-
tive obligation to repair. With this Holt CJ agreed. 
In Lord Raymond's report he is reported as holding (at 
1092) 
'there appeared a sufficient cause of action, to 
entitle the plaintiff to have his judgment: that 
they did not go on the word solebat, or the jure 
debuit reparare, as it were enough to say, that the 
plaintiff has a house, and the defendant has a wall, 
(continued on the next page) 
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( 9 1 5 ̂  
The decisions in Shury v Piggott and Sands v 
( 0 "1 £ ̂  
Trefusis thus established a general principle: a man's 
right to flowing waters was not an easement but rather exis-
( 217 ) 
ted 'of common right' or, in other words, as a natural 
right. As such any interference with it gave rise to an ac-
tion in tort on the basis that the defendant had offended 
( 2 1 R ) 
against the precept sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 
(219 ) 
And since the right to pure air also was .not an easement 
and was also redressed by the nuisance action in terms of the 
. . (22Q) . . . 
sic utere principle, • it too could be classified as being 
a natural right of property. Likewise the obligation to pro-
vide lateral support to a neighbour's land was not an ease-
(221) 
ment and would thus also seem to be a natural right and 
(222 ) 
fall to be redressable on the sic utere principle. 
In short then the implications of Aldred's case, Wilde 
v Minsterley and Shury v Piggott was that there existed a 
distinct category of real property rights which could be 
(223 ) 
classified as natural rights of property having their 
own particular form of remedy in the shape of the action for 
nuisance under the aegis of sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
. , . ( 2 2 4 ) 
laedas. 
(214) (continued) 
a  he ought to repa r th  wall.... [T]he reason 
of this case is upon this account, that every one 
must so use his own as not to damage another ... 
so he must keep in the filth of his house of office, 
that it may not flow in and damnify his neighbour'. 
(215) Supra n 207. 
(216) Supra n 212. 
(217) Cf above n 200. 
(210)1 Above 137. 
(219) Above 124. 
(220) Above 131-2. 
(221) See Wilde v Minsterley (1639) 2 Rolle Abr 564, cited 
n 9 5 above. 
(222) Cf-Humphries v Brogden (185.0) 12 QE 739; Rowbotham v 
Wilson (1857) 8 E & B 123; DaIton v Angus (1881TT AC 740 
(223) Cf Simpson op cit 246; Baker op cit 240; Sims op cit 
(1921-2) 8 Virginia LR at 325//. 
(224) Cf Sims op cit (n 222 above) 334/f. 
1144. 
In a sense the dichotomy of natural rights of property 
j o. j. • jr • ( 2 2 5 ) _ , . , 
and easements is unsatisfactory. It is however a con-
venient way of explaining the fact that the .action for nui-
sance can lie for an interference with an easement as well 
as in cases where a plaintiff complains of acts which in no 
/ r\ r\ r- \ 
way Impinge upon such easement rights as he may enjoy. 
And although the action for nuisance would continue to lie 
( 227 ) 
for the vindication of easement rights, it was to be m 
its guise as an action for the vindication of 'natural' 
rights of property that it was to achieve its further develop-
ment and ultimate apotheosis. 
5. The Action on the Case for Common Nuisance 
5.1. Introduction 
( 0 0 R *) 
We have seen that by the sixteenth century the 
differentiation of private and common (public) nuisance had 
reached the point where the two concepts were considered to 
be entirely separate and distinct. This had come about through 
the establishment of 'jurisdictional rules which laid down that 
the courts leet could not entertain an action for private 
nuisance and, conversely, that the action for damages could 
not lie where the damages suffered were the result of a 
(229) 
common nuisance. 
(22 5) As Simpson, History of Land Law 2 4 6 points out the 
'terminology which speaks of natural rights is now, 
however, suspect; it is simpler and more intelligible 
to talk of the situations in which a landowner can sue 
in tort without proving a servitude, than to speak of 
natural rights and attempt to list these'. 
(226) Cf Baker English Legal History 239. 
(227) 'Such an action - in essence an action based on property 
- has been called "cognate nuisance" to distinguish it 
from the tortious action brought to protect the natural 
enjoyment of land'". Baker op cit 23 9-40. 
(228) Above 8 8-9. . 
(229) This latter proposition was reiterated in the seventeenth 
century cases. See especially Iveson v Moore (1699) 
1 Ld Raym 48 6 where Rokeby J said" (at 4 91-2TT 
'he would admit, that no particular person could 
have an action for the general stopping of a way 
1. Because the offender is punishable at the King's 
suit 2. Because multiplicity of actions is to be 
avoided; and if one man may have an action, for 
the same reason a hundred thousand may'. 
See also William's case (1592) 5 Co Rep 72b (cited n 233 
below). 
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But in the sixteenth century an exception came to be 
allowed to the latter proposition. If, it was said, a member 
of the public -who suffered damage from a public nuisance 
could show that the damage he suffered was different to that 
suffered by the other persons affected by the nuisance he 
could bring an action on the case for that 'special' or 'par-
ticular' damage. 
5.2. The Exception 
This exception to the general rule was first mooted by 
(230) Fortesque J in the case of Sowthai1 v Dagger (1538). 
The action arose from an obstruction of the king's highway 
which prevented the plaintiff from reaching his close. He 
sued in case for the damage thereby suffered. Baldwin CJ 
refused to allow the action pointing out that the obstruction 
'is a common nuisance to all the King's lieges' and thus fell 
(231) 
to be redressed 'in the Leet'. Fitzherbert J however 
dissented: 
'I agree well that each nuisance done in the King's' 
highway is punishable in the Leet and not by an ac-
tion, unless it be where one man has suffered greater 
hurt or inconvenience than the generality have; but 
he who has suffered such greater displeasure or hurt 
can have an action to recover the damage which he has 
by reason of this special hurt. So if one makes a 
ditch across the highway, and I come riding along the 
way in the night and I and my horse are thrown into 
the ditch so that I have great damage and displeasure 
thereby, I shall have an action here against him who 
made this ditch across the highway, because I have 
suffered more damage than any other person. So here 
the plaintiff had more convenience by this highway than 
any other person had, and so when he is stopped he 
suffers more damage because he has no way to go to his 
close. Wherefore it seems to me that he shall have 
this action pour ce special matiere; but if he had 
not suffered greater damage than all others suffered, 
then he would not have the action! 
(230) This case is usually cited as Anon (1535) YB 27 Hen 8/ 
27 pi 10 (Fifoot History and Sources 98). Kiralfy 
Action on the Case 59 has however Identified it as 
Sowthall v Dagger C.P roll Hil 26 Hen 7 (1535) m 280. 
(231) See above 88. 
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Nothing more is hear of this until 15 84. In that year 
(232 ) 
a plaintiff brought an action on the case for damages 
arising from the delay and inconvenience caused to him by the 
obstruction of a public highway by the defendant. Signifi-
cantly the court did not reject the claim out of hand in ac-
cordance with the traditional rule as expounded by Baldwin CJ 
i-n Sowthall v Dagger. Rather we. find it refusing the action 
on the ground that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was 
not in fact any different to that suffered by other users of 
the highway. In other words the court had approached the 
matter on the basis advocated by Fortesque J. Then in '. a 
(233) 
William's case the case of Sowthall v Dagger is cited in 
a way which indicates that Fortesquers dissent was regarded 
as being as much a part of the ratio of the case as the judg-
ment of Balwin CJ. 
By the beginning of the seventeenth century it had be-
come the settled principle of English law that an action for 
damages in respect of a public nuisance 'lies not for a pri-
f n q c \ 
vate person ... unless he can shew some special prejudice'. 
(232) Anon (1584) Moo KB 180. 
(233) (1592) 5 Co Rep 72b. 
(234) A man shall not have an action on the case for a nui-
sance done in the highway, for it is a common nuisance, 
and then it is not reasonable that a particular person 
should have the action; for by the same reason that 
one might have an action for it, by the same reason 
every one might have an action; and then he would be 
punished 100 times for one and the same cause. But if 
any particular person afterwards by the nuisance done 
has more particular damage than any other, then for that 
particular injury, he shall have a particular action on 
the case.' 
(235) The rule was expressed thus by Sir Edward Coke (then 
attorney general) in argument in the case of Fineux v 
Hovenden (1599) Cro Eliz 665. Coke continued his state-
ment of the law by saying 
'and so it was adjudged in this court, in Serjeant 
Bendlows v Kemp [not reported], that he might main-
tain an action upon some special prejudice. And ... 
i-n Williams v Johns [supra n 2 32]. And therefore, 
i-n Westbury v Powel [not reported] , where the in-
habitants of Southwark had a common watering place, 
and the defendant stopped it up, and the plaintiff, 
being an inhabitant there, brought his action upon 
the case, it was adjudged maintainable'. 
Later cases in which the rule is approved and followed were 
(continued on the next page) 
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5.3. The Concept of Particular Damage 
Once it was accepted that private individuals might sue 
for damages incurred as a result of a public nuisance the 
courts set about defining the type or character of damage 
which would entitle a plaintiff to bring the action. 
Sowthall v Dagger was a case where the plaintiff 
complained that the obstruction of the public highway preven-
ted him obtaining access to his close, and this thus appeared 
to be an instance of special damage allowing an action on the 
(237) 
case. 
( 9 3 8 ) 
In Maynell v Saltmarsh " (1664) the action was allowed 
on the plaintiff showing that his corn was spoiled by rain as 
a result of his not being able to transport it because the 
defendant had obstructed the highway. 
Then in Hart v Basset 9^(1681) the plaintiff rested his 
action on the delay and inconvenience suffered as a result of 
the obstruction of the highway. Observing that 'the common 
rule, that no one shall have an action for that which every 
one suffers, ought not to be taken too largely', the court 
allowed the action, finding that the plaintiff had 
particular damage, for the labour and pains he was 
forced to take with his cattle and servants, by rea-
son of this obstruction, may well be of more value 
than the loss of a horse, or such damage as is allowed 
to maintain an action on the case.(240) 
(235) (continued) 
Mary's case (1612) 9 Co Rep 111b (cited above 88); 
Hart v Bassett (1681) T Jones 156; Paine v Partrich 
(1692) Carth 192; Iveson v Moore (1699) 1 Ld Raym 48 6. 
See also Co Lift 5 6a. Cf Holdsworth 8 HEL 424; 10 HEL 
316. The rule is discussed at length in Fridman 'The 
Definition of Particular Damage in Nuisance' (1953) 2 
U West Australia Ann LR 490; Prosser 'Private Action 
for Public NuisancerTT966) 5 2 Virginia LR 99 7. 
(236) Supra n 229. 
(237) See Fineux v Hovenden (supra n 234); Iveson v Moore 
(1699) 1 Ld Raym 486. 
(238) (1664) 1 Keb 847. 
(239) (1681) T Jones 156. 
( 2 4 0 ) Cf Anon ( 1 5 8 4 ) Moo KB 18 0 ; S t o n e v Wakeman ( 1 6 0 7 ) Noy 120 
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This decision, that non-material and pecuniary loss 
might constitute a form of special damage, though not happily 
(241) 
received by Holt C J, nevertheless became an undisputed 
ground for bringing the action for special damages. Thus in 
(242 ) Baker v Moore the action was allowed where the plaintiff 
could show that as a result of an obstruction of the highway 
he had lost tenants from his house. So too in Iveson v Moore 
(243 ) 
(169 9) the action lay for loss of custom arising from 
(244 ) the obstruction of the way to the plaintiff's colliery. 
(245) 
•In Sowthall v Dagger Fortesque J used as an illus-
tration of the type of damage that should entitle a plaintiff 
to an action on the case the example of a horseman falling 
into the ditch which constituted the public nuisance in the 
(241) In Paine v Partrich (1692) Carth 192 at 194 he was in-
clined to dispute that delay or inconvenience could 
constitute sufficient special damage to allow the ac-
tion, saying 
'Concerning special damages sufficient to maintain 
an action on the case ...-if a highway'is so- stopped, 
that a man is delayed in his journey a little while, 
and by reason whereof he is damnified, or some im-
portant affair neglected; this is not such a spe-
cial damage for which an action on the case will 
lie; but a particular damage to maintain this 
action ought to be direct, and not consequential; 
as for instance; the loss of his horse, or by 
some corporal hurt, in falling into a trench in the 
highway'. 
See too Iveson v Moore (1699) 1 Ld Raym 486 at 494 where 
he appears to question the decision in Hart v Basset. 
(242) (1696) (unreported) cited Iveson v Moore (supra) at 491. 
(243) (1699) 1 Ld Raym 486; Holt 10. This case was much 
argued, coming before the King's Bench on a writ of 
error, where Rokeby and Holt JJ found against the 
plaintiff and Gould and Turton JJ were for. Afterwards 
the case was heard by all the justices of the Common 
Pleas and the Barons of the Exchequer (sub nom Jeveson 
v Moor 12 Mod 262) and judgment was given for the . 
plaintiff. 
(244) It was also alleged that the coals from the plaintiff's 
colliery had deteriorated during the period that the 
plaintiff was unable to transport them because of the 
obstruction to the highway. Cf Maynell v Saltmarsh 
(supra n 237 ) . 
(245) Supra n 229. 
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highway. In Fowler v Sanders (1617) the plaintiff had 
been riding along a public highwa}' across which the defendant 
had laid some logs. The horse 'stumbled upon these blocks, 
and much hurt him' and the rider sued for damages. The court 
allowed the action 'because he having special damage had 
caused to bring that action, although the nuisance be a pub-
lic nuisance'. 
Ostensibly there is nothing exceptional about this de-
cision in that the damages suffered were as much 'special' or 
(247 ) 
'particular' as the loss of custom in Iveson v Moore or 
( 9 U R ) 
the spoiling of the corn in Maynell v Saltmarsh . But as 
(249) . . . . 
Newark has pointed out the effect of this decision was 
that an action on the case for nuisance could lie for per-
sonal injuries, a proposition which, as we shall see, had 
the effect of blurring the boundaries of the concept of 
. , (25 0) 
private nuisance. 
(246) (1617) Cro Jac 446. 
(247) Supra n 242. 
(248) Supra n 237. 
(249) Newark 'The Boundaries of Nuisance' (1949) 65 LQR 480 
at 4 84. 
(250) We have seen (above 12 6.) that the action for nuisance 
had come to protect certain interests of personality, 
particularly those relating to the integrity of the 
physical person. The import of Fowler v Sanders how-
ever was that the action could lie for actual physical 
'.-harm to the person. In the nineteenth century this was 
to be the realm of the tort of negligence and it is in 
the confusion of the scope of that remedy with that of 
the action for nuisance under the principle in Fowler 
v Sanders that the blurring of boundaries occurred. 
See further below 3 62-5. 
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C H A P T E R F O U R 
ELABORATION : 'COMMON' NUISANCE ( 1 6 0 0 - 1 9 0 0 ) 
A. ABSORBTION INTO THE COMMON LAW 
1. Introduction 
Prior to the seventeenth century 'common' nuisances 
(1) 
were the subject of leet jurisdiction and, as such, 
very seldom came within the purview of the courts Common 
T (2). 
Law 
During the period under discussion the situation 
changed. Common laywers became interested in the activi-
ties of the courts leet and produced authoritative trea-
tises upon their jurisdiction and functions. A general 
decline in the importance of the leet as an instrument of 
local government began about this time so that the Courts 
of Common law came to take over something of their func-
tions. Influenced by the treatises on the courts leet 
the common law courts bodily incorporated into the common 
law the nuisance concept evolved in the leets . By the 
early eighteenth century there thus emerged in the common 
law an elaborated concept of common (public) nuisance the 
main features of which had been drawn from the law and 
practice of the courts leet. 
2. The Common Law Courts begin to suppress 'Common' 
nuisances 
2.1. By Writs of Prohibition 
During the seventeenth century the common law courts 
began to suppress and punish nocumenta which had the effect 
of harming the public under their jurisdiction to issue 
. . . (3) 
writs of prohibition. 
(1) See above 69ff 
(2) The only real point of contact was when the action on 
the case lay for particular damages suffered as a result 
of a common (or public) nuisance. See above 144. 
(3 ) Cf above 107 n73. 
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In 1671, in Jacob Ha l l ' s case , the court of Kings 
Bench ordered a nuisance suppressed. Hall was a rope-
dancer who erected a booth for the display of his art in 
Charing Cross. The crowds of 'idle and naughty persons' 
who gathered to view the exhibition were, the local inhabi-
tants claimed, a 'great annoyance' and they complained to 
Lord Chief Justice Hale. He ordered Hall summoned into 
his court and instructed him that pending an indictment 
he should desist from his activities. Hall defied this 
order and the chief justice committed him for contempt and 
ordered the booth to be prostrated. 
The order of the court was in the nature of a writ of 
prohibition and was extraordinary in that the nuisance was 
suppressed without the usual process of presentment to a 
( 5 ) ; " • - ' " • 
grand jury and trial of the question whether there was 
a nuisance. Lord Hale however justified the proceeding 
by citing a precedent from 163 3 where 
'Noyprayed a writ to remove a bowling-alley ... 
and had it without any presentment at all.' 
Further, he appears to have considered the booth to be a 
' (6) 
nuisance per se, saying 
'things of this nature ought not to be placed 
among people's habitations, and that it was a 
nuisance to the King's Royal Palace; besides, 
that it straitend the way, and was insufferable 
in that respect.' 
(4) (1671) 1 Mod 76; 1 Vent 169; 2 Keb 846; Holt KB 538 
(5) There is some suggestion that the usual procedure was 
followed in that the judges had a personal 'view' of 
the booth 'it being in their way to Westminster' and 
made a record of their finding. It was however an 
open question whether a presentment made upon a personal 
view of a justice could be suppressed without being put 
to a jury : see R v Justices of Wilts (17 64) 1 Wm Bla 467. 
(6) Cf R v Betterton (1695) 5 Mod 142 where Hall's case 
was distinguished on the ground that there was a 
nuisance 'per se'. 
151. 
Although there was another attempt to obtain such a 
(7) 
prohibitory writ from the Court of King's Bench, the 
procedure adopted in Hall's case did not become usual, 
probably because of the existence of another process by 
which the common law courts could exercise an original 
jurisdiction over common nuisances. 
2.2. By Information 
The normal procedure for prosecuting nuisances was a 
presentment by a jury of accusation. However there had 
long existed a process in the common law whereby offences 
might be prosecuted on an information laid by the king or 
his attorney-general to the Court of the King's Bench. 
By the sixteenth century this power was of an indefinite 
nature and there was some doubt, of a constitutional nature, 
whether proceedings by way of information were legitimate 
• • 1 4-4- (8) 
in criminal matters. 
(7) In R v Betterton (1695) 5 Mod 142; Skin 625 a 'writ 
of prohibition' was sought to suppress a play house 
in Lincon's Inn Fields. The application was strongly 
resisted, it being said ' that this would be an extra-
ordinary way of proceeding, to try a criminal matter 
by a prohibition,' and that to issue the writ 'would 
be to condemn the party without hearing him.' Eyre J 
was reluctant to grant the writ, saying that 'the most 
proper way to proceed is by indictment' and Holt CJ, 
while apparently more inclined to issue the writ, 
ordered the matter adjourned. The reported Skinner 
(who was also a party to the application) appends to his 
report his opinion which inclined to uphold the propriety 
of the writ. In Lyons, Sons & Co. v Gulliver (1914) 
1 Ch 631 at 653 Phillimore LJ discussed Betterton's case 
and suggests that the basis of the authority of the court 
to issue the writ was that 'in those days the Courts 
exercised a kind of executive control in assizes and 
quarter sessions and. probably in London by the Court of 
Queens Bench, over all places of public amusement ...' 
(8) See Holdsworth 9 HEL 23 6 ff 
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Nevertheless it seems that at this time there had 
grown up a practise of pursuing certain nuisances by way 
(9 ) 
of an information. The history of this practice as it 
(10) 
concerned nuisances was traced by Shower who cites 
precedents collected by Lord Hale extending back to the 
(11 ) 
reign of Edward I, and others coming forward to the 
(12 ) 
reign of Charles II. For the most part these seem 
to have been in relation to nuisances to public highways 
(13 ) 
and rivers, but in 1683 in R v Pierce we find an 
information being laid for keeping a soap-boilery in London 
and 'tried before Jefferyes Chief Justice at Guildhall.' 
The defendant was found guilty 
'and in this case was remembered the case of 
a calendar-man here in London, in Bread Street, 
who was convicted before Lord Hale on such as 
information, for that the noise of it disturbed 
the neighbours ... and the case of the King v 
Jordan (14) for a brewhouse ... about a year 
and a half since; and he was forced to 
prostrate the same.' 
(9) Holdsworth op cit 239 
(10) In R v Berchet (1690) 1 Show KB 106 
(11) 'Trin 13 Edw I, majus, nuisance for stopping 
a common river punished by information, and the 
jurisdiction of the court well vouched ' 
(op cit 118). 
(12) 'In Trinity Term 23 Hen 8 Roll 10 Information by ... 
Attorney General ... for a nuisance in an highway' 
(op cit 115). Shower also cites Egerly' s case (1641) 
3 Salk 182, an information for destroying the highway 
with an overloaded.wagon 'and the party fined and 
imprisoned', and R v Inhabitants of Yarton (1664) 
1 Sid 140. " ~ 
(13) (1683) 2 Show 327. 
(14) Not reported. 
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Informations in Equity 
In 1587 the Attorney-General brought an English 
(15 ) 
information in the Exchequer against James Bond to 
prevent the erection of a pigeon-house on the ground that 
it was a 'common nuisance', and the court awarded an 
injunction. 
( 1 fi ) 
This suggestion that common nuisances could be 
suppressed by injunctions issued out of the courts of equity 
• (17) 
was not, it seems, followed up, apparently because common 
nuisances were deemed to be criminal offences and thus not a 
(18 ) 
proper subject for the award of an injunction. 
(15) Bond's case (1587) Moo KB 238 
(16) Private nuisances were at this time liable to restraint 
by Injunction. See above 106. 
(17) In Baines v Baker (1752) 1 Amb 158 Lord Hardwicke 
refused to enjoin a small-pox. hospital, apparently 
on the ground that it was a public nuisance. As 
such, he said, the proper procedure was by way of 
'an information in the name of the Attorney-General.' 
(It is not clear however whether he meant an information 
brought to a court of common law or whether his point 
was that an Injunction could not issue against a public 
nuisance on the request of a private individual), 
(18) In Attorney-General v Richards (1795) 2 Anstr 603 counsel 
opposed the award of an injunction against a public 
arguing that 
'that is a matter completely foreign to the 
jurisdiction of a court of equity. It is 
a breach of the general police of the kingdom, 
and as such is considered to be a crime, 
and to be prosecuted in the criminal courts. 
But a court of equity cannot hold cognizance 
of any criminal matter. It never was 
attempted to prosecute a suite in equity 
to remedy any other public mischiefs, as 
to prohibit rope-dancing, plays etc or to 
abate a nuisance or purpresture on the 
highway. ' 
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However after 17 9 5 it became the practice to issue 
injunctions on informations laid by the Attorney-General 
in respect of those public nuisances which could be said 
4- K 4- (19) 
to be purprestures. 
2.3. Common Nuisance institutionalized as a 
Plea of the Crown 
The most significant development in the process where-
by the common law came to take over the concept of common 
nuisance occurred when 'Common Nuisance" was incorporated 
into the criminal law of England as a Plea of the Crown. 
That 'nocumenta' could be classified under the heading 
'pleas of the crown' is a principle that goes back to the 
thirteenth century when the sheriff's tourn held pleas of the 
U- V, 4-̂  4- 4- (20) 
crown among which were the various purpresture-nocumenta. 
In the hey-day of the courts leet this idea was virtually 
forgotton. In the seventeenth century, however, there 
appeared a number of treatises on the jurisdiction of the 
(21) 
leet, written by common lawyers, which differentiated 
(22 ) 
the jurisdiction of leet and court baron. In drawing 
this distinction the authors noted that the leet was the 
successor to the tourn and thus, in theory at least, was a 
court of royal jurisdiction entitled to hold pleas of the 
(23) 
crown. 
(19) Attorney-General v Richards (supra). The action was in 
the Exchequer which court enjoyed a jurisdiction to pro-
tect the revenue interest of the crown. MacDonald CB 
avoided the argument (above n 18) that equity could not 
act in criminal matters by treating the nuisance in 
question as a purpresture and holding that the Crown 
was entitled to the relief sought. See also Bagwell 
'Criminal Jurisdiction of Equity' (1931) 2 0 Kentucky LJ 
161 at ,164. See further below. " " 
(20) See above 23 if. 
(21) See Holdsworth 4 HEL 12 0-1; Hearnshaw Leet Jurisdiction 
in England 3 4//. The leading treatises were those of 
John Kitchin Jurisdictions (158 0) (see 84 n 223 above) 
and William Shepherd The Court Keepers Guide (1641) (see 
Hearnshaw op cit 38). The numerous treatises published 
in the seventeenth century and after are usefully 
collected in Webb Manor and Borough 10 n 2. 
(22) Holdsworth op cit 13 0; Webb op cit 11 //. 
(23) 'The Leet is a court of record for the cognizance of 
(continued on the next page) 
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. Since the leet had jurisdiction over common nuisances 
and since the leet could hear pleas of the crown, it seemed 
to follow that common nuisances could be classified as pleas 
of the crown. This at least seems to be the explanation of 
the fact that when Sir Mathew Hale in 1682 produced one of 
the earliest treatises on English criminal law he included 
in it, under the rubric 'offences not capital of an inferior 
nature', what he called simply 'Nuisances'. 
(05) 
Hale's Pleas of the Crown is remarkable for our 
purposes only insofar as it provides evidence that by this 
time nocumenta were regarded as punishable offences at common 
law. The treatise has little else of value in its treatment 
of this topic. Hale attempted no definition of the offence, 
and indeed the pages devoted to the topic are singularly 
unenlightening. They begin with a heading 'Nuisances' 
immediately under which there is the rubric 'bridges, publick' 
followed by some cryptic notes concerning the obligation to 
criminal matters or pleas of the crown, and necessarily 
belongs to the King ...' Ritson The Jurisdiction of'the 
Court Leet viii In fact the leet jurisdiction over pleas 
of the crown was theoretical only. In 1215 Magna Charta 
(cap 24) had deprived sheriffs of the power to hold pleas 
of the crown and thereafter the criminal jurisdiction 
of the sheriffs tourn was taken over by other courts 
(see Hearnshaw op cit 94-5) leaving the tourn, and later 
the leet, with 'the small fragments of .the once-extensive 
criminal jurisdiction of the sheriffs ... such disjecta 
membra as have appeared to the acquisitive central govern-
ment too small to be worth snatching at ..." (Hearnshaw 
op cit 93). 
(24) Between Bracton and Hale (1609-1676) no books of any 
significance were produced relating to the criminal law 
of England. See Hall General Principles of Criminal 
Law 7 n 10. 
(25) Pleas of the Crown, or a Methodical Summary of the 
Principles Relating to that Subject (i%02) 
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repair. The following page is devoted to 'Highways' and 
consists also of cryptic notes concerning the obligation 
of repair. The next page is merely a list of subjects 
which reads 'Inns, Ale-houses, Bawdy-houses Gaming-houses'. 
Kale then discusses rather more fully the topics of 'Common 
Inns' (observing that it is no offence to erect such a 
place 'so it be not ad nocumentun') and Ale-houses (most 
of the discussion of this topic being a commentary on 
certain statutory provisions).. 
Hale's work was in fact a preliminary exercise to 
his unfinished magnum opus The History of the Pleas of the 
Crown, published posthumously in 17 36, and it is thus not 
entirely surprising that it is both cryptic and incomplete. 
The later History has nothing on nuisances and it was thus 
left to Hale's successor William Hawkins (167 3-1746) to 
produce the first comprehensive account of nuisance as a 
plea of the Crown. This he did in his treatise Pleas of 
the Crown, or a System of the Principal Matters Relating 
to that Subject, digested under their proper Heads published 
in 1716. 
Hawkins devoted four chapters of his treatise to the 
subject of punishable nuisances. The first, chapter 75, 
attempts a general statement of the nature of 'common 
nuisance', and thereafter there are chapters on 'Nuisances 
relating to Highways' (c 76) 'Nuisances relating to Bridges' 
(c 77) and 'Nuisances relating to publick Houses' (c 78). 
There is also a chapter (74) on ' ... the offence of 
keeping a Bawdy House' which offence Hawkins characterizes 
as a common nuisance. 
Hawkins' work is remarkable for two main reasons. The 
first is that by the authority it came to enjoy it settled 
beyond question the fact that there existed at common law 
a concept of a public nuisance, characterized by the fact 
that it was a plea of the Crown. The second significant 
feature was that Hawkins attempted some sort of general 
definition of the concept thus breaking with the old 
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tendency of seeking the distinction between public and 
private nuisance in the jurisdictional distinction be-
tween courts eet and the courts of civil jurisdiction. 
'[I]t seems, he wrote, 'that a Common nuisance may 
be defined 
to be an offence against the Publick, either 
by doing a thing which tends to the annoyance 
of all the king's subjects, or by neglecting (?c\ 
to do a thing which the common good requires.' 
3. Common Nuisance in the Common Law 
3.1. Scope 
If Hawkins was responsible for institutionalizing the 
idea of a common nuisance as a criminal offence liable 
to prosecution as a plea of the crown, he did little 
toward settling the contents of the offence. For the 
most part his account of common nuisance is a somewhat 
tentative digest of the various authorities statutory 
and common law that bore on indictments, the maintenance 
and repair of public highways and bridges and the keeping 
of various types of public houses. There is little in 
all this by way of an attempt at laying down the boundaries 
of the concept of common nuisance or of rationalization 
(26) Chap 7 5 s 1. Hawkins cites 2 Rolle Abridgement 83 
as authority for this definition, but the folio to 
which he refers contains no more than a collection . 
of the cases in which it is held that there can 
be no presentment of nocumenta affecting private 
interests. Indeed there can be little doubt that 
the definition is Hawkin's own attempt to rationalize 
the authorities already discussed. It is signifi-
cant that in it he uses Coke's category of nocumentum 
publicum (see above 89)'- that which is ad nocumentum 
totius regni - as the basis of the definition ('a 
thing tends to the annoyance of all the king's 
subjects') but uses the appellation 'common nuisance1 
to describe it. In other words Hawkins has rolled 
Coke's 'common' and 'public' nocumenta into one 
composite concept which he describes by the traditional 
term 'common' nuisance. 
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of the relationship between the various categories of 
things which by his account fell to be regarded as 
common nuisances. Indeed a reading of Hawkins on common 
nuisance leaves one with the impression that the author 
had no particular clear view of what a common nuisance 
was or why it was liable to prosecution rather than a 
civil action. 
(27 ) 
Bacon's New Abridgement of the Law, which appeared 
during the middle decades of the century, relied upon 
Hawkins (adopting his definition of common nuisance) but 
in the mode of exposition was something of an improvement 
upon Hawkins. Under the heading 'What shall be said to 
(28) 
be a nuisance' Bacon listed the following: 
(i) 'keeping a Bawdy-house' (ii) 'all common gaming-
houses' (iii) 'all common stages for Rope-dancers' (iv) 
play-houses (though these were 'not nuisances in their own 
nature, but may become such by accident') (v) obstructing 
a highway by ditches, hedges, gates, logs or otherwise 
'rendering it less commodious' (vi) diverting navigable' 
rivers (vii) setting up of brew-houses, glass-houses, 
chandlers' shops and swine sties 'in such inconvenient 
parts of a town, that they cannot but greatly incommode 
the neighbourhood.' 
Like Hawkins, Bacon made no attempt to rationalize 
this list of subjects being content to derive them from 
the cases, Hawkin's treatise, and the statutes. It was 
left to Blackstone in his Commentaries (17 65), to provide 
a statement of the scope of the concept of public nuisance 
(27) A Gentleman of the Middle Temple [Mathew Bacon] 
A New Abridgement of the Law (1736-1766). On 
Bacon's authorship of this work see Holdsworth 
12 HEL 169. The work is less of an abridgement 
and more of a treatise and marks the beginning of 
a new style in the exposition of the law (Holdsworth 
op cit 170). 
(28) Bacon 3 New Abridgement 'Nuisances' (A) 
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which sought to extract some general principles from the 
authorities and which knitted these together into something 
approaching a'coherent, rational and comprehensive state-
ment of the concept as reflected by the sources: 
(29 ) 
'Of this nature are' he wrote 
1. Annoyances in highways, bridges and public 
rivers, by rendering the same inconvenient 
or dangerous to pass: either positively, 
by actual obstruction; or negatively, by 
want of reparation . . . 
2. All those kinds of nuisances (such as 
offensive trades and manufactures) which 
when injurious to private man are action-
able, are, when detrimental to the public, 
punishable by prosecution ... 
3. All disorderly inns or ale-houses, bawdy-
houses, gaming-houses, stage-plays unlicensed, 
booths or stages for rope-dancers, mounte-
banks , and the like are public nuisances, 
and may upon indictment be suppressed and 
find 
4. Eaves-droppers, or such as listen under walls 
or windows ... are a common nuisance, and 
presentable at the court leet: or are in-
dictable at the sessions ... 
5. Lastly, a common scold, communis rixatrix ... 
is a public nuisance to her neighbourhood. 
Of these species of common law public nuisance only 
the first two were of any importance in the future deve-
lopment of the nuisance concept. The quaint, medieval 
idea of a scolding woman as a public nuisance had 
(2 9) 4 Bla Comm 187 
(3 0) See above 78. 
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(31) 
f a l l en in to desuetude even m Blackstone's time as 
had the idea t ha t eavesdropping cons t i tu ted a public 
(32 ) ' 
nuisance. The concept of a disorderly house as a 
public nuisance was partly derived from leet practice 
and partly based on the somewhat dubious authority of 
(33 ) 
Jacob Hall's case. The concept itself received 
(31) Kitchin Jurisdictions 2 2 ('scolds and brawlers to the 
noyance and disturbance of their neighbours') was the 
source Blackstone relied upon in including scolding 
as a common nuisance. A prosecution for this offence 
was brought in 17 04 in R v Foxby 6 Mod 12, 178, 213, 
239; 1 Salk. 266; Holt 274, and was the occasion of some 
judicial jocularity (Holt CJ said that the prescribed 
punishment of ducking in a ducking stool was 'better 
in a Trinity than in a Michaelmas term' (6 Mod 12) 
and suggested that 'ducking would rather harden than 
cure her; and if she were once ducked, she would 
scold on all the days of her life.' 
In R v Saxfield(17 05) 2 Ld RayirTl094 it was laid down 
that trie™offence could be committed by a woman only. 
In R v Taylor (1730) Sess Cas 131 and R v Cooper 
(1746) 2 Stra 1246 indictments charging woman with 
scolding were dismissed as being too generally 
laid. In the latter case the court agreed that 
'it should be laid to be ad commune nocumentum 
of her neighbours, for every degree of scolding 
is not Indictable'. There are no further 
cases of prosecutions for the offence (prosecutions 
were brought in the nineteenth century in the 
United States of America where the offence still 
exists. See 15 Am Jur 2nd 815). 
(3 2) Indeed there appears to have been no prosecutions 
for this offence at common law See 2 Russell on 
Crime 13 98 " 
(33) Under leet practice those who kept disorderly houses 
were presentable (see Kitchin Jurisdictions 104). 
Hawkins 1 Pleas of the Crown Chap 78 s 1 laid it 
down that 
'... the Keeper of an Inn may by the common 
law be indicted and fined, as being guilty of a 
publick nuisance, if he usually harbour thieves, 
or persons of scandalous reputation, or suffer 
frequent disorders in his house, or set up a 
new Inn in a place where there is no manner of 
need of one, to the hindrance of other ancient 
and well governed Inns, or keep it in a place 
in respect of its situation, wholly unfit for 
such a purpose.' 
(continued on the next page) 
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but little further elaboration and its contribution to 
the further development of the nuisance concept was minimal. 
On the other hand the remaining species of common nuisance 
mentioned by Blackstone - annoyances in the highway and 
the carrying on of noxious trades - are important in the 
history of the concept of nuisance for what they contributed 
to the evolution of the concept and thus deserve fuller 
examination here. 
3.2. Noxious trades. 
The concept of a noxious trade as a public nuisance 
is a creature of the recognition in Aldred[s case of the 
(3 3) continued 
He also said that the keeping of a gaming-house was 
a nuisance 'in the eyes of the law (op cit Chap 7 5 
s 6), a proposition supported by R v Dixon (1716) 
10 Mod Rep 33 5. There was some suggestion, emenating 
from Jacob Hall's case (1671) (supra 150.) that a 
play-house could be suppressed as a public nuisance 
(cf Betterton's case (1695) (supra 151 n 7). Hawkins 
(op cit Chap 7 6 s 7) laid it down that a play-house 
was a common nuisance only 'if it draw together such 
numbers of coaches or people, as prove generally 
inconvenient to the places adjacent' distinguishing 
play-houses from the other sorts of 'houses' pro-
scribed as nuisances on the ground that as they had 
'been originally instituted with the laudable 
design of recommending virtue to the 
imitations of the people, and exposing vice a 
folly, [they] are not nuisances in their own 
nature, but may become such by accident ...' 
The proposition that bawdy-houses were public nuisances 
seems to be based on.a dictum of Coke (3 Inst 206) that 
'the keeper, he or she, of such houses is 
punishable by indictment at the common law: 
for although adultery and fornication be punishable 
by the ecclesiastical law, yet the keeping 
of a house of bawdrie or stewes, or brothell 
house, being as it were a common•nuisance is 
punishable by the common law...' (emphasis supplied 
This suggestion was followed in R v Pierson (1706) 
2 Ld Raym 1197. In R v Williams (1712) 10 Mod Rep 63 
it was held that 
'Keeping a bawdy house is a common nuisance 
.••[T]he keeping here is the governing and 
managing a house in such a disorderly manner 
as to be a nuisance...' 
See also R v Higginsoh (17 62) 2 Burr 123 2 
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right to salubritas aeris as an incident of domestic 
(34) 
habitation. We have seen that the leets acted 
(3 5) 
against those tradesmen who befouled the public ways. 
The Common Law Courts, however, when they came to take 
jurisdiction to suppress noxious trades, rested the 
offence not so much upon the need to protect the public 
health but rather upon the interference with householder's 
rights to salubritas aeris. 
The earliest recorded case of the Courts of Common 
Law acting to suppress a noxious trade was the information 
laid, in R v Pierce (168 3) against one who erected 
a soap-boilery. The defendant argued that his trade 
was lawful but Jefferyes CJ, finding the accused guilty, 
said that 
'though such a trade is honest and may be 
lawfully used, yet if by its stench it be 
an annoyance to the neighbours, it is a 
nuisance'. 
There is a hint here that the- prosecution lies for 
what is essentially a private nuisance, where the nuisance 
is so extensive as to affect an entire neighbourhood. 
(37 ) 
Certainly this was the view taken by Bacon who wrote 
that 
'It seems the better opinion, that a Brew-house, 
glass-house, Chandler's shop or stie for swine, 
set up in such inconvenient parts of a Town, that 
they cannot but greatly incommode the neighbour-
hood, are common nuisances.' 
(34) See above 123. 
(35) See above 7 3 if 
(3 6) (1683) 2 Show 327 There appear to have been 
earlier cases of informations laid against tradesmen 
for causing a nuisance. They are mentioned in 
R v Pierce (and cited above 152). 
(37) 3 New Abridgement Nuisance (A) 
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The policy of the law in allowing prosecutions of 
noxious trades as common nuisances was mentioned in 1726 
( 3 8 ) 
in R v Pappineau. ' The accused had been convicted of 
a public nuisance in that he had kept stinking hides near 
a public highway. The sentence of the court had been that 
a fine be levied. Strange upon a writ of error contended 
that the sentence could not stand since it did not include 
an order for the abatement of the nuisance. He argued 
that 
1... the intent of indictments for nuisances was 
in order to have an end put to them by one suit, 
and to avoid a multiplicity of action, and it is 
upon this reason that an indictment for a publick 
nuisance is given before an action upon the case, 
because it makes an end of things at once, which 
is not done by giving damages in a civil action. 
The inconveniences to the publick are intended to 
be removed by these endictments for nuisances ; 
but that cannot be effected in any manner other 
than by judgement to abate the nuisance ... 
This identification of the private wrong as the .subject 
of a public prosecution is very evident in the later case 
of R v White and Ward (3 9 )(1757). There the defendants 
were charged with maintaining buildings 'for making 
noisome, stinking and offensive liquors ... whereby the 
air was impregnated with noisome and offensive stinks 
and smells; to the common nuisance of the King's liege 
subjects .,. passing the said'King's common highway...* 
The defendants took the point that this indictment 
was too vague in its statement of the offence committed. 
The prosecution however replied 
... an offensive stench is of itself a nuisance; 
even though it should not be strictly hurtful. 
An indictment merely for a stench would have been 
good ... It depends upon rendering the property 
of other persons incommodious and uncomfortable to 
them. 
(3 8) (1726) 2 Str 687: Also reported sub nom R v Papinian 
Sess Cas 13 6. 
(39) (1757 ) 1 Burr 333. 
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Lord Mansfield agreed with this saying that 
i 
it is not, necessary that the smell should 
be unwholesome: it is enough, if it renders 
the enjoyment of life and property uncomfort-
able 1 
Thus it was that by the time Blackstone came to 
expound the concept of public nuisance he was able 
(41) to include under this head 'those kinds of nuisances ... 
which when injurious to private man are actionable1. 
These were punishable as public nuisances 'when detri-
(42 ) 
mental to the public'. 
3.3. Highway Nuisances 
The idea that the obstruction of passage along a way 
was a nuisance goes back to the original, undifferentiated 
nocumentum concept of the twelth century. In the 
thirteenth century, as we have seen, this idea was applied 
(40) Blackstone loc cit (supral59) 
(41) It is interesting to note the tendency to designate 
acts which corrupt the ambient air as, simply, nuisance 
This is an early indication of a usuage which would 
identify the term with annoyance to the sensory 
organs of perception. 
(42) Blackstone loc cit (supra 159) There is not much 
in the law at this time which indicates when it is 
that these nuisances are detrimental to the public. 
In R v White_and Ward (1757) (supra n 39) Lord 
Mansfield said that the 'very existence of the 
nuisance depends upon the number of houses and 
the concourse of people: and this is a matter of 
fact, to be judged of by the jury'. In other 
words the approach seems to have been that the 
question whether the nuisance was detrimental to 
the public was treated as a question of fact 
rather than of law, an approach which allowed 
the judges to avoid the problem of formulating 
a test of what constituted a public nuisance. 
This device of relying upon the findings of a 
jury as the determinant of the existence of a 
nuisance is, of course, as old as the nuisance 
concept itself. Cf above 3 8 and 43 n 43 
(43) Cf above 10 - 11 
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to obstructions of the King's highway so as to create 
. (44) the primordial form of a public nuisance. 
The original idea of a highway nuisance as some 
physical obstruction to the passage way of the King's 
people, was expanded by the development of the principle 
that those persons under customary obligations to repair 
highways who were derelict in this duty could be pre-
sented in the tourn as having acted ad commune nocumentum. 
In retrospect we can see that presentments under this 
head were essentially a part of the primitive local 
government machinery for ensuring the maintenance and 
• . . (45) 
repair of the public highways and bridges. ' In the 
sixteenth century this machinery was replaced by a more 
sophisticated instruments for the administration of these 
public services in which the idea that want of reparation 
of the highway was a nuisance at common law became 
irrelevant and redundant. J But the idea that a 
highway nuisance might consist in something more than 
the erection of physical obstructions to passage lingered 
on, providing the common lawyers with a theme capable 
of many variations. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the common law judges exploited this theme by 
creating new forms of public nuisance, derived from the 
idea of obstruction of the highway, but expressing more 
sophisticated public interests. It is necessary to 
explore these variations on the theme of highway nuisances 
since they contributed, in greater or lesser degree, to 
the shades of meaning that were gathering around the word 
nuisance and which would influence the ultimate develop-
ment of the nuisance concept. 
(44) Above 23 ff 
(45)Cf above 5 
(46) See below. 
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B. HIGHWAY NUISANCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CONCEPT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE 
1. Introduction 
(47 ) 
Blackstone defined annoyances m highways 
(under which head he included bridges and public rivers) 
as the rendering them 'inconvenient or dangerous to pass' 
either positively 'by actual obstruction' or negatively 
'by want of reparation'. 
2. Nuisance by want of reparation. 
The story of want of reparation of a highway as a 
species of public nuisance, in essence is the story of 
the evolution and development of institutions of local 
government for the maintenance and repair of key public 
facilities. ''"'" As such it largely falls beyond the scope 
of this work, and It will suffice to merely Indicate here 
the main outlines of the development of the concept. 
The medieval principle was that 'the common services 
needed for social life were to be performed, not by any 
specialized organs of the community, but by being shared 
(49) 
among all citizens, serving compulsorily without pay'. 
Under this scheme of things the concept of want of 
reparation as a common nuisance provided a convenient 
mechanism by which these duties could be enforced. By 
the sixteenth century however it had become plain that 
specialized organs of local government were needed to 
supervise the maintenance and repair of such public 
facilities as highways, bridges and water-ways. Parlia-
ment took the initiative and enacted in 1531 a Statute 
(47) Loc cit (supra 159) 
(48) Sidney and Beatrice Webb found it necessary to 
include this story in their monumental study of 
the history of English local government. 'In 
the evolution of road administration in England' 
they wrote 'we shall see exemplified ... the 
whole story of English Local Government ...' 
(Webb The King's Highway 1) 
(49) Webb op cit 2. 
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of Bridges(50) in 1532, a 'Statute of Sewers 
(50) 2 2 Hen 8 c 5. The public obligation to repair 
bridges is the earliest example of the medieval con-
cept of the duty to repair (cf above 5 n 17). The 
great importance of bridges as aids to travel and 
transport meant that from early times the law 'stren-
uously enforced the obligation to maintain all bridges 
forming part of the public highway, by whomsoever they 
had been erected and however moderate might be their 
utility to the public'. (Webb op cit 88) On the 
origins of bridge-building, usually by holy men under-
taking the work as an act of piety, see Jusserand 
English Wayfaring Life 41 ff\ Jackman The Develop-
ment of Transportation in Modern England 14 ff Webb 
op cit 85-7). Dereliction of this duty was present-
able in the leet as a common nuisance and, more 
commonly, before the King's Justices (for numerous 
examples see Flower 1 Public Works in Medieval Law 
(32 Selden Socy) passim!-! The general rule was that 
the county was liable to repair the bridges within it 
(see the Case of Bridges (1609) 13 Co Rep 33; Webb 
op cit 88; Holdsworth 10 HEL 324). The Statute of 
Bridges regularized and defined the incidence of the 
duty to repair (s 3) and visited upon the Justices of 
the Peace they duty to 'enquire, hear and determine ... 
of all manner of annoyances of bridges broken in the 
highway to the damage of the King's liege people' and 
to take such steps against the persons liable to 
repair as 'necessary and convenient for the speedy 
amendment of such bridges'. Further they were em-
powered levy rates upon the county 'convenient and 
sufficient for the repairing, re-edifying and amend-
ment of such bridges', (s 4) These provisions mark 
the beginning of a new system of bridge maintenance 
by specialist organs alimented by complusory taxation, 
which rendered the concept of public nuisance largely 
irrelevant, its sole remaining function being that of 
providing a vehicle by which men's civil obligations 
might be tested and determined in a court of law. 
(See further Webb op cit 90 ff Jackman 144//). The 
whole mass of statute and common law relating to bridges 
was discussed by Hawkins 1 Pleas of the Crown Chap 77 
'of nuisances relating to Bridges'. 
(51) 2 3 Hen 8 c 5. The navigable rivers of England were 
more subject to physical obstruction than the land 
highways and the concept of common nuisance as the 
obstruction of a highway flourished in this context 
until well into the nineteenth century (see below 183) • 
Other rivers and streams and ditches (the 'fossatum' 
of early nuisance law (see above 35) were from an 
early time under stricter control. From the twelth 
century it was the practice of the crown to issue 
commissions to investigate and report upon the 
conditions of streams, sea-walls, dykes, sluices, 
(continued on the next page) 
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and in 1555 a ' S t a t u t e of Highways'. 
(51) (continued) 
drainage ditches and the like. The commissioners 
were required to survey and enquire, through specially 
summoned juries, as to the condition of these facilities 
in various districts, to establish the incidence of 
duties of maintenance and repair, to settle disputes, 
and even to execute repairs. (For a full account 
of the origin and work of these commissions and the 
'juries of sewers' see Webb Special Authorities 
Chap 1 ; see also Holdsworth 10 HEL 19977) The 
Statute of Sewers of 1532 established the commissioners 
and Courts of Sewers as permanent local authorities 
with a fixed constitution and procedures (see 
Holdsworth op cit 202-3. ) The leading authority on 
the subject was Robert Gallis' Reading on the Statute 
of Sewers (delivered in 1622, first published in 1647). 
(52) (155 5) 2 & 3 P and M c 8 (The preamble states that the 
act was passed 'for the amending of highways, being 
now both very noisome and tedious to travel in and 
dangerous to all passengers and carriages'.) This 
act shifted the duty of repair from the manor to the 
parish and created the office of Surveyor of the 
Highways. The surveyors took over the leet function 
of 'viewing* the highways and presenting (to the 
Justices of the Peace) those who were derelict in 
their duty. The act further provided that on four 
appointed days each year the people of the parish 
were to come together, with the necessary implements 
for repairing roads,, make all necessary repairs under 
the direction of the surveyor. Those who neglected 
to perform this 'statute labour' were to be fined, 
the fines to be applied to meeting the costs of high-
way maintenance. The work was to be done without 
remuneration and the office of surveyor was likewise 
unpaid. (See generally on the act Jackman op cit 
33-5. The system of road administration established 
under it is discussed by Webb The King's Highway 
Chap 2-4). The effect of the Act was thus to 
establish an organized system for the repair of high-
ways . Statute labour continued in one form or 
another as the device for maintaining highways until 
1835 when it was abolished (by the Highway Act of 
that year 5 & 6 Will 4 c 50). The later history 
of highway administration under this new dispensation 
was largely concerned 'with attempts to regulate the 
increasing traffic and to divide the increasingly 
irksome financial responsibility for the upkeep of 
the roads between their users and the community at 
large'. (Dyos and Aldcroft op cit 34). The concept 
the failure to repair a highway was a common nuisance 
thus tended to become irrelevant and redundant except 
as the technical vehicle for the enforcement of the 
duties established by the statute. (Cf Webb op cit 
Chap 4: 'Road Administration by Presentment and 
Indictment'). 
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These enactments established in effect systems for the 
administration of local affairs from which emerged a body 
of administrative law. For historical reasons this body 
of law continued to be classified under the heading of 
common nuisance by want of reparation of highways, bridges 
( 53 ) 
and the like. In fact though the connection with 
the primordial nuisance concept was by now so remote as 
to no longer justify the appellation. 
3 . Obstruction 
3.1. Introduction 
Actual physical obstruction of the highway by the 
establishment or maintenance of physical barriers to the 
safe and convenient passage of users however continued 
to be an essentially common law concept. When Hawkins 
came to consider 'What shall be said to be a nuisance 
to the Highway' his version, significantly in the light 
of what has been said above concerning the 'nuisance' of 
want of reparation, was that of the old common law notion 
of obstruction by hedges, ditches and the like: 
'... all injuries whatsoever to any highway 
[he wrote] as by digging a ditch, or making a 
hedge overthwart it, or laying logs of timber 
in it, or by doing any other act which will 
render it less commodious to the King's people, 
are publick nuisances at common law.'(55) 
(53) Hawkins' account of nuisances to highways (1 Pleas 
of the Crown Chap 7 6) and bridges (op cit Chap 77) 
is a summary of the legislature enactments relating 
to these topics. 
(54) Cf nn 5 0, 5 2 above 
(55) Op cit Chap 76 s 48 
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By the late eighteenth century the idea of a highway 
nuisance in the form of the erection of barriers and the 
like across the passage way no longer represented the 
chief form of obstruction of the public right of passage. 
Rather obstruction tended to arise as a result of con-
gestion of the highways by vehicular traffic. Obstruction 
of the highway thus became a product of the use of highways 
for purposes of passage, a paradox which increasingly 
focused judicial attention upon the question of the exact 
nature of the public interest in highways and, more 
specifically, the public's right to free passage over the 
highway. 
3.2. The Public in the Highways 
Implicit in the idea of the public right of passage 
in the highways was the idea that users of the highway 
were entitled to be free of harm or inconvenience while 
using the highway for passing and repassing. 
This idea was brought out in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in a series of decisions in which 
persons were convicted for common nuisances in that they had 
endangered or inconvenienced members of the public using 
the King's highways. This notion is well illustrated by 
the case of R v Vantandillo'' 5 6 ) (1815 ). There a child 
suffering from small-pox was carried by its mother in a 
public passage. Two children in a nearby school con-
tracted the disease and died. A prosecution was brought 
against the mother, the indictment being that the child 
has been taken 'into and along a certain open public way ... 
used for all the King's subjects' this being done 
'to the great danger.of infecting with the said 
contagious disease ... all the lieges ... to 
the damage and common nuisance of all the lieges 
( 56) (1815) 4 M & S 73.. 
171. 
For the defence it was pointed out that the only 
offences to the public health known to the common law 
were 'spreading the plague and neglecting quarantine'. 
The prosecution pointed out that legislation introduced 
in Parliament 'for the purpose of subjecting this 
offence to punishment' had been withdrawn since 'it was 
taken for granted that to carry infected persons about 
the streets of London was an indictable offence.' 
The Court, in convicting•the accused, conceded that 
it ' had not found upon its records any prosecution for 
this specific offence, 
'Yet there could be no doubt that in point of 
law that if a person unlawfully, injuriously 
and with full knowledge of the fact, exposes in 
a public highway a person infected with a con-
tagious disorder, it is a common nuisance to 
all the subjects and indictable as such ... 
[N]o person having a disorder of this description 
upon him, ought to be publicly exposed to the 
endangering the health and lives of the rest of 
the subjects.'(57) 
The interest of the public' s • safety in the highways, 
extended to cover cases where the public was endangered 
by conditions not actually on or in the highway. 
(58) ' Thus in R v Watts (17 03) a man was convicted 
upon an indictment for not repairing a runious house 
adjacent to the highway. It was alleged that the 
defendant was liable to repair the house' rat ion e' te'nurae . 
This obligation was disputed, but the court convicted, 
holding 
'that the defendant was occupier, and in that 
respect he is answerable to the public;, for the 
house was a nuisance as it stood( 5.9). . . And as 
the danger is the matter that concerns the public, 
the public are to look to the occupier... ' 
(57) Cf R v Burnett (1815) 4 M & S 272 where an apothecary 
who inoculated patients against the samll-pox was 
successfully prosecuted for causing them to walk in 
the public thoroughfares 'to the great danger of in-
fecting with the said contagious disease all the sub-
jects who were on the highway, ad commune' hocu'm'e'n'turn1 
On the risk of small-pox infection as a nuisance see 
below... See also R v Henson (1852) Dears 24 
(bringing an infected horse into a public place). 
(58) (17 03)1 Salk 357. Also reported sub nom R v Watson 
(17 03) 2 Ld Raym 8 56. ~ 
(59) A nuisance writ for the. repair of a runious house lay 
at common law. Cf above 50 n 76. 
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In R v Lister (1857) a man was convicted of a 
public nuisance in that he had stored a quantity of 
explosives near a public highway because of the danger 
( P. i ̂  
of the users of the highway. And in R v Mutters 
(1864) a conviction for public nuisance was sustained 
for carrying on blasting operations so that 'the use of 
the houses or the traffic of the roads was rendered 
unsafe1. 
Implicit in the latter decisions is an idea that to 
inspire fear or alarm in the users of the highway might 
( R 9 ̂  
amount to a public nuisance, an extension of this 
notion being that users, of the highway should not be sub-
jected to any indecent spectacles thereon. It is true 
that in 17 3 3 in R v Gallard the accused 'being a woman' 
(60) (1857) 7 Cox CC 342. The keeping of gun-powder 
magazines had been held to be a nuisance in R v 
Taylor (1742) 2 Stra 1167. Cf Crowder v Tinkler 
(1816) 19 Ves 617. 
(61) (1864) Le & Ca 491; 10 Cox CC'6. 
(62) The prosecution in R v Pease (1832) 4 B & Ad 30 
illustrates. The prosecution was brought against 
the directors of the Stockton and Darlington 
Railway Co., the first railway to use locomotive 
engines for conveying passengers and goods, for 
public nuisance in that they caused their locomotive 
engine and attached carriages 
'to move along the said ... railway ... for 
a great length of way, to wit, one mile, 
with great noise, force, and violence ... 
[and that the engines did] exhibit terrific 
and alarming appearances , and make divers 
loud explosions, shocks and noises, where-
by it became dangerous for the subjects of 
this realm to go, return, pass and repass 
on ... the common highway, near to ... 
the said railway ... to the great terror, 
. and common nuisance of all the liege subjects ., 
At the trial it was found that the engines by 'their 
appearance and noise alarmed the houses of many of 
the King's subjects when travelling along the high-
way, and thereby occassioned many accidents..' The 
prosecution failed only because it was held that the 
Company was authorized by statute to perpetrate such 
nuisances. See below .3 12. 
(63) (1733) Kel W 163. 
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was indicted 'for running in the common way naked down 
to the waist' and the conviction was quashed 'for nothing 
appears immodest or unlawful.' However after 1809 there 
occurs a series of prosecutions for indecent exposure, 
on the basis that the act done was ad commune nocumentum 
of users of the highway, from which emerged a general 
(6.4) The seminal decision was R v Crunden (1809) 2 Camp 
89. This case reflects the judge's uncertainty as 
to whether the offence was one e_o nomine or merely 
a species of public nuisance. But in the next case, 
R v Reubegard (1830) (unreported, cited R v Webb 
(1848) T & T 2 3 )a 'French master* was charged for 
'exposing his person at a window' to a female in an 
opposite house and convicted because those in the 
street could have seen him, and 'if they could 
have seen him, it was a nuisance'. Then in R v 
Watson (1847) 10 LT (OS) 204; 2 Cox CC, a prosecution 
failed because the complainant was the only person 
who saw the indecent act. Lord Denman CJ plainly 
considered that the act was punishable only .if it 
could be said to be ad commune nocumentum: 
'The general rule is, that a nuisance must 
be public; that is to the offence or in-
jury of several. There is no precedent 
of such an indictment as the present, and 
we are not inclined to make one' 
The hint to prosecutors was clear, and in the next 
case involving indecent exposure, R v Webb (1848) 
2 Car & K 933; 1 Den 338; 3 Cox CC 183 the indictment 
recited that the accused had acted 'to the great • 
damage and common nuisance' of the complainant 
'and the other liege subjects' to the Queen. The 
exposure was however only to the complainant and the 
defendant argued that a conviction could not follow 
since there was no 'public' nuisance. ('This is an 
indictment for a nuisance at common law, and to sus-
tain it, it must be shown that the exposure was in 
an open and public place, and publicly "to the 
people"* (3 Cox CC 183 at 184)). The Court agreed, 
citing R v Watson (supra). Pollock CB seemed to 
have some doubts as to whether the exposure was 
indecent at all: 'I remember' he said 'that, in 
our older Courts of Justice, the Judge retired to 
a corner of the Court, for a necessary purpose, even 
in the presence of ladies'. He concluded however, 
'That, perhaps, would be indecent now' (2 Car & K 93 4 
at 940). Later decisions reflect a tendency to abandon 
the idea that indecent exposure was an offence only if 
it could be said to be ad commune nocumentum (see R v 
Holmes (1853) 2 Car & K 3 61, but cf R v Elliot & White 
TT86T7 Le & Ca 10 3). " " ~ ~ " 
174. 
doctrine that passers-by on public highways should not 
( 6 
be exposed to that which was indecent or disgusting. 
3.3. The Public Right of Passage 
Wheeled traffic became a common feature of the public 
/ P C \ 
highways during the seventeenth century. The number 
of wheeled vehicles using the highways increased so rapidly 
(65) See R v Grey (1864) 4 F & F 73. The accused was 
charged with displaying in his window a large picture 
of a man covered with sores. Willes J convicted 
saying there was no doubt that 'the exhibition of 
the picture on a highway is a nuisance ... No man 
has a right thus to expose disgusting and offensive 
exhibitions in or upon a public highway'. See also 
R v Clark (1883) 15 Cox CC 171 where the exposure 
of a dead body on the highway was held to be calcu-
lated to shock and disgust passers-by and was thus 
a nuisance at common law. Cf R v Price (1884) 15 
Cox CC 3 89. 
(66) Webb The King's Highway 69, 79. Already in.1621 
efforts were made to prevent the use of wheeled 
vehicles because 'they so galled the highways ... 
that they were public nuisances' (See Webb op cit 
74, 81). One of the early instances of an informa-
tion for a public nuisance was that brought against 
a waggoner for 'spoiling' a highway by traversing 
it with an excessively laden wagon. (Egerley's 
case (1641) 3 Salk 183. The nuisance found in 
this case may have been a nuisance by statute 
rather than at common law. Legislation had been 
introduced in 16 29 limiting the weight to be 
carried by wagons (Webb op cit 81 cf Hawkins op 
cit Chap 7 6 s 65). Hawkins mentions these pro-
visions when noting 'one particular nuisance 
which is made such by statute... and that is... 
the carrying of excessive loads...' (op cit 
Chap 76 s 51). Cf Garrett Nuisances 3 5 who 
describes the offence as being 'a nuisance at 
common law' . 
(67) See Jackman The Development of Transportation' in 
Modern England 113/f who shows that the congestion 
of London's streets from wheeled traffic was 
already prevalent in the seventeenth century, a 
state of affairs which led to the introduction of 
licensing laws in an attempt to control the number 
of vehicles and coaches which used the streets. 
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that very soon the public thoroughfares, especially in 
v C 68) , , " . ' _, , . (69) 
urban areas, became much congested. R v Russell 
(1805) is the first reported instance of a prosecution 
for the obstruction of the public highway of a member of 
the public using the highway for travelling thereon. 
The accused, 'the principal waggoner in the west of 
England' was indicted on a charge that he left his waggons 
standing 'for a long and unreasonable time' to the hind-
rance and annoyance of the King's subjects, passing and 
repassing. The defendant argued that 
i 
it was not every public inconvenience which 
was a nuisance. That partial obstructions 
of this kind, which arose out of the necessary 
means of carrying on trade and business in a 
populous city having narrow streets ... did 
not constitute a nuisance, the public passage 
not being impeded, though narrowed by such 
partial obstructions.' 
The court however rejected this contention, adopting 
an absolute view of the nature of the right of public 
passage over the highway that was to be rigidy maintained 
in subsequent cases. It said that 
( . 
it should be fully understood that the 
defendant could not legally carry on any 
point of his business in the public street 
to the annoyance of the public.(71) That 
(68) Cf Jackman op cit 3 03 who notes that in some cities 
'the streets which were narrow had to be widend 
to accommodate the increasing traffic' but that in 
some places this was not feasible and 'the only 
things to be done were to regulate the driving of 
waggons, carts etc ...' 
(69) (1805) 6 East 427; 2 Smith KB 424. 
(70) See below.180 
(71) R v Jones (1812) 3 Camp 230 where a timber merchant 
was indicted for obstructing the highway by sawing 
timber in the street prior to carrying it into his 
yard. It was argued that his activity was no 
different to that of drayers and other tradesmen 
who holted vehicles in the public street for loading 
and unloading of goods. But Lord Ellenborough CJ 
would have none of this, reiterating that if anyone 
for any purpose caused inconvenience to the public 
using thoroughfares which 'is prolonged for an 
unreasonable time, the public have a right to 
complain, and the party may be indicted for a 
nuisance.' 'The rule of law on this subject* 
(continued on the next page) 
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the primary object of the street was for the 
free passage of the public, and anything which 
impeded the free passage, without necessity, (72 ) 
was a nuisance... This this was a species of 
nuisance to be found in many other places, and 
was fit to be suppressed.' 
(73) In R v Cross (1812) the proprietor of the Greenwich 
stage was similarly indicted. A more sophisticated defence 
was raised, it being contended that the stage-coaches pro-
vided a public service and a 
great share of accommodation is thus afforded 
to the public, which much more than counter-
balances any partial inconvenience which the 
practice may occasion1. 
Lord Ellenborough CJ however rejected the argument, 
observing that 
'every unauthorized obstruction of a highway 
to the annoyance of the King's subjects is an 
indictable nuisance ... a stage-coach may 
set down or take up passengers in the street, 
this being necessary for the public convenience: 
but it must be done at a reasonable time; (74 )an<3 
private premises must be procured for the coach 
to stop in during the interval between the end of 
one journey and the commencement of another. No 
one can make a stable-yard of the King's highway.' 
(71) (continued) 
he added darkly 'is much neglected, and great advant-
age would arise from a strict and steady application 
of it.' 
(72) There was some authority for this qualification. 
Rolle cites a case((1618) Hill 15 Ja BR) to the effect 
that a nuisance to the highway is not committed by 
unloading billets 'before my house for my use* 
because of the 'necessity'. But, the decision goes 
on to say that if the billets 'continue there for a 
long time after the unloading' the offence is committed. 
See 2 Rolle Abr 137. Cf Hawkins op cit Chap 7 6 s 49; 
Bacon New Abridgment 'Highways' (E). 
(73) (1812) 3 Camp 224. 
(74) What Lord Ellenborough had in mind here is revealed - . 
by his reply to defendants contention that if his 
activities were a nuisance, then nuisances existed 
'every time a rout is given by a fashionable lady in 
the west end of the town.' 'Is there any doubt' the 
Chief Justice replied 
i 
that if coaches, on the occasion of a rout, 
(continued on the next page) 
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Obstruction by use of adjoining premises 
The concepi: of obstruction of a highway by the 
presence of vehicles standing in the streets for purposes 
of loading or unloading passengers or goods provided the 
germ for the recognition of another species of public 
nuisance by way of obstruction of the thoroughfare. 
(75 ) 
We have seen that Hall's & Betterton's cases 
suggested that play-houses or other public entertainments 
might constitute a public nuisance for that they attracted 
crowds or coaches to the nuisance of the neighbourhood. 
The ratio of these cases was elaborated in a number of 
nineteenth century decisions. 
In R v Moore (1832) a gun-maker established a 
shooting range some distance from a highway. Crowds 
gathered about this place and an indictment on a charge 
of public nuisance was brought against the gun-maker. 
His defence was that he could not be held responsible 
for the fact that people he had not invited collected 
about his premises. Lord Tenterden CJ brushed this aside 
with the remark that if * a person collects together a 
crowd of people to the annoyance of his neighbours, 
that is a nuisance for which he is answerable', while 
Littledale J found him to be responsible because the 
crowd was the foreseeable consequence of his own actions. 
Tainton J rested the conviction on the authority of 
(77 ) 
Hawkm's disquisition on Hall and Betterton, saying 
that the 'present is a very similar case'. 
(74) (continued) 
wait an unreasonable length of time in 
a public street, and obstruct the transit 
of his Majesty's subjects who wish to pass 
through it on carriages or on foot, the 
persons [responsible]... are guilty of a 
nuisance? In measuring out the punish-
ment, the Court would examine whether the 
act was repeated, and what degree of public 
inconvenience was experienced. 
(75) Above 150-1, 160 n 33. 
(76) (1832) 3 B & Ad 184; ILJ (OS) MC 30. 
(77) Hawkins 1 Pleas of the Crown Chap 76 s 7. 
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Two years later the redoubtable Richard Carlile was 
(78) 
charged with causing a public nuisance as a conse-
quence of the crowds that gathered about his book-shop 
in Fleet Street to view a scandalous exhibit. Carlile 
(79) 
appeared xn person and defended the charge wxth vxgour 
and some impudence. " Carlile was convicted by a jury 
after Park J, in charging it, had cited the cases of 
Cross, Jones and Russell and observed that the accused 
in carrying on his trade 'must not do anything there 
that injures his neighbours, so so as to be a private 
nuisance; nor anything which annoys the public, which 
is a public nuisance.' 
3.4. Obstruction of Navigation 
The most elaborate and extensive consideration of 
the nature of the public right of passage in the highway 
occurred however in relation to obstructions made in 
navigable rivers. . • • 
(78) R v Carlile (18 34) 6 Car & P 6 3S. Carlile was the 
well-known free-thinker who published the writings 
of Tom Paine and others. In 183 0 his property was 
assessed for church rates which he refused to pay. 
His assets were siezed in execution and in response 
he placed effigies of a bishop and a devil in the 
window of his shop. 
(79) Citing various instances of public events which 
attracted crowds to view them. He also mentioned 
'Mr Very's daughter,' a reference amplified by the 
reporters of the case in the following note: 
'Mr Very was a confectioner in Regent Street, and 
he had a daughter who attended to his shop, who was 
considered so beautiful that a crowd of three or 
four hundred persons used daily to assemble and 
stand at his shop windows for the purpose of 
looking at her... [T]he inconvenience was so great, 
both to Mr. Very and his neighbours, that he was 
obliged to send his daughter out of town.' 
(80) Carlile suggested that the judge's procession to 
St Pauls might also constitute a nuisance by the 
crowds it attracted. 
17 9 
Since earliest times public rivers had been regarded 
as a species of public highway over which all citizens 
( 81 ) 
enjoyed a right of free passage. During the medieval 
era this right was much encroached upon as men established 
(82) 
mill-weirs in rivers or acquired, as a franchise, the 
(83) 
right to fish in the rivers. Magna Charta ordered 
the removal of all obstructions to navigation of public 
rivers, an injunction repeatedly confirmed by supple-
(85) 
mentary legislation in succeeding centuries. Never-
theless there were 'few rivers in England which were 
^naturally navigable over much of their course before the 
seventeenth century. Almost everywhere they tended to 
be cluttered up by mills and fish-garths or intersected 
by weirs - sometimes up to ten feet high - which impeded 
(81) This principle was most plainly established by Magna 
Charta (1215) (cf above 24 n 83; Jackman The Deve-
lopment of Transportation in Modern England^ 157) 
(82) The owners of land riparian to public rivers would 
establish a mill and construct dams and weirs to 
provide the necessary motive power. The continued 
existence of these obstructions without complaint 
would in time give rise to the presumption of some 
prescriptive right to title to so obstruct the river 
• (cf Jackman op cit 162). Although techincally public 
nuisances, and thus liable to abatement (since a 
public nuisance can never be authorized by prescription, 
it was unlikely that such long established enterprises 
would readily be ordered to be abated (see Williams v 
Wilcox (1838) 8 Ad & El 314 at 335-6). Cf Note! ^he Public 
Trust in Tldal Waters'(1970) 79 Yale LJ 762 at 770. 
(83) The Crown could grant the franchise of exclusive 
fishing in any waters falling within the royal 
domaine. Magna Charta prohibited further grants 
of this franchise (Hale De Jure Maris c 4 (cited 
Neill v Devonshire (1882) 8 AC 135 HL at 176-7). 
The right" of fishing contemplated the erection in 
the river of 'kyddels' stakes connected by network 
and supporting a large net) and weirs (also used 
for trapping fish and for the launching of boats) 
(see Hale De Jure Maris c 5 (cited Attorney-General 
v Emerson T1891J AC 649 at 6 56. See also Malcomson 
v O'Dea (1863) 10 HL Ca s 593 at 619-20). 
(84) Cf above 24 n 83 
(85) See Jackman op cit 23 ff for details of this 
legislation. 
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the passage of barges and boats'. It was only in 
the seventeenth century that mercantile interests and 
( 87 ) 
local authorities began successfully to clear the 
(88) 
rivers under authority of private 'improvement acts'. 
With this improvement of navigation the matter of the 
nature and extent of the public right of passage in 
navigable waters became important. The eighteenth 
century saw the emergence of a doctrine which asserted 
the public right of navigation in tidal waters to the 
exclusion of the private property in public rivers. 
The Public Right 
The chief source of authority for this new approach 
were the writings of Sir Mathew Hale first published in 
1 7 8 7 > (89) I n t h e t r e a t i s e pe Portibus
(90) Hale laid it 
down that there existed in respect of ports a trinity of 
rights which were, respectively, the jus reglum of the 
Crown, the jus privatum of the franchise holder and a 
jus publicum which existed in the public at large. In 
this trinity the jus publicum was predominant: 
i 
. . . the people have a public interest, a' jus 
publicum of passage and repassage with their goods 
by water ... [T]he jus privatum of the owner or 
proprietor is charged with and subject to that 
jus publicum which belongs to the King's subjects. 
as the soil of an highway is, which though in 
point of property it may be a private man's 
freehold, yet it is charged with a public interest 
of the people, which may not be prejudiced or 
damnified. ' ̂ 1 ) 
(8 6) Byos and Aldcroft British Trans port at ion' 38. 
(87) The Commissions of Sewers (for which see 167 n 51) 
made some tentative efforts in this connection but 
it was clear 'by 1650 that they were neither the 
appropriate bodies nor did they have adequate legal 
powers to make rivers navigable' (Dyos and Aldcroft 
op cit 41). 
(88)See Jackman op cit 164//; Dyos and Aldcroft op cit 
41-45; Clifford Private Bill Legislation (i) 5ff. 
(89) Hale wrote extensively on the law relating to the 
sea and sea shore. His work was published in Hargrave's 
Law Tracts (1786) 1-248 under the title 'A Treatise 
in three parts : Pars Prima - De Juri Maris et 
Brachiorum ejusdem. Pars Secunda - De Portibu's Maris. 
Par Tertia - Concerning the custom of goods imported 
and exported'. (See Holdsworth 6 HEL 588 n 4). 
(90) See n 89 above. 
(91) De Portibus Chap 6. 
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But not only was the jus privatum of franchise holders 
subject to the jus publicum so also was the jus regni. 
The Crown, Hale said, was charged with the duty of pro-
(92 ) 
tectmg and preserving the public right even to the 
extent that the Crown itself could not establish, permit 
or license that which was an obstruction to the public 
• , . xr (93) 
right of passage. 
The right of public navigation in ports and tidal 
rivers was widely accepted by the nineteenth century 
(94) . . . 
judges. Initially the nature of the right was 
(95 ) 
expressed by way of the analogy of a public highway 
(92) ~De Portibus Maris c 7 (p87): 
' ... we are to observe, that the common law 
hath intrusted the King with the patronage 
and protection of the jura publica, as 
highways, public rivers, parts of the sea, 
and the like, so the care of preventing and ' 
reforming all public nuisances therein is 
left to him, and his courts of justice ...' 
(93) Where a nuisance concerns immediately all 
men, as the obstruction of a port [or] the 
making of a weir in a public river; this 
can neither be licensed nor dispensed with, 
though the King and the owner of the soil 
should consent thereunto, because it is 
immediately a common nuisance, and all are 
directly or immediately concerned with it'. 
Hale First Treatise (a manuscript work of Lord Hale 
published in Moore The History of the Foreshore. 
See at 3 80). ~ ~ " ""' ' 
(94) Who however confined it within fairly narrow limits, 
refusing to recognize that there was an incidental 
right of tow-path along navigable rivers (see' Bal 1 
v Herbert (17 89) 3 Term Rep 25 3 overruling the earlier 
decisions in Young v - (1698) 1 Ld Raym 725;Vernon 
v Prior(1747) (unreported, cited in 3 Term Rep 253 
at 2 54)). So too they refused to hold that the 
public had a common law right of passage over the 
sea-shore (Blundell v Cafterall (1821) 5 B & Aid 268). 
(95) Hale used the analogy in his treatises ('[waterways] 
are in the nature of common highways in which all the 
King's subjects have a liberty of passage' First Treatise 
(Moore. 339)). The analogy was repeated in the earliest 
judicial formulation of the right by Wood B in 
Anonymous(1808) 1 Camp 519 n : 'A navigable river is . 
a public highway; and all persons have the right to 
come there in ships, to unload, moor, and stay there 
as long as they please'. In Attorney-General v 
Johnson(1819) 2 Wils Ch 87 at 103 Lord Eldon observed 
that 'prima facie the subject has a right to use that 
which may be called a water-highway, and which prima 
(continued on the next page) 
182. 
(although the analogy was not exact). Later formu-
lations of the right tended to emphasize its character 
as a jus public.um of an absolute nature. Thus Best J 
in Blundell v Catterall (1821)( 9 7 ) said that 
[Inland navigations] like the sea and its 
shores, were ... the property of the public, 
and the right of the public in them was not 
acquired by any compromise with the interests 
of any individual'(9 8) 
(95) (continued) 
facie includes the water between the high and low 
water mark when it covers the soil'. See too Ashurst 
J in Ball v Herbert (supra) who observed that when a 
river is made navigable 'it is made a common highway 
for all the King's subjects ...' Cf Lord Denman CJ 
in Williams v Wilcox (1838) 8 Ad & El 314 at 329 who 
said that 'it cannot be disputed that the channel of 
a public navigable river is a King's highway'. He 
repeated this language in Mayor of Colchester v 
Brooke (1845) 7 QB 339 at 373 where he said that 
it'cannot be disputed that the channel of a public 
navigable river is properly described as a common, 
highway'. 
(9 6) As noted by Buller J in Ball v Herbert(supra): Callis 
compares a navigable river to an highway; but no two 
cases can be more distinct. In the latter case if 
the way be founderous and out of repair the public 
have a right to go on the adjoining land: but if a 
river should happen to be choaked up with mud, that 
would not give the public a right to cut another 
passage through adjoining lands'. In Williams v 
Wilcox (1838) 8 Ad & El 314 at 329 Lord Denman CJ 
noted also that the 'nature of the highway which 
is a navigable river ... [is] attended by the 
important circumstance that on no one is any duty 
imposed by the common law to do that which would 
be analogous to the ordinary repair of a common 
highway to remove obstructions .. . ' 
(97) (1821) 5 B & Aid 268 at 283. 
(9 8) Cf Holroyd J in the same case who said(at 29 4) that 
'By the common law, all the King's subjects have in 
general a right of passage over the sea with their 
ships, boats , and other vessels for the purposes of 
navigation, commerce, trade and intercourse, and 
also in navigable rivers'. Bayley J (at 304) 
emphasized the pre-eminent nature of the right in 
these terms: 'many of the King's rights are, to a 
certain extent, for the benefit of his subjects, 
and that is the case as to the sea, in which all of his 
subjects have the right of navigation and of fishing ... 
and the King can make no modern grants in derogation of 
those rights'. 
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In Williams v Wilcox (183 8) Lord Denman CJ emphasized 
that the public right of passage in a navigable was 
'paramount to the power of the Crown' extending over the 
whole of the channel, while other judges emphasized 
that the public right of navigation was pre-dominant over 
+. 4.-+.1 • +V. " (101) 
private titles in the river. 
The Concept of Nuisance to Navigation 
The Common Law Courts had come to deal with nuisances 
to navigation in the seventeenth century under their 
( 99) (1838) 8 Ad & El 314. 
(100) '... we cannot conceive such right to have been 
originally other than a right locally unlimited to 
pass on all and every port of the channel...' (at 
329) [It is] an almost irrestible conclusion that 
the paramount right ... must have been a right in 
every part of the space between the banks'. Further 
he adds that 'It is difficult ... to see how any 
such grant [of piscary] made in derogation of the 
public right previously existing, and in direct • 
opposition to that duty which the law casts on the 
Crown, of reforming and punishing all nuisances 
which obstruct the navigation of public rivers, 
could have been in its inception valid at common 
law' (at 333-4), 
(101) See Lord Westbury LC in Gann v Free Fishers of 
Whitstable (18 64) 11 HL Cas 192 at 207 who noted 
that the ownership of the Crown in the soil of 
the foreshore 'is for the benefit of the subject, 
and cannot be used in any manner so as to derogate 
from or interfere with the right of navigation, 
which by law belongs to the subjects of the 
realm... If the Crown therefore grants part 
of the bed or soil of an estuary or navigable 
river, the grantee takes subject to the public 
right, and he cannot in respect of his ownership 
of the soil make any demand, even if it be 
expressly granted to him, which in any way inter-
feres with the enjoyment of the public right'. 
Cf Lord Denman CJ in Mayor of Colchester v 
Brooke (1845) 7 QB 339 at 374 'The right of 
soil or arms of the sea and public navigable 
rivers ... must in all cases be considered as 
subject to the public right of passage, however 
acquired: and any grantee of the Crown must of 
course take subject to such right. See also Williams 
v WiTcox(1838) supra (n 99 ) at 330 where Lord Denman 
uttered the dictum that 'the right of the public 
(continued on the next page) 
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emerging jurisdiction to hear informations laid against 
(102) 
those who perpetrated public nuisances. 
In his treatise De Portibus Maris Hale described 
the various forms that nuisances to navigation might take. 
These included obstructions by sunken vessels, depositing 
refuse or ballast in the channel, decayed wharves, piers 
or quays, unbuoyed anchors, the construction or extension 
of weirs, shortening a port by building too far into the 
water, impeding the mooring of ships (where such right 
existed free of toll) towing or hauling ships or vessels up 
or down a creek, to or from a port town, allowing a port or 
(104) 
public passage to become silted up or stopped. 
(101) (continued) 
being supposed to be paramount by law, the grantee 
must be taken to be cognizant of such right'. 
(102) Previously obstructions of water-courses and rivers 
fell within the purview of the courts leet. (For 
medieval presentments for the obstruction of navi-
gable rivers see eg Flower 2 Public Works in Medieval 
Law (40 Selden Socy) 112-114, 125, 300 (see also op 
cit xxiii-xxv); Murphy 'English Water Law Doctrines 
before 1400' (1957) 1 Am Jo of Legal History 103 at 
110//). Although there was old authority for the 
bringing of informations for the obstruction of 
rivers (see above 152 n 11) the practice seems to 
have become general only in the seventeenth century. 
Hind v Mansfield (1615) Noy 103 seems to be the ear-
liest reported case. See also Attorney-General v 
Philpot (1633); Attorney-General v Errington (1641) 
(unreported, cited R v Russell (1827)6B & C 566 at 582; 
The Sutton Pool case(1665) (unreported cited R v 
Russell (supra) at 572). 
(103) Chap 7 passim. 
(104) In the First Treatise (Moore 338) Hale described the 
nuisances more shortly as being 
'Generally that which stops the port or chokes' 
it up, as casting out of filth or ballast or 
otherwise, obstructs the passage of ships ... 
or stopping up a channel or rode ... are prima 
facie nuisances'. 
Bacon 3 New Abridgement 'Nuisance' (A) wrote that 
'as navigable Rivers are deemed Highways, it is 
a nuisance to divert part of the river... also • 
the laying of timber in a common river ... is 
equally a nuisance ... if thereby the passage of 
boats etc is obstructed; and from hence also it 
seems to follow, that private stairs ... are 
common nuisances ... * 
In Hind v Mansfield (1615) Noy 103 it was held to be a 
public nuisance to 'weaken' the flow of a river. 
(continued on the next page) 
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In the nineteenth century the judges adopted a strict 
attitude toward the sanctity of the public right of passage 
in navigable waters, refusing to admit any type of 
obstruction as being not liable to suppression. This 
attitude is most strikingly revealed in relation to improve-
ments to harbours and ports by the contruction of wharves, 
piers and quays. Where any such improvements were 
effected without the authority of an enabling Act the judges 
(107) 
did not recoil from ordering them abated and removed. 
The idea that a wharf or quay or pier might constitute 
a nuisance followed from the fact that to be of any use 
these structures had to be situated well into navigable 
waters so as to enable their easy access by the vessels 
that they were to service. But by being so situated they 
(104) (continued) 
In R v Clark (1802) 12 Mod 615 it was held that the 
building of locks in a public river was a nuisance since 
'to hinder the course of a navigable river is against 
Magna Charta, c 2 3'. 
(105) Cf the remarks of Lord Denman CJ in Williams v Wilcox 
(1838) (supra n 101) at 330 holding a weir across a 
navigable river to be a nuisance: 'If ... the Crown 
had at any period the perogative of raising weirs in 
such parts as were not at the time actually required 
by the subject for the purposes of navigation, it 
follows from the very nature of a paramount right on 
the one hand and a subordinate right on the other, 
that the latter must cease whensoever it cannot be 
exercised by to the prejudice of the former ... 
LThere is] nothing unreasonable or unjust in [this]... 
for, the right of the public being supposed to be 
paramount by law, the grantee must be taken to be 
cognizant of such right...' (emphasis supplied). 
(106) In the early nineteenth century there was a consider-
able increase in the number of ships using the ports, 
a fact which called for additional wharves and quays 
in order to speed-up and facilitate the loading and 
unloading of vessels. See Dyos and Aldcroft 
British Transport 5M--5 . 
(10 7) See for instance the Portsmouth Harbour cases (Attorney-
General v Richards (179 5) 2 Anst 60 3; Attorney-General 
v Parmeter (1811) 10 Price 378; Attorney-General v . 
Burridge (1822) 10 Price 350, where improvements (a 
dry-dock and wharf), erected, by private entrepeneurs 
who claimed a right to do so under a Crown grant, were 
ultimately order abated as nuisances to the port (cm 
the ground that the grant (made in 162 8) had lapsed 
before construction of the improvements was commenced 
in 1785). See also Attorney-General v Johnson (1819) 
2 Wils Ch 8 7 and R v Lord Gros¥enClg,. (1819) 2 Stark 
511, where the construction of a wharf in the Thames 
was enjoined and punished. 
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also constituted an obstruction to the general right of 
passage over the waters. Hale resolved this paradox by 
pointing out that, though a quay or wharf might constitute 
a purpresture it did not necessarily follow that it 
( i no ) 
was also a common nuisance. In order to be a nuisance 
the construction would have to 'be a damage to the port and 
navigation' and whether it was or not was thus a question 
(110) 
of fact to be determined by a jury. 
Insofar as the public right of navigation was con-
ceived of as predominant and absolute right, Hale's formu-
lation of a nuisance to navigation as being a question of 
fact rather than law to some extent diminished the absolute 
character of the jus publicum. That is to say, the right 
though pre-eminent was not of such an absolute character 
as to preclude any encroachment upon the public passage 
over the waters. By making the test one of fact rather 
than law, Hale allowed for a more flexible determination 
(108) De Portibus Cap 7: 'It is not every building below the 
high-water mark, nor every building below the low-water 
mark, that is ipso facto in law a nuisance, for that 
would destroy all the quays that are in all the ports 
of England ... Indeed where the soil is the King's, 
the building below the high-water mark is a purpresture, 
an encroachment, an intrusion on the King's soil, which 
he may either demolish, or sieze, or arent at his 
pleasure'. 
Cf. also Attorney-General v Richards (1795) 2 Anst 603 
where the Court of Exchequer claimed the right to enjoin 
the constructions in Portsmouth Harbour (see 10 7 supra)' 
on the ground that they were purprestures. Cf on the 
nature of purprestures above 2 3//. 
(109) Hale op cit ibid: ' ... it would be impossible for 
the King to license the building of a new wharf or 
quay, whereof there are a thousand instances, if ipso 
facto they were a common nuisance; for the King can-
not license a common nuisance'. Cf above 81-2. 
(110) 'In the case therefore of a building within the extent 
of a port, in or near the water, whether it be a 
nuisance or not is quaestio facti and to be deter-
mined by a jury, on evidence, and not quaestio juris'.• 
Hale op cit ibid. Cf above 164 n 4-2. 
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of whether the construction of quays, wharves etc might be 
permitted, " ' 
But although the Courts adopted Hale's definition of 
(112) 
a nuisance to navigation they applied it with great 
vigour, refusing to admit any counter-vailing considerations 
as a defence once a structure was found to be, in fact, a 
nuisance. Thus in 1819 when the Earl of Grosvenor and others 
sought to erect an embankment and wharves in the Thames with 
the consent of the Corporation of London, who were the con-
servators of the,, river,the Court of Chancery issued an in-
... (113 ) 
junction restraining the works. The defendants con-
tended that the works would improve navigation in the river. 
Lord Eldon while conceding this nevertheless adopted the 
attitude that the sole question to be considered was 'whether 
this sort of proceeding can be authorized and can be stated 
to be no nuisance'. Finding that the works had been done 
without the authority of an Act of Parliament or a writ ad 
(114) . . 
quod damnum, he issued the injunction. Lord Grosvenor (111) If the matter had remained q aestio juris the eff ct 
would have been that since a quay by definition obstructs 
.navigation' all quays etc would per se have qualified as 
nuisances. Cf R v Shepard (1822) 1 LJ (OS) KB 45 where 
the court intimated that a minute obstruction would 
not amount to a nuisance. 
(112) eg MacDonald CB in Attorney-General v Richards (1795) 
2 Anst 603 at 615:'. .. the question of nuisance being, 
as laid down by Lord Hale a question of fact, and not of 
law'; Richards CB in Attorney-General v Burridge (1822) 
10 Price 350: 'It is clear that the question whether 
a port is straitened by building too far into the water 
is questio facti and not questio juris, and it is there-
fore proper that it should be determined by a jury'. 
See also R v Shepard (1822) (supra). 
(113) Attorney-General v Johnson (1819) 1 Wils Ch 87. 
(114) A writ issued before the grant of any franchise or 
liberty to determine what harm would be caused to others 
by the award of the franchise (see above 46 n 63). 
The writ was also used where it was desired to divert 
an ancient highway or water-course. This could only 
be done with the King's license which was not granted 
until it was established, by an inquisition held under 
the authority of the writ ad quod damnum, that the 
diversion would not be detrimental to the public 
(cf R v Ward and Lyme (1632) Cro Car 266). Specimen 
writs are given in the Registrum Omnium Brevium (1595) 
24 7. " " — ~ ~ 
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and his associates were thereafter indicted on a charge of 
erecting the structures 'to the injury of the navigation 
. that 
(116) 
( *1 i R } 
of the river'. Again the defendants argued that their 
works would improve the navigation of the river. 
Abbott CJ however dismissed these arguments saying the 
'question here is whether a public right has not been 
infringed' and observing that 
'Although the benefits which were enjoyed before 
the erection were limited to particular times and 
seasons of the weather, and were enjoyed by 
occasionally, yet the public are not to be deprived 
of them by the erection of a wharf for mere private 
convenience'. 
The jury found the defendants guilty. 
So too in R v Randall(1 (1842) where a wharf had been 
erected which enabled the unloading of ships Wightman J' in-
structed the jury that they were to consider only whether 
the wharf 'occasioned any hindrance or impediment whatever 
to the navigation of the river' and that they could not take 
into consideration the 'circumstance that a benefit had 
resulted to the general navigation of the river'. And in 
_R v Betts(118)(1850) Lord Campbell CJ held that 
'it is.for the jury to say whether an erection of 
this kind [a bridge] is a damage to navigation or 
not. That the utility of such work ... may be 
taken into account as a compensation, is a point 
on which ... I cannot concur .... The true question 
is, whether a damage occurs to the navigation in 
the particular locality; and that is a question 
for the jury. An indictment would not lie merely 
for erecting piers in a navigable river; it must 
be laid "ad commune nocumentum": and whether it 
was or not must be decided by a jury'. 
(115) R v Lord Grosvenor and Others (1819) 2 Stark 511. 
(116) The place where the construction was being carried out 
was normally not covered by water for 18 hours a day. 
It was contended that the works would rectify this 
and also provide refuge for large ships. 
(117) (1842) : Car & M 496. 
(118) (1850) 16 QB 1022 at 1037. 
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(119) 
This uncompromising attitude towards the preservation 
of the integrity of the public right of passage was however 
(120) 
questioned in R v Russell (18 27). There an indictment 
was brought against the defendants for obstructing the navi-
gation of the river Tyne before the great coal port of 
Newcastle. The defendants were the owners of coal mines 
in the vicinity and for purposes of shipping coals they had 
erected two staiths in the Tyne, being elevated railways 
along which coal was transported in wagons and then deposited 
. . (121) . . . 
in waiting vessels. At the trial Bayley J m instructing 
(12 2 ) . 
the jury said that 
1... the use of a navigable river was not for passage 
only, but for other important rights which might super-
sede the right of passage' 
and that 
'when a great public benefit accrued from that which 
occasioned the abridgment of the right of passage, 
that abridgment was not a nuisance, but proper and 
beneficial'. 
Bayley J then instructed the jury to acquit the defendants if 
they thought that the obstruction of the public passage was 
'for a public purpose and produced a public benefit' and. if 
the staiths were 'in a reasonable situation and a reasonable 
(123) 
space was left for the passage of vessels navigating the Tyne'. 
(119) The only modification the judges permitted was in the case 
of an obstruction so slight or minute as to constitute an 
obstruction to navigation in the most technical sense. 
See R v Shepard (1822) 1 LJ (OS) KB 45; R v Tindall(1837) 
6 Ad & El 143. 
(120) (1827) 6 B & C 566. 
(121) This method of loading was an improvement upon the earlier 
method by which coals were loaded into lighters ('keels') 
which then came alongside the ship and loaded into her by 
hand, a process which took longer and was more expensive 
than loading by staiths. 
(122) 6 B & C 566 at 569-70. 
(123) These propositions of course challenged the prevailing 
view of the jus publicum as a right of an absolute nature. 
They can be seen as an attempt to accommodate the right of 
navigation to other rights of a public (or even private) 
nature. The medium for achieving the accommodation was 
the concept of 'reasonableness' allowing for adjustment 
of rights in a mutually beneficial fashion. In adopting 
this concept Bayley J anticipated one of the great deve-
lopments in the theory of property rights and nuisance 
law. See further below' ^2 9 
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A new trial was sought on the grounds of a misdirection 
to the jury. The matter was argued by four counsel on either 
side (seven of whom were to become judges) before Bayley, 
Littledale, Holroyd JJ and Lord Tenterden CJ. In support of 
the application counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the 
direction of Bayley J was wrong in that it conflicted with 
the established propositions that 'no infringement of a public 
right of this nature can be legal unless there has been a writ 
of ad quod damnum' and that 'the communication of a mere bene-
fit by a private person cannot be any defence for depriving 
the public of a right'. As to the latter proposition they 
argued that the 'notion of justifying the obstruction of a 
public right by shewing that a collateral benefit results 
from it, is perfectly novel' and that there was 'no trace of 
any such doctrine in any decided case or text writer of 
- -4. , (124) authority'. 
Counsel for the defendants relied heavily on Lord Hale's 
dictum that the question of whether there was a nuisance or 
not was a question of fact to be decided by a jury. This 
being so, they argued, it follows that the jury 
'sanction the enquiry, whether there by any benefit 
resulting to the public from such erections, to com-
pensate the public the unavoidable abridgment of 
their right of passage, that abridgment necessarily 
arising in some degree wherever the shore is built 
on, and being pro tanto an evil, the only fact that 
can be presented to the jury so as to redeem the 
character of the encroachment, and entitle it to 
protection, must be the fact of compensation.'-^5) 
The Crown met this argument by contending that the plea of not 
guilty put the fact of the obstruction by the defendant 'and 
that only' in issue. There was thus no room for the jury to 
(124) 6 B & C 566 at 579. 
(125) 6 B & C 566 at 574 Bayley J was thus entitled, their 
argument continued, to put to the jury the advantages 
flowing from the use of staiths for loading was 'the . 
furtherance of commerce, to which the rights of navi-
gation are instrumental'. The staiths achieved an 
effect of enlarging the dimensions of the port (by 
the economy of space achieved, the rapidity with 
which vessels could be loaded, factors which allowed 
more vessels to use the port than ever before) and so 
were 'a benefit, not a nuisance, to the navigation'. 
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consider collateral benefits. Lord Hale's proposition 
had to be understood as meaning that what was to be left to 
the jury was whether any perceptible injury has been done to 
the port 
'and any sensible inconvenience felt by the ships 
resorting to it, that is to say, whether the en-
croachment extends to parts "where ships or vessels 
might formerly have ridden", not whether a benefit 
has- been conferred upon other persons greater in 
degree than the injury done to those making use of 
the port'.(12 7) 
The Court was divided in its opinion. Lord Tenterden CJ 
- reiterated to the view he had expressed (as Abbott CJ) in 
(12 8) 
Lord Grosvenor's case, while Bayley J adhered to the 
principles enunciated by him at nisi prius. Holroyd J 
agreed with Bayley J, while Littledale J, who had been con-
sulted in the matter while still at the bar, declined to give 
an opinion. 
Holroyd J fdllowed Bayley J in"the view that the public 
right of navigation was not abvolute in its nature. Rather, 
he held, it was a right qualified by -the existence- of other 
public rights (such as fishing, loading and unloading,- access 
to the wind) so that 
'the enjoyment of each of those rights by some is 
frequently and necessarily an obstruction to the 
free and complete enjoyment either of the same right 
or of some other of the above rights in others".(129) 
(126) '.., considerations of public policy are not legitimate 
grounds for the decision of nuisance or no nuisance'. 
6 B & C 566 at 580. 
(127) 6 B & C 566 at 581. 
(12 8) 'Admitting that there is some public benefit both from 
the price and condition of the coals, still I must own 
that I do not think those points could properly be taken 
into consideration in the question raised by this indict-
ment. That question I take properly to have been, 
whether the navigation and passage of vessels on this 
public navigable river was injured by these erections'. 
6 B & C 566 at 602. 
(129) 6 B & C 566 at 586. 
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Accordingly it could not be said that 
'such obstruction ... necessarily or as a matter 
of law, a public or private nuisance. Each of 
the rights above mentioned must a times occasion-
ally yield and become subordinate, as may be 
necessary or reasonable, at least in part, to 
some of the others'. 130) 
Whether or not a particular user of the right of passage was 
thus a nuisance was a question to be determined in the 
(131) 
circumstances and that question was 'according to Lord 
Hale, a question of fact for the jury'. In this case the 
(130) A proposition anticipated by Best J in his dissenting 
judgement in Blundeii v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Aid 268 
on the public right to use the sea-shore for bathing. 
Arguing that the sea-shore was in the nature of a public 
highway, Best J (at 2 77) said that there was nothing in-
consistent with this view in the fact that certain persons 
might be granted exclusive rights over the sea-shore: 
'The owner of the soil of the shore may erect 
such buildings or other things as are necessary 
for the carrying on of commerce and navigation on 
any parts of the shore that may be conveniently 
used for such erections,taking care to impede, as 
little as possible, the public right of way. This 
is not more inconsistent with a public right of way 
over it than the right of digging a mine under a 
road, or the erecting of a wharf on a river, are 
inconsistent with the right of way along such road 
or river. The former does not interfere with 
the use of the road; and although the latter, 
in order to be useful, must be carried out 
beyond the high water mark, and, whilst the tide 
is up, must somewhat narrow the passage of the* 
river; yet, such wharves are necessary for the 
loading and unloading of vessels, and the right 
of passage must be accommodated to the right of 
loading and unloading the craft that pass. 
The law in these, as in other cases, limits the 
balances opposing rights, that they may be so 
enjoyed as that the exercise of one is not 
injurious to the other'. 
(131) '... the ships lie at the wharfs ... in the port or 
river, to load or unload, and their obstruction to 
others is or is not, as well as the erection of the 
wharf itself, a nuisance to the navigation, in like 
manner as the staiths ... themselves in the coal trade 
are or are not a nuisance according to the circumstances'. 
6 B & C 566 at 587. 
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evidence suggested that the staiths were less a nuisance to 
navigation that the keels, and the jury 'upon the evidence 
(132) 
were of that opinion' and thus there was no ground for 
ordering a new trial. 
Bayley J defended his direction to the jury in a judge-
ment which, in substance amounted to a vigorous assertion of 
the doctrine of free enterprise in trade according to the 
principles of laissez faire. He took as his point of departure 
the proposition that the right of navigation was not in essence 
a mere right of passage: 'trade and commerce are the chief 
objects, and the right of passage is chiefly subservient to 
(133) 
these ends'. These ends required facilities for loading 
and unloading which admittedly amounted to encroachments upon 
the navigation but at the same time they advance 'the main 
(134 ) 
purposes of a port, its trade and commerce'. This being 
so staiths and the like are 'a justifiable erection, not a 
nuisance'. The argument that the staiths were not for the 
benefit of the public since they had been erected for private 
profit the judge disposed of with a broadside of laissez faire 
philosophy, arguing that their effect was to lower-the (132) Holroyd J also closely analysed the direction by Bayley J 
to the jury and found it 'in substance.correct'. 
6 B & C 566 at 589-592. 
(133) 6 B & C 566 at 594. 
(134) '. .. upon what principle can the erection of a wharf or 
staith be supported? It occupies a space where boats 
before had navigated. It turns part of the waterway into 
solid ground; but it advances some of the other purposes, 
the main purposes of a port, its trade or commerce' ... 
Make an creation for pleasure, for whim, for caprice; and 
if it interferes in the least degree with the public right 
of passage, it is a nuisance. Erect it for the purposes 
of trade or commerce ... and it is a justifiable erection, 
not a nuisance'. (Here Bayley J cites Lord Hale's observa-
tion that not all structures upon the foreshore are 'ipso 
facto in law a nuisance, for this would destroy all quays 
...' (see 186 n 108 above)). 6 B & C 566 at 595. 
(135) 'If the conduct of many individuals, though proceeding 
wholly and exclusively from private motives of private 
profit, produce results of great public benefit ... 
[am I to say that public benefit did not occur] because 
public benefit was never in the contemplation of the 
individuals by who it is produced' 6 B & C 566 at 596. 
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price of coal in the markets of the kingdom and thus to 
be productive of great public advantage. These factors, he 
concluded were thus proper considerations to be put to the 
(137) 
jury, and for this reason he. could not order a new trial. 
In its immediate context the majority view in R v Russell 
can be said to be an attempt to apply a doctrine the rights 
in navigable waters s.hpul_d be determined by the invisible hand 
of the market rather than according to a principle of an absolute, 
(13 8) 
state-maintained, public trust in public waters. 
(13 6) "Encourage the trade, make the article cheap, and improve 
its quality and who reaps the benefit? The market to 
which the article is sent ... Facility in loading is 
one of the chief means to give the trade encouragement... 
It increases the number of sellers and has a tendency to 
produce such a competition as will keep the price low'. 
6 B & C 566 at 597. 
(137) After the decision, a fresh indictment was preferred 
against the defendants, but was not proceeded with, one 
reason being, ironically enough, that another innovation 
in the shipping trade, the introduction of 'steam boats 
for towing' had rendered the matter 'less important' 
(see R v Ward (1836) 4 Ad & E 384 at 389 n c) . 
(138) Cf Note "The Public Trust in Tidal Areas" (1970) 79 Yale 
LJ 762 at 769. It was perhaps'a distaste for that 
doctrine that led to the subsequent repudiation of the 
decision. See R v Ward (1836) 4 Ad & El 384 where 
Lord Denman (at 404-51 observed, anent R v Russell that 
'no greater evil can be conceived than the encouragement 
of capitalists and adventurers to interfere with known 
public rights, from motives of personal interest ...' 
The decision was likewise repudiated by Lord Campbell CJ 
in R v Betts (1850) 16 QB 1022 at 1037 and held to be 
'not law"1 by Jessell MR in Attorney-General v Terry(18 74) 
9 Ch App 423 at 423 n. Sir James Stephen Digest of 
Criminal Law 140 n 4, however, thought it 'misunderstood' 
and said it established that the public had a right to 
use navigable waters and to anchor ships therein for 
'a reasonable time'. In his view the difference 
between the judges over this case boiled down to whether 
'Bayley J had influenced the jury by referring to the 
collateral advantage of cheapening coal on the London 
market'. Another champion of the decision was Justice 
Daniel of the US Supreme Court who in the case of the 
State of Pennsy-lvarira *V The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge 
Company (1851) 13 US 249 at 286 vigorously supported the 
doctrine in R v Russell, commending Bayley J's char'ge to 
the jury and his subsequent judgement as 'lucid' and 
'entirely conclusive'. Daniel J's own view was 'that 
upon the plainest principles of common sense, no act in 
reference to the public, by which a public benefit is 
conferred, can be denominated a nuisance ...' 
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Be that as it may, the great significance of R v 
Russell, in relation to the evolution of the nuisance con-
cept lies in the conception advocated by Holdroyd and 
(13 9 ) 
Bayley JJ that mutually conflicting interests can be 
accommodated by a concept of mutually limited rights allowing 
for the recognition of competing interests without assigning 
to any interest some pre-eminent or predominant status. This 
concept though apparently repudiated along with the decision 
in R v Russell was soon to reappear in the realm of nuisance 
law when it would be adopted and applied as the cornerstone 
of a developed concept of nuisance. 
C. THE EMERGENCE OF THE 'STATUTORY' NUISANCE 
1. Introduction: The Impact of the Industrial 
Revolution 
During a period falling roughly between the years 17 60 
to 183 0 the face of England was transformed by what would be 
called the Industrial Revolution. . The growth and develop-
ment of industry during these years had far-reaching social, 
economic, cultural and environmental consequences many of 
(mo) 
which permeated through to the concept of nuisance, 
bringing about important developments within the concept. 
These developments were first manifested in relation to the 
(141) 
concept of common nuisance. 
2. The Health of Towns 
One of the most remarkable consequences of the Industrial 
Revolution was an ever-increasing concentration of a growing 
(139) And Best J in Blundell v Cattera!1 (supra n 132). 
(140) Cf Chafee's remark that 'One could easily write an in-
formative account of the development of the Industrial 
Revolution from nuisance cases alone'. Chafee Cases 
and Materials on Equity 79 5. See generally Brenner 
'Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution' (1973) 3 
Jo Legal Studies 4 03. 
(141) For the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the con-
cept of private nuisance see below 247. 
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population in densely crowded industrial and urban 
agglomerations. In many places this intensification of 
urbanization was directly related to the existence of in-
dustrial enterprises thus creating what came to be known as 
the industrial towns. Usually industries were established 
in the low-lying areas in order to be close to the canal and 
railway transportation routes. These areas were usually 
vacant sites, and it was here then the the factories were 
built and also the housing to accommodate the labour forces 
of industry. The many thousands of workers' houses built 
during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution were 
erected on the principle of providing the greatest amount 
of accommodation in the smallest area. The houses were con-
structed 'back to back' with the result that two rooms out 
of four on each floor had no direct daylight or ventilation 
and there were no open spaces except the passages between the 
doubled rows. Cheap materials and poor workmanship combined 
to cause this type of housing to become the quitessential 
(143) 
slum. 
(142) An increase in population was one of the phenomena 'which 
accompanied the Industrial Revolution. In 17 50 the 
population of England and Wales was six and a half 
million; in 1801 nine million; in 1831 fourteen million 
(Ashton The Industrial Revolution 2). During the period 
1801-1861 the percentage of people living in towns with 
a population of 20,000 and over increased from 17% to 38% 
(Brenner op cit (n 140) 409). To what extent the increase 
of population was a cause or effect of the Industrial 
Revolution is debatable : Ashton op cit 3/j. See, for a 
full discussion of population trends in the industrial 
age, Mantoux The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth 
Century 344//. 
(143) Cf the contemporary description cited by Webb Special 
Authorities 402 
'The principle of speculation is to take large tracts 
of ground by the acre, and to crown as many streets 
and lanes into it as they can ... These houses are 
therefore of the meanest sort; one built with the 
worst and slightest materials ...' 
Cf Hosking The Making of the English Landscape 226:'Bad 
materials and fewer of them, and bad workmanship, reduced 
the cost of building ... Birmingham specialized in in 
close, dark and filthy courtyards ... and many of their 
houses were built back to back in order to get the maxi-
mum number on to each expensive acre. The local medical 
men did not object, but rather commended them for their 
(continued on the next page) 
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In these places was unleashed what the Webbs aptly des-
(144) 
cribe as a 'devastating torrent of public nuisances'. 
The regular method of disposal of refuse was to dump it in 
the streets. Dunghills, middens and open cess-pools were 
invariable features of every street, lane and court. The 
(145 ) 
houses themselves were usually without toilets or drains, 
and the ubiquitous pig was as much a feature of the industrial 
towns as it had been in the medieval city, as were slaughter» 
houses which were to be found in yards, courts and cellars, 
adding blood, offal and filth to the refuse in the streets. 
The stench was pervasive and appalling, the product of rotting 
(147) 
refuse and industrial effluent. Likewise smoke and soot 
from the innumerable factory chimneys polluted the air and 
( A h Q \ 
defiled houses, clothir^g and food. Such water supplies 
as there were were polluted by the filth of the thoroughfares 
(149) 
and the absence of water-borne sewerage and, as Mumford 
notes, next to dirt the new towns boasted a new blight upon 
human sensibility - noise, an omnipresent consequence of 
industrial activity which occurred both day and night. (143) (continued) 
cheapness.... Decent people moved out if they could, 
and the born-squalid moved in: the swamp of slums 
spread a few years behind the speculative builder every-
where ' . 
The word 'slum' was first used in the 1820's. It was 
derived from the term 'slump' meaning 'wet mire', and 
so referred especially to the low lying, badly drained 
land upon which the workers' houses tended to be con-
structed in the typical industrial town. 
(144) Op cit 400. 
(145) Webb op cit 402; Mumford op cit 526; Hoskings op cit 
284. 
(146) Webb op cit 401. 
(147) The Webbs op cit 404 cite the case of Bristol in 1822 
when generally two or three times a week, 'a most sicken-
ing and offensive vapour' emenated from a local gas works 
and hung over the city, its effluvia 'capable of awaken-
ing the soundest sleeper, and interrupting the respira-
tion of all who have not very strong lungs'. 
(148) On atmospheric pollution during the Industrial Revolu-
tion see also below 247-8 
(149) Webb op cit 404; Mumford op cit 5 26. 
(150) Op cit 538. He quotes on 'ear-witness account of 
Birmingham' in the 1850's: 
(continued on the next page) 
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The effect of these conditions - the dark, overcrowded 
unventilated houses, the filthy streets , the polluted waters -
was to create health hazards of massive proportions, whose 
grim threats were to be fully realised as epidemics of cholera 
and typhoid swept over Britain during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. 
Viewed from the point of view of the nuisance concept, the 
various components which made up the insanitary conditions 
which afflicted the typical industrial town were the Webbs 
'devastating torrent of public nuisances'. That nuisances 
of this sort should have existed on this massive scale must 
be attributed to the fact that the machinery designed for sup-r 
r i c i \ 
pressing public nuisances had broken down. 
3. The Decline of the Leet 
We have seen J how it was that the courts leet emerged 
as institutions of local government charged, inter alia, with 
the function of the cleansing of streets and the suppression 
(150) (continued) 
'In no town in the world are the mechanical arts more 
noisy: hammerings incessantly upon the anvil; there 
is the unending clang of engines; flame rustles, 
water hisses , steam roars .... The people live in an 
atmosphere vibrating with clamour....' 
The metal industry had always been noisy. Camden in 
Britanniae Descriptio (1607) II 105 observed that in 
Sussex in the seventeenth century the 'beating with 
hammers upon the iron, fill the neighbourhood day and 
night with their noise'. (Cited Mantoux op cit 279). 
In Birmingham in 17 9 5 the sound of hammering could be 
heard at three o'clock in the morning (Mantoux op cit 281) 
(151) It should be pointed out that the insanitary conditions 
in the new industrial towns w.&rjg also in part due to the 
fact that many of these places when first established did 
not fall within the jurisdiction of the Leets. As the 
Webbs observe (op cit 400) it was '[e]xactly where the 
local institutions were of the weakest type' that the 
population was allowed to grow in the manner which pro-
duced the conditions described above. Where there were 
operating leets they did initially seek to provide some 
control over the activities of industry (see Webb Manor 
and Borough 55, 105). 
(152) Above 75-78. 
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of.insanitary practices, a jurisdiction acquired by an exten-
sion of the primordial concept of a public nuisance as a . 
purpresture upon the King's highway. By the seventeenth cen-
tury it was becoming plain that the Leet was no longer capable 
/ A c q ̂  
of effectively discharging this role. Already in the 1660's 
resort was being had to the alternative device of appointing 
special commissioners under the authority of local private acts 
of parliament^charged with the task of improving the conditions 
of the streets and thoroughfares of towns and cities. Initially 
the function of these 'improvement commissioners' was 'the dull 
routine business of paving, lighting and cleansing the 
(154 ) 
streets'. Gradually their functions were extended to in-
clude 'preventing encroachments, removing obstructions, regu-
lating the traffic ... prohibiting the wandering of pigs in 
the thoroughfares, naming streets and numbering houses, putting 
down nuisances and making by-laws....' In short the 
improvement commissioners assumed the functions of the Leet 
which gradually slipped further into decline, the demoralized 
jurors returning presentments which 
'become steadily more perfunctory, often degenerating 
into a careless return of "omnia bene" or, as in a 
Welsh manor in 1804, "all well but the pigs"'.(156) 
(153) Chiefly because the machinery by which the leet operated 
was ineffective: 
'Its whole procedure in its successive stages of pre-
sentment, amerciament, affeering, and distraining 
for small fines was cumbrous and often ineffective; 
and the absence of any provision against a recurrance 
of the offence gave the locality the very minimum of 
protection'. 
Webb Manor and Borough 12 5. 
(154) Webb Special Authorities 236. 
(155) Ibid. For the earliest improvement act ((1662) 14 Car 
2 c 2) see Clifford Private Bill Legislation (ii) 268-70; 
Webb op cit 277. The enactment of improvement acts be-
came common after 17 63 (cf Webb op cit 242) and between 
1785 and 1800 211 local acts for the improvmeent of towns 
were passed (see Buer Health Wealth and Population in the 
Early Days of the Industrial Revolution chap 7) and be-
tween 1800 and 1845 nearly 400 were obtained in 208 towns 
(Clifford op cit 291). 
(156) Webb Manor and Borough 122. The decline of the leets is 
traced in great detail in this work. See also below 201-2 
200. 
4. Sanitary Reform 
During the early nineteenth century epidemics of cholera 
swept across England, bringing in their wake a public outcry 
for the reform of what was called the 'health of towns'. In 
1839 the government ordered Poor Law Commissioners to insti-
tute an enquiry into ways and means of improving public health 
This work was undertaken by Edwin Chadwick, a Poor Law com-
missioner and professional bureaucrat. In 184-2 Chadwick pub-
lished his important and influential Report on the Sanitary 
( 1 5 7 ) 
Condition of the Labouring Population. 
This work is of interest in relation to a study of the 
concept of nuisance in that Chadwick in his Report cited the 
common law concept of nuisance as the instrument for achieving 
the reform of the sanitary conditions in England. The 'substan-
tive English law', Chadwick observed, contained 
'extensive and useful provisions, and complete principles 
for the protection of the public health'. 
/ A C O \ 
These provisions included the Statute of Sewers . and the 
(159) ' 
Highway Acts. In addition there existed, at common law, 
a set of general remedies 
'under the comprehensive title nuisance (nocumentum) 
meaning anything by which the health or personal 
safety, or the conveniences of the subject might be 
endangered or affected injuriously'.(1«0) 
Under the nuisance concept, Chadwick went on to say, 
'the subject is entitled to protection against things 
which are offensive to the senses , from which no injury 
to health or other injury can be proved than the often 
overlooked but serious injury of discomfort, of daily 
annoyance, as by matters offensive to the sight, as by 
allowing blood to flow in the streets; by filth- K " 
offensive smells, and by noises. 
(157) See generally Finer The Life and Times of Sir Edwin 
Chadwick. 
(158) See above 167. 
(159) See above 168. 
(160) Chadwick Report 348. 
(161) Chadwick Report 348-9. 
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In support of this Chadwick cited authorities showing it to 
be a common nuisance to divide a house in order to enable 
'poor people to inhabit it by which it will be more dangerous 
• *• 4r • 4r 4.- f ( 1 6 2 ) , . • . ( 1 6 3 ) in time of infection , or to corrupt the air or 
(164) . . . (165) . ., ... 
waters or to create noise , together with some scat-
tered citations from the 'sanitary regulations' of London's 
Ordinance of the Streets. 
After outlining the law of nuisance Chadwick turned to 
consider the 'State of the Special Authorities for reclaiming 
the execution of the laws for the Protection of the Public 
Health'. Of these the cJourts Leet, he observed, were 
the most important 'because the most cheap and accessible1 
yet the fact was that at the present time they achieved little 
or nothing in this connection. Indeed, Chadwick wrote, 'there 
is scarcely one town in England ... that does not present an 
example of standing violations of the law, and of the inflic-
tion of public and common as well as private injuries, the 
tenements over-crowded, streets replete with injurious nui-
sances, the streams of pure water polluted, and-the air ren-
. . , (16 8) dered noisome'. 
The fact was that in 'the rural districts the Courts 
Leet have generally fallen into desuetude'. Indeed so 
much so was this that although 'the nuisances which favoured 
the introduction and spread of cholera' were for the most part 
evils within the cognizance of the Ieets and could not have 
existed if the 1-eets had acted properly, 'yet so complete was 
the desuetude of the machinery of these courts that it 
appeared nowhere to be thought applicable' and an entirely new 
machinery of local health boards was created to deal with the 
, .... , (170) 
pestilence'. 
(162) Citing R v Pedley (1834) 1 Ad & E 822. 
(163) Citing Aldred's case (1611) 9 Co Rep 57. 
(164) Citing a number of medieval enactments: op cit 350-1. 
(165) Citing the unreported case of The Duke of Northumberland 
v Clowes (1824). 
(166) Op cit 353-354. 
(167) Chadwick Report 354. 
(168) Op cit 354-5. 
(169) Op cit 358. 
(170) Op cit 360. 
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The chief causes of the iheffee£JLxe.ne_s.s of the -leets was 
the absence of funds 'by which the common remedy by indictment 
(171) 
could now be prosecuted'; the fact that the 'complication 
of various nuisances in some of the larger manufacturing dis-
tricts has frequently become so great as to put them beyond 
any existing legal remedy, whether public or private, by 
placing out of the apparent possibility of distinct technical 
, . . ~ (172) 
proof any injury or particular effect arising from any one'; 
and the fact that the citizens whose duty it was to serve on 
the leet juries performed their duties in the most perfunctory 
(173) manner. 
The thrust of Chadwick's Report was thus that the medium 
for the preservation of the public health was the nuisance con-
cept, this to be achieved through the resuscitation and improve 
ment of 'the constitutional machinery for reclaiming its execu-
, (174) tion'. 
(171) Ibid.' Chadwick goes on to say that 'the most offensive 
and injurious nuisances' were those 'supported by large 
capital' so that their suppression was 'practically 
available only to persons who can afford to risk large 
. spurns in litigation'. He cites the example of one who 
s'pent in excess of £4 0 00 in seeking to prevent the 
pollution by a dye-works, of a stream supplying a village 
and was then regarded by 'persons of his own class as 
the persecutor of the author of the nuisance'. (id). 
(172) Op cit 360. 
(17 3) Op cit 35 8. Chadwick mentions that the jurors were 
mainly tradesmen who 'attend unwillingly and at incon-
venient sacrifice of time; who can have little or no 
information in respect to the evils in question before 
them; no time to master such information as may be 
brought before them casually; little interest and scarcely 
any real responsibility imposed for ensuring any mastery 
of it; and neither time nor adequate means at their 
disposal for the removal of such evils as those in 
question when presented to them'. 
(174) Chadwick also called for the execution of great works of 
sanitary engineering including the construction of under-
ground, lined sewers, pipe drainage, universal provision 
of water-closets and the provision of abundant supplies 
of piped water.-for street cleansing and the flushing of 
sewers. See Chadwick Report passim. See also Finer 
The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick 2 09//. 
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5. The Sanitary Legislation 
In 1846 Parliament enacted a statute'for the more speedy 
1(175) 
removal of certain nuisances. " The nuisances aimed at by 
the Act were 'the filthy and unwholesome condition of any 
dwelling house or building', the 'accumulation of any offensive 
or noxious matter, refuse, dung or offal' and 'the existence 
of any foul or offensive drain, privy or cess-pool'. In 
respect of these the Act empowered local authorities to issue 
complaints to Justices of the Peace who might then order abate-
(177 ) 
ment of the nuisance, the costs of such proceedings to be 
recovered from the party responsible for the nuisance. The 
general effect of the legislation was thus to meet Chadwick's 
complaint that the existing procedures of indictment or infor-
mation were too clumsy and expensive to enable litigation for 
suppression of public nuisances. The Act thus laid the foun-
dation of what was to become a new procedure for suppressing 
nuisances, that of the'summary proceedings',. 
In 1847 the legislature enacted two statutes of further 
significance for the principle of sanitary reform. These were 
model 'improvement' acts intended to be adapted by local 
authorities as measures for sanitary improvement. 
(17 8) 
The Town Clauses Improvement Act ' provided, as it 
were, a model strategy for local authorities for the improve-
ment of the sanitary conditions in towns. This A.ct and its.: 
(179) 
satellite, the Police Town Clauses Act, were particularly 
significant since they were founded in the fruits of the 
(17 5) 9 & 10 Vict c96: 'An act for the more speedy Removal of 
certain Nuisances and ... for the Prevention of contagious 
and epidemic Diseases . . . . ' 
(176) s51 
(177) Ibid. 
(178) 10 & 11 Vict c 34: 'An act for consolidating in one Act 
certain provisions usually contained in Acts for paving, 
draining, cleansing, lighting and improving Towns'. 
(179) 10 & 11 Vict c 89: 'An act for consolidating in one Act 
certain provisions usually contained in Acts for regula-
ting thi= Polio© of Towns ' . 
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research of Chadwick and his disciples and devised so as to 
meet and combat the most serious and prevalent sanitary de-
fects in the towns which those researches had revealed. 
The Town Clauses Act provided for local authorities to 
appoint a surveyor of paving and drainage, an 'inspector of 
nuisances' and an 'officer of health'. The authori-
ties were vested with powers to control and regulate sewers, 
drains, the paving, lighting and cleansing of streets, the 
ventilation of buildings, lodging houses, and the supply of 
water. 
The Act made special provision for a collection of tradi-
tional common nuisances. It was provided that if 
'any candle-house, melting-house, melting-place, or 
soap-house, or any slaughter-house, or any building or 
place for boiling offal or blood, or for boiling or 
crushing bones, or any pig stye, necessary house, dung-
hill, manure heap', -
be certified by the inspector of nuisances 'to be a nuisance 
(18 2 ) 
or injurous to health' it might be suppressed. 
The Act also empowered local authorities to direct prose-
cutions 'for any public nuisance whatsoever created, permitted 
(18 3 ) 
or suffered' and that nothing in the,act should be con-
strued to render lawful that 'deemed to be a nuisance at common 
law' nor exempt any person 'guilty of nuisance at common law1 
,- . . (184) 
from prosecution. 
The Police Town Clauses Act contained a number of sections 
which in effect amounted to a codification and elaboration of 
the common law nuisance of obstructing the highway or en-
dangering the safety of passengers. 
(180) s 9. 
(181) s 12. v 
(182) sL 104, 105. 
(183) s 106. 
(184) s3 107. 
(185) as 21-29. 
205. 
The Nuisances Removal Act of 1846 was temporary and 
expired in 1848. In that year its provisions were 
renewed by a further enactment. The Act provided 
that where notice was given to duly appointed local 
authorities that any dwelling house or building was 'in 
such a filthy and unwholesome condition as to be a 
nuisance or injurious to the health of any person' or 
that upon the premises there was 'any foul and offensive 
ditch, gutter, drain, privy, cesspool or ashpit', or any 
such thing 'kept or constructed so as to be a nuisance 
or injurious to the health of any person' or that any 
accumulation of dung, manure, offal or refuse or any 
cattle or animals were, or were kept so as to be a 
nuisance or injurious to the health of any person, a 
similar though more elaborate procedure for summary abate-
ment might be initiated. 
In 184 8 Parliament also enacted the first piece of 
legislation aimed at 'promoting the public health' as a 
(18 8) 
whole. The Act created a 'Board of Health' and 
provided for the establishment of local health boards 
empowered to appoint surveyors, medical officers of 
health and 'inspectors of nuisances'. These officers 
were charged with a variety of duties relating to the 
inspector and control of sewers, drainage, the cleansing 
of streets , slaughter-houses, offensive trades, lodging 
houses, street repairs, water supplies , mortuaries, 
cemetries and 'nuisances'. The 'nuisances' dealt with 
by the Act concerned mainly drains, sewers etc which were 
'offensive' or 'likely to be prejudicial to health', the 
keeping of swine or pig-styes in dwellings or in a manner 
'so as to be a nuisance to any person' (which latter 
nuisance was deemed to be also a punishable offence) and 
were subject to proceedings for summary abatement. 
(186)'11 & 12 Vict c 123. This Act was sloppily drawn 
and badly conceived' : Finer op cit 33 6. 
(187) § 1. 
(18 8) 11 & 12 Vict c 63: 'An Act for Promoting the Public 
Health.' See Finer op cit chap 319//. 
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The Act was not a notable success. Its provisions 
relating to the establishment of local health authorities 
(189) 
were permissive and thus not enforced in all places. 
In 1855 the statutes of 1846 and 1848 relating to 
nuisance removal were repealed and replaced by a consoli-
dating act entitled Nuisances Removal Act for England 
(190 ) 
1855. The Act provided that local health authorities 
established under the Public Health Act and other specified 
local authorities were to administer its provisions. The 
Act provided a more elaborate procedure for summary abate-
ment of nuisances (defined essentially in the terms 
employed in the Act of 1848) and granted powers of entry 
to inspect premises and to abate nuisances thereon. The 
Act further provided penalties for the pollution of waters 
(191) 
by gas manufacturers, the keeping or sale of unwhole-
(192 ) 
some food, the conduct of certain trades or activities 
'causing effluvia' and conducted so as 'to be a nuisance' 




neighbourhood and the maintenance of overcrowded 
houses. 
In 1875 there was enacted the most comprehensive 
and ambitious piece of sanitary legislation. The Public 
(195 ) 
Health Act 187 5 was not only mandatory in its pro-
visions but its ambit extended to almost all significant 
aspects of the promotion of public health. Besides making 
elaborate provision for the existence powers and duties of 
local authorities and the institution of legal proceedings 
by them, it set out in Part III extensive provisions re-
lating to sanitary matters. Included herein were pro-
visions for the regulation of sewerage and drainage, the 
(189) See Holdsworth 14 HKL 225. 
(190) 18 & 19 Vict c 121. 
(191) s 23. 
(192) s 26. 
(193) s 27. 
(194) § 29. 
(19 5) 38 & 39 Vict c 55. 
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scavenging and cleansing of streets, houses and ditches, 
provision of water supplies and prevention of their 
pollution; the regulation of cellar dwellings and 
lodging houses, offensive trades, unsound food-stuffs, 
infectious diseases and hospitals, and the regulation 
of nuisances. For the purposes of the Act nuisances 
were defined to be: 
1. Any premises in such a state as to be a 
nuisance or injurious to health. 
2. Any pool, ditch, gutter, watercourse, 
privy, urinal, cesspool, drain or ash-
pit so foul or in'such a state as to 
be a nuisance or injurious to health. 
3. Any animals so kept as to be a nuisance 
or injurious to health. 
4. Any accumulation or deposit which is 
a nuisance or injurious to health. 
5. Houses so over-crowded as to be dangerous 
or injurious to the health of the inmates. 
6. Factories and workshops not kept in a 
cleanly state. 
7. Certain fire places and furnaces which . 
did not consume their own smoke. 
8. Chimneys sending forth such quantities 
of black smoke as to be a nuisance. 
Local authorities were charged with the duty of 
inspecting their district with a view to ascertaining 
whether any such nuisances existed and implementing 
the machinery provided by the Act for abating nuisances. 
Householders and persons aggrieved were entitled to inform 
the authority of nuisances, and upon such information 
being laid the authority was to call upon the person 
responsible for the nuisance to abate it. Any person 
failing to act upon such instruction was to be summoned 
before a court of summary jurisdiction which, being 
satisfied that the nuisance existed, could make an order 
for its abatement. Failure to comply with the order 
• • -i .ccr • j • -, ^ (196 ) 
was a criminal offence carrying a per diem penalty. 
(196) Ss 92-98. 
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In addition the Act contained provisions for the 
suppression of any offensive trade (specified by the 
Act as any candle-house melting house melting place or 
soap-house or any slaughter or place for boiling bones, 
blood or offal, or any place of trade or manufacture 
'causing effluvia') certified to be 'a nuisance or 
(197 ) 
injurious to health'. 
6. Nuisance under the Statutes 
The essential effect of the statutory provisions 
outlined above was not so much the creation of a distinctly 
(198 ) 
new category of nuisances. Rather it was to supple-
ment the existing processes of indictment, information 
and action as means of suppressing nuisances. The pro-
cedures for the summary abatement of nuisances applied 
however only to those nuisances specified in the legislation, 
so that where a nuisance could not be said to be of a type 
mentioned in any of the relevant enactments, the victum 
was obliged to fall back on the traditional processes 
of the common law. 
For the purposes of these legislative provisions the 
term 'nuisance' thus tended to be accorded its traditional 
common law meaning. In The Great Western Railway Co v 
(199) Bishop (1872) Cockburn CJ was inclined to restrict 
the scope of the nuisances which could be said to fall 
within the purview of the legislation to those which were 
(197) g. 114. The trades of blood, bone, soap or tripe 
boiler, or of fell-monger or tallow melter and any 
'other noxious or offensive' trade, business or 
manufacture, in terms of section 112 could not be 
carried on in any district without the written 
consent of the local authority. 
(198) The legislature could of course pronounce a particular 
condition or state of affairs to be a nuisance, regard-
less of whether it was such at common law or not. To 
some extent this did occur, but the general tendency 
was for the Legislature to designate as nuisance only 
those conditions or activities which had already been 
considered to be such at common law, or treated as 
such in the Courts Leet.. 
(199) (1872) LR 7 QB 550 at 552. 
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'injurious to health'. In subsequent cases the 
judges, while accepting that not all common law nuisances 
could be said to liable to the summary abatement-procedures 
(201) 
provided by the legislation, took a somewhat broader 
view of the effect of the legislation, holding that a 
nuisance in the sense of that which interferes with 
personal comfort,though not necessarily injurious to health, 
(202) 
came within the provisions of the legislation. 
(200) '[The Nuisance Removals Act 1855] speaks of nuisances 
or things injurious to health, and I think that ... 
it was intended for the benefit of public health or 
health generally, to secure the means of abating things 
that were either matters of public or private nuisance, 
of public nuisance as coming within the word "nuisance", 
and private nuisance coming within the words "injurious 
to health"; but whether you regard public or private 
nuisance, still it was intended that the powers of 
this Act should apply only when the thing complained 
of was injurious to health ...[T]his Act cannot be 
considered as comprehending within its provisions 
all things which would amount to nuisances in point 
of law... It is plain that the object was to protect 
the public health and private health of Individuals 
living in towns ...'. 
(201) In Malton Board of Health v Malton Manure Co (.1879) 
LR 4 Exch D 302 at 307 Stephen J followed Bishop's 
case (supra) saying that 'the word "nuisance" cannot 
be taken in its fullest sense, as that would lead 
to some obvious absurdities'. In Bishop Auckland 
Local Board v Bishop Auckland Iron Co (18 82) LR 10 
QB 13 8 at 140 he intimated that the legislation 
could not apply to 'mere common law nuisance like 
the non-repair of a highway'. 
(202) In Banbury Sanitary Authority v Page (18 81) LR 8 
QB 97 Grove J held the for purposes of section 47 
of the Public Health Act 1875, which made It an 
offence to keep a swine-stye or pigs 'so as to be 
a nuisance to any person', 'the word "nuisance" is 
here used In the ordinary legal sense, and includes, 
in addition to matters injurious to health, matters 
substantially offensive to the senses'. In the 
Bishop Auckland case (supra) Stephen J said that the 
formula 'nuisance or injurious to health' did not mean 
'nuisance injurious to health' : 
'The natural sense of the words seem to me... 
[to be] a nuisance either interfering with personal 
Li comfort or injurious to health ... I think the legis-
lature intended to strike at ... anything which would 
diminish the comfort of life though not injurious 
to health, and at anything which would In fact 
injure health'. 
2 1 0 . 
D. THE RISE O F ' ' P U B L I C NUISANCE 
1. Introduction 
The recognition, in the eighteenth century, by the 
Common Law of the 'common' nuisance,, raised the question of 
the exact nature and character of this species of nuisance. 
The conventional answer, advanced especially by the treatise 
writers, was that 'common' nuisance was an offence against 
(203) 
the public and, as such, distinguishable from 'private' 
(204) . . . . . . • . . . . . - - (205) 
nuisance xn that it was a species of criminal offence. 
2. 'Common' Nuisance as an offence against the Public. 
We have seen how it was that the Courts Leet came to 
assume a jurisdicition to suppress nuisances which affected 
sane 
(207) 
( O f) C \ 
community interests. We have seen too that the nui ces 
pursued in the Leet was denominated as 'common' nuisance 
and characterized as a species wrong pursued by the k'ing on 
behalf of the public.(208) 
(203) Hawkins (1 Pleas of the Crown Chap 75 s 1) defined a 
common nuisance as 'an offence against the Publick'. 
So too Blackstone (4 Comm 177) described 'common' 
nuisances as 'such inconvenient or troublesome offences 
as annoy the whole community in general, and not merely 
some particular person....' 
(204) See Blackstone loc cit. See also Blackstone 3 Comm 216 
(cited in the following note). 
(205) Hawkins (1 Pleas of the Crown Chap 75 s 1) defined 
common nuisances as 
'offences, under the degree of capital, more 
immediately against the subject, not amounting 
to an actual disturbance of the peace....' 
So too Blackstone (4 Comm 17 6) classified common nuisances 
under the heading of 'Public Wrongs' in a chapter en-
titled 'Of offences against the Public Health and the 
Public Police or Economy' where the offence is described 
as 'a species of offences against the public order'and 
economical regieme of the State'. 
He also laid it down (3 Comm 216) that 'nuisances are 
of two kinds; public or common ... which ... we must 
refer ... to the class of public wrongs, or crimes and 
misdemeanours; and private nuisances....' 
(206) Above 72//. 
(207) Above 80. 
(208) Above 81//. 
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Upon closer examination the leet concept of a nuisance 
can be seen to have acquired a particular connotation. The 
leet was an organ of local administration staffed by laymen 
concerned not so much with the niceties of the Common Law as 
with the exigencies and needs of local government and admini-
stration. The medieval system of local government was largely 
based on the principle of community responsibility for the 
performance of the various works which would later be known 
as local government services. To this end each member of the 
community was visited with customary duties and responsi-
bilities to be performed voluntarily and without remuneration. 
The work of the leet thus often amounted to little more than 
ensuring that each individual member of the community had dis-
charged his civic duties and responsibilities. Those who did 
not were presented to the Leet as offenders to be punished 
for their dereliction. Very often the charge laid before the 
Leet in these cases alleged that the offender had perpetrated 
(209) 
a nocumentum. 
It was in this sense that the leet concept of common 
nuisance came to be denominated as ah offence against the 
(210) 
public. In this sense too the leet concept of common 
nuisance was not so much that which was malum in se, an offence 
against the king's peace, as that which interfered with the 
institutions' of secure and orderly government. 
(209) See Webb Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes 358. 
The 'notion of obligation' they write 
'elucidates what was understood by the conception of 
nuisance, which had swelled into so large a part of 
the framework of law in which the ordinary citizen 
found himself. A nuisance implied a breach of obli-
gation. If every person fulfilled his lawful duty, 
according to the customs of the Manor and the Common 
Law, no one would do or suffer anything to be done to 
the annoyance of his neighbours. Any breach of this 
fundamental obligation was therefore a nuisance, 
active or passive. 
(210) Cf Stephen A General View of the Criminal Law 105: 
'The public have a right to breathe the air in a 
natural and unpolluted state. A man who makes foul 
or unwholesome smells commits a nuisance unless he can 
justify or excuse himself. The public have a right to 
pass safely along public highways without danger or 
interruption. A person whose duty it is to repair the 
(continued on the next page) 
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To a large extent it was this concept of a nuisance 
which was the subject of judicial and legislative elaborations 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which have been 
traced above. The industrial revolution in transforming an 
essentially rural and agrarian society into one which was 
essentially urbanized and industrialized had intensified the 
social need for institutions which protected the general se-
curity, the health and the peace of the public. In responding 
to these claims the courts and the legislature found in the 
leet concept of common nuisance an institution which contained 
and expressed the essential claims of the public welfare which 
(211) 
they sought to advance. 
(210) (continued) 
roads, and who fails to do so, whereby their safety 
or convenience is seriously diminished, commits a 
nuisance. The public have a right to be undisturbed 
by riotous or disorderly proceedings and collections 
of ill-conducted persons. Those, therefore, who 
gather together collections of disorderly persons 
commit a nuisance. In accordance with this principle, 
brothels, gaming houses, betting houses, and dis-
orderly places of entertainment are ... common nui-
sances ' . 
(211) In retrospect the elaboration of the concept of common 
nuisance can be seen to be a part of the process for 
establishing and institutionalising some of the compo-
nents of what would subsequently be identified as the 
paramount social interest of 'general security' (see 
Pound 3 Jurisprudence 268//; Stone Social Dimensions 
of Law and Justice Chap 6). This claim or interest 
included the establishment of measures or devices for 
maintaining the 'general safety' of the public (cf Stone 
op cit 280) the public health (Stone op cit 291): and 
the public peace and order (Stone op cit 293). Stone 
(op cit 280) points out that these interests came into 
prominence as a result of the transformations of the 
physical conditions of social life by the industrial 
revolution: 
'The mushroom appearance of densley populated cities, 
the unhealthy and ugly veil cast over them by indus-
trial smoke and other excreta, the disease-breeding 
qualities of factories ... the increased perils in' 
congested areas from catastrophe, epidemic, and human 
malefaction - all these gave to the claims of the 
general safety and health an importance they had not 
had in agricultural and petty industrial civilisation'. 
The main manifestations of the recognition of this in-
terest were measures for the regulation of 'conditions of 
labour, the structure of dwellings, theatres and other 
(continued on the next page) 
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3. Common Nuisance as a Crime 
For all this, there was an irresistible tendency to 
(21?'} 
classify a common nuisance as a species of criminal offence, 
a tendency which is well illustrated by the fact that when, 
in the nineteenth century, attempts were made to codify the 
criminal law of England it was considered right to include in 
( 213 ) 
such a code a crime denominated as 'common nuisance'. The various draft codes each provided a definition of 'common 
,(214) , .. 
nuisance' and attei 
content of the offence. 
nuisance' and attempted a statement of the scope and 
(211) (continued) 
haunts of men; of the construction, use and equipment 
of roads and vehicles ...' (Stone op cit ibid). The 
interest of the public health likewise led to 'elaborate 
controls of the food men eat, of the air that they 
breathe, of the external world that they see, and in-
creasingly of the noises that they hear ... to measures 
for the control of infectious diseases' (Stone op cit 
281). 
(212) See above n 205. ; . 
(213) Three attempts were made during the nineteenth century 
to codify the criminal law. The first was by a Royal 
Commission appointed in 1833 (see Holdsworth 15 HEL 
143-4, 146)(hereinafter referred to- as the 1833 Commis-
sion). The second was the unofficial codification 
attempted by Sir J F Stephen in 1877 published as a 
Digest of the Criminal Law. The third was by a Royal 
Commission appointed in 187 9 (of which Stephen was a 
member)(hereinafter referred to as the 1879 Commission). 
The 1833 Commission issued <3.ight reports (published as 
Parliamentary Papers) between 1834 and 1845. The 
Seventh Report contained a draft penal Code (Pari Pap 
(1847-8) xxvii). The Report and Draft Code of the 1879 
Commission was printed as C 2345 of 1879 (Pari Pap 1878-9) 
xx 169). Common nuisances were dealt with in Chapter XIII 
of the Code prepared by the 18 33 Commission; in Chapter 
XIX of Stephen's Digest and in Part XIV of the Code pre-
pared by the 1879 Commission. 
(214) The 1833 Commission's definition (op cit 145) was: 
'A common nuisance consists in any unlawful act or 
omission which injures or annoys, or tends to injure 
or annoy Her majesty's subjects in the enjoyment of 
any public right or privilege, or which causes or 
directly and manifestly tends to cause any public 
calamity, mischief, or disorder, or which causes, or 
directly tends to cause, any common injury, damage 
inconvenience, or annoyance to her majesty's subjects, 
in respect of their habitations, personal safety, 
health, comfort or property'. 
(continued on the next page) 
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It was generally agreed that obstructions to highways, 
bridges and navigable rivers were common nuisances, 
although the 18 77 Commission argued that in certain circum-
stances such nuisances should not be the subject of criminal 
prosecution. It was also generally agreed that activi-
ties which affected the public in their health safety or 
(214) (continued) 
Stephen's Digest (art 197) defined a 'common nuisance' 
to be 
'an act not warranted by law or an omission to dis-
charge a legal duty, which act or omission obstructs 
or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in 
the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's 
subjects'. 
Royal Commission of 187 9 in its draft code defined 
(op cit 96) a common nuisance as 
'an unlawful act or omission to discharge a legal 
duty, which act or omission endangers the lives' 
safety health property or comfort of the public, or 
by which the public are obstructed in the exercise 
or enjoyment of any right common to all her majesty's 
subjects.' . 
(215) 1833 Commission, Seventh Report, 58 (art 3); Stephen's 
Digest arts 210-212. The Commission in fact elaborately 
listed the species of public facilities falling to be 
protected in this way. Under the heading 'Nuisances to 
public rights' it stated it to be a nuisance to damage 
or destroy any gaols, bridges, harbours, ports, docks, 
quays, landing-places , market-places, roads , weirs, de-
fences from the sea, flood or inundation, canals, public 
rivers, water-courses, springs, wells, highways, or 
other land, buildings, erections or works lawfully used 
enjoyed by the subjects or intended to be a safeguard 
or protection to the subjects. The nuisance consisted 
in 'unlawfully injuring or damaging such things or un-
lawfully hindering or obstructing the subjects in the 
using or enjoying of them or in diminishing or rendering 
less safe, secure or convenient of such things or any 
right, priviledge or advantageT appertaining to them. 
(216) See below 216-7. The Commission did not make specific 
mention of highway nuisances in its draft code though 
clearly contemplating that such could in appropriate 
cases be regarded as common nuisances. 
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comfort were common nuisances though there were divergences 
(217 ) 
in the expression of this idea. 
Disorderly houses in their various manifestations were 
considered to be common nuisances by Stephen and the 18 79 
Commission but not by the Commission of 1833. 
For the rest there is little unanimity as to what else 
should be included under the rubric. The 183 3 Commission 
included the corruption of wells and springs, fireworks, and 
the keeping of ferocious animals, topics not adverted to by 
the other reports. Stephen's Digest included lotteries while 
others did not. The 187 9 Commission regarded certain dealings 
with human corpses as common nuisances, a topic not adverted 
to in the other reports. 
There was general agreement that the common law offence 
of public indecency should not be regarded as a common 
nuisance but should be classified as an offence against 
(218) 
morality; and the 18 33 Commission argued that the exposing 
(217) The 1833 Commission spoke of 'nuisances to the habita-
tion and to the comforts and convenience of society' 
treating offensive and noxious trades as the source of 
this type of nuisance (op cit 5 8 (art 8)). Stephen's 
Digest (art 208) sppke of 'Nuisances to Health, Life 
and Property' describing anything 'which endangers the 
health, life, or property of the public or any part of 
it' as a common nuisance and citing as specific examples 
the exposure for sale of impure foods, the exposure of 
infected persons in public places, the keeping of flam-
mable or explosive sub;stances in urban areas. Stephen's 
Digest treated noxious trades as a distinct species of 
common nuisance (art 209), while the 1879 Commission 
made no reference either to the general public safety 
or convenience or to the matter of noxious trades. Its 
only specific concern in this connection was with the 
exposing for sale of impure food-stuffs (art 153)). 
(218) The 1833 Commission classified both the keeping of dis-
orderly houses and public indecency as 'Offences against 
Public Morals and Decency' (op cit 61 arts 2, 3). 
Stephen Digest (art 190) classified 'public indecencies' 
under 'offences against morality'; :op cit Chap 18) as 
did the 1879 Commission (Draft Code xiii s 146). 
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of an infected person in a public place was a crime against 
(219 ) 
public health rather than a common nuisance, as was 
(220 ) 
that of exposing for sale impure food-stuffs. 
Finally, it may be noted that the leet nocumenta of 
eaves-dropping and scolding were believed to be antiquated 
(221) 
and probably to be in desuetude. 
But for all this it was not always necessarily true 
that what was termed a common nuisance could be properly said 
to be a crime strictly so-called. For one thing a common 
nuisance unlike other crimes could not be pardoned by the 
Crown and for another thing it was sometimes more accurate 
to say that a 'prosecution' brought in respect of a common 
nuisance was in reality nothing more than an attempt to de-
. . . . (222) 
termme the existence of a civil obligation. Indeed 
(219) Cf Report 56 'Offences Against Public Health' art 5 
where it is observed that the offence though 'sometimes 
classed under the head of Public Nuisances ... it has 
appeared to us to belong more appropriately to that of 
Public Health'. ' 
(220) Op cit art 4. 
(221) Cf the 1833 Commission which in its Report (at 13) ob-
served "~~ 
'There are several antiquated offences, characteristic 
of the rude simplicity of the times when they were 
made the subject of prosecution as crimes which we 
have ventured to omit, and with ought, we think., to 
be expressly repealed if any common law misdemeanours 
other than those included in the Digest are retained. 
These are the offences of eaves-dropping, or listening 
under other men's walls or windows, or the eaves of a 
house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to 
frame slanderous and mischievious tales; of being a 
common scold, which was confined to women, and punish-
able by the ducking-stool, or trebucket castigatory. 
See too Stephen Digest art 20 8 n 1. 
(222) Attention was drawn to this in the Report of the 1879 
Commission (op cit (n 213) 22) where it was pointed out 
that 'when a civil right such as a right of way is 
claimed by one private person and denied by another, the 
mode to try the question is by an action. But when the 
right is claimed by the public, who are not competent 
to bring an action, the only mode of trying the question 
is by an indictment or information, which is in form the 
same as an indictment or information for a crime. But 
it was very early determined that, though it was in form 
a prosecution for a crime, yet that it involved a remedy 
for a civil right, the Crown's pardon could not be 
(continued on the next page) 
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the Royal Commission of 187 9 went so far as to propose in 
its draft code that a distinction be drawn 'between ̂such. 




pleaded in bar Ccf above 81-3]'. These points had 
often been taken in judicial proceedings where the 
judges, while admitting the 'civil' nature of the pro-
ceedings tended to continue to characterize them as 
criminal (usually because to do so meant that the rule 
of autrefois acquit could be invoked to prevent a 'de-
fendant' being harrassed by repeated 'prosecutions' 
brought to establish an obligation to repair the high-
ways. See R v Mann (1815) 4 M & S 337; R v Burbon 
(inhabitants) (1816) 5 M & S 392; R v Russell (1854) 
3 E & B 942; R v Johnson (1860) 2 E & E 613). See too 
R v Paget (1862) 3 F & F 29 where, upon indictment for 
obstructing a highway, it was shown that the accused 
had abated the obstruction and the court found that 
there was 'substantially nothing to try' and entered a 
verdict of not guilty. As the reporters of the case 
observed ( 3 F & F 2 7 n c c ) this suggests that 'the 
proceeding is substantially of a civil and not a criminal 
character* (compare R v Train (186 2) ;3 F & F 22). 
See too R v Broke (1859) 1 F & F 514 where Pollock CB 
allowed the evidence to be summed up as in a civil case, 
saying that the case involved 'a mere question of right. 
It is in reality, a cause, and the defendant ought to 
have the same rights as in a civil action'. In R v 
Stephens (18 66) LR 1 QB 7 02 the court relied upon the 
'civil' nature of a prosecution brought for common nui-
sance by obstruction of a public river to hold that 
mens rea need not be proved on the part of the accused. 
Mellor J supported this view with the observation 
'Inasmuch as the object of the indictment Is not 
to punish the defendant, but really to prevent the 
nuisance from being continued, I think that the 
evidence which would support a civil action would 
be sufficient to support an indictment'. 
(223) Op cit (supra n 213) 22. Common nuisances which en-
dangered 'the lives safety or health of the public, or 
which injures the person of any individual' the draft 
code (s 151) designated as an indictable offence. It 
went on to provide (s 152) that any person convicted 
'upon any indictment or information for any common nui-
sance other than those mentioned ... shall not be deemed 
to have committed a criminal offence ....' These 
recommendations never bore any fruit in English law. 
They were however given effect in the criminal code of 
Canada: see R v Toronto Railway Co [1917] AC 630. 
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4. The Recognition of 'Public' Nuisance 
This element of ambivalence in the concept of common 
nuisance was symptomatic of wider duality which underlay the 
(224 ) 
concept. Coke, as we have seen, had suggested that in 
fact nuisances: could be classified into three types: 'private* 
'common' and 'public'. During the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, however, it was conventional to treat the terms 
'common' and 'public', when applied to nuisances, as being 
( o o r *\ 
synonymous. That there was indeed a distinction between 
the 'common' and 'public' nuisances however came to be apparent 
in the nineteenth century when the Courts of Equity began to 
assume a jurisdiction to suppress nuisances which were not 
private nuisances. 
Injunctions against Public Nuisances 
( 0 0 £ V 
The courts of equity, we have seen, had begun to 
issue injunctions at the request of private individuals for 
the suppression of nuisances. In -1752 Lord Hardwicke LC in 
(227 ) 
Barnes v Baker had however refused to award an injunction 
upon the application of a private individual, giving as his 
reason the fact that the nuisance was 'a public nuisance' and 
thus properly redressed by an information brought by the 
(228) 
Attorney-General. In addition there was some reason to 
(224) Above 89. 
(225) Thus Blackstone (cited n 205 above) spoke of nuisances 
which were 'common or public' in contradistinction to 
those which were 'private'. Cf Gile's New Law Diction-
ary (1772) '. sv. Nusance : 'Nusances are publick and 
common, or private : a common nusance is defined to be 
an offence against the publick ... by doing a thing 
which tends to the annoying of all the King's subjects, 
and is common against all ...'; Garrett and Garrett 
Nuisances 1: 'Nuisances are of two kinds (1) Common 
or Public ... and (2) Private ....' 
(226) Above 106-7. 
(227) (1752) 1 Amb 158. 
(228) 'Bills of this sort are founded on being nuisance 
at common law. If a public nuisance, it should be 
an information in the name of the Attorney-General, 
and then it would be for his consideration, whether 
he would file such an information'. 
(continued on the next page) 
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believe that a court of elquity could not in any event enjoin 
a nuisance affecting the public since 'common' nuisances were 
criminal offences and the courts of eiquity traditionally acted 
(229 ) 
civilly only and not criminally. 
However in 17 9 5 the Court of Exchequer, relying oh the 
fact that it had jurisdicition in respect of the fiscal in-
(230 ) 
terests of the Crown, enjoined the purprestures in 
(231) 
Portsmouth Harbour on the ground that they invaded the 
(232 ) 
proprietary interests of the Grown. 
(228) (continued) 
The Attorney-General was the legal representative of the 
Crown and thus the appropriate officer to act in matters 
affecting the interests of the Grown. Insofar as a 
nuisance might be a purpresture it would naturally follow 
that the Attorney-General would act to redress this in-
vasion of the proprietary interests of the Crown. His 
jurisdiction to act in respect of public nuisances could 
also be founded on the fact that the monarch as parens 
patiae was expected to act to protect the rights and 
interests of subjects not otherwise capable of obtaining 
the assistance of the law. This jurisdiction lay with 
the Court of Chancery, presided over, as it was, by the 
Chancellor the keeper of the royal conscience. Here 
again the Attorney-General as the Crown's legal repre-
sentative was the appropriate official to institute pro-
ceedings on behalf of affected citizens. In principle 
the Attorney-General could act mero motu or at the in-
stigation of a number of the public. In the latter case 
the action was known as a relator action, being brought 
'at the relation o f a member of the public. It was 
however not an action by the private individual since 
as in the action brought mero motu, 'the Sovereign as 
parens patriae, sues by the Attorney-General' (per 
Jessell MR in Attorney-General v Cockermouth Local Board 
(1874) LR 18 Eq 172 at 176). See generally de Smith 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action Chap 9. 
(229) See above 153. Cf Mack 'The Revival of Criminal Equity' 
(1903) 16 Harvard LR 389 at 390. 
(230) Attorney-General v Richards (1795) 2 Anstr 603. 
(231) Cf above n 109. 
(232) 'Where the King claims and proves a right to the soil, 
where a purpresture and a nuisance have been committed, 
he may have a decree to abate it': per MacDonald CB at 
616. It can be argued that the Court in fact acted here 
on the ground that the wharves and quays were public 
nuisances. If the action was brought simply on the 
basis that the encroachments were purprestures it would 
have been possible for the court to avoid ordering their 
suppression by considering whether they could not be 
arresten (cf above 24 n 80). Since there was no enquiry 
(continued on the next page) 
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Then in 17 99, in Mayor and Commonalty and Citizens of 
£233) ~~ 
the City of London v Bolt Lord Loughborough LC, sitting 
in Chancery, granted an injunction against ruinous houses, 
though adding that there was 'a much more proper and effec-
tual remedy' namely that the mayor 'upon the presentment of 
the ward_ [leet] that these houses are a public nuisance' 
could obtain an order for the abatement of the nuisance. 
In 1811 in Attorney-General v Cleaver Lord Eldon LC 
evinced considerable reluctance to proceed against a public 
nuisance by injunction. Sir Samuel Romilly argued that 'the 
general jurisdiction [of the court] to restrain a public 
nuisance stands upon very strong authority; the opinion of 
two judges of high character, that this was the common 
I foot: \ 
acknowledged jurisdiciton. v Lord Eldon however rejected 
this contention, observing that the main instances of grants 
of equitable relief were in the Court of Exchequer and then 
in respect of purprestures upon the jus privatum of the Crown. 
Where the purpresture was 'merely a public nuisance to all 
the King's subjects' then, Lord Eldon held, the proper pro-
ceeding was to seek a trial at common law before a jury on the 
( O O C \ 
question of whether there was in fact a nuisance, ~ and on 
this ground he refused to award the injunction. 
(232) (continued) 
of this sort it seems that the encroachments were en-
joined because they affected the public right of navi-
gation in the harbour, in which case they were enjoined 
because they were public nuisances, and not merely be-
cause they were purprestures. Cf Read 'Equity and 
Public Wrongs* (1933) 11 Can BR 73 at 165-6;-
(233) (1799) 5 Ves 129. 
(234) (1811) 18 Ves 211. 
(235) Citing Baines v Baker (supra)(n 226); Mayor of London 
v Bolt (supra). He also argued that 
'The principle upon which this court interferes, is 
the irreperable mischief .... The ground of the 
application is, not that this act is a crime, but 
that it occasions irreperable injury to several 
persons'. 
(23 6) Cf below 233n 16 
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But in 1819 in Attorney-General v Johnson, per-
suaded by the precedents in Exchequer he distinguished 
Attorney-General v Cleaver, and held that an injunction might 
issue in Chancery against a public nuisance which threatened 
(238) 
Irreperable' harm. Thereafter the jurisdiction of Courts 
of Equity to issue injunctions at the suit of the Attorney-
General to restrain or abate public nuisances was undoubted, ' 
as Cottermam LC pointed out in robust terms in Attorney-
General v Forbes(2 H 0 ) (1836): 
'With respect ot the question of jurisdiction, it was 
broadly asserted that an application to prevent a 
nuisance to a public road was never heard of. A little 
research, however, would have found many such instances. 
Many cases might have been produced in which the court 
has interfered to prevent nuisances to public rivers 
and to public harbours; and the Court of Exchequer, 
as well as this court, acting as a court of Equity, has 
a well established jurisdicition ... to prevent nuisances 
to public harbours and public roads; and, in short, 
generally to prevent public nuisances.... The juris-
diction is exercised ... for the purpose of exerting 
a salutary control over all for the protection of the 
public*.(241) 
(237) (1819) 2 Wils^Ch '87 . 
(238) 'The complaint is, therefore, to be considered as of 
not a public nuisance simply; but what, being so in 
its nature, is attended with extreme probability of 
irreperable injiury to the property of the plaintiffs, 
including also danger to their existence; and on such 
a case, clearly established, I do not hesitate to say 
an injunction would be granted'. 
(239) See also Read 'Equity and Public Wrongs5' (1933) 11 Can BR 
73 at 162-3. 
(240) (1836) 2 My & Cr 123 at 133.. 
(241) Cf the contemporaneous view of the American Supreme 
Court in Georgetown v Alexandria Canal Co (183 8) 12 US 
91 at 9 8 (per Barbour J~T~: 
'... it is now settled that a court of equity may 
take jurisdiction in cases of public nuisance by an 
information filed by the Attorney-General. This 
jurisdiction seems to have been acted on with great 
caution and hesitancy ... yet the jurisdiction has 
been finally sustained, upon the principle that 
equity can give more adequate and complete relief than 
can be sustained at law. Whilst, therefore, it is ad-
mitted by all that it is confessedly one of delicacy; 
and accordingly, the instances of its exercise are 
rare, yet it may be exercised in those cases in which 
there is imminent danger of irreparable mischief be-
fore the tardness of the law could reach it'. 
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The scope of the jurisdiction was however not abundantly 
( 242 ) 
c l e a r . In A t to rney -Gene ra l v She f f i e ld Gas Consumers Co 
(1853) there are dicta which suggest that a court of equity 
(243) 
would not enjoin every case of a public nuisance, and 
the accepted rule seemed to be that equity would only enjoin 
public nuisances which affected the public interest in streets 
or other public thoroughfares. Or as Turner LJ observed in 
( 2 4 4 ) 
the Sheffield casev } 
'is not on the ground of any criminal offence com-
mitted or, for the purpose of giving a better remedy 
in the case of a criminal offence, that this court is 
or can be called on to interfere. It is on the ground 
of injury to property that the jurisdiction of this 
court, must rest . ... * (245) -
'Public* Nuisances 
The Courts of Equity, while thus allowing injunctions 
to issue against nuisances affecting the public, insisted 
that only the Attorney-General had locus standi to seek the 
injunction. For this reason the question of the character 
(242) (1853) 3 De G M & G 304. 
(243) Per Lord Cranworth LJ (at 314) 'I dissent from ... 
[the] proposition in point of law, that if it be once 
established that there is a public nuisance there must 
be an injunction to restrain it'. 
(244) (1853) 2 De G M & G 304 at 320. 
(245) See Read op cit (n 23 8) 167//. In the United States of 
America, on the other hand, the injunction came to be 
widely used in respect of nuisances affecting the safety, 
health or morality of the public. See Bagwell 'Criminal 
Jurisdiction of Equity' (1931) 20 Kentucky LJ 161. 
(246) Baines v Baker (1752) (cited supra n 227); Crowder v 
Tinkler (1816) 19 Ves 618 at 621 ('where the subject of 
complaint is a matter of public nuisance, the Attorney 
General alone can sue'); Attorney-General v Forbes 
(183 6) 2 My & Cr 123 at 129. The injunction was however 
allowed to a private individual where the nuisance 
threatened 'particular and special injury': Crowder v 
Tinkler (supra) at 621; Sampson v Smith (1838) 8 Sim 
2 7 2; Spencer v London and Birmingham Ry Co (1836) 
8 Sim 193. 
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of the nuisance in issue was important. Significantly, the 
dourts of elquity in formulating the rules as to locus standi 
to obtain the injunction invariably spoke of 'public' nui-
( 247 ) 
sance (as opposed to 'common' nuisance) and defined this 
type of nuisance in terms which emphasised the number of per-
sons affected by it. 
(248) 
Thus in the seminal case of Baines v Baker (1752) 
Lord Hardwicke LC said that for purposes of the award of in-
junctions 
'the notion of a private nuisance is, where it 
affects only parti cular persons .... It then be-
comes a public nuisance when it affects many persons, 
though it might likewise at the same time be of a 
private nature too....' 
Kindersley V-C in Soltau v De Held (1851) used a similar 
test, stating that in order to 
'constitute a public nuisance, the thing must be such 
as, in its nature or its consequences, is a nuisance -
and injury or a damage, to all persons who come within 
its sphere of operation though it may be so in a greater 
degree to some than it is to others ....'(249) 
(247) See for example Baines v Baker (1752) (cited in the 
text below); Mayor of London v Bolt (cited above 220); 
Attorney-General v Cleaver (1811) 18 Ves 212; Crowder 
v Tinkler (1816) 19 Ves 618; Attorney-General v Johnson 
(1819) (cited n 23 7 above). ' ~~ "" ~~ "~ 
(248) (1752) 1 Amb 158. 
(249) (1852) 2 Sim (NS) 133 at 142. He illustrated the pro-
position thus 
'For example, take the case of the operations of a 
manufactory, in the course of which operations volumes 
of noxious smoke, or of poisonous effluvia, are emitted 
To all persons who are at all within the reach of 
those operations it is more or less objectionable, 
mora or less a nuisance in the popular sense of the 
term. It is true that to those who are nearer to it 
it may be a greater nuisance, a greater inconvenience 
than it is to those who are more remote from it; but, 
still, to all who are at all within the reach of it, 
it is more or less a nuisance or an inconvenience. 
Take another ordinary case, perhaps the most ordinary 
case of public nuisance, the stopping of the king's 
highway; that is a nuisance to all who may have oc-
casion to travel that highway. It may be a much 
greater nuisance to a person who has to travel it 
every day of his life than it is to a person who has 
(continued on the next page) 
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This quantitative concept of a nuisance was in fact 
not particularly novel. It had attained some sort of recog-
nition even in the twelfth century and underlay the 
well-established rule of common law that an action on the 
case could not lie in respect of a nuisance presentable at 
the leet. Blackstone had intimated that it was the 
(249) (continued) 
to travel it only once a year, or once in five years; 
but it is more or less a nuisance to everyone who has 
occasion to use it. If, however, the thing complained 
of is such that it is a great nuisance to those who 
are more immediately within the sphere of its opera-
tions, but is no nuisance or inconvenience whatever, 
or is even advantageous or pleasurable to those who 
are more removed from it, there, I conceive, it does 
not come within the meaning of the term public 
nuisance'. 
He, however, also added the observation (at 144) 
'that it does not follow, because a thing complained 
of is a nuisance to several individuals, that, there-
fore, it is a public nuisance. One may illustrate 
that very simply, by supposing the case.of a man 
building up a wall which has the effect of darkening 
the ancient lights of half-a-dozen different dwelling-
houses. It does not follow that, because half-a-dozen 
persons or a dozen persons are suffering by the 
darkening of their ancient lights by the one act, 
that, therefore, it is a public nuisance which can be 
indicted at the suit of the Crown, or for which the 
Attorney-General can file an information in this 
Court. It is a private nuisance to each of the 
several individuals aggrieved'. 
(250) Cf above 26. 
(251) See above 87-89. The rationale of this rule was that 
nuisances affecting a number of persons should be re-
dressed by way of a single proceeding brought ex officio 
rather than leaving it to each affected individual to 
bring his own action, lest the wrongdoer be exposed to 
an intolerable multiplicity of actions (ibid). The 
Court of the Sherfiff's Tourn and the courts Leet could 
provide the appropriate machinery for ex officio com-
plaints in the form of its jury of presentment. It 
seemed appropriate to refer nuisances affecting a multi-
plicity of persons to these courts since they already 
exercised a jurisdiction over nocumenta of a 'public' 
nature in relation to purprestures upon the (King's) 
highways (cf above 25 ). The establishment of an ex-
ception to the general rule which allowed an action for 
damages in respect of a 'common' nuisance where special 
damages could be shown (see above 145 ) tended to pre-
serve the older notion, mainly through the reiteration 
of the judicial determination not to allow such an ac-
tion except where it would not lead to a multiplicity 
(continued on the next page) 
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point of distinction between 'common' and 'private' nui-
(252) 
sances. The test of the number of persons affected by 
a nuisance was even used at Common Law to determine whether 
/ 9 r q \ 
a nuiance was indictable or not. In R v Lloyd (1804) 
an indictment was preferred by the Society of Clifford's Inn 
'for a nuisance' by the noise created by the accused in 
carrying on his occupation of tin-smith. The evidence was 
that only three attornies were in fact affected by the noise 
and Lord Ellenborough CJ said: 
'That upon this evidence the indictment could not be 
sustained; and that it was, if anything, a private 
nuisance. It was confined to the inhabitants of 
three numbers of Clifford's Inn only ... it was there-
fore not of sufficiently general extent to support an 
indictment ....'(254) 
The effect of this decision has been understood to be that a 
private nuisance which affects a substantial number of persons 
(255) can be denominated as a 'public* nuisance. The point 
(251) (continued) . -; • 
of actions. It is perhaps significant that where the 
exception was in issue, the judges tended to speak of 
'public' rather than 'common' nuisance: see, eg, 
' Hubert v Groves (1794) 1 Esp 148. 
(252) 'Common nuisances are ... indictable only, and not 
actionable, as it would be unreasonable to multiply 
suits by giving every man a separate right of action 
for what damnifies him in common only with the rest of 
his fellow-subjects' (4 Comm 167). Elsewhere (3 Comm 
219) he expresses the point in these terms: '... no 
action lies for a public or common nuisance, but an 
indictment only: because the damage being common to 
all the king's subjects, no one can assign his particu-
lar proportion of it; or if he could, it would be ex-
tremely hard, if every subject in the kingdom were 
allowed to harass the offender with separate actions'. 
(253) (1804) 4 Esp 200. 
(254) Cf R v Davey (1805) 5 Esp 217 where Heath J applied a 
similar principle, in charging a jury in regard to an 
indictment for a nuisance 'ad commune nocumentum of the 
inhabitants' of a town arising from the smoke issuing 
from furnaces maintained by the defendant. On the basis 
of the evidence of the discomfort caused by the smoke, 
Heath J advised the jury that 
'[t]o make this nuisance indictable, it should appear 
to be more extensive, so much so, as to be generally 
dangerous'. 
(255) The decision in Lloyd's case was adverted to in the 
Report of the 1833 Commission (op cit n 213).. The 
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was taken too in the cases dealing with indecent conduct as a 
nuisance. " There Lord Denman CJ laid down the rule 
that to be indictable 
'the nuisance must be public, that is, to the injury 
of offence of several'.(258) 
(255) (continued) 
Commissioners suggested that nuisances 'to the habitation, 
comfort and convenience of society' caused by noxious 
trades should only qualify as a 'common nuisance' where 
it affected the inhabitants of more than three houses, 
observing 
'To what number, at the least, such injury must ex-
tend to constitute a public nuisance, does not appear 
from any decision or authority; it is, however, con-
venient that some limit should be appointed; and 
looking to the above negative authority [R v Lloyd] 
on this point, and the principle which regards a public 
prosecution as a more convenient mode of obtaining a 
redress in respect of an injury to many than can be 
afforded by a multiplicity of actions, we have suggested 
that the indictment should be maintainable when the 
number of dwelling houses exceeds three' (emphasis 
supplied). . 
It will not escape notice that the Commission here has 
adopted the nomenclature of 'public' (as opposed to 
'common') nuisance and appears to be suggesting that a 
private nuisance becomes 'public' when it affects a num-
ber of individuals. See also R v Webb (1848) 1 Den 338 
where Cresswell J, alluding to the decision in R v Lloyd 
said that it 
'seems to intimate that, if the nuisance there charged 
had been proved to have been more extensive, it would 
have been indictable, even though it had not amounted 
to a general public nuisance in the ordinary sense of 
the expression'. 
Here again there is the suggestion that a private nuisance 
affecting many individuals would necessarily be regarded 
as some sort of public nuisance even though it could not 
be said to be a common ('general public') nuisance. 
(256) Above 172-4. _ _ . 
(257) R v Watson (1847) 10 LT (OS) 204. Cf n 65 above. 
(258) Cf the comments of Denison (1 Den 345-8) upon this 
proposition: 
I. This case decides that an indecent exposure which 
consists in a single transitory act (i.e. a temporary 
personal exposure as distinguished from the exhibition 
of an indecent picture, &c.) in the actual sight and 
view of only a single person, though in a place of public 
resort, no others being able to see it at that time, is 
(continued on the next page) 
227. 
C H A P T E R F I V E 
THE FLOWERING OF 'PRIVATE' NUISANCE (1800-1900) 
A. THE BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
In a previous chapter we have seen how it was that by 
the end of the seventeenth century the concept of nuisance 
(258) (continued) 
of too limited and transient a nature to amount to a 
common nuisance at common law, and is therefore not 
indictable .... But the ... cases do not seem to de-
cide that a continuous personal exposure In the actual 
sight and view of several persons singly in succession 
does not amount to a common nuisance; nor that such an 
exposure in the sight and view of several persons singly 
in succession, even had only one of them actually- seen 
it, would not be indictable. Such a doctrine was not 
necessary for the decision of either case, and seems not 
maintainable on principle or authority. 
1. It seems difficult to see any reasonable distinc-
tion between a single transitory act in the sight and 
view of divers at one time, which is a nuisance even 
though actually seen only by one person; and a continu-
ous act in the sight and view of all those same persons 
singly In succession. The publicity is the same; the 
mischief is the same; the animus of the offender perhaps 
worse. And if each of those persons in succession actu-
ally see it, the publicity and mischief are in effect far 
greater. The only assignable distinction between the two 
cases seems accidental and immaterial, viz.: that those 
members of the public were not all shocked, or ran the 
risk of being shocked at one and the same time. But it 
can be held that public decency will be protected whole-
sale but not in retail. 
2. This view seems borne out by the analogy of other 
cases of nuisance. An act whereby a public highway, or 
a navigable stream is injured or obstructed is indictable, 
though it only happens to affect one person at one time, 
or even though no person is proved to have been actually 
affected by it. The law does not permit the public con-
venience or safety to be injured or even put in peril in 
detail, so too with regard to the public health; the law 
extends to It a measure of protection similar in kind 
though perhaps not equal in degree. A baker or a butcher 
would clearly be indictable for a nuisance at common law, 
for selling unwholesome provisions to divers persons in 
succession. So a person with a contagious disorder, 
would scarcely be permitted with impunity to place him-
self for a length of time in a thoroughfare, so as to be 
(continued on the next page) 
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had been considerably elaborated and expounded under the 
(1) 
regieme of the Action on the Case. In particular it 
(285) (continued) 
only able to touch each single passer by in succession; 
and yet the same man be held indictable if at noon he 
stood ten minutes at Charing Cross, though only proved 
to have actually touched one passer by. If then the 
public convenience, safety, and health are not with im-
punity to be injured in detail, why are the public 
morals and decency? 
3. The only sound principle on which the exhibition 
of an indecent print, &c. in the sight and view of one 
person only in a public place is indictable as a common 
nuisance, seems to be that it has a continuous character, 
and may therefore outrage or corrupt divers persons in 
succession. A continuous personal exposure seems to be 
precisely the same in principle 
7. With regard to the point decided in the principal 
case, it seems that the law does not consider public 
decency to be represented by one person in a public 
thoroughfare. The presence of one person only is' not 
deemed the presence of the public: and the possible 
presence of others is too remote a possibility for 
the law to recognise. But if others be actually presient 
even though they do not see the offence committed, the 
law recognises the risk of their seeing it as suffi-
ciently proximate to be dealt with as a reality. But 
in the matter of public convenience or safety the law 
treats as a reality that degree of possibility which 
in the case of decency it regards as too remote. Hence 
an obstruction to a public thoroughfare is deemed a 
common nuisance, though no one has actually been affec-
ted by it. The law in this instance regarding the 
possibility of the presence of divers as a sufficiently 
proximate possibility to be treated as a reality. It 
seems therefore that the law, in behalf of public safety 
or convenience creates a constructive public, but does 
not do so in behalf of public decency. 
(1) Chapter Three above. 
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appeared how there emerged out of the medieval idea of nui-
sance as an interference with possession of real property 
the more refined idea of a nuisance as an interference with 
• • • . . (2 ) 
the amenities of domestic habitation. So also we saw the 
beginnings of the concept that a nuisance was a violation of 
the precept sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, a concept 
which in turn gave rise to the idea that nuisance was an 
(3 ) 
interference with a 'natural' right of property. 
Remarkably enough these principles of common law were 
not much developed in the ensuring century and a half. They 
received some recognition and elucidation in Sir William 
Blackstone's pioneering Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(4) 
first published m the mid-eighteenth century, " and the 
(2) Above 114//. 
(3) Above 13 6//. 
(4) Blackstone (3 Comm Chap 13) in fact provided the first 
systematic account of private nuisance since Bracton's . 
tentative efforts in the thirteenth century. He classi-
fied nuisances as a 'species of real injuries to a man's 
lands and tenements' (op cit 216), defining 'nuisance, 
nocumentum, annoyance' as 'anything that worketh hurt, 
inconvenience or damage' (op cit ibid). Blackstone 
differentiated 'public or common nuisances from 'private 
nuisances', identifying the latter as 'anything done to 
the hurt ; or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or 
hereditaments of another' (op cit ibid). A nuisance, 
he pointed out might be committed against both corporeal 
and incorporeal 'hereditaments' (thus tacitly distin-
guising nuisances to 'natural rights' of property and 
nuisances to easements). In discussing nuisances to 
corporeal hereditaments Blackstone (op cit 217) treated 
especially of nuisances affecting 'a man's dwelling' 
writing that these comprehended the 'overhanging' of a 
man's house, the stopping of its 'ancient lights' and 
rendering 'the air unwholesome ... as it tends to deprive 
him of the use and benefit of his house'. A like injury 
was the carrying on of noxious trades 'for though these 
are lawful and necessary ... yet they should be exercised 
in remote places; for the rule is "sic utere tuo, ut 
alienum non laedas"'. Inter'ferences with light and air, 
he adds, 'are two indispensable requisites to every 
dwelling. Prospect however is 'nothing really convenient 
or necessary' and thus its obstruction 'is no injury ... 
and ... therefore not an actionable nuisance'. 
That which 'lends to the damage of another's property' 
(as the destruction of corn, grass or cattle) is like-
wise a nuisance. Likewise the stopping, diversion or 
pollution of a water-course (which Blackstone classifies 
as a corporeal hereditament) may constitute a nuisance 
(op cit 218). 
(continued on the next page) 
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process of differentiation of easements from the 'natural' 
rights of property was given impetus by the publication, in 
18 39, of Charles Gales's Treatise on the Law of Easements. 
(4) (continued) 
Blackstone concluded his discussion of nuisances to 
corporeal hereditaments with the observation 
'So closely does the law of England enforce that 
excellent rule of gospel-morality, of "doing to 
others, as we would they should do unto ourselves."' 
The discussion of nuisances to incorporeal hereditaments 
is more basic, being little more than a recitation of 
the principle that the obstruction of a way constitutes 
a nuisance*, a restatement of the medieval law concerning 
interferences with the franchises of markets, fairs 
and ferrys (op cit 218-9). The chapter concludes with 
a statement of the remedies for nuisances which Black-
stone lists as self-help and an action on the case for 
damages (noting that the remedies by way of the Assize 
of Nuisance and the Writ Quod Permittat prosternere 
'have long been out of use' (op cit 220-222) . 
(5) Simpson Land Law 244-5 notes that 'until his book was 
written no attempt had been made to knit together a body 
of principle since Bracton .... Largely as a result of 
Gale's book the courts built up a body of law which owes 
a great deal to the Civil Law .... Thus the nature of 
an easement, and the salient differnces between ease-
ments and other rights of a similar character, were 
settled in a series of cases'. 
Gale distinguished what he called 'the ordinary rights 
of property, which are determined by the boundaries of 
a man's soil' from 'certain rights accessorial to those 
general rights'. The latter were easements: 'rights of 
way, and rights to the passage of light and air and 
water' (op cit 1). The 'ordinary' or 'natural' rights 
of property were: 'the right to receive a flow of water 
in a natural stream' , (the right to interfere with the 
accustomed flow was however an easement) (op cit 130); 
the right to pure air (or, as Gale put it (op cit 19 8) 
the 'right ... to prevent his neighbour transmitting 
... air ... in impure condition; this ... is one of the 
ordinary incidents of property, requiring no easement to 
support it, and can be countervailed only by the acqui-
sition of an easement for that purpose by the party 
causing the nuisance'); the right to lateral support of 
land ('... an ordinary right of property, not ... an. 
easement, as being necessarily and naturally attached 
to the soil' (op cit 216). Gale also drew attention 
(op cit 3 92) to the important fact that 
'Ct]here is a clear distinction as to the foundation 
of the right of action for a private nuisance, properly 
so called, and an action for the disturbance of an 
easement. No proof of any right, in addition to the 
ordinary right of property, is required in the case of 
the former: to maintain an action for a disturbance 
(continued on the next page) 
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For the rest the law, and particularly the case law, is 
almost entirely devoid of any significant elucidations of 
the concept of private nuisance. 
However there were developments in another quarter 
which were to be of great import for the concept. About the 
middle of the eighteenth century the clourts of Equity came 
to be increasingly engaged in the business of suppressing 
nuisances through the instrument of the injunction. 
2. Redress of Nuisances by Injunction 
2.1. Introduction 
We have seen that in the late sixteenth century the 
Court of Chancery had asserted the power to suppress nuisances 
• • • (7 ) 
by way of an injunction. Resort to this remedy was by no 
( 8 ) 
means common even in Blackstone's time. ' However towards 
(5) (continued) , ; 
of an easement ... proof of the accessorial right 
must be given, but it is otherwise where an action 
is brought for corrupting the air, or establishing 
an offensive trade'. 
(6) Gale in his treatise identified nuisance in these terms 
(op cit 275): 
'The term nuisance is applied, in the English law, 
indiscriminately, both to disturbances of an ease-
ment already acquired, and infringements upon the 
natural rights of property, for which an action can 
be sustained. Strictly speaking, however, the term 
nuisance should be confined to the latter class of 
injuries only - those acts which, though originally 
tortious, as infringing the common law rights of 
property, may nevertheless, in the process of time, 
confer a prescriptive title by enjoyment'. 
Elsewhere (at 292-3) he observed that it was 'by no 
means easy to define in general terms what precise amount 
of infringement of the general rights of property is 
requisite to confer an action .... [I]t appears to be 
in every instance a question of fact whether such a de-
gree of annoyance exists as can be said to amount to a 
nuisance'. 
(7) Above 106-7. 
(8) In his account of private nuisance and the remedies 
therefor Blackstone (3 Comm 220-222) does not even men-
tion the injunction as a remedy for nuisance. 
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the end of the eighteenth century there is an increasing inci-
dence of applications to the Court of Chancery for the award 
(9 ) 
of an injunction against some alleged nuisance. 
Initially the injunctions were sought to prevent or re-
dress interferences with easements of light, though there 
are also cases where relief was sought against obstructions 
(11) (12 ) 
of prospect and the discomfort caused by brick-burning, 
(13 ) 
and a small-pox hospital. 
By the early decades of the nineteenth century the juris-
diction to restrain nuisances, while regarded as a novelty 
and approached with caution, was a recognised aspect of the 
jurisdiction of the courts of equity. 
(9) The reason probably being a gradual realisation of the 
inadequacies of the common law remedies as a means of 
obtaining abatement of a nuisance. Under the regime.'; 
of the -action on the Case the only effective method of 
abating a nuisance was self-help (cf above 101 and 
Blackstone's comment there cited (n 45)). Generally on 
the beginnings of the practice of enjoining private 
nuisances see Lewis 'Injunctions aginst Nuisances' (1908) 
5 6 U of Perm LR 289; Walsh 'Equitable Relief against 
Nuisance' (1929) 7 New York University L QR 352 at 256//. 
(10) East India Co v Vincent (17 40) 2 Atk 84; Ryder v Bentham 
(1750) 1 Ves Snr 543; Fishmongers Co v East India Co 
(1752) Dick 164; Wynstanley v Lee TT818) 2 Swans 333. 
(11) Attorney-General, ex rel Gray's Inn Socy v Doughty (1752) 
2 Ves Snr 454. 
(12) Grafton v Hilliard (1736) Amb 160 n (1). 
(13) Baines v Baker (1752) Amb 159. See also Coulson v White 
(1743) 3 Atk 21 where it is said that where a 'trespass' 
continues 'so long as a nuisance' the Court of Chancery 
'will interfere and grant an injunction to restrain the 
person from committing it'. 
(14) Lord Eldon in 1811 in Attorney-General v Cleaver, 18 Ves 
212 at 217, noted that " " 
'The instances of intreposition of this court upon 
the subject of nuisance ... [were] very confined and 
rare ...', 
while even as late as 1835 Lord Brougham would comment 
(Ripon v Hobart 3 My & K 169 at 180) 
'it is always to be borne in mind that-the jurisdic-
tion of this court over nuisance by injunction at all 
is of recent growth, has not till very lately been 
much exercised, and has at various times found great 
reluctance on the learned judges to use it ....' 
(continued on the next page) 
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The Court, of Chancery in asserting a power to enjoin 
nuisances, never developed anything in the nature of an 
(15) 
'equitable nuisance % and acted only xn respect of those 
conditions or activities which were designated as nuisances 
(16) 
by the Common Law. 
In the result the courts of equity seldom if ever attemp-
ted or proffered any definition of private nuisance nor did 
(14) (continued) 
It was in fact during Lord Eldon's tenure of office 
(1801-1806, 1807-1827) that the practice of issuing 
injunctions was developed. 'Before his time there are 
not more than half a dozen instances of each species 
of injunction, and in these relief was as often denied 
as granted. Now the injunction is, it is well known, 
the right arm of the Court .... Almost all the principles 
upon which this relief is granted or refused ... are to 
be found in Lord Eldon's judgments alone'. Turner LJ in 
Jenner v Morris (1861) 3 De G F & J 45 at 56. Cf , 
Holdsworth 13 HEL 63 3. 
(15) As Kindersley VC pointed out in Soltau v De Held (1851) 
2 Sim (NIS) 133. at 151: "' ' ' ~ 
'... Equity will only interfere, in case of nuisance, 
where the thing complained of is a nuisance at law; 
there is no such thing as an equitable nuisance'. 
(16) Largely as the result of a rule, adopted quite early on 
(see Anon (Baines v Baker) (1752) 3 Atk 750) that in 
order to obtain an injunction a plaintiff had to estab-
lish the existence of the nuisance complained of by an 
action at law. This rule was largely derived from the 
fact that the earliest cases involved nuisances to the 
easement of ancient lights and the chancery judges in-
sisted that an applicant establish his title to the ease-
ment before they would act to enjoin any structure ob-
scuring the lights (see Lewis op cit (n 8 above). Cf 
Walsh op cit (n 8 above) at 3 57). The rule itself was 
approved by Lord Eldon (Attorney-General v Cleaver (1811) 
18 Ves 218 at 220; cf Elmhirst v Spencer (1849) 2 Mac & 
G 4 5 at 50) but was later qualified (see Rip on v Hobart 
(1834) 2 My & K 169 at 180-1). In 1857 Lord Cranworth 
stated (Broadbent v Imperial Gas Co 7 De G M & G 436 at 
466) the rule thus: 
• 'The ordinary rule is, not to issue an injunction to 
restrain a nuisance until the existence of the nuisance 
has been established by a trial at law.... [But] I 
cannot state it as a proposition of law, that this 
Court never will or can interfere to restrain a nui-
sance until it Is established by law to be a nuisance; 
there may be cases in which it is so clear that this 
court does not want the assistance of a court of laitf'. 
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they make substantive decisions as to what could be said to 
(17) 
be a nuisance. Nevertheless the rise of equity jurisdic-
tion to enjoin nuisances was to have a profound effect upon 
the concept of nuisance. The courts of equity, for reasons 
(18) 
to be explained, declined to grant injunctions upon mere 
proof of the existence of a nuisance. Accordingly they evolved 
a set of rules defining the circumstances in which injunction 
would issue. 
What is remarkable, and significant, about these rules 
is that they constitute the first substantive attempt by 
(19) 
English judges to define the precise nature of the inter-
ference with the proprietary rights of another which would 
render the interference redemediable as a nuisance. Admittedly 
the rules did not purport to indicate what made a nuisance 
(20) (21) 
actionable at common law but, as we shall see, when 
the common law judges came to consider this question they 
largely adopted the doctrines of equity as the basis for their 
exposition. (17) But cf Baines v Baker (1752) Amb 158 (also reported sub 
nom Anon 3 Atk 7 50) where Lord Hardwicke LC refused to 
hold a small-pox hospital to be a nuisance since 'the 
fears of mankind ... will not create a nuisance1. 
(18) Below 236,240 
(19) The Common Law judges had not been compelled to under-
take this task since the question whether an alleged 
nuisance was actionable tended to be approached as a 
question of fact to be decided by a jury (see above 
42-3, 186 n 110 and Gale, cited n 5 above). 
(20) The Courts of Equity of course at the beginning were 
only concerned with the question whether or not to en-
join that which had already been found to be an action-
able nuisance (cf n 16 above). It was only after 1854 
(see n 55 below) that they were empowered to make the 
substantive decision whether a given state of affairs 
could be characterized as a nuisance in law. 
(21) Below 2 4 3 
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2.2. The Rules for the award of an Injunction 
against Nuisances 
The jurisdiction to issue injunctions had its origin in 
the fact that there existed no common law remedy to redress a 
particular wrong or that such remedies as existed were either 
(22 ) 
imperfect or inadequate. In relation to nuisances these 
principles translated into a doctrine that equity would enjoin 
a nuisance in order to prevent irreperable mischief or to put 
. . . (23 ) 
an end to an injury which was continuous. In other words, 
(24) 
as Story puts it, it was not 'every case, which will 
furnish a right of action against a party for a nuisance, 
which will justify the interposition of courts of equity to 
redress the injury or remove the annoyance. But there must 
be such an injury, as from its nature is not susceptible of 
being adequately compensated by damages at law, or such as, 
from its continuance or permanent mischief, must occasion a 
constantly recurring grievance, which cannot be otherwise 
prevented but by an injunction'. (22) Story 2 Equity Jurisprudence 61. 
(23) Cf Page Wood LJ in A-G v Cambridge Consumers Gas Co 
(1868) 4 Ch App 71 at 80: 
'Where the court intervenes by way of injunction to 
prevent an injury in respect of which there is a 
legal remedy, it does so upon two grounds, which are 
of a totally distinct character : one is that the 
jury is irreperable, as in the case of cutting down 
trees; the other, that the injury is continuous, as 
so continuous that the court ... restrains the re-
peated acts which could only result in incessant 
actions , the continuous character of the wrong making 
it grievous and intolerable.' 
For cases concerning the award of the injunction on the 
ground of a continuing nuisance, see Couison v White 
(1743) 3 Atk 22; Hopkins v Caddick (1851) 18 LT (OS) 
23 6; Attorney-General v Birmingham Borough' Council 
(1858) 4 K & J 528; Clowes v Staffordshire Potteries 
Waterworks Co (1872) LR 8 Ch App 125. For the award, 
of the injunction on the ground of irreperable injury 
see below 236. 
(24) Op cit 105. 
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From the beginning the courts of equity approached the 
remedy by way of injunction with much care. Some 'caution 
(25 ) 
is necessary', Lord Eldon pointed out in 1811 'before 
the Court should interpose to suspend, which might destroy 
concerns ... that cannot be established without immense ex-
penditure'. In Crowder v Tinkler he repeated 'that great 
caution is required in granting an injunction ... where the 
effect will be to stop a large concern in a lucrative trade'. 
(27 ) 
Lord Brougham in Ripon v Hobart (1834) expressed a similar 
concern thus: 
'... the soundness of that discretion seems undeniable 
which would be very slow to interfere where the thing 
to be stopped, while it is highly beneficial to one 
party, may very possibly be prejudicial to none. The 
great fitness of pausing much before we interrupt men 
in those modes of enjoying or improving their property 
which are prima facie harmless, or even praiseworthy, 
is equally manifest....1 
This attitude that led the courts of equity to state 
with particular precision the scope of the concept of 'irreper-
able harm' as a ground for the award of an injunction and to 
develop a doctrine of the 'balancing of conveniences'. 
Irreperable harm 
In the context of nuisance cases, the principle that 
nuisances would be enjoined only where they caused irreperable 
injury seems to have been first laid down by Lord Hardwicke in 
(28) 
1752 in Fishmongers Co v East India Co * where he refused to 
enjoin the erection of a wall which would obscure ancient 
lights saying 
'As to the necessity of this case there is no ground 
for an injunction there being no mischief likely to 
ensue...' 
Attorney-General v Cleaver (1811) 18 Ves 211 at 217. 
(1816)19 Ves 617 at 622. 
(1834) 3 My P £ 169 at 180. 
(1752) 1 Dick 163. 
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Some years later in the cognate circumstance of ploughing up 
of meadows the courts speaks of 'irremediable injury' as the 
. - (29) 
ground of interposition of courts of equity. In Attorney-
General v Nichol (1809), an action for injunction against 
disturbance of ancient lights, Sir Samuel Romilly arguendo 
used the phrase 'irreperable injury'. Lord Eldon in this 
(31) 
case observed that the foundation of the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Equity 
'is that head of mischief alluded to by Lord Hardwicke 
[in the Fishmonger's case] that sort of material injury 
to the comfort of the existence of those who dwell in 
the neighbouring house ....' 
( 32 ) 
Wynstanley v Lee (1818) was also a case of ancient lights. 
Plumer MR observed that a court of equity would intervene if 
it saw that 
'the injury might be irreperable, as where the loss of 
health, the loss of trade, destruction of the means of 
existence, might ensue from erecting a building ....'(33 
'Irreperable' harm is of course a relative concept and the 
courts of equity were thus obliged, by adopting this standard, 
to engage in processes of comparative evaluation of the 
injuriae suffered by plaintiffs. 
(34) 
Thus as early as 1818 Plumer MR in Wynstanley v Lee 
is reported as observing that in certain circumstances 
'a court of equity will not interpose by injunction; 
the nature or degree of injury not being such as to 
require that extraordinary relief....' 
(29) Johnson v Goldswaine (1796) 3 Anst 749. 
(30) (1809) 16 Ves 338 at 340. 
(31) At 340. 
(32) (1818) 2 Swans 333. 
(33) At 335-6. 
(34) (Supra) at 336. 
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he same theme was expounded by Kindersley VC in Wood v Sut-
(35 ) 
cliffe (1851) when he observed 
1... Whenever a Court of Equity is asked for an 
injunction in cases of such a nature as this 
[i.e. pollution of waters], it must have regard not 
only to the dry strict rights of the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, but also to the surrounding circumstances, 
to the rights or interests of other persons which may 
be more or less involved....' 
'The question ... which we have to consider' Turner LJ said 
( 3 fi ) 
in Attorney-General v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (1853) 
'appears to me* 
'to be whether this is a case in which the remedy at 
law is to inadequate that the Court ought to interfere, 
having regard to the legal remedy, the rights and in-
terests of the parties, and the consequences of this 
Court's interference. 
(37 ) 
The Chancellor, Lord Cranworth, formulated the task 
of the court in similar terms 
'It appears to me that ... it is a question of degree 
whether this court will interfere or not. , If that be 
the right view ... then the question is, whether or not 
such a probability of substantial injury to the rights 
of the public passing along the streets ... has been 
made out as to make it a reasonable exercise of the 
jurisdiction of this court to interfere by granting an 
injunction.' 
In applying this principle to the facts of the case, Lord 
Cranworth provided an excellent illustration of the dialeti-
cal process which the court applied: 
'Is the evil of such a nature as to justify the court 
in interfering?.... One must look at the quantum of 
evil at each particular place and at each particular 
moment of time, to determine whether this injunction 
ought to be granted.... [C]ases of nuisance or no 
nuisance arising from particular acts must, from the 
nature of things, be governed by particular circum-
stances.... Each case must be governed by its par-
ticular circumstances. The particular place or object 
in view must be regarded. I take it that all these 
questions are of this nature, "are you using that 
which is the subject matter of inquiry in a reasonable 
way and according to the uses for which it was in-
tended?"' ̂ 38) 
(1851) 2 Sim (NS) 163 at 165. 
(1853) 3 De G M & G 304 at 321. 







Particular circumstances of individual cases also tended 
to oblige the courts to develop specific tests for comparative 
evaluation of the type of injury complained of.' A seminal 
(3 9) 
example occurs in Walter v Selfe (18 51) where Knight Bruce 
VC found it necessary to formulate some principle by which the 
courts could fix the degree of inconvenience to physical com-
fort and well-being which would justify the award of an in-
junction: 
1... ought this inconvenience be considered in fact as 
more than fanciful, more than one of mere delicacy or 
fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially inter-
fering with ordinary comfort physically of human exis-
tence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes 
and habits of living, but according to plain and sober 
and simple notions among the English people.' 
Considerations such as these tended to spawn further 
rules. At a relatively early stage the equity judges found it 
necessary to adopt some specific yardstick as to the measure 
of harm that would determine whether an injury was irreperable. 
Lord Eldon in Attorney-General v Ni'choH. (180 9) had spoken 
of jurisdiction founded on 'material injury'. In Wood v 
(41) 
Sutcliffe (1851) Kindersley VC had observed that an injunc-
tion would not issue 'if the right be infringed ever so 
minutely' and in Walter v Selfe ^ 2 ) (1851)' Knight Bruce VC had 
issued the injunction because he found that the effect of the 
nuisance was to 'abridge and diminish seriously and materially' 
the comfort of the plaintiff or, as he also put it, 'to cause 
substantial inconvenience and material discomfort'. The case 
(43 ) 
of the Attorney-General v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (1853) 
introduced a more precisely formulated criterion. The case 
arose from the activities of the defendant company in tearing 
up streets and roads for purposes of laying gas mains. The 
injunction sought to restrain this nuisance was refused, the 
court holding in effect that the injury involved was so slight 
as not to justify the award of an injunction. Then in Swaine 
(44) 
v The Great Northern Railway Co (1864) an injunction was 
(39) (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315 at 322. 
(40) (1809) 16 Ves 338 at 342. 
(41) (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 163 at 166. 
(42) Supra (n 38) at 323. 
(43) Supra (n 35). 
(44) (1864) 4 De G J & Sm 211. 
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sought to restrain the defendants from dumping at irregular 
intervals and for comparatively short periods of time, loads 
of manure whose stench interfered with the plaintiff's com-
fort. Turner LJ refused the application for reasons which he 
found in the Sheffield case: 
'... adhering to the opinion expressed by both Lord 
Cranworth and myself in the case of The Attorney-
General v The Sheffield Gas Company, that it is not 
in every case of nuisance that the court will inter-
fere by injunction; and holding that occurrences of 
nuisances, if temporary and occasional only, are not 
grounds for the interference of this court by injunc-
tion except in extreme cases, there is not in my judge-
ment here a sufficient case for such interference.'(^5) 
In Goldsmith v Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners 
(1866) Turner LJ formulated the rule in the Sheffield case in 
these terms 
'This brings us to the question whether the nature and 
extent of the nuisance in this case is such that this 
court ought to interfere by injunction to prevent it 
I adhere to the opinion which was expressed by me and 
the Lord Chancellor in the Attorney-General v The 
Sheffield Gas Consumers Company, that it is not in 
every case of nuisance that this court will interfere. 
I think it ought not to do so in cases in which the 
-injury is merely temporary and trifling, but I think 
it ought to do so in cases in which the injuẑ y is per-
manent and serious; and, in determining whether the 
injury is serious or not, I think regard must be had 
to all the consequences which may flow from it'. 
The doctrine of balancing of interests 
An injunction has', the effect of permanently abating a 
nuisance. To this extent the award of an injunction can sig-
nificantly affect the right of a landowner to use and enjoy 
his property. The Chancery judges at a relatively early 
stage displayed an acute awareness of this consequence. Thus 
(147) 
in Wynstanley v Lee (1818) Plumer MR refused to enjoin a 
building as a nuisance to ancient lights, remarking that 
'The injury of postponing a building which the party 
is entitled to erect, may not, in every instance, be 
equal to the injury of permitting him to proceed with 
one which is a nuisance.' 
(45) At 215-6. Emphasis supplied. 
(46) (1866) LR 1 Ch App 349 at 354. 
(47) (1818) 2 Swans 333 at 335. 
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So too, in Wood v Sutcliffe (1851) the Vice-Chancellor 
refused to enjoin the pollution of a stream because, inter 
alia, he found' that 
'to some considerable extent, the pollution of this 
stream is inevitable. Not all the Courts of law and 
Equity in the kingdom can prevent it.... Therefore, 
if this injunction were granted, it would not have 
the effect of restoring [the purity of the water] .... 
On the other hand, to grant the injunction would have 
the effect of seriously injuring, if not ruining the 
Defendants. Weighing, then, the injury that may ac-
crue to the one party or the other by granting or 
refusing the injunction, I think that ... I should be 
bound to refuse it.' 
By the middle of the nineteenth century the idea that 
the courts of equity should balance the interests of parties 
had acquired something of the status of a formal principle of 
equity jurisprudence, and the courts can be seen to be under-
taking a process of rationalisation of the nature and function 
of the principle. 
The seminal example of this is perhaps the case of the 
Broadbent v The Imperial Gas Company (1856). The plaintiff 
in this case was a market gardener whose gardens adjoined the 
gas works of the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the 
vapours and effluvia from the gas works were destroying the 
plants in his garden and, after establishing the fact of a 
nuisance at law, now sought an injunction. Before the Vice-
(49 ) 
Chancellor it was argued inter alia that the defendants 
would suffer greater loss if the injunction were to issue 
than the plaintiff suffered by the nuisance and that, further, 
the public to whom the defendants supplied gas would be harmed 
if the defendants were enjoined. 
Page-Wood VC in granting the injunction rejected these 
arguments holding (1) where there is no question of rivalry 
in trade, a court of equity is less disposed to balance the 
comparative inconvenience caused to the contending parties by 
granting or withholding the injunction, and to consider more 
(48) (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 163 at 168. 
(49) (1856) 2 Jurist (NS) 1132. 
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the fact that the plaintiff was subject to a nuisance; and 
(2) that the interest of the public could not be brought for-
ward by a wrongdoer merely in order to maintain him in his 
wrong. 
On appeal, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor was 
(51) 
upheld. 'It was argued before me1 Lord Cranworth C said, 
'... that in issuing an injunction (whether inter-
locutorily or ... perpetually) [this court] ... will 
take into account, to some extent at least, the com-
parative injury that would result to the parties 
respectively from issuing or withholding the injunc-
tion. .. . I gave full attention to this argument ... 
with a view to satisfy myself as to the state of 
the law on the subject.... Now, attending to the 
principles laid down in ... [A-G v Sheffield Gas Con-
sumers Co] I cannot come to the conclusion that there 
was anything there decided to warrant this court in 
withholding the relief of an injunction to a person 
seriously and constantly injured by unlawful acts.... 
I think the present is not a case in which this Court 
can go into the question of convenience or incon-
venience, and say that where a party is substantially 
damaged, that he can only be compensated by bringing 
an action toties quoties. That would be a disgraceful 
state of the law, and I quite agree with the Vice . 
Chancellor j in holding that in such a case this Court-
must issue an injunction, whatever may be the conse-
quences with regard to the lighting of the parishes 
and districts which this company supplies with gas.' 
(52 ) 
An appeal to the House of Lords also failed. There Lord 
Kingsdown in particular considered the argument as to 'the 
balance of inconvenience' and found, as a fact, that no real 
inconvenience would result to the defendants by the issue of 
the injunction. 
Broadbent's case established the doctrine of the 'balance 
of inconvenience' as a principle of equity jurisprudence. In 
(53 ) 
186 3 Knight Bruce LJ, in Jacomb v Knight, is seen re-
fusing to enjoin a nuisance to lights 'considering the in-
convenience on either side of granting or refusing the in-
junction' and in Lillywhite v Trimmer(5U^(18 67) Malins VC 
pronounced it 
(50) (1857) 7 De G M & G 436. 
(51) At 461. 
(52) (1859) 7 HL Cas 600. 
(53) (1863) 3 De G J & Sm 533 at 539 
(54) (1867) 36 LJ Ch 525 at 529. 
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'to be the doctrine of this Court that you must, in 
all these matters, have some regard to the balance 
of inconvenience; and if the extent of the incon-
venience sustained by the plaintiff is of a trifling 
nature, such as may be readily compensated in money, 
you cannot and ought not to interfere with the rights 
of others....' 
.'• 2.3. Equity's influence upon the Common Law 
The doctrines evolved by the courts of equity concerning 
the circumstances in which an injunction would issue against 
a nuisance significantly influenced the common law judges 
when, in the second part of the nineteenth century, they came 
to expatiate upon the nature of the private nuisance at com-
mon law. The infiltration of the doctrines of equity was an 
almost imperceptible process more a matter of osmosis than 
(55 ) 
formal recognition. The nature of the process is however 
usefully illustrated by the approach of the common lawyers in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century to the matter of 
nuisance by way of an interference with 'ancient lights'. 
The right to the amenity of natural light, we have seen, 
was recognised in the seventeenth century, when the judges 
characterized it not as a 'natural' right of property but 
(c 
rather as an easement to be acquired by grant or prescription. 
The common lawyers of the nineteenth century having adopted 
(57 ) 
this doctrine were then faced with the question of what 
entitled the holder of this easement to successfully sue for 
an interferenQe\;wi_th..his:.rigbt. 
(55) It is perhaps worth noting that at least one judge -
Robert Monsey Rolfe, from 1839-1850 a baron in Exchequer, 
from 185 0 (under the title Lord Cranworth) a lord justice 
in equity and in 1853-1858 and 1865-1868 Lord Chancellor -
participated in most of the leading cases arising both 
in equity and at common law which influenced the evolution 
of the law of nuisance at this time. There can be little 
doubt that a man so placed would have applied a basic 
dialectic to dealing with cases both in equity and law. 
Cf Pluncknett Concise History 211 who refers to 'the 
gradual introduction into common law courts [in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] of procedures and 
doctrines which were originally the peculiar province of 
Chancery.... This tendency was carried much further by 
the Common Law Procedure Act 1854-....' 
(56) Above 121-2. 
(57) 'The right to the reception of light and air in a lateral 
direction,' Gale wrote in 1839 (Easements 191), 'is an 
easement' . 
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In practice an action on the case brought for an 
interference with lights, in effect, amounted to an action 
to vindicate the proprietary right which was the easement of 
light. "" "' Theoretically all that it was necessary to prove 
was that the right had been infringed in order to entitle the 
(59 ) 
plaintiff to succeed m the action. 
The dourts of elquity at an early stage had enjoined 
structures which obscured ancient lights, the award of 
the injunction of course being governed by the principles 
regulating the award of injunctions. 
In the Fishmongers Co v East Indian Co )(1752) Lord 
Hardwicke LC expressed the opinion that an injunction would 
not issue where the effect of the structure would 'alter' 
the plaintiff's lights, since such alteration was 'not a 
( en \ 
nuisance contrary to law.' In Attorney-General v Nichol 
(18 09) Lord Eldon LC approved this view. The ground upon 
which a court of equity would interfere by injunction was, 
he said, that of 'material injury to the comfort of the exis-
fence' of the dominant owner. ''There is little doubt' he 
,(64) 
continued 
'that this court will not interpose upon every degree 
of darkening ancient lights and windows. There are 
many obvious cases of new buildings, darkening those 
opposite to them, but not in such a degree that an 
injunction could be maintained....' 
(58) Cf Parker v Smith (1832) 5 C & P 438 where Tindal CJ, 
in charging a jury in an action on the case for nuisance 
by obstruction of lights, informed the jury that if it 
considered that the lights were diminished by the struc-
tures complained of 'then you will find for the plaintiff 
with nominal damages; and your verdict will have no other 
effect, than that of a notice to the defendants, that 
they must pull down the building of which the plaintiff 
complains'. 
(59) In other words, as the Common Lawyers expressed it, the 
plaintiff was entitled to succeed without proof of actual 
damage, notwithstanding the fact that actual damage was 
the gist of an action on the case. See Nicholls v Ely 
Beet Sugar Factory [1936] Ch 343 at 349, cf Glanville 
Williams and Hepple Foundations of Tort 55. 
(60) See above 232 
(61) (1752) 1 Dick 163. 
(62) (1809) 16 Ves 338. 
(63) At 342. 
(64) At 343. 
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Now of course all that this meant was that a court of 
equity would not act to enjoin an interference with an ease-
ment of light except where the interference was so substan-
tial or material as to justify the award of an injunction. 
Certainly the dictum in Nichol's case could not be construed 
to mean that an interference with the easement of light was 
only actionable as a nuisance at common law where the inter-
ference was material. Yet it is exactly this rule that was 
propounded by the Courts of Common Law when plaintiffs began 
to bring actions on the case for nuisance by interference with 
ancient lights. 
Back v Stacey (1826) seems to have initiated this 
development. The plaintiff in this case had sought an in-
junction to restrain obstruction of his lights. The Court of 
( R7 ̂  
Chancery granted the injunction ex parte and ordered the 
question whether the plaintiff's lights were in fact inter-
fered with to be tried by a jury. The evidence showed that 
there had been a substantial diminuition of light and the 
plaintiff then moved for a verdict-in his favour arguing that 
'any obstruction of ancient lights [was] ... wrongful and 
illegal.' The Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas 
then instructed the jury that 
'It was not sufficient to constitute an illegal 
obstruction, that the plaintiff had, in fact, less 
light than before.... In order to give a right of 
action, and sustain the issue, there must be a sub-
stantial privation of light, sufficient to render the 
occupation of the house uncomfortable.... [T]he jury 
must distinguish between a partial inconvenience and 
a real injury to the plaintiff in the enjoyment of 
the premises.' 
Then in Parker v Smith (1832) which was an action on the 
case for damages (In effect an action to vindicate the plain-
tiff's right to light by obliging the defendant to demolish 
(65) Cf above 236-7-
(66) (1826) 2 C & P 465 
(67) (1826) 2 Russ 121. 
(68) 2 C & P 465. 
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the obstructing erection ) the test formulated in Back v 
Stacey was adopted. 'It is not every possible, every specu-
lative exclusion of light which is the ground of an action' 
Tindal CJ instructed the jury 
'but that which the law recognises, is such a 
diminuition of light as really makes the premises 
to a sensible degree less fit for the purposes 
of buisness....' 
(71) 
In Wells v Ody (1836), an action on the case for obstruc-
ting lights, Parke B 'entirely adopt[ed]' the view stated in 
Parker v Smith. The question for the jury the baron said 
was thus 
'whether the effect of the defendant's building is 
to diminish the light and air so as sensibly to 
affect the occupation of the plaintiff's premises, 
and make them less fit for occupation'. 
(72 ) 
In the same year Lord Denman CJ in Prmgle v Wernham 
(183 6) held that in an action on the case for darkening lights 
'the merely taking off a ray or two will not be sufficient' 
and that to sustain the action 'there must have been a con-
siderable obstruction of light'. 
In this way the Courts of Common Law not only made the 
holder of an easement of lights right to an action depend 
(73 ) 
upon proof of the fact that he had suffered a 'nuisance' 
but they also incorporated into the concept of a nuisance 
notions developed in the courts of equity as to the nature of 
a nuisance. 
(69) (1832) 5 C & P 438. Cf n 57 above. 
(7 0) At 43 9. 
(71) (1836) 7 C & P 410 at 411-2. 
(72) (1836) 7 C & P 377. 
(73) See Colls v Home and Colonial Stores Ltd [1904] AC 179, 
especially the remark of Lord Davey (at 204) that the 
'test of the right is ... whether the obstruction com-
plained of is a nuisance'. See also the observations 
of Farwell J in Higgins v Betts [1905] LR 2 Ch 210 at 
215: * " ~ " 
'Any substantial interference with ... [a house-
holder's] comfortable use and enjoyment of his house 
according to the usages of ordinary persons in that 
locality, is actionable as a nuisance at common law. 
(continued on the next page) 
247. 
B. THE IMPACT OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
1. Introduction 
The elaboration upon the concept of a nuisance in the 
form of an interference with ancient lights which occurred 
in the early decades of the nineteenth century foreshadowed 
a more fundamental and extensive revision of the common law 
concept of nuisance which was to be undertaken in the latter 
part of the century. This process, which was to profoundly 
transform the idea of nuisance, had as its immediate context 
the right to salubritas aeris and was initiated by the advent. 
of the Industrial Revolution. 
One of the most striking consequences of the transforma-
tion of England into an industrial society was the massive 
amount of atmospheric pollution caused by the invention of 
the steam-engine and the growth and spread of the manufacturing 
industries. Almost every contemporary observer of the English 
landscape in the early nineteenlh century mentions the palls 
of smoke that permanently over-hung the great manufacturing 
(74 
towns, the grimy and blackened houses and the soot-laden air. 
(73) (continued) 
His neighbour's brick burning or fried fish shop 
may be a nuisance in respect of smell ... and in 
a like manner his neighbour's new building may be 
a nuisance in respect of interference with light. 
The difference between the right to light and the 
right to freedom from smell and noise is that the' 
former has to be acquired as an easement ... before 
it can be enforced, the latter two are ab Initio 
incident to the right of property. But the wrong 
done is in both cases the same, namely, the distur-
bance of the owner in his enjoyment of his house.' 
See generally Radcliffe 'The Easement of Light and Air' 
and its Limitations under English Law' (1908)~24 LQR 
120. 
(74) As early as 1724 Daniel Defore noted that in the manu-
facturing town of Sheffield the houses were 'dark and 
black, occasioned by the continued smoke of the forges, 
which are always at work' and that the town of Barnsley 
'looks as black and smoaky as if they were all smiths 
that lived in it'. (A Tour through the Whole Island of 
Great Britain (17 24) Tii) 183). Alexis de Tocqueville, 
the French statesman, visited Manchester In 1835 and 
described how a 'sort of black smoke covers the city. 
The sun seen through it is a disc without rays. Under 
(continued on the next page) 
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Industry also defiled the atmosphere with noxious chemical 
. . (75) 
vapours which harmed and destroyed all living things. 
(74) (continued) 
t'his half daylight 300 000 human beings ... work' 
Journeys to England and Ireland (cited Ward The Age of 
Change 102) Charles Dickens caught the effect of the 
steam engine on the primordial domestic amenities of 
life in a passage in The Old Curiosity Shop (1841). 
'On every side, and as far as the eye could see into 
the heavy distance, tall chinmeys, crowding on each 
other, and presenting that endless repetition of the 
same dull, ugly form, which is the horror of oppres-
sive dreams, poured out their plague of smoke, ob-
scured the light, and made foul the melancholy air.1 
A railway guide of 1844 give a vivid description of the 
industrial landscape: 
'... furnaces, chimney, forges, and iron works, beds 
of burning coal, coal pits with their engines .... 
The whole is constantly enveloped in the gloom of 
one perpetual cloud of smoke, which bedims and dar-
kens the country for miles around. By night the 
country is lit up by fires. On all sides the blazes 
of the furnaces, forges, coal pits, coke beds, and 
lime kilns, are seen terrifically glaring ghrough the 
awful darkness. The rushing and roaring of the blasts 
of the furnaces, the clankings and crashings of the 
steam engines ... the rattling and rumbling of the 
rolling mills ... give the stranger the most fearful 
and awful notions of the place'. 
(Cited J W Dodds The Age of Paradox 221-2). 
(75) The most remarkable example of this occurred in what 
Hoskins (The Making of the English Landscape 222) says 
was 'to be the most appalling town of all,' St Helens. 
There glass manufactories were established in 177 3 and 
in 17 8 0 'a most extensive copper-work' was erected. In 
a short time 'the atmosphere was being poisoned, every 
green thing blighted, and every stream fouled with 
chemical fumes and waste' (ibid). A parliamentary select 
committee on noxious vapurs (House of Lords Select com-
mittee on Noxious Vapours (Brit Pari Pap (1826) 14)) re-
ported that in 1862 there were at least six alkali and 
six copper smelting works in St Helens as well as a 
large number of collieries, glass works and other manu-
factories. 600 000 tons of coal were consumed annually 
in the district. The vapours emenating from the works 
resulted in farms with 'now neither tree nor hedge alive; 
whole fields of corn are destroyed in a single night ... 
orchards and gardens ... have not a fruit tree left 
alive; pastures are so deteriorated that graziers re-
fuse to place stock upon them.' (op cit at iv). The 
chief source of harm was the hydrochloric acid gas pro-
duced by alkali works. As early as 182 7 there were com-
plaints of the 'volumes of sulphurous smoke' which 
(continued on the next page) 
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The common Law concept of nuisance, committed as it was 
to preserving the amenity of salubritas aeris, stood as the 
f n c ) 
sole, frail shield of society against these depradations 
of industry. 
(75) (continued) 
'darken the whole atmosphere' and produce 'a scent 
[which] is almost insufferable'. (Barker & Harris 
St Helens 226). There was regular nuisance litigation 
for the harm caused by these works (op cit 2 3 8-9). The 
gases caused workers' teeth to decay and 'vomiting and 
fainting' were brought on by the inhalation of 'a more 
than usual quantity of gas', (op cit 283). Other 
chemical manufacturing processes produced sulpherethed 
hydrogen so that the air 'was filled with the foul smell 
of rotten eggs' (op cit 353). The Select Committee on 
Noxious Vapours (supra) was appointed as a direct re-
sult of complaints about conditions in the St Helens 
area (see Barker & Harris op cit 349-352). 
(7 6) The Legislature made only half-hearted attempts to deal 
with industrial pollution of the atmosphere. In 1819 
a Parliamentary Select Committee enquired into the use 
of steam engines and furnaces in industry and reported 
that they could be so operated as not to cause smoke 
nuisances (Pari Pap (1819M574) viii 271; (1820)(244) 
ii 235). The result was a statute (1 & 2 Geo 4 c 41) 
to 'facilitate prosecutions of nuisances arising from 
furnaces' which afforded special redress against nui-
sances caused by the improper construction or negligent 
working of the furnaces of certain classes of steam 
engines. A further Parliamentary Select Committee ap-
pointed in 184 3 recommended the introduction of a Bill 
dealing with smoke nuisances from furnaces and steam 
engines. The result was the inclusion in the Railway 
Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c 20) of a 
clause requiring locomotive engines to consume their 
own smoke (Steer The Law of Smoke Nuisances 10). Later 
a similar provision relating to industrial fire-places 
and furnaces was included in the Public Health Act 187 5 
(cf above 2 07')'. 
(77) In 17 9 3 an entrepreneur seeking to introduce a steam 
engine into his works was warned that 'we whose names 
are hereunto subscribed shall, if the same be found a 
nuisance, seek such redress as the law will give' 
(cited Mantoux The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth 
Century 342 n 5). As early as 1812 a successful prose-
cution was directed against a steam engine in 'smoke-
involved' Sheffield, the charge being that it produced 
'divers noisome and unwholesome smokes and smells ... 
so that the air was greatly corrupted and infected' 
(S v Dewsnap (1812) 16 East 194.) In 1832 the locomotive 
steam engines used on the earliest passenger railway 
service were indicted because the 'divers large quanti-
ties of coke, coal, charcoal, wood' they consumed 'cor-
rupted the air and caused noisome smokes etc', escaping 
condemnation only because they were authorized by an 
(continued on the next page) 
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The seventeenth century judges, as we have seen, had 
rigidly asserted the right to salubritas aeris, even as 
against lawful industries which they suppressed or drove in-
to uninhabited places rather than deprive men of their right 
(78) 
to breathe pure air- ' But the ethos of the nineteenth cen-
(79 ) 
tury was different. Industry was a preferred activity 
and its effect upon the atmosphere tended to be regarded as 
(77) (continued) 
Act of Parliament (R v Peaŝ a : (18 32) 4 B & Ad 30. The 
courts leet too acted against the smoke nuisance. The 
court leet of Manchester in 1802 'presented eleven 
owners of factories for not consuming their smoke' 
(Webb Manor & Borough 105 n 3). The Webbs note (op cit 
110) that at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
'the most common of all nuisances punished at this date 
[by the Manchester Leet] was the emitting of large quan-
tities of smoke by the new steam engines'. The Salford 
leet in 182 8 presented 'a manufactory for making sol 
ammoniac next to the King's common highway ... which 
emits great quantities of noisome and noxious fumes and 
vapours to the great nuisance of all the King's sub-
jects...' (op cit 55). In 1833 industrialists were 
presented for discharging the refuse of dye houses' which 
caused an 'intolerable' stench, 'the most intolerable 
nuisance in the neighbourhood', (op cit ibid). In St 
Helens a local land owner regularly sued manufacturers 
for the nuisances caused by the noxious vapours and 
smoke discharged by their factories: in 1840 he ob-
tained £1 000 in damages, in 1846 £1 700 in out of court 
settlements (Barker & Harris St Helens 239). For an 
analysis of the role of nuisance law in combating in-
dustrial pollution during the nineteenth century see 
Brenner 'Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution' 
1 Jo Legal Studies 403. 
(78) Abovel25-6. 
(79) Mumford The City in History 5 22 points out that in the 
industrial towns the 'factory became the nucleus of the 
new urban organism. Every other detail of life was 
subordinate to it'. Likewise manufacturers and workers 
were seen to be crusaders, subduing nature for the bene-
fit of mankind and the progress of civilization: 
Houghton The Victorian Frame of Mind 198. 
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part of the natural order of things and the price of 
(81) 
progress. "" It was inevitable then that some adjustment 
should be made' to the common law right of every landowner to 
enjoy salubritas aeris. The process was initiated in 1858 
( o 9 \ 
by Byles J in charging a jury on the question whether the 
noxious vapours emanating from a brick-kiln could be con-
sidered to be a nuisance. After observing that, in principle, 
if the vapours rendered the plaintiff's home uncomfortable he 
was entitled to the verdict, Byles J went on to add this 
rider: 
'it is not everybody whose enjoyment of life and 
property is rendered uncomfortable by the carrying 
on of noxious or offensive trade in the neighbourhood, 
that can bring an action. If that were so ... the 
neighbourhood of Birmingham and Wolverhampton and the 
other great manufacturing towns of England would be 
full of persons bringing actions for nuisances ... to 
the great injury of the manufacutring and social in-
terests of the community.' 
This dictum initiated a line of cases in which the judges 
in seeking to accommodate the right to pure air (and indeed 
other natural rights of property) to the claims of industrial 
enterprise to use and exploit the natural resources of air, 
water and light came to formulate more explicitly the exact 
circumstances in which it could be said that 'hurt, harm, in-
convenience or damage' constituted a nuisance. 
(80) In the cJity of Bradford 'men either liked their own 
smoke or made fun of it': Briggs Victorian Cities. 
(81) A notion expressed in picturesque language by James LJ 
in Slalvin v Northbrancepeth Coal Co (18 74) LR 9 Ch App 
7 09^TS 
'It would have been wrong, as it seems to me, for this 
court in the reign of Henry VI to have interfered with 
the further use of sea coal in London, because it had 
been ascertained ... that by the reign of Queen 
Victoria both white and red roses would have ceased 
to bloom in the Temple Gardens. If some picturesque 
haven opens its arms to Invite the commerce of the 
world, it is not for this court to forbid the embrace, 
although the fruits of it should be the sights, and 
sounds and smells of a common seaport and shipbuilding 
town, which would drive the Dryads and their masters 
from their ancient solitudes.' 
(82) In Hole v Barlow (1858) 4 CB (NS) 334; 27 LJ C P 207. 
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2. Theories of Property Rights 
2.1. Introduction 
The seventeenth century judges in recognizing 
a landowner's right to the amenity of pure air, con-
ceived of the claim as a species of property right, as 
an incident of the right of landownership existing ex 
jure naturae. v In the nineteenth century consideration 
of the exact nature and extent of this right thus tended 
to take place within the context rights of property in 
land. In order therefore to trace the developments 
that occurred at this time it is necessary to begin 
with an examination of prevailing judicial attitudes 
towards the nature and origin of claims to proprietary 
rights in land and it amenities. 
The Industrial Revolution converted an essentially 
rural and agrarian society into one which was essentially 
urban and industrial. This transformation was reflected 
in the changing role and function of real property. In 
the pre-industrial era the primary significance of land 
lay in its use as a source of most of the material pro-
ducts of society. Its value lay in its fertility and 
men tended to conceive of it in terms of its actual 
physical nature as soil and water. The Industrial 
Revolution changed.much of this. The industrialist 
used the land as a platform for his machines, and valued 
land not so much for its fertility as for it location 
near sources of motive power for driving machinery and 
as a repository of the mineral resources which provided 
that power and the materials for manufacture and pro-
duction, v 
This' pattern of land exploitation meant that the 
industrialist made different claims to the manner in 
which he might use and enjoy the land. He demanded 
the right to dam and control flowing waters to drive 
(83) See above 143 . 
253. 
his mills. He claimed the right to excavate the land 
to the fullest extent in order to win its mineral re-
sources. And he claimed the right to use the ambient 
air and the flowing waters as dumping grounds for the 
wastes and residues of his manufacturing processes. 
This new pattern of land use brought about an 
intensified situation of conflict between neighbours 
to the extent that adjoining landowners (and indeed the 
public at large) were exposed to the injurious conse-
quences of atmospheric and water pollution, the loss 
of the benefits of a stream of water and the subsidence 
and collapse of land. The result of all of this was 
to bring into sharp focus the question of the nature 
of a landowner's proprietary rights both in relation 
to the natural elements of air, water, support and in 
relation to modes of enjoyment of these vis-a-vis other, 
landowners. 
At the advent of the Industrial Revolution the 
prevailing concept of the nature of the right of pro-
perty was that classically expounded by Blackstone in 
characteristically vivid language: the right of pro-
perty, he wrote , was 
'that sole and despotic dominion which a man 
claims and exercises of the external things 
of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe! 
Property as a Natural Right 
Underlying this was the notion of the right of 
property as a natural right of man. As such, the pro-
perty right was conceived to be not only inviolable as 
against government, but also as against other men. None 
might take, use or interfere with a man's use and enjoy-
ment thereof. To this end the property right was 
supported by the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas, a prescription which enable a landowner to 
(84-) Blackstone 2 Comm 2 
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demand that others abstain from using their land in a manner 
which might interfere with his use and enjoyment of his own. 
That this conception of the property right contained 
an inherent contradiction - in that it necessarily circum-
scribed the right of other landowners to use and enjoy 
their land in accordance with their own absolute dominion -
was not fully realised. It was concealed by the assumption 
that 'natural' meant 'agrarian' and by the doctrine of 
strict liability which tended to preclude any consideration 
of the balancing of conflicting interests (under the guise 
of a concept of negligence and the standard of the reason-
., s(86) able man). 
The effect of this concept of the property right was 
thus to inhibit the use of land for industrial purposes. 
It did this by way of an invocation of the concept of 
natural rights of property so that a landowner relying 
upon, say, his 'natural' right to salubritas aeris, might 
suppress his neighbour's smelting, and smoke-producing, 
enterprise. 
The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation 
The Industrial Revolution was however attended by 
the emergence of a doctrine of economic freedom which pro-
claimed the twin tenets of the supreme value of individual 
liberty and the conviction that the individual in pursuing 
(87) 
his own interest is promoting the welfare of all. 
This concept was advanced by Adam Smith in. his" Wealth of 
Nations and gave rise to the doctrine of laissez faire. 
(85) Cf Blackstone 3 Comm 217-8 '... if one erects a smelting 
house for lead so near the land of another, that the 
vapour and smoke kills his corn and grass, and damages 
his cattle ... [or] any other act, in itself lawful, 
which yet being done in that place necessarily tends, 
to the damage of another's property, it is a nuisance: 
for it is incumbent on him to find some other place to 
do that act, where it is less offensive'. 
(86) Cf Fleming Torts 8. 
(87) Cf Toynbee Lectures on the Industrial Revolution 14 8. 
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As such it represented something of a departure from the 
theory of property as an absolute, inviolable natural 
(88) 
right. For the physiocrats property was an individual 
right to be protected, not regulated by the State. The 
implication, translated to the use of the land, was that 
the individual could develop it as he pleased and the 
public welfare would be served by the collective results 
of the individual's freedom of action. 
One manifestation of this theory was the doctrine 
of prior appropriation as a basis of the property right 
in land. The doctrine was to the effect that he who first 
established a pattern of land use - by appropriating flowing 
water, or the ambient air or the natural sunlight - acquired 
a property right which he was entitled to enjoy even to the 
detriment of others claiming interests in the light, air 
(90) or water. 
(88) See F S Philbrick 'Changing Conceptions of Property 
in Law' (193 8) 86 U of Pa LR 691 at 712: 'With Adam 
Smith the principle of economic freedom did not operate 
through the doctrine that property is natural and in-
violable; doubtless because he was too much of a 
realist'. 
(89) J E Cribbett 'Changing Concepts in the Law of Land Use' 
(1965) 50 Iowa LR 245 at 249. 
(90) Blackstone (2 Comm 402-3) had provided the doctrinal 
sources for this theory in his exposition of the 
acquisition of ownership by occupatio. Among the 
things that might be acquired in this manner were, 
he said, 
' ... the benefit of the elements, the light, the 
air, the water, [which] can only be appropriated 
by occupancy. If I have an ancient window over-
looking my neighbours ground, he may not erect a 
blind to obstruct the light: but if I build my 
house close to his wall, which darkens it, I can-
not compel him to demolish his wall; for there the 
first occupancy is rather in him than in me. 
If my neighbour make a tan yard, so as to annoy 
and render less salubrious the air of my house 
or gardens, the law will furnish me with a remedy; 
but if he is first in possession of the air, and 
I fix my habitation near him, the nuisance is of 
my own seeking, and must continue. If a stream 
be unoccupied, I may erect a mill thereon, and de-
tain the water; yet not so as to injure my neigh-
bours prior mill or his meadow: for he hath by 
the first occupancy acquired a property in the 
current'. 
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A doctrine of prior appropriation was particularly 
applicable to the natural elements of light, air and water 
since these were regarded as being, in principle, res 
(91) . . . . 
communes and thus liable to acquisition by persons who 
~ (92) 
had need of them. 
The doctrine itself seemed applicable in English law 
as an extension of the medieval doctrines by which rights 
(93 ) 
in light air and water could be acquired by prescription. 
The medieval doctrine of prescription was to the effect that 
a right or interest if enjoyed for a sufficient length of 
time could be regarded as having ripened into a form of 
proprietary interest which could be relied upon to exclude 
. . - . (94) 
others from interfering with the interest. This con-
ception of prescription did not involve a requirement that 
the right should have been enjoyed adversely to the one 
against whom it operated; it was rather a case of the 
recognition of interests in res communes which had been (91 )SeeS.above 127nl55 Blackstone states the principle thus 
(2 Comm 14): 
1 ... there are some few things, which ... still 
unavoidably remain in common; being such where-
in nothing but a usufructuary property is capable 
of being had: and therefore they still belong to 
the first occupant, during the time he holds 
possession of them, and no longer. Such (among 
others) are the elements of light, air and water; 
which a man may occupy by means of his windows, 
his gardens, his mills, and other conveniences'. 
(92) Cf Blackstone 2 Comm 3 94: 
'Many things may also be the objects of qualified 
property. It may subsist in the very elements, 
of fire or light, of air, and of water. A man 
can have no absolute permanent property in these ... 
[which] admit only of a precarious and qualified 
ownership, which lasts so as they are in actual use 
and enjoyment, but no longer. 
(93) Cf above 139. 
(94) Cf Blackstone (2 Comm 394): 
'If a man disturbs another, and deprives him of 
the lawful enjoyment of these; if one obstructs • 
anothers ancient windows, corrupts the air of his 
house or gardens, fouls his water, or unpens and 
lets it out, or if he diverts an ancient water-
course that used to run to the Mothers mill or 
meadow; the law will animadvert hereon as an injury, 
and protect the party injured in his possession'. 
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enjoyed without hindrance for a sufficiently long period 
(95) 
of time. In this sense then the doctrine of prior 
occupation was merely a variant of the older doctrine of 
prescription, both concepts contemplating the acquisition 
of a right to restrain others from interfering with the 
enjoyment of res communes on the basis of an earlier en-
joyment of light, air or water. On the face of it the 
doctrine of prior occupation was more consistent with the 
needs of a developing economy and consistent with the 
theory of laissez faire. It gave the entrepreneur the 
freedom to develop his land in the manner of his choice, 
conferring upon him title to the profitable exploitation 
of the natural elements. The possibly harmful effects 
to others of the exclusive interests to the resources of 
production so obtained could be overlooked on the ground 
that the prior occupant by so developing his land was pro-
moting the welfare of all. 
2.2. The Theories in practice: Property in Flowing 
Waters 
During the early decades of the nineteenth century 
the English courts were required to determine the nature and 
extent of the proprietary rights of landowners in the natural 
elements whose exploitation had become a pertinent feature 
(95) In this sense the medieval concept of prescription 
differed from the modern. The latter allowed a man 
to acquire an 'easement' of light air or water upon 
proof of an enjoyment of the right for the prescriptive 
period adversely to the interests of the owner of the 
praedium over which the easement existed. This 
concept of prescription only emerged in the later 
nineteenth century primarily as a result of the 
influence of Gale's Treatise on Easements. 
(96) Cf Horwitz 'The Transformation in the Conception of 
Property in American Law, 1780-1860' (1972-3) 40 
U Chi LR 248 at 250: '[The doctrine of prior appro-
piration was] justified by its power to promote 
economic development. In a capital scarce economy, 
its proponents urged, the first entrant takes the greatest 
risks; without the recognition of property in the first 
developer - and a concomitant power to exclude subse-
quent entrants - there cannot exist the legal and 
economic certainty necessary to induce investors 
into high-risk enterprise1. 
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of developing industries. The trend of the decisions 
was that of experimentation with both the doctrines of 
natural rights and prior appropriation. These ex-
periments revealed deficiencies in both of these concepts 
with the result that the courts gradually came to adopt 
a new and relatively novel doctrine of 'reasonableness' 
as a determinant of the incidence of rights to use and 
enjoy water and air. This represented an incorporation 
into the conceptual structure of the law relating to pro-
perty rights a standard of reasonableness(later much deve-
loped in the field of civil liability) and, as such, pro-
vided the key component for the evolution of a new concept 
of nuisance. 
We have seen that in the seventeenth century it had 
been established, under the influence of the cujus est 
solum eujus est usque ad coelum maxim, that the owner of 
land owned the waters upon it, his title being conceived 
as being a natural right so that he could claim the waters 
without having to establish an easement acquired by grant 
• .. (99) or prescription. 
The import of these sketchy principles became of 
matter of considerable importance with the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution. The motive power for machinery 
provided by a fall of flowing water made possible the deve-
lopment of manufactories even before the invention of the 
steam-engine. In this context the chief source of disputes 
concerning title to flowing waters arose when more than one 
riparian owner used the waters for the same purpose. Any 
(97) The most immediately relevant issue was the right to 
exploit flowing waters as a source of motive power 
for industrial enterprise. This was closely followed 
by the issue of the nature of rights in the air (as 
a component of industrial processes) and air-space 
(as a repository for the waste products of industrial 
process. Questions relating to rights to lateral 
. support become pertinent only later. 
(98) The doctrines are inter-related in their consequences 
(see Horwitz op cit (n 93) at 249-51) and the courts, 
not always aware of this, tended to shuffle them 
around in the course of seeking satisfactory solutions. 
(99) Above 138-143 
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diversion or damming of the water by the up-stream proprietor 
tended to deprive the lower proprietors of the head of water 
required to drive their machines. 
The question which thus presented itself was whether 
the upper proprietor could be said to be entitled in law to 
appropriate whatever waters he desired regardless of the effect 
upon his lower neighbours or whether his right to appropriate 
the waters was limited by the claims of other riparian owners. 
That the former was the position tended to be suggested 
by the conception that the owner of land owned the waters upon 
his land. On this basis the riparian owner would be free to 
take whatever waters he required as an exercise of his rights 
of dominion of land. The same conclusion could be reached 
by applying the Blackstonian doctrine of prior occupancy. On 
this approach however the waters were to be regarded as a 
res nullius, title to which was acquired by the act of appro-
priation. In effect the theory meant that the first riparian 
owner to establish a manufactory and appropriate waters acquired 
the right to take as much water as he desired without concern 
for the interests of other, later, claimants to the use of the 
+. • (101) stream. 
The earliest case in which the question of the nature of 
proprietary rights in the flow of water came up for considera-
(102 ) 
tion at common law was Bea'ley v Shaw (1805) which, inter-
estingly enough, reveals the court as relying upon both 
theories to explain the nature of the right. 
Prior to 17 87 the defendants had established a mill upon 
the river Irwell from which they diverted waters by means of 
a weir. In 17 87 the plaintiff had established down-stream 
(100) Cf above 112. 
(101) Cf Lauer 'The Common Law Background of the Riparian 
Doctrine' (1963) 28 Missouri LR 60 at 96-99. 
(102) (1805) 6 East 208. See Robinson v Lord Byron (1785) 
1 Bro Ch 588 where the Court of Chancery enjoined an 
interference with the flow of waters, apparently adopting 
the theory of prior occupation. 
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his own mill using the residual flow of water over the defen-
dant's weir to drive it. In 17 91 the defendants increased 
the size of their weir so diverting a greater quantity of 
water and substantially depriving the plaintiff of the waters 
needed to drive his mills. 
At the trial Graham B instructed the jury that riparian 
owners 'had a right to the flow of the water in its natural 
stream, unless.there existed before a right in others to en-
joy or divert any part of it to their own use.' The jury 
found for the plaintiff holding that the defendants had ac-
quired no right to divert the waters as flowing at the time 
the plaintiff erected his mill. 
In refusing an application for a new trial the Court of 
King's Bench ruled that the direction and verdict were good. 
Lord Ellenborough CJ adopted what was essentially the 
seventeenth century natural right theory as to the nature 
of a landowner's dominion in flowing waters: 
'The general rule of law as applied to this subject is, 
that, independent of any particular enjoyment used to 
be had by another, every man has a right to have the 
advantage of a flow of water in his own land without 
diminution or alteraion. But an adverse right might 
exist on the occupation of another.' (104-) 
The occupation of another could only diminish the owner's right 
if it was perfected by twenty year's enjoyment and this not 
being shown in the present case, the plaintiff was entitled to 
the flow enjoyed by him since 1791. 
brose J( 1 0 5 ) foil owed Lord Ellenhjorough' s approach, 
saying that the plaintiff 
'had a right to all the water flowing over his estate, 
subject only to the easement which the defendants 
might .have had ....' 
(103) None of the seventeenth century cases were in fact cited. 
Indeed the only case raised in argument was Prescott v 
Phillips (17 9 8)(unreported) where the Chief Justice of 
Chester had ruled 'that nothing short of 20 years un-
disturbed possession of water diverted from the natural 
channel ... could give a party an adverse right against 
those whose lands lay lower down the stream, and to 
whom it was injurious.' 
(104) At 214-5. 
(105) At 216. 
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Le Banc J, while agreeing, seemed to have rested 
his decision on a principle of prior appropriation: 
1... the true rule is, that after the erection of the 
works and the appropriation by the owner of the land 
of a certain quantity of the water flowing over it, if 
a proprietor of other land afterwards takes what re-
mains of the water before unappropriated, the first 
mentioned owner, however he might before such second 
appropriation have taken to himself so much more, 
cannot do so afterwards.1 
(107) 
Lawrence J, while not attempting to formulate any rule 
of law to govern the matter, also regarded the matter as 
governed by the question of the priority of occupation: 
'... the objection now made by the defendants to the 
plaintiff's claim is inconsistent with the ground 
upon which they attempt to rest their own case. For 
they contend that they had a right to appropriate as 
much of the water as they pleased from time to time 
to their own use; and yet they deny that same right 
to the plaintiff to appropriate to his own use what 
had not been appropriated before by any person. In 
this the defendants are wrong; for if the occupiers 
of their premises could before have appropriated to 
themselves any part of the water flowing through 
their own lands , by the same rule those through whose 
lands it afterwards flowed might appropriate so much 
as had not been appropriated before by others.' 
The doctrine of prior appropriation adopted 
In the next important case, Williams v Moriand 
(1824), the Court of King's Bench firmly enunciated a view 
that title to flowing waters was acquired by prior occupa-
tion. 
(109) 
Bayley J, in adverting to 'the manner in which an 
exclusive right to [flowing water] is obtained', said: 
'Flowing water is originally publici juris. So soon 
as it is appropriated by any individual, his right is 
co-extensive with the beneficial use to which he 
(106) At 219. 
(107) At 217-8. 
(108) (1824) 2 B & C 910. 
(10 9) At 913. 
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appropriates it. Subject to that all the rest of the 
water remains public! juris. The party who obtains a 
right to the exclusive enjoyment of the water does so 
in derogation of the primitive right of the public. ' (HO) 
(111) 
These principles were re-iterated in Liggins v Inge 
(1831) some years later. There Tindal CJ said(1 1 2 ) that 
'Water flowing in a stream, it is well settled, by 
the law of England, is public! juris.... [By] the 
law of England, the person who first appropriates 
any part of the water flowing through his land to 
his own use, has the right to the use of so much as 
he thus appropriates, against any other.' 
The doctrine of Natural Flow 
Even as Williams v Morland was asserting a clear doctrine 
of prior appropriation as a source of proprietary rights in 
flowing waters, another theory, based on the conception of 
natural rights of property, was evolving. 
In essence the theory adopted the concept that a land-
owner had as a natural incident of his ownership of real 
property a right to waters upon it. By extension, this prin-
ciple was said to mean also that he had a natural right to 
receive the waters naturally flowing to his land. Any inter-
ference with the natural flow - by diversion or obstruction of 
the stream - was an interference with the natural right for 
which an action might lie. 
This version of the nature of a landowner's rights in 
flowing waters emerged in the English law in an unexpected 
quarter. In 1823 in the case of Wright v Howard (1823) 3 ) 
Sir John Leach, vic-chancellor, sitting in Chancery proclaimed 
(110) Ho.lroyd J (at 914) expressed the view that there was no 
'private property' in running water and that the title 
a landowner had to water lasted only so long as it re-
mained on his soil. Littledale J (at 916-7) observed 
that a landowner's right to use the water upon his land 
'does not give a party such a property in the new water 
constantly coming, as to make a diversion or obstruction 
of the water, per se, give him any right of action'. 
Water was publici juris and all the King's subjects could 
use it provided that in doing so they do not injure 'the 
rights already vested in another by the appropriation of 
the water'. 
(111) (1831) 7 Bing 682. 
(112) At 692. 
(113) (1823) 1 Sim & Stu 190. The report of the case in (1823) 
(continued on the next page) 
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that the 'right to the use of waters rests on clear and 
( *1 "1 i! ~\ 
settled principles' + which he expounded as follows: 
'Prima facie, the proprietor of each bank of a stream 
is the proprietor of half the land covered by the 
stream, but there is no property in the water. Every 
proprietor has an equal right to use the water which 
flows in the stream, and consequently no proprietor can 
have the right to use the water to the prejudice of any 
other proprietor. Without the consent of the other 
proprietors, who may be affected by his operations, no 
proprietor can either diminish the quantity of the water, 
which would otherwise descend to the proprietors below, 
nor throw the water back on the proprietors above. 
... [In order to be able to do either of these things 
a proprietor must] either prove an actual grant or 
licence by the proprietors affected by his operation, 
or must prove an uninterrupted enjoyment of twenty 
years.(115) 
The effect of this doctrine was thus to hold that a 
riparian landowner could not divert or obstruct the flow of a 
natural stream since this would be an infringement of the 
natural right of property in other riparian owners to receive 
the waters in their natural state. The only circumstance in 
which diversion or obstruction could be permitted was where 
the party could claim an easement (acquired by grant or pre-
scription) to do so. 
The American Contribution 
In the United States of America the law relating to 
(113) (continued) 
'1 LJ (OS) Ch 9 4 differs somewhat. Cf on this case 
Lauer op cit (n 101 above) at 101-2. 
(114) In the Law Journal report he is stated as having 
said, 'The law on this subject is extremely simple and 
clear''. 
(115) At 203. (Emphasis supplied). The Law Journal report 
gives a rather different version: 
'Of the water itself, there is no separate ownership; 
being a moving and passing body, there can be no 
property in it. But each proprietor of the land on 
the banks has a right to use it; consequently, all 
the proprietors have an equal right: and therefore, 
no one of them can make such use of it, as will prevent 
any of the others having an equal use of the stream, 
when it reaches them .... His use of the stream must 
not interfere with the equal common right of his 
neighbours: he must not injure, either those whose 
lands be below him ... or ib... above him'((1813)1 
LJ (OS) 94 at 99). 
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(1 i R 
flowing waters had achieved a more precocious development. 
The natural flow doctrine had been articulated as early as 
(117 ) 
17 95 and by 1805 its premises were being challenged. In 
( 118 ) 
Palmer v Mulligan a Mew York judge argued that the doc-
(119 ) 
trine had the effect of impeding industrial progress. 
The development of this sort of reasoning led to the emergence 
of the theory that proprietary interests in the flow of waters 
should be settled on a basis of mutual adjustment of conflic-
ting interests. This view was advanced in the influen-
tial opinion of the distinguished jurist Joseph Story in the 
case of Tyler v Wilkinson(121)(182 7). 
(116) Joseph Angell had published his influential Treatise on 
the Law of Watercourses in 1824. See generally Weil -
'Waters : American Law and French Authority' (1919-20) 
33 Harvard LR 133. 
(117) In Merrett v Parker (1795) 1 NJL 526 at 530 where it 
was said: 
'... When a man purchases ... land through which a 
natural water-course flows, he has a right to make 
use of it in its natural state, but not to stop or 
divert it to the prejudice of another. Aqua currit, 
et debere currere is the language of the law.' 
(118) (1805) 3 Cai R 307. 
(119) The rule of natural flow Livingston J said (at 313-4) 
'must be restrained within reasonable bounds so as not 
to deprive a man of the enjoyment of his property'. 
Otherwise he pointed out 'he who would first build a 
dam or mill ... would acquire an exclusive right, at 
least for some distance, ... for it would not be easy 
to build a second dam or mill in the same river on the 
same side ... without producing some mischief or detri-
ment to the owner of the first.' 
(12 0) The idea appears to have been first articulated in. 
Piatt v Johnson (1818) 15 Johns 213 at 218 where it was 
observed that 
'[A]lthough some conflict may be produced in the use 
and enjoyment of such rights [in flowing water], it 
cannot be considered, in judgment of law, an infringe-
ment of right. If it becomes less useful to one, in 
consequence of the enjoyment by another, it is by 
accident and because it is dependent on the exercise 
of the equal rights of others.' 
(121) (1827) 24 Fed Cas 472 (No 14,312). 
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Story's judgment begins with an affirmation of the 
(122 ) 
traditional natural flow doctrine which he immediately 
qualifies: 
'I do not mean to be understood as holding the doctrine 
that there can be no diminution whatever, and no ob-
struction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian pro-
prietor, in the use of the water as it flows; for that 
would be to deny any valuable use of it.' 
Accordingly, there 
'may lie, and there must be allowed of that which is 
common to all, a reasonable use.... There may be a 
diminution in quantity, or a retardation or acceleration 
of the natural current indispensable for the general and 
valuable use of the water, perfectly consistent with 
the use of the common right.... The law here ... 
acts with a reasonable reference to public convenience 
and general good, and is not betrayed into a narrow 
strictness subversive of common use, nor into an ex- c\0"*% 
travagant loosness which would destroy private rights.' 
The demise of the doctrine of prior appropriation 
Meanwhile the doctrine of prior appropriation advanced 
(1240 
in Williams v Morland was coming under attack. In Mason 
v Hill (183 2) the plaintiff complained of an obstruction of 
the flow of a stream by the defendant, an upper proprietor, 
( 1 9 S ) 
which deprived his mill of motive power. At the trial 
defendant citing Williams v Morland claimed prior appropria-
tion of the flow of waters and contended that he was thus 'not 
answerable for the diversion'. Bosanquet J 'acting upon that 
authority' directed a verdict for the defendants. In an 
(122) The consequence of this principle is, that no proprietor 
has a right to use the water to the prejudice of another. 
It Is wholly immaterial whether the party be a proprietor 
above "or below in the course of the river, the right 
being common to all the proprietors on the river; no one 
has the right to diminish the quantity which will accor-
ding to the natural current, flow to a proprietor below, 
or throw It back upon a proprietor above. This is the 
necessary result of the perfect equality of right among 
the proprietors of that which is common to all.' (at 4-74) 
(123) At 474. 
(124) Above n 108. 
(125) Mason v Hill (1832) 3 B & Ad 304. 
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application for a new trial the Court of King's Bench, 
citing the 'perspicuous and comprehensive' judgment of Leach VC 
in Wright v Howard and 'upon the authority of that de-: : 
cision and the reasoning of the learned judge' held that the 
defendants could not acquire a right to divert the waters by 
prior appropriation. 
The matter was then tried again before a bench consisting 
(127 ) 
of Denman CJ, Littledale and Parker JJ. 
(19 8} 
The question Lord Denman CJ said was whether 'the 
first person who can get possession of [a] stream, and apply 
it to a useful purpose, has a good title to it against all 
the world, including the proprietor of the land below' even 
to the extent that he may altogether deprive him of the bene-
fit of the water'. 
(129 
The question so posed, Lord Denman went on to observe, 
was in another sense the question 
'whether he can take away from the owner of the land 
below, one of its natural advantages, which is capable 
of being applied to profitable purposes, and generally 
increases the fertility of the soil ... and deprive 
him of it altogether by anticipating him in its appli-
cation to a useful purpose.' 
If this were to be so, he pointed out, landowners would be de-
prived of a valuable asset 'in manufacturing districts particu-
larly' where the value of an estate 'is much enhanced by the 
existence of an unappropriated stream of water with a fall....' 
With this preface Lord Denman went on to express the 
view of the court that the proposition was untenable. It was 
based he said on a 'mistaken view of the principles' laid 
down in Bealey v Shaw, Williams v Morland, Blackstone and 
Liggins v Inge. After analysing these authorities Lord Denman 
n , ,(130) ... . concluded that 
(126) Above n 113 . 
(12 7) Mason v Hill (1833) 5 B & Ad 1. 
(128) At 17. 
(129) Ibid. 
(130) At 23. 
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'None of these dicta, when properly understood with 
reference to the cases in which they were cited, and 
the original authorities in the Roman law, from which 
the position that water is public! juris is decided, 
ought to be considered as authorities, that the first 
occupier or first person who chooses to appropriate, 
a natural stream to a useful purpose, has a title 
against the owner of the land below, and my deprive him 
of the benefit of the natural flow of water.' 
The adoption of the natural flow doctrine 
The effect of Mason v Hill was thus to adopt a doctrine 
of natural flow in preference to that of prior appropriation. 
In 1839 Gale in his newly-published treatise on ease-
ments, cited Story's decision in Tyler v Wilkinson and quoted 
from it at length. Gale himself regarded the law as expressed 
(131) 
m Williams v Morland as based on a misconception and 
stated that Mason v Hill 'may be considered as having settled 
(132 ) 
the law on this point'. 
However the authority of Mason v Hill was not universally 
(133 
admitted. In 1839 the Court of Exchequer In Arkwright v Gell 
refused to apply its doctrine to waters flowing in artificial 
channels. In the court of Common Pleas Tindal CJ ' (who it will 
be recalled applied the prior appropriation doctrine in 
(134) Liggins v Inge ) showed considerable scepticism about the 
principles stated in Mason v Hill. In Acton v Blundell 
(1843) he implied that the origins of the Mason doctrine were 
at best obscure and, in the event, refused to apply it to the 
case of subterranean streams of water. 
(131) Gale Easements 2 2 4: ... 'the right to the corporeal 
thing, the water itself, has been confounded with the 
Incorporeal right to have the stream flow in its accus-
tomed manner. Upon this a further error was founded -
that the first appropriator of water had a right to con-
tinue to divert the stream to the extent of such appro-
priation, no matter how injurious such diversion might 
be to the rights of parties who should afterwards seek 
to use the stream'. 
(132) Op cit 243. 
(133) (1839) 5' M & W 203 . 
(13 4) Above n 111. 
(135) (1843) 12 M & W 324. 
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But in 1849 the decision in Mason v Hill was vindicated 
in the judgment of Pollock CB'in Wood v Waud. In an 
elaborate judgment the chief baron cited with approval Kent's 
(13 7) 
Commentaries and Story's judgment in Tyler v Wilkinson 
and expressed the view that 'the principles which regulate 
the law as to natural streams' are 'placed on their right 
( -I O Q "\ 
footing, in the case of Mason v Hill ....' By 1851, 
when the leading case of Embrey v Owen came to be decided, the 
authority of Mason v Hill was beyond doubt. In Embrey v 
(13 9 ) 
Owen deference was again paid to American authorities: 
counsel cited American cases and Parke B quoted from Kent's 
Commentaries and Story's judgments. 'The law on flowing 
(140 ) 
waters', the Baron observed 'is now put on its right 
footing by a series of cases, beginning with that of VJright v 
Howard followed by Mason v Hill and ending with that of Wood 
v Waud and is fully settled in the American courts....' 
The doctrine of reasonable user 
(141) . Embrey v Owen in fact did more than support the 
proposition advanced in Mason v Hill that the doctrine of 
natural flow governed the law relating to flowing waters. The 
judgment of Parke B is replete with references to the doctrine 
of reasonable user developed by Story J in Tyler v Wilkinson 
and its entire tone and tenor suggests that the court was 
adopting the principles of that doctrine. 
The case had been argued by the plaintiff on the basis 
that any abstraction of waters from a flowing stream was a 
(136) (1849) 3 Exch 748. 
(137) Kent Commentaries on American Law, a treatise which 
'became an American counterpart of Blackstone' (Lauer 
(op cit (n 101 above) at 61). For the influence of 
Kent upon the development of American water-law see 
Lauer op cit 60-61; Weil (op cit (n '.116 above). 
(138) At 774. 
(139) (1851) 6 Exch 353. 
(140) At 368. 
(141) Supra (n 139). 
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breach of a riparian owner's proprietary right for which an 
(142 ) . 
action might lie. Relying upon Wright v Howard, Mason v 
Hill and Wood v Waud, Parke B enunciated the view that the 
right to water flowing past land 
'is not an absolute and exclusive right to the flow 
of water in its natural state ... but it is a right 
only to the flow of the water, and the enjoyment of 
it, subject to the similar rights of all the pro-
prietors ... to the reasonable enjoyment of the same 
gift of Providence.'(143) 
Accordingly, Parke B went on to say, an action will only lie 
for 'an unreasonable and unauthorized use of this common 
benefit.' Whether a particular user was reasonable or 
not, Parke B added, 'must depend upon the circumstances of 
each case': 
'It is entirely a question of degree, and it is very 
difficult, indeed impossible, to define precisely the 
limits which separate the reasonable and permitted use 
of the stream from its wrongful application; but there 
is no difficulty in deciding whether a particular case 
falls within the permitted limits or not.' 
(142) 'It was very ably argued before us ... that the plaintiff 
had a right to the full flow of the water in its natural 
course and abundance, as an incident to their property 
in the land through which it flowed; and that any ob-
struction of the water, however inconsiderable, by an-
other riparian proprietor, and though productive of no 
actual damage, would be actionable, because it was an 
injury to a right, and, if continued would be the founda-
tion of a claim of adverse right in that proprietor' 
per Parke B at 368. 
(143) At 369. 
(144) This proposition Baron Parke supported by citing a lengthy 
extract from Kent's Commentaries which was in essence 
a precis of the judgment of Story J in Tyler v 'Wilkinson. 
See at 37 0. The idea itself was of course not particu-
larly novel having been advocated in relation to public 
nuisances by obstruction of the highways by Lord Ellen-
borough CJ in R v Cross (1812) 3 Camp 224 (see above 176) 
and by Holroyd J in R v Russell (1827) 6 B & C 566 (see 
above 190 n 123, 192 n 130 . 
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3. The Right to Pure Air 
3.1. Introduction 
(145) 
Since the decision in Aldred's case (1610) the 
attitude of the common law had been that each landowner as of 
right was entitled to pure, wholesome air , a principle 




into uninhabited areas or causing enterprises to close 
down. 
(14 5) See above 123. 
(146) A principle elaborately re-iterated in equity in 
Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315. There Knight 
Bruce VC held (at 3 21) that a landowner was entitled 
'to an untained and unpolluted stream of air for the 
necessary supply and reasonable use of himself and 
his family ... to have there for the ordinary pur-
poses of breath and life an unpolluted and untainted 
atmosphere ... meaning by "untainted" and "unpolluted" 
not neceszarily air ... fresh, free and pure ... but 
air not rendered to an important degree less compatible 
or at least not rendered incompatible, with the 
physical comfort of human existence....' 
(147) Cf above 126 n 153. 'The new mills, factories and works 
tended to be in more or less remote places, partly be-
cause of the need to be near a falling stream ... and 
later to escape too close an inspection and regulation 
of their unhibited activities'. (Ho.skins The Making of 
the English Landscape 216). The great Soho ironworks 
of Birmingham were established in 17 9 5 on 'a barren . 
heath, on the bleak summit of which stood a naked hut 
the inhabitation of a warrener':. (Mantoux The Industrial 
Revolution in the Eighteenth Century 332 n 4). Alkali 
manufacturers chose St Helens to establish their noxious 
works because it was 'a district where they were not 
likely for some time to be bothered by irate neighbours -
apart from nearby farmers who could be kept quiet by 
small doles of money . . . . ' (Barker & Harris St Helens 
235). It was only with the invention of the steam en-
gine that industry was liberated from its dependence 
upon water power. It then tended to shift to the urban 
areas. 
(14 8) Cf R v White and Ward (1757) 1 Burr 333 where the manu-
facturers of spirits of sulphur, oil of vitriol and oil 
of aqua fortes were convicted of a common nuisance 
created by the 'noisome, offensive and stinking1 by-
products of their process. The accused were given only 
nominal fines upon 'it appearing that the nuisance was 
absolutely removed (the works being demolished, and the 
materials, utensils and Instruments, all sold and parted 
with)'. 
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The conversion of England, during the nineteenth cen-
tury, into an industrialized state had the effect of calling 
in question the extent to which men might assert their right 
to pure air at the cost of closing down some profitable in-
(149) . . 
dustrial enterprise. Essentially the question was that 
of determining on the one hand, the extent to which industry 
could exploit the ambient air as a receptacle for the waste 
products of the processes of manufacture and, on the other 
hand, that of determining the extent to which neighbouring 
landowners could seek to prevent the discharge of smoke, 
vapours and noxious matter into the ambient air by invoking 
their common law right to pure air. 
3.2. Proprietary Rights in Air Space 
The earlier decisions in this regard reflect a tendency 
to recognise a right in a landowner to be entitled to freely 
use the column of space above his land as a receptacle for 
smoke or other effluents. This principle was essentially 
derived from the principle cujus est solum ejus est usque ad 
.. (15 0) , . , , . . . 4.. ~~ . (151) , • " 
coelum, which, by implication at least was relied 
upon to justify and excuse the discharge of smoke or other 
(149) The analagous question, we have seen, had been raised 
already in the related context of the extent of the 
public right of passage in the highways (cf above 180). 
R v Russell (1827) 6 B & C 566 contains the most vigor-
ous assertion of the claims of industrial enterprise to 
be relieved of the strict constraints of the common law 
(cf above 189-194). Already in 1811, in Attorney-General 
v Cleaver 18 Ves 212, an application for an injunction 
against a soap manufactory, because of the nuisance 
caused by the 'vapours' emenating therefrom, was resisted 
with the argument that the 'application is really to 
abate this, which is called a nuisance, but is in truth 
a large trading concern, comprising property to a vast 
amount . . . . ' (at 213). 
(15 0) Cf above 111-3. The maxim, after its initial recognition 
in Bury v Pope (1586) Cro Eliz 118 was not mentioned in 
the case law again until the famous case of Pickering v 
Rudd (1815) 4 Camp 219 where it is cited by counsel as 
establishing that '[t]he space over the soil ... is the . 
plaintiff's, like the minerals below, and an invasion of 
either is, in contemplation of the law, a breaking of his. 
close'. Lord Ellenborough CJ was sceptical about the 
validity of this contention, saying 'I do not think it'is 
a trespass to interfere with the column of air super-
incumbent on the close' (at 221). 
(151) This contention was seldom advanced explicitly. It 
(continued on the next page) 
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pollutants into the atmosphere on the basis that the land-
owner, as owner, was free to use the coelum above his land 
as he pleased. The claim was usually advanced in the form 
of a demand to be entitled to carry on some trade or enter-
prise which was a nuisance without incurring any liability 
for the harm or inconvenience suffered by ajoining or neigh-
bouring owners. In the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury this claim was asserted under the aegis of a version of 
the doctrine of prior appropriation of the right to use the 
(152) 
air or air-space. 
(151) (continued) 
appears however in the argument of counsel in Rich v 
Basterfield (1846) 2 Car & K 256 at 258 where it was 
asked, 'could you deprive a man of the right of the 
circumjacent air to let off his smoke?' Erie J is 
reported to have responded to this with 'a strong opinion 
as to the right each one possessed to the enjoyment of 
the air around his house which the law would not allow 
to be interrupted'. See further below 2 7 7-8 
A similar contention is to be found in the American case 
of Pennoyer v Allen (1883) 42 Am Rep 540 where it was 
argued: 'The ownership of land carries with it the 
rightful use of the atmosphere while passing over it. 
Title to land gives to the owner the right to impreg-
nate the air upon and over the same with such smoke, 
vapor, and smells as he desires....' Cf Laitos 'Con-
tinuities from the Past affecting Resource Use and Con-
servation Patterns' (1975) 28 Oklahoma LR 60 at 82: 
'... the hoary maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad 
coelum was occasionally invoked TO ... establish a vested 
right in owners to use the atmosphere over their lands 
as a free waste receptacle. The cujus est solum doctrine 
was particularly useful to the infant industries of the 
nineteenth century....' 
(152) Cf Blackstone 2 Comm 402-3, cited n 87 above. Already 
in 1824 it had been laid down that a landowner acquired 
his rights to 'light and air' by occupancy. This was 
said by two judges who in the same year adopted the 
doctrine of prior appropriation in relation to flowing 
waters in Williams v Morland (cf above nn 106-7). In 
Moore v Rawson (1824) 3 B & C 332 Littledale J said 
(at 339) that the right to light and air 
'[t]he latter is acquired by mere occupancy .... 
Every man on his own land has a right to all the 
light and air which will come to him.... In order to 
make it lawful for him to appropriate to himself the 
use of the light, he does not require any consent from 
the owner of the adjoining land. He therefore begins 
to acquire the right to the enjoyment of the light by 
mere occupancy.' 
Bayley J (at 3 36) expressed the same view rather more 
shortly: '[t]he right to light, air, or water, is ac-
quired by enjoyment, and will ... continue so long as 
(continued on the next page) 
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Enterprises involving the production of atmospheric 
pollutants tended to be originally established in remote or 
( "1 C\ Q ^ 
uninhabited locations. In the course of time habitations 
came to be established in the vicinity and the new-comers 
tended to complain of the nuisance caused by the pollution. 
The response was to claim that the defendant polluter was en-
titled to carry on his activity by virtue of his earlier occu-
(154) . ' 
pation of the locality. Linked to this contention was 
the point that the new-comer,' if entitled to succeed in an 
action for nuisance, would effectually interfere with the 
(155 ) 
prior occupant's beneficial use of his land. 
In R v Neville(156)(1791) Lord Kenyon CJ applied a ver-
sion of the doctrine of prior appropriation to allow the 
business of 'a melter of kitchen stuff and other grease' to 
remain in a residential area, observing that 
'in places where offensive trades have been long carried 
on they are not nuisances though they would be so in 
any of:;the squares , or other places where such trades 
have not been exercised.... Where manufactories have 
been borne within a neighbourhood for many years it 
will operate as a consent of the inhabitant to their 
being carried on, though the law may have considered 
them as nuisances, had they been objected to in time. 
(152) (continued) 
the party either continues the enjoyment or shows an 
intention to continue it.' 
(153) See above n 147. 
(154) The defence being that the plaintiff had 'come to the 
nuisance'. See for example the argument of counsel in 
Bliss v Hall (1838) 4 Bing (NO 183 at 186: 
'... the Defendant was the first occupier In the 
district. There must be some places in which such 
a business may be carried on; and when it Is up 
before other houses are built, those who erect them 
must do so subject to the rights of the first occupier 
to carry on a lawful business'. 
(155) Cf defendant's plea in Bliss v Hall (supra) at 184: 
'... that the defendant lawfully enjoyed his said pre-
mises ... before the plaintiff came to, occupied ... his 
said premises ... and of right ought still lawfully to 
enjoy the same without any interruption or suit of the 
plaintiff....' 
(156) (1793 Peake 125. 
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t A c n \ 
In R v Cross (18 26) Abbott CJ recognised a principle 
that a prior occupation of a place might establish a good 
defence to a public nuisance , 
'If a certain noxious trade is already established 
in a place remote from inhabitations ... and 
persons afterwards come and build houses within 
reach of its noxious effects ... the party would 
be entitled to continue his trade, because his 
trade was legal before the erection of the houses ...' 
A claim to have acauired rights in the ambient air by 
prior occupation was raised, albeit tacitly, in Roberts v 
Macord (1832). The action was for trespass for breaking 
down a wall. The defence was that the defendant carried 
on the business of timber cutter and supplier and for this 
purpose, he required 'the admission of light and air 
to his tenement for the purpose of drying the timber. For 
more than twenty years there had been an open space adjoining 
his land which allowed access of air to the yard. The wall 
which was the subject of dispute had been erected by the 
plaintiff in this space thus obstructing the access of the 
air. 
(159) 
The matter was decided at nisi prius. There 
Patterson J, in instructing the jury, observed that the 
claim was novel and could not be supported: 
'If such a plea could be sustained, it would follow 
that a man might acquire an exclusive right to the 
light and air ... merely by reason of having been 
in the habit of laying out a few boards on his 
ground to dry. Such a rule would be very incon-
venient and very unjust.' 
This repudiation of this claim to title to air on the basis 
of prior appropriation was confirmed in the latter decision 
of Webb v Bird (1861).( 1 6 0 ) 
(157) (1826) 2 C & P 485. 
(15 8) The claim of a landowner to receive an unobstructed flow 
of air to his land had already been made in the seven-
teenth century by the owners of windmills and had been 
the subject of some confused and inconclusive judicial 
pronouncement. See above 124 n 134. 
(159) (1832) 1 Mood & R 230. 
(160) (1861) 10 CB (NS) 289. 
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The plaintiff, whose windmill had stood since 1829, 
sued the defendant for damages arising from the obstruction 
of access of wind to the mill as the result of a structure 
erected in the year 1860. Although counsel for the plain-
tiff argued valiantly for the proposition that his client 
was entitled to access of air relying upon the old and 
modern cases, logic and the theory of occupancy, 
the court of.Common Pleas on grounds both technical 
and politic dismissed the action, a decision subse-
quently confirmed by the Exchequer Chamber. 
Already in Bliss v Hall (1838)( 1 6 8 ) the ciourt of King's 
Bench had come to reject the claim to be entitled to pollute 
air on the ground of prior occupation. In so doing it 
relied upon a version of the doctrine of natural rights which 
had been employed in relation to flowing waters. The 
defendant had carried on a candlers business upon his premises 
for some three years before the plaintiff acquired neighbouring 
premises and instituted an action in nuisance on the ground 
(161) See above 124 rv 134. 
(16 2) "The whole reasoning in the judgement of Littledale J 
in Moore v Rawson in in favour of the plaintiff here.' 
(16 3) 'In Aldred's case, the stoppage of the wholesome air 
was held to give a right of action; a fortiori, then, 
will an action lie where the air is used for the purposes 
of trade ' (at 276). 'If a man is entitled to wholesome 
air, why is he not equally entitled to useful air' (at 281). 
(16 4) By implication mainly: 'The law has always favoured 
prescriptions for things of necessity and public 
utility' (at 276). 
(16 5) Treating the matter as falling within the purview of the 
Prescription Act 18 32which, it was held, did not provide 
for the type of easement claimed by the plaintiff. The 
windmill had not stood long enough to establish presciption 
under the common law. 
(166) 'A grant of such an easement as this would operate as a 
prohibition to a most formidable extent to the owners of 
the adjoining lands - especially in the neighbourhood of 
a growing town' .(per Erie CJ at 2 84). 
(167) Webb v Bird (1862) 13 CB (NS) 841. 
(168) (1838) 7 LJ CP 122. The case is also reported in 4 Bing 
(NO 18 3 but the report is not as full as that of the Law 
Journal. Cf above. See also Elliotson v Feetham (1835T~ 
2 Bing (NO 134 which presaged this new approach. 
(169) Cf above 262. 
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of 'divers noisome, noxious and offensive vapours, fumes, 
smells, and stenches.' 
For the defendant it was argued that the plaintiff had 
(17 0) 
come to the nuisance and thus could not complain. 
The judges were unanimous in rejecting this argument. 
(171) 
Tmdall CJ observed of the argument that the defendant 
had carried on his trade prior to the plaintiff's acquisition 
of adjoining premises: 
'This ... does not give a right against the owner 
of the adjoining house; neither does the fact of 
the trade being carried on before, furnish an answer 
in law to that which is admitted on the record to 
exist as a nuisance.' 
The rule in this regard was rather that 
'When a person become occupier of a house, he is 
entitled, by common law, to all reasonable rights, 
easements, and appurtenances, amongst which good * 
wholesome air is of course included.' 
So too, Parke J denied that the 'priority of possession' was 
relevant: 
'... when a party purchases a house, he has ... 
a right to all the advantages of a comfortable 
habitation; and every exercise of a noxious 
trade is an infringement and encroachment upon 
this right.' 
Eosanquet J invoked the sic utere principle saying that 
'A man should enjoy his own property, so as not 
to injure that of his neighbour', 
while Vaughan J followed the same theme observing that 
'Nuisances of this description should be removed 
from the neighbourhood of human habitation, and 
be established in places, where, from the circum-
stances, they cannot be injurious of offensive.' 
3.3. Modification 
Neither of these approaches was however particularly 
satisfactory. The doctrine of prior appropriation effectively 
negated the right to pure air of those landowners who were 
(170) Cf 154 above. 
(171) At 123. 
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not the earliest occupants of an area while the doctrine, 
advanced in Bliss v Hall, effectively precluded industry from 
establishing any enterprise which would render the ambient 
air impure. 
It is thus hardly surprising to find the courts casting 
about for another approach to the problem of reconciling 
claims to pure air with claims to carry on industrial processes 
productive of air pollutants. Nor is it particularly 
surprising to discover that the approach which was adopted 
was premissed upon a principle of reasonableness similar to 
(172) 
that adopted for flowing waters by Parke B m Embrey v Owen. 
The first signs of this approach can be discerned in 
. . . (17 3 
the proceedings at nisi prius m the case of Rich v Basterfield 
(1846). The action was for the nuisance caused by smoke, 
(174) 
emenatmg from a chimney. At the trial before Erie J, 
Serjeant Byles for the defendant, pleaded the cujus est solum 
doctrine : 
(172) (1851) 6 Exch 353. Indeed Baron Parke, in expounding 
the true nature of a landowner's right in flowing 
waters, let fall the remark (at 372-3) that a similar 
principle 
'will be found to be applicable to the corres-
ponding rights to air and light.' 
These, he went on to say, 
'also are bestowed by Providence for the common 
benefit of man; and so long as the reasonable 
use by one man of this common property does not 
do actual and perceptible damage to the right 
of another to the similar use of it, no action 
will lie . ' 
In relation to air the position was that 
'A man cannot occupy a dwelling and consume 
fuel in it for domestic purposes, without its 
in some degree impairing the natural purity of 
the air ... but such small interruptions give 
no right of action; for they are necessary 
incidents to the common enjoyment by all.' 
(173) (1846) 2 Car & K 257. 
(174) The report states that the case was tried before Tindal CJ 
but, as Erie J himself pointed out later (Bamford v 
Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 67 at 72) the case was tried 
before him. 
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•The question ... turned upon this: could you 
deprive a man of the right to use the circumjacent 
air to let off his smoke? Every man had a right 
to make a chimney to his house, and use it in an 
ordinary and reasonable manner; and it would be 
against the analogy of the established doctrine, 
that an owner of land is entitled to dig up to 
his very boundaries, even if by so doing he 
should injure his neighbour's house, to contend 
that a man may not use the chimnies of his house /'17S'> 
because the smoke may inconvenience his neighbour.' 
To this Erie J made a portentous- reply: 
'No man may use his right so as to damange another; 
though on the other hand, every one has a right 
reasonably to use his property, even if he should 
thereby annoy his neighbour.' (176) 
This proposition is next encountered in 1858 when 
Serjeant Byles, now Byles J, came to try the case of Hole v 
Barlow. 
4. Hole v Barlow (1858) 
Hole v Barlow is one of the epochal cases in the history 
of private nuisance. It initiated 'a radical departure from 
(177) 
previous law' and probably marks the beginning of the 
modern tendency to divorce the action for nuisance from its 
origins in the law of property and the assimilation of the 
(17 8) 
concept with the law of torts. 
The case 
(179) 
In Hole v Barlow Byles J had to try an action for 
nuisance arising from the burning of bricks. The setting of 
the action was a 'newly-formed' road on the outskirts of 
London. The plaintiff's house was on a piece of land 
(175) At 258. 
(176) Ibid. 
(177) Brenner 'Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution' 
(1973) 3 Jo Legal Studies 403 at 411. 
(178) Brenner suggests (ibid) that 'under Hole v Barlow, the 
successful plaintiff would probably have had to show that 
the defendant acted unreasonably in doing him damage, and 
the liability would have come to resemble negligence, as 
it does in America.' 
(179) (1858) 4 CB (NS)334; 27 LJ CP 207; 4 Jurist (NS) 1019. 
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adjoining a field where the defendant 'preparatory to 
building certain houses thereon' had dug out clay, made 
bricks, and burnt these in 'clamps', one of which was within 
thirty feet of the plaintiff's house. There was abundant 
evidence that the plaintiff had suffered annoyance. 
(180) Byles J in instructing the jury begun by stating 
the law in conventional terms: it was not necessary that 
the annoyance complained of be injurious to health before 
an action could lie; it was sufficient if the vapours rendered 
'the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable and if this ' 
was proved.,'that is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to 
maintain this action.' Then, however, he proceeded to add 
an 'observation' that was to initiate a far-reaching revision 
of traditional nuisance law: 
'Not everybody whose enjoyment of life and property 
is rendered uncomfortable by the carrying on of 
an offensive or noxious trade in the neighbourhood 
that can bring an action... I apprehend the law 
to be this , that no action lies for the use, the 
reasonable use, of a lawful trade m a convenient 
and proper place, even though some one may suffer 
annoyance from its being so carried on ... It is 
therefore my duty to tell you that^this action 
will not lie, although you should be of the opinion 
that the nuisance complained of is such as to 
render the plaintiff's enjoyment of life and 
property uncomfortable, if you should think that 
the place where the business is carried on was 
a convenient and proper place for the purpose.' 
Byles J is so instructing the jury as to the law, had 
sought to explain the reason why the annoyance suffered by 
the plaintiff might not be actionable. If every annoyance 
were actionable, industrial progress would be severely 
(181) 
impeded, and thus it was necessary to consider the 
locality in which the annoyance had occured: 
'... it would not be justifiable to place camps 
for brick-burning in the immediate vicinity of 
Berkley of Belgrave, or Eaton Squares. But that 
(180) 4 CB (NS) 334 at 335; cf 27 LJ CP 207 at 208. 
(181) Cf above 251. 
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is a very different thing to say that the mere 
temporary burning of bricks ... in a new neigh-
bourhood in the outskirts of London, which no 
one could'say was an inconvenient place for the 
purpose, though it might cause annoyance to one 
or two persons residing near, would afford a 
ground of action. If this were so, it would 
be exceedingly difficult to find any place within 
a reasonable distance at which this sort of trade 
could be exercised at all.' 
Accordingly he instructed the jury that it should consider 
whether the place where the defendant had burnt bricks was 
'a proper and convenient place for the purpose' bearing in 
mind 'all the circumstances'. If the jury found the place 
to be proper then 'although the plaintiff's enjoyment of 
his property may have been rendered uncomfortable, he cannot 
'(182) 
maintain the action. 
( -i o q \ 
The jury entered it verdict for the defendant, who 
then applied to the court of Common Pleas for an order directing 
a new trial on the grounds of a misdirection of the jury. In 
( A on \ 
opposing the application counsel for the defendant sought 
to support Byles J's statement of the law, arguing that 
authority for it could be found in a placitum in Comyn's 
Digest(185) and Rich v Basterfield.(186) The locality in 
which a nuisance had occurred, counsel contended, had always 
(187) 
been a material factor in nuisance actions. 
(182) 4 CB (NS) 334 at 336. 
(18 3) To the surprise of Byles J who later said he 'rather 
expected the jury would find for the plaintiff (4 CB 
(NS) at 337). 
(184) 4 CB (NS) at 337-9. 
(185) Comyns Digest 'Nuisance' (C) 
'An action upon the case does not lie upon a 
thing done to inconvenience of another, as if a 
man erect a mill [etc]. So, it does not lie for 
a reasonable use of my right, though it lie to 
the annoyance of another; as, if a butcher, 
brewer etc use his trade in a convenient place, 
though it be to the annoyance of his neighbour'. 
Comyn's cites nc authority for this proposition. He 
probably derived it from Rankett's case (1606) 2 Rolle 
Abr 139 (cf above 125). Byles J confessed that he had 
this passage in mind when he instructed the jury (4 CB 
(NS) at 230). 
(186) See above 277-8. 
(187) Citing Jones v Powell (1628) Hut 135 above 135-6 R v 
pierce (1B83 2 Show 327 (cf above 15 2) Barnes v Barker 
(1752) 1 Amb 158: 'All these cases shew that the locality 
is a material ingredient on the enquiry of nuisance or no 
nuisance' (4 CB (NS) at 339). 
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The plaintiff's argument was constructed upon conven-
tional lines derived from the principle laid down in 
the seventeenth century cases. Pure and undefiled air, he 
argued, is 'the common law right of every subject of Her 
(18 8 ) 
Majesty, whether he resides in a hovel or a mansion', 
(189) 
a principle established by Aldred's case and the 
authorities which held that even 'lawful and necessary' 
(19 0) 
trades could not be carried on to the injury of that right 
(191) 
'for the rule is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 
Byles J's formulation of the law was unacceptable because it 
implied that the convenience of the locality excused a 
nuisance '[n]o matter how injurious may be the thing com-
plained of, or how much it may interfere with the comfortable 
(192) 
enjoyment' of habitations. 
The Court of Common Pleas (coram Crowder, Willes and 
Byles JJ) refused to grant the order, holding Byles J's 
direction to the jury to be correct. 
(19 3) 
Crowder J cited the passage from Comyns, which Byles J 
had 'evidently' relied upon, and concluded that 'the direction 
of Brother Byles to the jury was consistent with all the 
authorities, and we should be in effect overruling several 
(194 ) • 
of them' if the direction was not upheld. 
(19 5) 
Willes J agreed with Crowder J and offered, further, 
his own version of the rule asserted by Byles J in the Court 
below: 
(188) 4 CB (NS) at 340. 
(189) 4 CB (NS) at 343. Counsel cited Walter v Selfe (1851) 
4- De G & Sm 315 (cf above n 143) as supporting this 
principle. 
(190) Cf above at 125-6 for these cases. 
(191) 4 CB (NS) at 343. 
(192) 4 CB (NS) at 340. 
(193) 4 CB (NS) at 344. 
(194) He did not say which. 
(195) 4 CB (NS) 345. 
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'the common law right which every proprietor of 
a dwelling house has to have air uncontaminated 
and unpolluted is subject to this qualification, 
that necessities may arise for an interference 
with that right pro bono publico, to this extent, 
that such interference be in respect of matter 
essential to the business of life, and to be 
conducted in a reasonable and proper manner and 
in a reasonable place.' 
Willes J cited no authority for this formula but observed 
that his rule 'was not without analogy', mentioning the 
defence of privilege in the law of defamation and the power 
to expropriate land for purposes of national defence. 'In 
these and such like cases, private convenience must yield 
to public necessity. It seems to me we shall only be 
acting upon that principle' in dismissing the plaintiff's 
(196) 
application. 
• .. Rise and demise 
Two years later the rule enunciated in Hole v Barlow 
was applied in Bamford v Turnley, another action based on 
the nuisance caused by brick-burning. The case was first 
(197 ) 
tried by Cockburn CJ who instructed the jury that the 
case came within the principle laid down in Hole v Barlow 
and directed that if they thought the place where the bricks 
were burnt was 'convenient and proper' and the burning itself 
was 'under the circumstances, a reasonable use' by the defendant 
of his land, they should give their verdict for the defendant. 
The jury found for the defendant and the plaintiff sought an 
(198) t 
order setting aside the verdict. The court of Queens 
Bench (Cockburn CJ, Wrightman, Hill and Blackburn JJ) refused 
the rule, with leave to appeal against the decision. 
In the same year the court of Exchequer was also called 
upon to apply the principle of Hole v Barlow. In Stockport 
Water Works v Potter(199)(1861) Channel -B left it to a jury 
(196) Byles J did not deliver a judgement. 
(197) (1860) 2 F & F 231. 
( 1 9 8 ) B a m f o r , d v Turnley (1860) 3 B & S 62. 
(199) (1861) 7 H & N 160. 
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to decide whether the acts of the defendants had been carried 
on 'for purposes necessary or useful for the community and 
carried on in a reasonable and proper place'. The jury 
finding for the plaintiffs, the defendants sought to have 
the verdict set aside. Before the Exchequer Chamber they 
cited Hole v Barlow and argued that their activities could 
not amount to a nuisance since they had been carried on in 
'a proper manner and a proper place'. 
The Exchequer Chamber refused the order on the ground 
that the defendant's activities in fact were not carried on 
in a proper place or reasonable manner. The authority of 
Hole v Barlow was not disputed but it was plain that the 
court had doubts as to the correctness of the principles 
. . , . . , (200) enunciated in the case. 
The nature of these doubts was made plain when the 
same court came, in the same year, to decide the appeal 
against the decision of the Queen's Bench in Bamford v 
Turnley ( 1 ) . ( 2 0 1 ) In Bamford v Turnley (2 ) ( 2 0 2 } (1861) the 
majority of the court (Erie CJ, Wilde B, Williams and 
Keating JJ) held Hole v Barlow to be not 'well decided' while 
Bramwell B found it stood alone. Pollock CB however dissen-
ted from the view of the majority. ° The effect of 
(200) Martin B (at 169) expressed the strongest doubts about 
Hole v Barlow: 'There may be', he said 'expressions 
used by some of the judges in which we would not coincide, 
but we do not at all dispute the authority of that case'. 
Bramwell B (at 169) desired 'to avoid expressing any 
opinion on Hole v Barlow. Channell B preferred not 
'to throw the least doubt on the decision in Hole v 
Barlow' (at 17 0). The decision in .Hole v Barlow was also 
questioned in the same year in equity, in the case of 
Beardmore v Tredwell (1862) 3 Giff 683, Counsel for the 
defendants argued that Hole v Barlow 'in effect reversed' 
Walter v Selfe, to which counsel on the other side replied 
that the case was 'under review, and was not expected to 
be supported'. Stuart V-C while not expressly dissenting 
from the case, was plainly unhappy about following it, 
observing especially that Byles J's proposition that a 
trade was not a nuisance if carried on in a 'convenient 
and proper' place 'must be taken to subject to some 
qualification' (at 699). 
(201) Above n 198. 
(202) (1861) 3 B & S 67. 
(203) For a discussion of the judgments in Bamford v Turnley (2) 
see below 2 87. 
284. 
the decision of the court, it was said in Cavey v Ledbitter 
(18 63), was in fact to have overruled Hole v Barlow. 
However Willes J continued to maintain the correctness 
of the doctrine enunciated in Hole v Barlow saying, in Wanstead 
Local Board of Health v Hill(20 6 } (1863 ) , that the case had 
been 'mis-understood' and that it was still 
'... an open question, which must one day be determined 
by the highest tribunal, whether one who carries on a 
business under reasonable circumstances of place, time, 
and otherwise, can be guilty of an actionable nuisance'. 
The opportunity for the House of Lords to pronounce upon the 
question came in 1865 in the case of The St Helens Smelting Co 
(207) 
v Tipping. The case was argued before the House of Lords 
for the appellants by the Attorney-General Sir Roundell Palmer 
(later Lord Selborne LC) on the basis that it involved the 
(208) 
doctrine of Hole v Barlow. And although the court did not 
expressly consider that case, the tenor of its decision was to 
be taken to have established that Hole v Barlow had been over-
i A (209) ruled. 
Hole v Barlow evaluated 
(210) It has been said of Hole v Barlow that it 'is hard 
to discover exactly what the judges in later cases objected to 
in Hole v Barlow, or why they regarded Bamford v Turnley as 
(204) (1863) 13 CB (NS) 476. 
(205) By Keating J (at 478). Erie CJ however observed (at 473) 
that he did not understand that in participating in the 
majority decision in Bamford v Turnley 'I was concurring 
to overruling of Hole v Barlow,' addint (at 477) that he 
thought that the judgment of Willes J in Hole v Barlow 
was 'sound'. Ironically, Byles J was a member of the 
court and concluded that the decision in Bamford v 
Turnley (2) was binding upon him. 
(206) (1863) 13 CB (NS) 479 at 484. 
(207) (1865) 11 HL Cas 642. 
(208) See 11 HL Cas 642 at 645-6. 
(209) See Shotts Iron Co v Inglis (1882) 7 AC 518 at 528; 
Reinhardt v Mentasi (1889j~LR 42 Ch D 685 at 688. 
(210). Winfield 'Nuisance as a Tort' (1930-2) 4 Camb LJ 189 at 
200 n 68. 
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overruling it, or how much of Hole v Barlow is overruled. 
In retrospect it seems that what was objected to in 
Hole v Barlow was not the principle there stated, but the 
manner in which it was stated. Byles J's proposition that 
that a nuisance was not actionable if carried out at a 
'convenient and proper place' sought to express a principle 
that what constituted a nuisance should be determined by 
examining the circumstances in which it had occurred, and 
particularly, the circumstance of the locality. By this 
formula, Byles J was attempting to establish a technique for 
accommodating conflicting land-use activities (in casu the 
right of comfortable domestic habitation as against the right 
to carry on a trade or industry) and, to the extent that the 
Courts would subsequently evolve such a technique, his direction 
in Hole v Barlow can be seen to have pioneered this development. 
The reasons for the subsequent disapproval of the 
direction thus lie not so much in the principled involved but 
the manner of its formulation. To some extent the force of 
Byles J invocation of the circumstance of locality was weakened 
by the fact that in Hole v Barlow the place where the defendant 
carried on his brick-burning could hardly be said to be a 
locality devoted to that purpose. The jury's decision that 
it was, seems to have been unexpected and wrong, something 
which probably suggested to the judges that it was undesireable 
to put the question of such a nature before a jury. Further, 
the later cases criticised the direction by Byles J as being 
expressed in ambiguous terms, especially on the grounds that 
the question of the significance of the locality as expressed 
in the formula of the place being a 'convenient and proper* 
• • (211) 
place was not stated with the necessary precision, and 
(211) This was the gist of the objection of the majority of the 
court in Bamford v Turnley (1861) 3 B & S 67 at 75 to the 
direction of Byles J: 
'It may be observed that, in the language of this dictum 
[of Comyns as relied upon by Byles J] there is a want of 
precision, expecially in the words "reasonable" and 
"convenient" which renders its meaning by no means clear. 
'•What is a "convenient place?" .• Does this expression mean. 
(continued on the next page) 
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tended to suggest that the situation of the victim of a 
(212) 
nuisance need not be considered, thus establishing 
(213) 
a principle of law which was dangerous and impolitic. 
But for all its defects, Hole v Barlow is remarkable 
as the case which established the idea that a landowner's 
right to pure air was not an absolute right. It stated, 
albeit imperfectly, a principle that the right to pure air 
could be qualified, in appropriate circumstances, in such 
(211) (continued) 
as the Court understood it to mean ... the the place 
is proper and convenient for the purpose of carrying 
on the trade, or does it mean a place where a nuisance 
will be caused to another.' 
Cf Bramwell B who said (at 87) he had 'a difficulty in 
putting a meaning on the words "convenient, reasonable 
and proper" as there used .': 
1"Convenient reasonable and proper" as regards the 
sufferer? No. "Convenient reasonable and proper" 
as regards the defendant? That cannot be, as that 
might place the nuisance close to the plaintiff to 
the entire loss of the power of dwelling in his house.* 
(212) Cf the remarks of Stuart VC in Beardmore v Tredwell (1862) 
3 Giff 6 83 at 6 99 
'In this [Byles J's] exposition of the law the words 
"convenient and proper" must be taken to subject to 
some qualification. Nobody will doubt that to the 
brick-burner the place may be convenient ... but it 
is clear that the mere circumstance of the place 
being convenient to one party is not enough to 
justify the continuance of the acts if they make 
the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable to 
the other ... The words, therefore, "convenient and 
proper" must be used with reference to the situation 
of both parties.' 
(213) In Bamford v Turnley 3 B J, S 67 at 77 the majority of 
the Court said that the principle in Hole v Barlow 
'would we think lead to great inconvenience and 
hardship because ... if the doctrine is to be main-
tained at all, it must be maintained to the extent 
that, however ruinous may be thd amount of the 
nuisance caused ... by carrying on an offensive 
trade, [a neighbour] is without redress if ... 
the place where the trade is carried on is a proper 
and convenient place for the purpose.' 
Bramwell B too critised Hole v Barlow on this ground saying 
(at 86) that since the decision 'claims have been made to 
poison and foul rivers, and to burn up and devastate land 
on the ground of public benefit. I am aware that the case 
did not decide so much, but I have a difficulty ... in 
saying that what has been so contended for does not 
follow from the principles enunciated in that case.' 
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a way as to allow a neighbouring landowner to use his 
property in a manner which diminished the purity of air with-
out thereby becoming liable to an action for nuisance. In 
this it institutionalized what had been said two hundred and 
thirty years previously in Jones v Powell. To this end it 
applied a principle of reasonableness already developed in 
the case-law of nuisance, as the standard for determining 
the relative claims of landowners demanding, on the one hand, 
the right to carry on profitable trades upon their land and, 
on the other, the right to breathe pure, healthful air. All 
that remained was for the Victorian judges to extract from 
this principle the detailed rules necessary to elevate the 
principle into a technique and method for resolving the full 
range of endemic conflicts that arise from the condition of 
neighbourhood. 
5. The Concept of Private Nuisance Re-formulated 
5.1. In Bamford v Turnley (18 62) 
The decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Bamford v 
(214) . . . 
Turnley did not consist merely in an over-ruling of 
Hole v Barlow. Rather the Court, in giving its reasons for 
not agreeing with the law as laid down in that case, took the 
occasion to expatiate on the concept of a private nuisance. 
In so doing the judges of the Exchequer Chamber presented a 
revision and re-formulation of the nuisance concept In terms 
which were to prove to be of seminal importance. 
The seminal quality of Bamford v Turnley lies in the 
manner in which the judges adapted doctrines developed by the 
courts of equity to serve, basic common law concepts relating 
to the nature of a landowner's natural rights of property. 
The pioneering character of the decision can be gathered from 
the fact that in only one of the three judgments delivered 
were any judicial precedents referred to and then the court 
found it necessary to only cite one case at common law and one 
in equity. For the rest the judgments consist in processes of 
ratiocination of first principles. 
(214) (1861) 3 B & S 67. 
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The basic thrust of each of the judgments was to show 
that a landowner enjoyed no absolute natural right to 
salubritas aeris , but rather that the right (whose existence 
was not disputed) was qualified to a greater or lesser degree 
the extent of the limitation being determined empirically 
by means of a dialectical process which was essentially an 
adaptation of that developed in the courts of equity. 
The judgment of the majority of the court 
The judgment of Erie CJ, Keating, Williams JJ and 
Wilde B consisted mainly in an exegisis upon the placitum in 
(215 ) 
Comyns' Digest relied upon by Byles J in Hole v Barlow. 
The proposition there enunciated that it was no nuisance to 
carry on a trade in a 'convenient' place could be interpreted 
in two ways. One construction, and that which had been adop-
ted in Hole v Barlow, was that a place 'may be "proper and 
convenient" for the carrying on of a trade, notwithstanding 
it is a place where the trade cannot be carried on without 
causing a nuisance to a neighbour'. Such a doctrine, the 
(21£ 
judgment observes, was untenable being both without authority 
(217) 
and contrary to policy. 
(218) 
On the other hand, the majority said, if the 
placitum expressed a doctrine 
'that a man may, without being liable to an action, 
exercise a lawful trade ... notwithstanding that 
it be carried on so near the house of another as to 
be an annoyance to him, in rendering his residence 
there less delectable or agreeable, provided the 
trade be so conducted that it does not cause what . 
amounts, in point of law, to a nuisance to the 
neighbouring house', 
(215) For which see n 185 above. 
(216) 'This is a doctrine which has certainly never been 
judicially adopted in any case before that of Hole v 
Barlow and moreover ... it would be inconsistend with 
... some of the cases ... especially ... Walter v Selfe' 
(at 76). 
(217) Cf n 213 above. 
(218) At 76. 
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then it established 'no more than what has long been settled 
, , (219) 
1 aw' . 
This dictum is noteworthy as the first explicit state-
ment of a principle that a landowner might suffer interferences 
with his domestic comfort and convenience and yet not be en-
(220 ) 




nuisance harms were damnum sine injuria to the case of 
interferences with a landowner's right to salubritas aeris. 
The judgment of Baron Bramwell 
Bramwell B sided with the majority of the court in 
holding Hole v Barlow to have been incorrectly decided. His 
point of departure for this conclusion was the proposition 
that every landowner enjoyed a natural right of property to 
salubritas aeris, expressed and protected by the doctrine 
(2 23) 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. However the right 
( o o h ̂  
was not absolute but subject to some exception. These 
(219) The 'settled law' was said to be found in Jones v Powell 
(1628) Hut 135 and a passage in Hawkins 1 Pleas of the 
Crown chap 7 5 s 10. 
(220) The principle had been suggested in Jones v Powell (see 
the discussion of this case above 135-6) and it seems 
clear that the majority judgment was much influenced by 
that case. 
(221) Cf above 42-4. 
(222) The majority of the court did not advert to Bracton on 
the notion of damnum sine injuria. Their reference to 
Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315) and their obvious 
approval of that case suggests that the principle enun-
ciated by them was probably a version of the equity 
doctrine that an injunction would not issue against a 
nuisance unless the nuisance was so substantial as to 
justify the interposition of a court of equity (cf 
above 239). 
(223) 'The defendant has done that which ... would be action-
able as being a nuisance to the plaintiff's habitation 
by causing sensible diminuition of the comfortable en-
joyment of it .... The plaintiff, then, has a prima 
facie case. The defendant has infringed the maxim sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' (at 82). Note the 
invocation of the criteria of equity in the words 
'sensible dinimuition'. 
(224) 'It is clear to my mind that there is some exception 




exceptions J consisted in nuisances which were not action-
able, and the point to be established was the reason why no 
i^ i • (226) action would lie. 
The relevant principle the learned Baron, significantly 
enough, 'deduced' to be, was I that 
'those acts necessary for the common and ordinary 
use and occupation of land and houses may be done, 
if conveniently done, without subjecting those who 
do them to an action. '(227 ) 
He then explained the rationale of this principle in what is 
probably the most often-cited passaged of any judgment in the 
modern law of nuisance: 
'There is an obvious necessity for such a principle 
as I have mentioned. It is as much for the advantage 
of one owner as of another; for the very nuisance 
the one complains of, as a result of the ordinary use 
of his neighbour's land, he himself will create in 
the ordinary use of his own and the reciprocal nui-
sances are of a comparatively trifling character. 
The convenience of such a rule may be indicated by 
calling^il; a rule of give and take, live and let 
live.^' '28) 
(225) Bramwell B cited the cases of 'burning weeds, emptying 
cess-pools , making noises during repairs' as instances 
of such exceptions (at 83). 
(226) 'The instances ... nevertheless may be lawfully done. 
It cannot be said that such acts are not nuisances , be-
cause, by the hypothesis, they are .... There must be, 
then, some principle on which such cases must be 
excepted' (ibid). 
(227) Ibid. This principle, he went on to say, 
'would comprehend all of the cases I have mentioned, 
but would not comprehend the present, where what has 
been done was not the using of land in a common and 
ordinary way, but in an exceptional manner - not un-
:• natural or unusual, but not the common and ordinary 
use of land.' 
(228) At 83-4. The idea that the rule might be characterized 
in terms of these homely maxims may have been suggested 
by Blackstone's characterization of the law of nuisance 
as applying the rule of 'gospel-morality, of "doing unto 
others, as we would they should do unto ourselves" 
(cf above 23 0 n 4). 
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This classic formulation of a basic doctrine of modern 
nuisance law not only restates the principle (advanced in the 
judgment of the majority of the court) that certain nuisances 
to the comfort and convenience of habitations will be cases of 
damnum sine injuria but rationalises it on the basis of the 
(22 9 ) 
reciprocal nature J of the interferences which occur be-
tween neighbours. Perhaps more than anything else it is this 
dictum of Lord Bramwell that has made explicit the character 
of the nuisance concept as the law's device for regulating 
relationships between neighbours. 
The judgment of Chief Baron Pollock 
Pollock CB dissented from the opinion of the rest of the 
court that Hole v Barlow was wrongly decided. The gist of his 
judgment was that it was a proper approach to the question 
whether a nuisance existed to enquire whether what was done 
was done in a convenient place and was a reasonable use of 
land. The proprietry of this approach rested upon empirical 
considerations which the chief baron formulated in language 
redolent of the dialecticism of any equity decision: 
'I do not think that the nuisance for which an action 
will lie is capable of any legal definition which will 
be applicable to all cases and useful in deciding them. 
The question so entirely depends on the surrounding 
circumstances - the place where, the time when, the 
alleged nuisance, what, the mode of committing it, how, 
and the duration of it, whether temporary or permanent, 
occasional or continual - as to make it impossible to 
lay down any rule of law applicable to every case....'(230) 
(231) 
From this it followed, he went on, that it cannot be said 
as a general proposition that anything which under any circum-
stances lessens comfort or endangers health or safety 'must 
necessarily be an actionable nuisance': 
(229) The model for this perception of the character of nui-
sance harm was the equitable doctrine of the 'balancing 
of interests' in enjoining nuisances (see above 240). 
For an analysis of the reciprocal nature of nuisances 
see below.428 n 45. 
(230) At 79. Cf the emphasis on the need for a consideration 
of the 'circumstances' of a nuisance for purposes of 
deciding whether it was enjoinable by Lord Cranworth in 
Attorney-General v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (18 5 3) 
(cited above 238). 
(231) Ibid. 
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'That may be a nuisance in Grosvenor Square which 
would be none in Smithfield market,(232) that may 
be a nuisance at midday which would not be so at mid-
night, that may be a nuisance which is permanent and 
continual which would be no nuisance if temporary or 
occasional only.1 
What all of this implied, the Chief Baron continued, was 
recognition of the fact that the law of nuisance must involve 
(233 ) 
recognition of a system of compromises. As he put it: 
'The compromises that belong to social life, and 
upon which the peace and comfort of many depend, 
furnish an indefinite number of examples where some 
natural right is invaded, or some enjoyment abridge, 
to provide for the more general convenience or neces-
sities of the whole community.' 
Having so formulated a general doctrine of the concept of 
nuisance, Pollock CB turned to the question of the principle 
of reasonable use of land as a defence against an allegation 
( 234-) 
of nuisance. He rejected the construction placed upon 
this concept by the majority of the court: 
'If the act complained of be done in a convenient 
manner, so as to give no unnecessary annoyance, and 
be a reasonable exercise of some apparent right, or 
a reasonable use of the land, house or property of 
the party under all the circumstances, in which I 
include the degree of inconvenience it will produce, 
then I think no action can be sustained....' 
The test of whether a user of land was reasonable, he went 
on, meant no more than that a jury would be required to 
find 
'that it was reasonable that the defendant should be 
allowed to do what he did, and reasonable that the 
plaintiff should submit to the inconvenience occasioned 
by what was done'. 
(232) It may be worth noting that this classic form of allusion 
to the doctrine of locality in nuisance law was antici-
pated by Byles J in Hole v Barlow where in the course of 
argument he put it to counsel that (4 CB (NS) 334 at 340) 
'A swine-stye might not be considered a nuisance in 
Rethnal Gree : but it certainly would be so in 
Grosvenor Square'. 
(233) At 80. 
(234) At 80-1. 
(235) At 81. 
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This eliminated the difficulty raised in the judgment of 
the majority of the court 
'because it cannot be supposed that a jury would find 
that to be a reasonable act by a person which produces 
any ruinous effect upon his neighbours'. 
Chief Baron Pollock, while differing from the rest of 
the court on the specific question of the correctness of the 
decision in Hole v Barlow, supplemented the views of his 
bretheren as to the true nature of the nuisance concept. His 
particular contribution was the articulation of the principle 
that the decision whether a nuisance was actionable (in the 
sense postulated in the other judgments); fell to be determined 
by the proper evaluation of a set of factual elements, the 
'circumstances' of the case. In due course the courts evolved 
from this principle a dialectical technique for answering the 
basic question of whether, in given circumstances, a landowner 
should succeed in his action for nuisance or not. 
5.2. St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 
Introduction 
Said to be 'arguably the most important nuisance case 
M q c y 
of the '[industrial] era', the decision of the House of 
Lords in The St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping approved, 
elaborated and institutionalized the concept of private nui-
sance formulated in Bamford v Turnley. 
Appropriately in a case of this strategic importance in 
the development of the nuisance concept, there were elements 
in its facts which symbolised the forces which had driven the 
judges of the mid-Victorian era to revise traditional concepts 
of nuisance law. The setting was the archetypal industrial 
town, the appalling St Helens whose poisoned atmosphere, pol-
luted waters and blighted vegetation were even then the subject 
( 237 ) 
of a parliamentary enquiry. The defendant company carried 
(236) Brenner op cit (n 177 above) 413. 
(237) See above 248 n 75. 
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on activities of a type which were a prime cause of this 
state of affairs. " The plaintiff represented the 
older agrigarian order, being the owner of a country estate, 
a remnant of what was once the holding of the local lords of 
the manor. 
The nuisance complained of was the large quantities of 
'offensive, noxious, poisonous and unwholesome smokes, stinks, 
stenches gases and other vapours and noxious matters' issuing 
from the smelting works which 'spread and diffused themselves 
over, upon, into, through and about' the plaintiff's property, 
destroying the 'hedges, trees, shrubs, fruits, crops and her-
bage', and causing the plaintiff his servants, cattle and 
livestock to become 'disordered and sick', thus preventing the 
plaintiff's 'beneficial and healthy' use and occupation of the 
premises. 
Tipping instituted his action in the court of Queen's 
(241) 
Bench in 1863. The action was tried by Mellor J before 
a jury who found there to be a nuisance and awarded damages to 
the sum of £3 61 18 \\. The defendants sought a new trial on 
the grounds of a misdirecton to the jury. The Court of Queen's 
Bench (Cockburn CJ, Wightman, Blackburn and Mellor JJ) refused 
( 242 ) 
the rule, with leave to appeal. The defendant appealed 
to the court of Exchequer Chamber (coram Erie CJ, Pollock CB, 
Channell, Bramwell and Pigott BB, Byles, Keating JJ) which 
(243 ) 
affirmed the decision of the Queen's Bench. 
(238) The St Helens Smelting Co was the first copper factory 
to be established in the district after 1854. Like the 
others already there it produced highly acidic vapours, 
containing sulphur dioxide. See Barker and Harris 
St Helens 345. 
(239) William Whitaker Tipping, 'a successful manufacturers 
from Wigan' (Barker & Harris op cit 346). 
(240) Tipping's estate 'Bold Hall' consisted of a 'mansion' and 
1300 acres. The Bolds of Bold had been lords of the 
manor and were one of the great families of the district. 
Tipping bought Bold Hall, a remnant of the original estate 
(Barker & Harris op cit 346) in 1860 (see Tipping v St 
Helens 'Smelting Co (1866) LR 1 Ch App 66). 
(241) Tipping v St Helens Smelting Co (1863) 4 B & S 608 at 610; 
35 LJ QB 66. 
(242) Tipping v St Helens Smelting Co (1863) 4 B & S 608; 
3 5 LJ QB 7 0. 
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(244 ) 
The defendants then appealed to the House of Lords. 
The judges were summoned to attend the hearing, Blackburn, 
Shee, Willes and Keating JJ, Martin and Pigott BB being 
present. After hearing the Attorney-General, Sir Roundell 
Palmer, for the defendant, they advised that the direction of 
Mellor J at nisi prius was correct. The House then affirmed 
the decisions of the courts below, Lords Westbury LC, Cran-
worth and Wensleydale each delivering a judgment. 
Five days later Tipping filed a bill in chancery for an 
injunction to restrain the defendants from using their works 
so as to injure his estate, which was granted. An application 
by the defendants to have the bill discharged was later re-
_ . (245) fused. 
The company thereupon closed down the works, moving 
( 0 l± K ̂  
their operations to a new locality. Ironically the 
abandoned works were later to be used for the manufacture of 
( 247 ) 
'patent manure'. 
The judgments in the St Helens Case 
(1) At Nisi Prius 
The various stages of the litigation of the St Helens 
case turned essentially on the question whether Mellor J had 
correctly expounded the law of private nuisance to the jury 
which found the defendants' works to be an actionable nuisance 
In his direction to the jury Mellor J had deliberately 
refrained from stating the law in terms of the principles laid 
(248) 
down in Hole v Barlow and purported to state the law in 
(244) St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HL Cas 642; 
3 5 LJ QB 71. 
(245) Tipping v St Helens Smelting Co (1866) LR 1 Ch App 66. 
(246) Barker & Harris op cit 346. 
(247) Barker & Harris op cit 346 n 8. 
(248) At the trial counsel for the defendants had sought to 
persuade him to direct the jury in accordance with the 
judgment of Pollock CB in Bamford v Turnley. Since this 
as we have seen (above 291) substantially upheld the de-
cision in Hole v Barlow, the effect of counsel's con-
tention seems to have been to seek to persuade the judge 
to apply Hole v Barlow. See Tipping v St Helens Smelting 
Co (1863) 4 B & S 608 at 610. 
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accordance with the decision of the majority of the court of 
(249 ) 
Exchequer Chamber m Bamford v Turnley. Since his direc-
tion was consistently and expressly approved by each of the 
courts that considered it, it has a particular significance • 
as an exposition of the professional understanding of the 
version of nuisance law laid down in Bamford v Turnley. 
Mellor J began by observing that a landowner has 'cer-
tain rights of property, and within the limits of those rights 
he may do any act which is not unlawful'. He then . 
equated the unlawfulness of land-use activity with it 'conven-
( 9 R i ^ 
ience' and added that 'convenient' meant 
'that it must be plain that he will not do an action-
able injury to another, because a man may not use his 
own property so as to injure his neighbour.'(252) 
This being so, he went on, it followed that 
'if a man by an act ... sends over his neighbour's 
land that which is noxious and hurtful to an extent 
which sensibly diminishes the comfort and existence 
of the property, that is an actionable injury'. 253j 
That being the law, he went on, when the jury came to 'the 
question of facts' there was 'no doubt [that] you must take 
into consideration a variety of circumstances': 
'In considering whether or not a man's property has 
been sensibly injured by the actions of another per-
son on his own land, of course you will consider the 
place, the circumstances, and the whole nature of the 
thing.*(255) 
(249) See 4 B & S 608 at 610. 
(250) (1866) 35 LJ QB 66 at 67. 
(251) 'When I say unlawful, I mean any act which is not wrong: 
he may erect a lime-kiln if it is in a convenient 
place....' (ibid) . 
(252) Ibid.' In this connection he also pointed out to the 
jury that a landowner whose smoke, odours or vapours 
came upon a neighbour's land 'is not doing an act on 
his own property only, but he is doing an act on his 
neighbour's property also, becuase every man by common 
law has a right to pure air....' 
(253) At 68. 
(254) At 68. 
(255) Ibid. 
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Thus the jury should consider the degree to which the noxious 
fumes have come upon the plaintiff's lands and whether they 
emanated from the defendant's works. In considering this he 
said, citing authorities, they should consider the 
'locality' the 'work'. The significance of these considera-
tions he explained to the jury in words which were to receive 
( o r <n \ 
explicit approval by Lord Wensleydafe in the House of Lords 
'The defendants say, If you do not mind you will stop 
the progress of works of this description. I agree 
that this is so because, no doubt, in the county of 
Lancaster, above all other counties, where great works 
have been created and carried on, and are the means of 
developing the national wealth, you must not stand on 
extreme rights and allow a person to say, I will bring 
an action against you for this and that, and so on. 
Business could not go on if that were so. Everything 
must be looked at from a reasonable point of view; 
therefore the law does not regard trifling and small 
inconveniences, but only regards sensible inconveniences, 
injuries which sensibly diminish the comfort, enjoyment 
or value of the property which is affected.' 
The judge then adverted to the nature of the' St Helens locali-
ty and the evidence of the large scale destruction of the 
vegetation thereabouts :as a result of the atmospheric pollu-
tion caused by the manufactories in the area, and concluded 
by instructing the jury to decide whether the plaintiff's 
property had been sensibly damaged and whether that damage 
was attributable to the defendant's works. 
(2) Queen's Bench and Exchequer Chamber 
The defendants' application for a new trial was based 
on the contention that Mellor J had misdirected the jury, 
especially in relation to the significance of the locality 
(256) These were a note in a 'very admirable book', which he 
did not identify, and a judgment of Erie CJ also not 
identified. These stated, respectively, 'whether a nui-
sance has been caused by the defendant at all, the nature 
of the locality, the work, and every other fact in the 
case, must be taken into consideration'; and, 'The time, 
the locality and so on, are all circumstances to be 
taken into consideration upon the question of fact whether 
an actionalbe injury has been occasioned....1 
(257) See below 300. 
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as establishing that the defendants were entitled to carry 
on their trade in an area such as St Helens. 
The court of Queen's Bench rejected these contentions, 
citing Bamford v Turnley, and holding that in terms of that 
decision it would have been a misdirection to put it to the 
jury whether the defendant's activities had been carried on 
in a suitable and convenient place. The court of Exchequer 
Chamber too rejected the defendant's arguments as to the mis-
,. .. ... , . • . . , (258) 
direction without giving particular reasons. 
(3) The judgments in the House of Lords 
Like the decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Bamford 
v Turnley, the decision of the House of Lords is remarkable 
for the fact that none of the earlier cases in nuisance were 
cited or discussed, Lord Westbury LC in particular being con-
tent to base his decision upon first principles and, indeed, 
upon principles formulated for the first time by him. He 
(259 ) 
began his judgment by expounding a proposition not pre-
viously advanced in any nuisance case. There was, he said, 
a distinction to be made between actions brought for nuisance 
on the ground that there had been a 'material injury to pro-
perty' and one brought on the ground that the nuisance caused 
'sensible personal discomfort'. 
In the latter case:, he went on, the position was that if 
'a man lives in a town, of necessity he should subject 
himself to the consequences of those operations of 
trade which may be carried on in his immediate locality, 
which are actually necessary for trade and commerce; 
also for the enjoyment of property, and for the benefit 
of the inhabitants of the town and the public at large'. 
(258) Pollock CB however took the opportunity to make it plain 
that he adhered to the dissenting views expressed by him 
in Bamford v Turnley and that, in concurring in the 
present decision, he was doing so only out of deference 
to authority: 'I am compelled to say that which I now 
pronounce to be the law, not entertaining that opinion' 
(3 5 LJ QB 71). 
(259) (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 at 650. 
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A man, he added 'has no ground for complaint' where a trade 
is carried on next door to him 'in a fair and reasonable way' 
even if 'there may arise much discomfort from the trade....' 
But, his lordship continued, where the nuisance com-
plained of caused 'material injury' very different considera-
tions arose. In such a case 
'the submission which is required from persons living 
in society to that amount of discomfort which may be 
necessary for the legitimate and free exercise of the 
trade of their neighbours would not apply to the cir-
cumstances and immediate result of which is sensible 
injury to the value of the property'. 
( o f\ n ̂  
Lord Westbury then turned to apply the principles 
so formulated by him to the facts of the present case. The 
defendant's case was, he said, that their works were carried 
on in a neighbourhood more or less devoted to manufacturing 
purposes of a similar kind and thus could not be said to be 
a nuisance since they were carried on in 'a fit place'. This 
contention he rejected, obviously having the principle enun-
ciated by Byles J in Hole v Barlow in mind; the defendant's 
argument meant, he said, that their works could be 'carried 
on with impunity, although the result may be the utter des-
truction, or the very considerable diminuition of the value 
of the Plaintiff's property': 
'My Lords, I apprehend that that is not the meaning of 
the word "suitable" or the meaning of the word "con-
venient" which has been used as applicable to the sub-
ject. The word "suitable" unquestionably cannot carry 
with it this consequence-, that a trade may be carried 
on in a particular locality, the consequence of which 
trade may be injury and destruction to the neighbouring 
property'. 
For this reason he held that the decisions of the courts not 
to grant a new trial were correct and should be affirmed. 
( 0 f\ *1 ̂  
Lord Cranworth concurred. In a short judgment he 
quoted with approval a passage from the direction of Mellor J, 
cited in an unreported case tried by him when in the court of 
Exchequer and uttered the following dictum (which seems 
(260) At 651. 
(261) At 652. 
(262) For which see 338 n 131, 
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tacitly to approve the principle enunciated by Pollock CB 
in Bamford v Turnley,: 
1... it is extremely difficult to lay down any actual 
definition of what constitutes an injury, because it 
is always a question of compound facts, which must be 
looked to to see whether or not the mode of carrying 
on a business did or did not occasion so serious an 
injury as to interfere with the comfort and enjoyment 
of property'. 
Lord Wensleydale agreed 'in opinion' with both of the pre-
• A a. (263) „ ... (264) - .. ... 
vious judgments. He cited a passage from the direc-
tion of Mellor J to the effect that everything must be looked 
at from a reasonable point of view in which, he said, 'every-
thing is included' and could not have been 'more correctly 
laid down'. He thus agreed that the appeal ought to be 
dismissed. 
Evaluation 
The decision of the House of Lords in the St Helens case 
was significant in two respects. In the first place, through 
its approval of Mellor J's statement of the law it implicitly 
gave its imprimatur to the formulation of the concept of nui-
sance enunciated in Bamford v Turnley. In the second place, 
it added to that formulation. The principle enunciated by 
Lord Westbury that there was a distinction between nuisance 
actions involving material harm to property and those involving 
sensible personal discomfort was novel and without precedent* 
It introduced into the concept of private nuisance a structural 
component which not only divided nocumenta into two main cate-
gories but which also postulated different rules for deter-
mining their actionability. Nuisances involving material harm 
to property were actionable, as it were, on the doctrine of 
/ r\ r> r \ 
res ipsa loquitur; those involving personable discomfort 
were actionable only if found to be unreasonable according to 
contextual considerations of the type enunciated by Pollock CB 
in Bamford v Turnley. 
(263) At 653. 
(264) See above 297. 
(265) See below 327 n 92. 
(266) See, further, below 327-8 
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Expressed another way, what Lord Westbury did in the 
St Helens case was to devise a compromise between the older 
concept that, in nuisance actions, once damage was proved 
liability followed, and the newer concept, first advanced in 
( O P 1 \ 
Hole v Barlow, that a landowner might be without an ac-
tion even though he had suffered what was technically a nui-
sance. Where the nuisance affected proprietary interests 
f O O Q \ 
liability followed according to the old principle; where 
it affected merely the personal sensibilities of the land-
owner (as opposed to his proprietary interests) liability 
c -,'-, 4- 4.1, • • • (269) 
followed according to the new principle. 
(267) Cf Brenner's remark (op cit (n 177) 415) that what 
'the Lords did in the St Helens case was not to bury 
Hole v Barlow, as they seemed to be doing, but rather 
to apply it discriminatorily'. 
Because, as McLaren ('Nuisance in Canada' Studies in 
Canadian Tort Law 3 47) suggests the 'stark fact of 
actual material loss is, in the judges' minds, suf-
ficient to outweigh the relevance of other factors'. 
Whose less absolute standards as to the degree of harm 
which was required before a nuisance became actionable 
at law, allowed for industrial and commercial progress 
at_the price of sensible personal comfort of human 
beings, especially those living in industrial locali-
ties . 
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C H A P T E R S I X 
THE REVISED CONCEPT OF PRIVATE NUISANCE (1865-1900) 
I THE REVISED CONCEPT 
1. Introduction 
The law of private nuisance originated in attempts to 
ensure to landowners the convenience of the amenities of 
landholding. Its realm was the somewhat elusive area falling 
between assured physical occupation of land (protected by 
analogous remedies derived from the Assize of Novel Disseisin) 
and the freedom from physical invasions of the land (protected 
by the trespass action). The private nuisance concept evolved 
here mainly by way of an elaboration upon the amenities of 
landownership, focusing particularly on those attached to the 
use of land for domestic residential purposes. 
By the dawn of the nineteenth century it had become 
apparent that this pre-occupation of private nuisance law 
was tending to inhibit the development of land for other 
purposes, notably those of industry and commerce. While 
earlier generations of English lawyers had regarded this con-
sequence with indifference, the ethos of Victorian England 
no longer permitted this luxury. The Victorian judges were 
ineluctably driven to seeking some method by which they could 
sustain the claim of a landowner to enjoy the amenities of 
his habitation while at the same time permitting his neighbour 
to devote his land to other and different uses of a lawful and 
proper nature. In Hole v Barlow, Bamford v Turnley and the 
St Helens case they devised such a method, predicated upon a 
principle of mutual and reciprocal limitation of the rights 
to claim particular amenities of land holding. 
In this guise the private nuisance concept came to be a 
central feature of the system for regulating and controlling 
the use of land in the interests of the social and economic 
(1) 
advancement of English society. It fulfilled this role 
(1) The other major component of the system was the public 
nuisance concept, particularly as elaborated by the 
(continued on the next page) 
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for something like eighty years before being supplanted in 
the early decades of the twentieth century by a new, more 
vigorous system of land-use controls implemented through the 
• • (2 ) 
administrative agencies of the State. 
This chapter is devoted to an examination of the con-
cept of private nuisance in this period, seeking particularly 
to reveal how the nuisance concept had been revised and 
adapted by the Victorian judges so as to serve as an instru-
ment for controlling.the land use activities of adjoining 
landowners. 
2. The Rationale of the Revised Concept of Private 
Nuisance 
The major contribution of the Victorian judges to the 
evolution of the concept of private nuisance was their per-, 
ception of the nature of the relationship which the fact of 
. . ( 3 ) 
physical neighbourhood imposed upon adjoining landowners, 
and their adoption of the nuisance concept in a way which 
recognised and gave effect to the implications and consequen-
ces of this relationship. 
(1) (continued) 
Nuisance Removal and Public Health Acts of the first 
half of the nineteenth century (see 195/j) which repre-
sent the sources of state intervention in the field of 
land-use regulation and controls. See generally 
McA.uslan Land, Law and Planning 33ff. 
(2) For this development, see below 417-8. 
(3) The nature of this relationship is examinej.d below at 
• 428. its main features may be said to be the fact that 
by reason of the physical vicinity of neighbouring land 
units, the use-activities carried out on each unit have 
a tendency to 'spill-over' onto the adjoining units so 
affecting and influencing the manner in which the indi-
vidual landowners can in fact use and enjoy their land. 
Because adjoining land units are in the state of physi-
cal neighbourhood these 'spill-over' effects are re-
ciprocal in their impact thus leading to the consequence 
that to attempt to regulate the activities of one owner 
is to affect the activities of the other. The concept 
of private nuisance regulated land-use activities es-
pecially by way of the enforcement of the maxim sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas. The Victorian judges percieved 
that this maxim operated only unilaterally (ie to the 
advantage of the landowner invoking it); the revised 
concept of private nuisance evolved by them operated bi-
laterally, seeking to regulate the reciprocating spill-
over effects in a way which simultaneously gave due 
recognition to the interests of neighbouring landowners. 
30i+. 
It is fair to say that the exact nature of the neigh-
bour relationship was only vaguely perceived by the Victorian 
judges. They appreciated that a landowner in using his land 
(4) 
in a sense was also using that of his neighbour. They saw 
also that, as a result, the nuisance remedy by enabling one 
landowner to complain of and suppress the activities of his 
neighbour was an instrument by which he could control the 
(5 ) 
uses to which the neighbour might put his land. 
These perceptions led them to a pragmatic statement of 
the nature of the neighbour relationship as a social phenome-
non, a consequence and feature of the nature of human existence 
in a social order. They spoke of the 'compromises that belong 
to social life', of the fact that 'the affairs of life in 
a dense neighbourhood cannot be carried on without mutual 
(7) 
sacrifices of comfort'. These compromises created 'a rule 
(4) Cf Mellor J in Tipping v St Helens Smelting Co (1865) 
3 3 LJ QB 66 at 67: 
'When [a landowner] sends on the property of his 
neighbour noxious smells, or smoke or vapours, then 
he .is not doing an act on his own property only, but 
he is doing an act on his neighbour's property also, 
because every man by common law has a right to the 
pure air....' 
(5) Cf Knight Bruce VC in Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 
315 at 3 24: 
'[There are] notorious instances of various kinds in 
which the rights of a neighbouring occupier ... pre-
vent a man from using his own land, as, but for those 
rights, he profitably and usefully and lawfully might. 
Nothing is better recognised than that a man may be 
disabled from building on his own land as he may wish 
by reason of his neighbour's rights'. 
See too Cresswell J in Smith v Kenrick (1849) 7 CB 515 
at 5 65. 
(6) See Pollock CB in Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 67 
at 8 0: 
'The compromises that belong "to social life, and upon 
which the peace and comfort of it mainly depend, fur-
nish an indefinite number of examples where some ap-
parent natural right is invaded, or some enjoyment 
abridged, to provide for the more general convenience 
or necessities of the whole community'. 
(7) See Erie CJ in Cayey v Ledbitter (1863) 14 CB (NS) 471 
at 4 7 6 : 
'the affairs of life in a dense neighbourhood cannot 
be carried on without mutual sacrifices of comfort; 
(continued on the next page) 
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of give and take, live and let live' whose justification 
was the public advantage, the need to advance the enjoyment 
* 4- O ) ' +. A A • A 4- ( 1 0 ) . 
of property, trade and industry. 
Given these premisses the judges in Hole v Barlow, 
Bamford v Turnley and the St Helens case sought to express 
the nuisance concept in terms which not only explicitly 
recognised the reciprocal nature of neighbour relations but 
which provided the conceptual framework for applying the law 
of nuisance in a way which gave effect to the principle of 
evaluating the reciprocal interests of both parties in a 
nuisance action. 
To this end they had before them the model of the cal-
culus of the balancing of conveniences devloped by the courts 
of equity. But, as judges of common law, their task was to 
describe this model in terms suited to the methodology of the 
common law and in a way which preserved the integrity of the 
historic origins of the nuisance concept in the Assize of 
Nuisance and the action on the case for Nuisance. 
(7) (continued) 
and that, in all actions for discomfort, the law 
must regard the principle of mutual adjustment....' 
^n Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co (18 66) LR 2 
QB 223 at 247 the same judge spoke of the fact that be-
tween neighbours 'proximity necessitates mutual for-
bearance ' . 
(8) See Bramwell B in Bamford v Turnley (supra) at 84 
(cited above 290). 
(9) See especially the reasoning of Bramwell B in the passage 
cited in the previous note. 
(10) Cf Willes J in Hole v Barlow (1858) 4 CB (NS) 334 at 345: 
'The common-law right which every proprietor of a 
dwelling-house has to have the air uncontaminated 
and unpolluted, is subject to this qualification, 
that necessities may arise for an interference with 
that right pro bono publico, to this extent, that 
such interference be in respect of a matter essen-
tial to the business life'. 
See too Lord Westbury in the St Helens case (1865) 11 
HL Cas 642 at 650l 
'If a man lives in a town, it is necessary that he 
should subject himself to the consequences of those 
operations of trade which may be carried on in his 
immediate locality, which are actually necessary for 
trade and commerce, and also for the enjoyment of 
property and for the benefit of the town and of the 
public at large'. 
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Possibly the most successful effort at producing an 
appropriate formulation of the nuisance concept was provided 
in the famous undelivered judgment prepared by sir William 
Erie in the case of Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co 
(1867). The case involved the question whether the applicant 
was entitled to compensation for the 'injurious affectation' 
of his premises by the noise, smoke and vibration caused by 
the defendant's railway. In order to succeed it was necessary 
for the plaintiff to establish that the noise etc amounted 
to a nuisance actionable at law. In considering whether that 
had been established Erie CJ dilated upon the nature of the 
concept of nuisance, obviously having in mi^d the implications 
of the decisions in Hole v Barlow; Bamford v Turnley and the 
(12) 
St Helens c a s e . 
Erie CJ began by formulating 'the usu^i rights of 
property' between 'adjoining owners': 
'Each owner, as against his neighbour, has a right to 
cause some noise , smoke and vibration o n his o w n land 
and is not liable to an action if part of 'such noise 
smoke and vibration extends to his neighbour's land'.^I1*) 
(11) As Erie CJ he presided at the hearing 0f the case. 
However before the decision of the court was announced 
he resigned his position, with the result that his judg-
ment did not form part of the formal Record of the case. 
It is however reproduced as an appendix to the judge-
ments delivered. See (1867) LR 2 QB 233 at 246. 
Pollock CB too was a member of the court but delivered 
no judgment. 
(12) He noted (at 2 48) that the plaintiff 'had to maintain 
the same point as the plaintiff maintained in Hole v 
Barlow'. He also referred specifically to that decision 
'and the cases in sequel thereto' as exemplifying what 
he had to say (see at 247). Cf the judgment of Channell B 
(at 23 6) who treated the harm as an actionable nuisance 
'within the ordinary definition and the rule to be de-
duced from the recent case of Bamford v Turnley, re-
viewing the decision in Hole v Barlow'. "Montague Smith J 
too regarded the facts as establishing a n actionable 
nuisance on the authority 'not only of the old cases but 
in the following recent decisions : Bamford v Turnley; 
St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping . . . .1_^TalT_2 40TT 
(13) At 247. 
(14) Cf the observation of the majority of the court in ••x 
Bamford v Turnley that 'a man may, without being liable 
to an action, exercise a lawful trade ... notwithstanding 
it be carried on so ... as to be an annoyance ... provided 
the trade be so conducted that it does not cause what 
(continued on the next page) 
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The neighbour's cause of action where his land was so in-
vaded would lie, if at all 
'in the excess of the damage beyond what is con-
sidered reasonable, after taking into account 
the circumstances of time and place, and quantity 
of annoyance, and the relation of adjoining 
properties to each other'. 
This formula contains three main components. The first 
is the element of damage which had a dual function. It served, 
in the first place, to mark off those instances in which a 
landowner suffered some effect upon his own interests brought 
about by an activity of a neighbour which was of such a type 
or character as not to deserve the redress of the law. In 
other words it indicated those harms which were damnum sine 
injuria. Although expressed so as to emphasise the matter of 
the harm caused, the element necessarily tended to put in 
issue the question of the nature of the act causing the harm 
and required a determination whether the act was unlawful or 
not. In the second place the damage element came to serve as 
one of the considerations to be taken into account in consider-
ing whether the conduct of the defendant was unreasonable. 
The second component in the formula is the test of 
reasonableness. In essence it called upon the judicial 
officer to determine the social costs of the activities which 
had brought about the damage and to consider which of these 
activities should be preferred In terms of the broad social 
interests involved. In particular it called for an evaluation 
of the harm suffered by the plaintiff and a balancing of this 
against the utility and propriety of the conduct of the de-
fendant which had brought about the harm. 
The third component in this formula is the factor of the 
'circumstances of the case'. This factor seeks to identify 
(14) (continued) 
amounts, in point of law, to a nuisance....' (see 
above 288). Cf also the dictum of Erie CJ In" Smith v 
Thackerah (1866) LR 1 CP 564 that a person 'may build 
a chimney ... and the smoke from it may annoy you, or 
he may carry on a trade next door ... the noise of which 
may be inconvenient; but unless the smoke or noise be 
such as to do you appreciable damage, you have no right 
of action against him for what is a lawful act1. 
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and elaborate the particular considerations which were to be 
thrown onto the balance established by the test of reasonable-
ness . 
2. The Components 
2.1. Damage 
Historically the award of a nuisance remedy had always 
been dependant upon proof that the plaintiff had suffered 
(15 ) 
damage of some sort or another. Since Bracton's time it 
had been equally clear that it was not damage per se which 
entitled the plaintiff to his remedy but rather damage of a 
( 1 R ) 
certain kind or character. This latter principle of 
course enabled the Victorian judges to propound and justify 
their idea that the actionability of a nuisance was to be de-
termined by the rule of give and take, live and let live, 
insofar as it held that a landowner was required to endure 
certain types of damage as part of the cost of social and 
economic advancement. 
(a) Unlawful Damage 
In essence, the principle relied upon in Bamford v 
Turhley and the St Helens case was that a plaintiff could only 
succeed in a nuisance action where the damage suffered by him 
(17 ) 
was of a type which the law judged to be unlawful. 
Damnum Sine injuria 
In principle the lawfulness or otherwise of nuisance 
damage fell to be determined by considerations of policy. The 
(15) See above 40. 
(1.6) See above 42. 
(17) Cf the remarks of Erie J in Bonomi v Backhouse (18 59) 
EB & E 622 at 643: 
'As a general principle, it is difficult to conceive 
a cause of action from damage when no right has been 
violated, and no wrong has been done. The maxim sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is mere verbiage. A 
party may damage the property of another where the 
law permits; and he may not where the law prohibits...' 
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question of policy of course was that of the extent to which 
the courts should regard the external effects of land-use 
activities as being the subject of actions for nuisance. To • 
a large extent the basic policy of the law had been laid down 
in the seventeenth century in the form of decisions that a 
landowner could not complain of damage in the form of inter-
ferences with privacy or prospect or other matters of 'de-
light'. 
De Minimis non curat lex 
General legal policy also required that persons should 
not complain of injuries which were slight or trivial. This 
doctrine was expressed by the maxim de minimis non curat lex, 
and there is evidence,that the courts had applied this prin-
(19 ) 
ciple xn relation to nuisance actions. It is found ex-
pressed in early cases of nuisances to navigation and in 
(21) 
the comic case of Evans v Lisle (18 36) where Lord Denman 
observed that 
'There are many nuisances which the law will not 
recognise; as by building so as slightly to ob-
struct another's light, or shut out his view of a 
fine prospect, and the like. You must be satisfied 
that the plaintiff has sustained some substantial 
damage'. 
'Material' harm 
The courts of equity had applied an analagous principle 
in considering the award of injunctions, holding that the in-
junction would not issue unless the plaintiff had suffered 
(18) Cf above 117. For the attitude of the nineteenth cen-
tury judges to these matters see below 408, 410. 
(19) See Brenner 'Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution' 
(1974) 3 Jo Legal Studies 403 a.t 415: 'There has been 
an informal rule in English law from earliest times, 
and it is a rule of utterly unimpeachable wisdom, that 
petty and inconsequential grievances be summarily dis-
missed should some ill-advised and overly litigious 
plaintiff carry his complaint to court'. 
(20) See above 189 n 119. 
(21) (1836) 7 Car & P 562. 
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(22 ) 
'material' harm. The common law judges in Bamford v 
Turnley and the cases descended therefrom enunciated a similar 
doctrine to the effect that nuisance harm was actionable only 
prin 
(24) 
(23 ) . . if it were shown to be material, justifying this principle 
by way of a tacit appeal to the de minimis principle. 
In fact the proposition that only 'material' nuisance 
harm gave a cause of action amounted to a principle that a 
landowner who suffered an invasion of his natural rights of 
property could not rely upon the mere fact of the invasion of 
(25 ) 
his right as a basis for seeking redress. Rather, the 
(22) See above 236-7. 
(23) See Mellor J in the St Helens case (cited above 296); 
Erie CJ in Smith v Thackerah (18 6~6) LR 1 CP 564 at 566, 
Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co (1866) LR 1 QB 
223 at 246. Cf Blackburn J in Scott v Firth (1864) 
4 F & F 349 where he told a jury that noise and vibra-
tions would be a nuisance if they produced 'not merely 
a nominal, but ... a sensible and real damage'. 
(24) The classic exposition of the significance of the notion 
of materiality of the harm in cases of common law nui-
sance was provided in Fleming v His lop (1886) 11 AC 686. 
There Lord Selborne LC observed Tat 690) that the 
'word "material" is of great importance there - it 
excludes any sentimental, speculative, trivial dis-
comfort or personal annoyance of that kind, a thing 
which the law may be said to take notice of and 
have no care for'. 
Lord Bramwell (at 694) (as he then was) explained its 
role as being 
'to explain to a jury what it is which would consti-
tute a nuisance as distinguished from something that 
which might, indeed, be perceptible, but not of such 
a substantial character as to justify the interference 
of the court or allow the maintenance of an action'. 
(25) There was clear authority in the earlier cases that a 
plaintiff could succeed in a nuisance action on proof 
of a mere invasion of his common law rights without 
having to prove actual damage suffered (see Bateh's 
case (1610) 9 Co Rep 5 3b), Fay v Prentice (1845) -1 CB 
828), the law presuming the damage from the violation of 
the right (Embrey v Owen (1851) 6 Exch 3 53 at 3 68). In 
actions for interferences with easements this continued 
to be the rule in order to guard against prescriptive 
abrogation of the easement, see Harrop v Hirst (186 8) 
LR 4 Exch 43. ' 
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rule was now that in addition to the breach of right he had 
to show that he had suffered harm or damage which was of a 
character or degree that justified the award of a nuisance 
remedy. Such an approach was of course consistent, with 
the basic rationale of the revised concept of a nuisance, 
enabling the courts to look to the rule of give and take, 
live and let live as determining whether a nuisance was action-
able rather than having to hold that a nuisance existed merely 
because a right had been violated, however slightly. 
Further, it seems plain that the judges conceived of 
the materiality of the harm as a flexible concept to be used 
in arriving at value judgments on the conflicting claims be-
tween neighbours. Certainly the idea of what constituted a 
'material' harm was sufficiently vague to allow it to be used 
(27) 
this way and, as a reading of the cases shows, the courts 
applied the materiality test in a way which considerably ex-
(28 ) 
ceeded the limits suggested by the de minimis doctrine. 
(b) Lawful Harm 
The question of the lawfulness of nuisance damage some-
times fell to be considered in the light of an argument that 
the plaintiff had no cause of action since the defendant was 
lawfully entitled to inflict harm upon the plaintiff. This 
argument took two forms: (i) that the nuisance damage was 
(29 ) 
authorized by statute or (ii) that the defendant had ac-
quired a prescriptive right to inflict the harm upon the 
plaintiff. 
(26) The question of exactly what type of damage would so 
qualify fell to be determined under the test of reason-
ableness. See below 329. 
(27) As Sir William Erie pointed out in Brand's case (1866) 
LR 2 QB 223 at 247 when he noted that 'there is no stan-
dard by which to measure degrees of annoyance ... [T]he 
degree of tolerance to be required is measured by the 
sensibility to feelings of delicacy of the tribunal which 
has to decide the case, and cannot be foreseen till that 
decision is given'. 
(28) See Brenner op cit (n 19) at 415// who by examining the 
nature and extent of the pollution of the industrialized 
localities suggests that the courts tolerated interferences 
with landowners' rights to a healthy environment that went 
far beyond the sort of limits envisaged by the de minimis 
principle. 
(29) And hence rendered not unlawful: see belowj 
(continued on the next page) 
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(i) Statutory authorization 
According to notions of constitutional government pre-
vailing at the time, the only manner in which entrepreneurs 
could set about developing the new modes of transportation -
canals, railways, tramways - or other utilities - gas-works, 
electricity - was by parliamentary sanction granted by way of 
a private act. Of related importance were the private 
'Improvement ' Acts which, as we have seen, became the usual 
method of suppressing public nuisances in towns or localities. 
The purpose of this type of legislation was to empower local 
authorities or private entrepreneurs to undertake the works 
and activities specified in the act. Since these operations, 
in the nature of things, touched upon or interfered with pri-
vate rights the question soon arose whether the owner of 
private property had recourse in law for injuries suffered as 
a result of acts done under the enabling legislation. 
(3 
In the field of nuisance law this question first arose 
crisply in relation to the nuisances caused by railways. The 
seminal case was R v Pease (1832) concerning, appropriately 
enough, nuisances perpetrated by the owners of the world's 
first passenger railway service in carrying on their enter-
(32 ) 
prise. Pease's case, which was a case of public nuisance, 
was relied upon in Vaughan v Taff Vale Railway Co (1860) in 
(29) (continued) 
Cf Channell B in Stockport Waterworks Co v Potter (18 61) 
1 H & N 160 at 167: 
'In R. v Pease what was complained of was a legalized 
nuisance'. 
(30) Cf Holdsworth 11 HEL 615-.6, and, generally, Clifford 
A History of Private Bill Legislation. See too Linden 
'Strict Liability, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization' 
(1966) 4 Osgoode Hall LJ 196. 
(3.1) The matter had arisen earlier in a related area in con-
nection with interferences with private property in the 
course of works undertaken in terms of local improvement 
acts: Leader v Moxton (1773) 3 Wils KB 461, British Cast 
Plate Manufacturers v Meredith (1792) 4 TR 794. 
(32) (183 2) 4 B & Ad 30. For the facts of the case see above 
172 n 62. The court construed the enabling act as con-
templating that, by authorizing the use of locomotive en-
gines on the railway, some inconvenience would be caused 
to users of the adjoining highway 'for the sake of the 
greater good to be obtained by other parts of the public 
for the more speedy conveyance of merchandize along the 
new railroad'. 
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enunciating a general rule that there could be no liability 
for injuries arising from activities sanctioned by the legis-
t s ) 
lature. Vaughan's case was applied to private nuisances 
in the Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co. There the 
question was whether the plaintiff could obtain compensation 
for the 'injurious affectation' of his property by the noise 
and vibration of the working of a railway. The 'affectation' 
was in the nature of a nuisance and, in considering the plain-
tiff's rights, the judges had occasion to consider the question 
whether the plaintiff would have succeeded in an action for 
nuisance. Since the railway operated under the authority of 
a private act the question thus arose whether any common law 
right of action he might have had was affected by the fact of 
the legislative authorization for the working of the railway. 
( 34 ) 
In the court of Queen's Bench it was held that the plain-
tiff had no right to compensation, Mellor J intimating that 
the damage he had suffered, by reason of the statutory authori-
(35 ) 
zation, had to be regarded as damnum absque injuria. The 
court of Exchequer Chamber in deciding an appeal against 
(33) The action in this case was brought in negligence for 
damage caused by fires ignited by sparks from locomotive 
engines plying along the defendant's railway line. In 
the court of Exchequer the defendants were held liable, 
the defence of statutory authorization being .brushed 
aside (see Vaughan v Taff Vale Railway Co (1858) 3 H & N 
743). The decision was reversed in the court of Exchequer-
Chamber (5 H & N 769), it being held that R v Pease 'has 
settled that when the legislature has sanctioned the use 
of a locomotive engine, there is no liability for injury 
caused by using it, so long as every precaution is taken 
consistent with its use' (per Blackburn J at 688). 
(34) (1866) LR 1 QB 130. 
(35) The plaintiff he said (at 143) had to show that in terms 
of the legislation he was entitled to compensation for 
the sort of injury which he had sustained 'and that it 
is not damnum absque injuria'. The reason why the legis-
lature might have designated damage in these circumstances 
as not unlawful, he suggested, was that otherwise railway 
companies would be subject 'to claims from a multitude 
of persons' with the result that it would be 'almost im-
possible to construct a railway near a large town.... 
[T]he legislature may have thought that so important an 
undertaking ought not to be sacrificed to their [land-
owner's] convenience'. 
(36) Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co (186 6) LR 2 QB 
223; (1867) J6 LJ (NS) QB 133. 
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the decision of the Queen's Bench, considered especially the 
matter of the actionability of the nuisance suffered by the 
plaintiff. Baron Bramwell, in holding the plaintiffs en-
titled to compensation was inclined to question the correct-
(37 ) 
ness of R v Pease and Vaughan's case. Channell B, in 
dissenting from the opinion of the other members of the court, 
held that the plaintiffs' right of action at common law which, 
he pointed out, was established by Bamford v Turnley, had to 
be regarded as being 'taken away' by parliament, relying for 
( 38 ) 
this proposition on Vaughan's case. Montague Smith J 
though differing from Channel B on the question of compensa-
tion, agreed on this point. The plaintiffs, he held, had in 
terms of Bamford v Turnley and the St Helens case suffered a 
nuisance which was not excusable on the ground that the de-
fendant company was carrying on a lawful trade in a proper 
place. The question, however, was 
'whether parliament which, by legalizing the acts of 
the company, has taken away from the owners of the 
land their right to recover damages for what would 
otherwise have been an actionable wrong ... [The 
company's] acts having been (as I'agree) authorised 
by statute, and thereby rendered lawful, the injury, 
however great, is without remedy','39) 
The decision of the Exchequer Chamber, that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to compensation, was appealed to the House of 
(40 
Lords where the decision of the Queen's Bench was restored. 
There the judges, having been summoned to advise the House, 
said that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation. 
Blackburn J considered especially the matter of statutory 
authorization of nuisances, taking it to be agreed that the 
Legislature might authorise acts which would otherwise be 
(37) At 230-5. See also his express holding to this effect 
in Hammersmith and City Railway Co v Brand (186 9) 
(below n 40). 
(3 8) At 23 6. 
(39) At 240-1. 
( 4 0 ) Hammersmith and City Railway Co v Brand (1869) LR 4 HL 
171; (1869) 38 LJ QB 265; [1861-73J ALL ER Rep 60. 
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(41) 
wrongful, and holding that such was the position in the 
instant case. 
Baî on Bramwell, on the other hand, entered a vigorous 
dissent, holding Pease and Vaughan's cases to be wrongly de-
., . (43) cided. 
The House of Lords did not agree with Bramwell B. Lord 
Chelmsford dealt with his argument by saying that parliament 
by authorizing the use of locomotive engines must be taken, 
'upon the principle of law, that cuicunque aTiquis quid con-
cedit concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non 
potuit', to have authorized their use in a way which caused 
(41) He seems however to have entertained some doubts about 
this principle, observing that if the House were to 
over-rule R v Pease and Vaughan's case 'the consequence 
would follow that any owner of a house or field so ad-
jacent to a railway that the inevitable consequence 
from the working of the line amounted to a nuisance ... 
might stop the working of the line. So large an amount 
has been invested in the belief that trains might be run, 
even though some mischief to others was inevitable, that 
I think your lordships will hold that, even if the prin-
ciple of R v Pease was originally an error, it has long 
become communis error, and ought to have been held to 
have made the lavF (3 8 LJ QB 2 65 at 273). 
(42) 'I come ... to the conclusion that but for the statutes 
the plaintiffs would have had a right of action for the 
vibration ... and that the statutes have taken away that 
right of action' (at 2 74). 
(43) '... I think those cases clearly wrong, and that they 
have proceeded on an inadvertent misapprehension of the 
object and effect of the clauses in question' (at 269). 
His lengthy judgment is devoted to establishing these 
contentions. His reasoning may be summed up in this way: 
the enabling acts do not contain any express provision 
legalizing or allowing nuisances. The power granted to 
use locomotive engines could not be construed as legali-
zing the nuisances caused by them since a citizen did 
not require parliamentary sanction to operate a locomo-
tive . The citizen however may not operate such an 
engine as to be a nuisance to others and if parliament 
had intended to so authorize him it would be expected to 
say so in express terms (38 LJ QB 265 at 269/f). 
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nuisances to others. To adopt any other view would 'soon 
(till) 
put a stop to the use of railways'. Lord Cairns agreed 
with this proposition, holding that the effect of 'the legis-
lation on this subject is to take away entirely any right of 
action on the part of the landowner against the railway com-
(45 ) 
pany for damage that the landowner has sustained'. 
The Brand case thus clearly established a principle 
that nuisance damage could be regarded as being not unlawful 
where the act causing the damage was sanctioned by parliament 
The principle may be seen to be derived from a judicial con-
(47) cern to protect infant industries and local authorities by 
preserving them from the consequences of activities carried 
on without negligence and for the public advantage. To the 
extent that this policy led the courts into establishing a 
general rule that nuisances were not actionable if they en-
joyed statutory sanction, they tended to qualify the rule in 
(46) 
(44) [186X-73] All ER Rep 60 at 65. 
(45) Lord Cairns reasoned that parliament intended the rail-
way to be used, and if it could not be used without 
causing vibration which damaged adjoining landowners it 
was illogical to hold that the landowner retained his 
common law right of action to proceed against such 
damage: 
'... if it was intended to preserve to the adjacent 
landowner his right of action, the consequence would 
be that action after action would be maintainable 
against the railway company ... [and that] the Court 
of Chancery would interfere by injunction and would 
prevent the railway from being worked, which of course 
is a reductio ad absurdam, and would defeat the in-
tention of the legislature' ([1861-73] All ER Rep 60 
at 7 2). 
(46) Cf R v Bradford Navigation Co (1865) 6 B & S 631 where 
the principle was recognised in relation to public nui-
sances. Cockburn CJ there held that R. v Pease (supra 
(n 32)) established that that which amounted to a nuisance, 
and would have been 'actionable or indictable' as such, 
when authorized by the legislature 'the criminal or un-
lawful character of the act was taken away'. Cases 
which followed the Brand decision include Dungey v London 
Corp (1869) 38 LJ CP 298; Smith v London & S W~Rwy Co 
(18.70) 6 CP 14; City of Glasgow Union Rwy Co v Hunter 
(187 0) LR 2 Sc & Div 78; Metropolitan Asylum District 
v Hill (1881) 6 AC 193 at 201, 203, 211. 
(47) Cf British Cast Plate Glass Co v Meredith (1792) 4 TR 794: 
'If this action were allowed every Turnpike Act, Paving 
Act and Navigation Act would give rise to an infinity of 
actions'. See also Dungey v London Corporation (supra). 
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circumstances where the issues of policy were not such as to 
justify this blanket authorization of nuisance harms to the 
private citizen. Thus we find, after the Brand case, decisions 
holding that a nuisance caused by a sewer or the discharge 
rr C+9) . ., • , ,. . , -, (50) 
of sewerage, by the maintenance of stables or a small-
(51) (59) 
pox hospital\ by polluted waters in a canal, or the 
(53 ) 
diversion of a stream, although ostensibly sanctioned by 
statute, was actionable. 
This restriction of the general principle was achieved 
by a tendency to adopt a strict interpretation of the en-
(514.) 
abling statute or to find that the legislature granted 
(55 ) 
only premisslve powers or to find that the legislature 
did not intend the establishment of an enterprise in a resi-
dential locality. Another method employed to restrict 
( 4 8 ) Attorney-General v Leeds Corporation (1870) 5 Ch App 583, 
(49) Attorney-General v Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum (18691)' 
4 Ch App 146. 
(50) Rapier v London Tramways [1893] 2 Ch 588. 
(51) Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (18 81) 6 AC 193. 
(52) R v Bradford Navigation Co (1865) 6 B & S 631. 
(53) C P R v Parke [1899] AC 535. 
(54) See Attorney-General v Leeds Corporation (supra), 
Attorney-General v Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum (supra), 
Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (supra). It is 
noteworthy that in Pease's, Vaughan's and Brand\s cases 
the courts were prepared to imply the intention of the 
legislature to authorize nuisances in the absence of 
express wording to this effect. In fact cases in which 
this approach has been adopted are now in a minority, 
the more usual approach being, to apply the rule of 
strict interpretation. 
(55) See Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (supra) at 213: 
'... where the terms of the statute are not imperative 
but permissive ... the fair inference is that the legis-
lature intended that the discretion be exercised in 
strict conformity with private rights ' . See also R_ v 
Bradford Navigation (supra), where R v Pease is distin-
guished . 
(56) See Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (supra); 
Rapier v London Tramway Co" (supra). See too Mudge v 
Penge U C (1917) 86 LJ Ch 126. 
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the operation of the general principle was for the courts to 
adopt a special meaning for the word 'negligence' in connec-
tion with the rider to the r>ule that statutory authority only 
(57 ) 
covered those acts done without negligence. The effect 
of this approach was to hold that an act done under statutory 
authorization was negligent if it in fact caused damage to 
( S 8 ) 
others. There can be little doubt that these various 
techniques for limiting the immunity afforded by the general 
principle were based on a concern for the damage suffered by 
those who were the victims of the activity for which immunity 
i • A (59) was claimed. 
It is also worth noting that the courts in applying the 
principle of statutory authorization were alert to the nature 
of the harm caused and suffered and seem to have been prepared 
to grant immunity only where the harm was of a comparatively 
trivial nature. 
(ii) Prescription 
Throughout the nineteenth century there prevailed a 
theory that nuisance damage might be rendered not unlawful by 
reason of the operation of the doctrine of prescription. 
(57) See above-
(58) See Geddis v Barm Reservior Proprietors (1878) 3 AC 43 0 
at 4 5 5 per Lord Blackburn: 
'If by a reasonable exercise of the powers ... given 
by statute ... the damage could be prevented it is, 
within this rule, "negligence" not to make such 
reasonable exercise of their power'. 
(59) The Courts were more inclined to allow the claim of 
statutory authorization where the plaintiff was in any 
event entitled to compensation for the harm suffered. 
See Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (18 81) 6 AC 193 
at 201. Cf Price ' s Patent "Candle Co v London CC [190 8] 
2 Ch 52 6: 
'Certain general principles have been laid down in 
cases of nuisance. First, there is a presumption that 
a public body, whether a trading body or not, is not 
authorized to create a nuisance ... unless compensation 
is provided. Secondly, this presumption must yield 
where the language of the statute is sufficiently clear 
to authorize the nuisance without compensation'. 
(60) In Brand's case the harm was in the nature of 'sensible 
personal discomfort' involving vibrations and air 
(continued on the next page) 
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Essentially this theory held that it was possible for a land-
owner to acquire, by prescription, an easement to use his 
land in a way which perpetrated what was a nuisance upon his 
neighbour. By reason of the existence of such an easement 
the nuisance, it was said, was 'legalized' and thus not 
actionable. 
The Concept 
Established principles of English law held that proprie-
tary rights over land could be said to have been acquired by 
way of long-established use or, in other words, the lapse of 
( f\ i ̂  
time. We have seen that this idea had been relied upon 
in the seventeenth century to confer upon landowners' rights 
to receive lateral light for their habitations and as a basis 
/CO') 
for the acquisition of rights in flowing waters. We have 
seen too that rights acquired in this way were conventionally 
designated as easements and, as such, were distinguished from 
the so-called 'natural' rights of property. The idea that a 
landowner might acquire a right in alieno solo by prescrip-
tion, not surprisingly, led to the theory that among the 
rights capable of being so acquired was the right to perpetrate 
upon a neighbouring landowner that which the common law would 
designate as a nuisance. The thinking here was that as a 
nuisance amounted to a diminuition of a landowner's natural 
rights of property it could be seen as being analagous to an 
easement and as such could be acquired prescriptively as could 
(60) (continued) 
pollution. As we have seen (above 3 00) this type of 
injury was less liable to be protected by the courts 
than that involving material harm to property. It is 
thus significant that Jones v Festinog Rwy Co (1868) 
LR 3 QB 733; Gas, Light Co v St Mary's Tl885) 15 QB D 
1 (CA); CPR v Parke L1899J AC 535, which were cases in 
which immunity was not allowed, all involved damage in 
the form of material harm to property. See generally 
Linden op cit (n 27) at 217. 
(61) Holdsworth 7 HEL 3 43//. 
(62) Above 122-3, 139-40. 
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an easement. Conversely this principle suggested the idea 
that a landowner, relying on long established use, could re-
sist the claims of neighbours that his land-use activities 
amounted to an actionable nuisance. Such an idea gained 
support from the doctrine of prior occupation. That doctrine, 
as we have seen, suggested that a land use activity by the 
priority of its establishment was to prevail over other, 
later-established and conflicting, uses. '* The doctrine of 
prescriptive legalization of nuisances was variant of this 
idea in that it laid down that such previously established 
activities were immune if they had existed for a pre-deter-
• A • A * +• (64) 
mined period of time. 
Development: 
The idea that a landowner might prescriptively acquire 
the right to inflict a nuisance upon his neighbours had some 
f c n \ 
tacit and obscure recognition in the earlier law. It also 
received express recognition in the nineteenth century in re-
lation to nuisances against water rights, particularly the 
landowner's right to receive waters in an unpolluted COn-
dition. OD However up until 183 8 there was no clear authority 
on the question whether the right to perpetrate a nuisance to 
the personal sensibilities of a neighbour (by pollution of the 
atmosphere, noise, vibration etc) could be acquired by pre-
( fi7 ) 
scription. In that year the important case of Bliss v Hall 
was decided. 
(63) Above 2 54. 
(64) Above 2 56. 
(65) The authorities usually dwell on the question whether the 
nuisance in question was of 'ancient' origin or not, im-
plying that things anciently established were not liable 
to suppression as a nuisance (see above 122 n 12.8, 139 
n 60). Cf Viner. Abr Nusance, G pi 18 who offered the 
proposition that an 'ancient brew house time out of mind' 
would not be regarded as nuisance, adding 'contra if a 
brew-house should be new erected'. 
(66) See Wright v Williams (1836) 1 M & W 177; Wood v Waud 
(1849) 3 Exch 748. 
(67) (1838) 4 Bing (NO 183; 7 LJ CP 122; 5 Scott 500; 
2 Jur 110. 
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This case was of strategic significance in this con-
( 6 8 ) 
nection. It represents the demise of the judicial romance 
with the doctrine of prior occupation. On the other hand, 
in rejecting that doctrine, it really went no further than 
asserting that priority of occupation could not be pleaded if 
(7 
it had not existed for a prescriptive period of twenty years. 
(68) See also above 275-6. 
(69) Ibid. 
(70) Tindal CJ is reported (in 4- Bing (NC) 185 at 186) to have 
said, 'Unless the Defendant shews a prescriptive right 
to carry on his business in the particular place, the 
Plaintiff is entitled to succeed'. In the Law Journal 
report of the case (7 LJ CP 122 at 123) a rather differ-" 
ent version of his words is given: '... a trade or 
avocation similar to that now complained of, which has 
existed for so long a time as to lead to the conclusion 
that the party who carries it on has purchased the right 
from his neighbour'. In Scott's report (6 Scott 500) 
he is reported to have said that the nuisance was action-
able 'unless the business which creates the nuisance has 
been carried on there for so great a length of time that 
the law will presume a grant from his neighbours in 
favour of the party who causes it'. 
Park J observed that 'Twenty years may ... legalize the 
nuisance ...', citing Elliotson v Feetham (1835) 2 Bing 
(NC) 139 where a claim to be entitled to continue a 
nuisance on the basis that the plaintiff had 'come to1 
it, was required to be supported by proof of occupation 
by the defendant 'of twenty years duration'. 
See too the judgment of Bosanquet J (as reported in the 
Law Journal) 
'A man should enjoy his own property, so as not to 
injure that of his neighbour, unless the party shews 
an exercise of that which is complained of for such 
time as may establish a right'. 
In Scott's report he is quoted as saying: 
'It is clearly not enough in such a case as this for 
the defendant to show a short possession and exercise 
of the plaintiff's possession. Nothing less than a 
twenty year's use will afford a defence'. 
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In the result, Bl1ss v Hall, in repudiating the doctrine 
of prior occupation, gave weight to the theory that a land-
owner might be legally entitled to inflict a nuisance upon his 
neighbours in the form of a prescriptively acquired easement. 
But although the proposition received some uncritical judicial 
(72 ) 
approval, notably m the St Helens case and Crump v 
(73 ) 
Lambert, it was apparent that the courts were in fact 
(71) Gale's Treatise on Easements, first published a year 
after the decision in Bliss v Hall, approved this prin-
ciple, saying that nuisances may be 'legalized by time' 
(at 275), illustrating the proposition in these terms 
(citing Elliotson v Feetham (supra) and Bliss v Hall): 
'Thus the right not to receive impure air is an inci-
dent of property and for any interference with this 
right an action may be maintained; but by an easement 
acquired, a man may, it appears, be compelled to re-
ceive air from him in a corrupted state, as by the 
admixture of smoke or noisome smells, or submit to 
noises caused by the carrying on of certain trades'. 
Significantly he queried some 'ancient authorities' which 
'appear to have recognised a species of right' to inflict 
nuisances 'by an enjoyment, however short', having in 
mind the doctrine of prior occupation as expressed by 
the doctrine of the defence of coming to a nuisance (at 
276). 'These dicta', he concluded (at 279) 'appear to 
be opposed to principle, and the general current of 
authority, both ancient and modern'. 
(72) See Mellor J in the St Helens case (1866) 35 LJ QB 66 at 68: 
'If a man for twenty one years or more has carried on 
in a particular district a work which is noxious to 
his neighbours, and has for a period of time sent 
noxious smells and impure air over the neighbourhood, 
and that, has been submitted to for twenty years, he 
gets in time what is called a prescriptive right to do 
what he has done'. 
So too Lord Westbury LC in the House of Lords, (11 HL Cas 
642 at 65 2) in rejecting the proposition that a landowner 
could be entitled to inflict nuisance harm on a neighbour, 
excepted 'cases where a prescriptive right has been ac-
quired by a lengthened user of the place'. 
(73) (1867) LR 3 Eq 409 at 413 (per Romilly MR): 
'The owner of one tenement cannot cause or permit -to 
pass over, or flow into, his neighbour's tenement any 
one or more of these things in such a way as materially 
to interfere with the ordinary comfort of the occupier 
of the neighbouring tenement, or so as to injure his 
property. It is true that, by lapse of time, if the 
owner of the adjoining tenement, which, in case of 
light or water, is usually called the servient tenement, 
has not resisted for a period of twenty years, then 
the owner of the dominant tenement has acquired the 
(continued on the next page) 
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reluctant to apply it in substantive form in relation to nui-
sances to personal sensibilities. Indeed as early as 1839 in 
( 74 ) . 
the case of Flight v Thomas this reluctance was apparent. 
The case involved a nuisance created by the odours emanating 
from a mixen which, the defendant was able to show, had exis-
ted for the prescriptive period of twenty years. His attempts 
to rely upon this fact as excusing the nuisance were met with 
(75 ) 
much judicial resistance, the court finally taking refuge 
in the technicality that it had not been proved that the odours 
from the mixen had actually crossed the boundary between the 
adjoining tenements. " The somewhat scambling attempts of 
the court in Flight v Thomas to find reasons why the lapse of 
time could not be said to establish a prescriptive right to 
perpetuate a nuisance were overshadowed in subsequent years by 
a series of decisions relating to the acquisition of prescrip-
( 77 ) 
five rights in relation to flowing waters ' and the passage 
(73 )(caretinued) 
right of discharging the gases or fluid, or sending 
smoke or noise from his tenement over the tenement of 
his neighbour; but until that time has elapsed, the 
owner of the adjoining or neighbouring tenement, 
whether he has or has not previously occupied it, - in 
other words, whether he comes to the nuisance or the 
nuisance comes to him, - retains his right to have the 
air that passes over his land pure and unpolluted, and 
the soil and produce of it uninjured by the passage 
of gases, by the deposit of deleterious substances, or 
by the flow of water.1 
(74) (1839) 10 Ad & E 590; 3 Jurist 822; 8 LJ (OS) QB 337. 
(75) This can be gleaned from the reports which consist mainly 
in a record of the colloquy between counsel for the de-
fendant and the Bench. Thus Coleridge J harassed counsel 
with remarks such as 'It is not stated in the plea, that 
the smells had for twenty years passed into or over the 
adjoining soil'; 'The plea does not state that the smells 
have gone beyond the boundary of the defendant's land1; 
'You do not allege a right to make the smell on the 
plaintiff's premises, but only to keep a mixen, whereby 
smells arose'. 
(76) Per Lord Denman CJ: 'The nuisance may never have passed 
beyond the limits of the defendant'^ own land' (10 Ad & S 
590 at 5 92). In the Jurist report, he is said to have 
rejected the plea on the ground that it did 'not even 
say that the plaintiff had any knowledge of the existence 
of the dung-heap'. 
(77) See Chasemore v Richards (18 59) 8 HL Cas 3 49 at 3 86. 
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(78 ) 
of a stream of air which developed and expounded the 
principle that prescriptive acquisition of rights required 
proof of an adverse use on the part of the claimant. This 
principle required that the defendant should establish that 
the plaintiff was aware of the invasion of his rights and had 
either acquiesed therein or negligently failed to resist the 
( 7 9 ) . 
invasion. This of course was a rather different proposi-
tion to the earlier principle which had regarded the mere 
lapse of time as creating the" right (on the fiction of a lost 
grant). Thus when the question next arose, in Ball v Ray 
(1873), of the acquisition by prescription of a right to per-
petuate a nuisance causing personal inconvenience, Mellish LJ 
disposed of it with greater confidence by holding the defen-
dant to be under a burden of proving, in effect, that his use 
(81) (8?) 
had been adverse. And in Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 
the court citing Chasemore v Richards and Webb v Bird, held 
(78) Webb v Bird (1861) 10 CB (NS) 268 (on this case see also 
above 274-5). 
(79) See Chasemore v Richards (supra) at 37 0 (per Wightman J ) : 
'The presumption of a grant only arises where the person 
against whom it is to be raised might have prevented the 
exercise of the subject of the presumed grant'. (see 
too at 3 86 per Lord Wensleydale); Webb v Bird (supra) 
at 2 85 per Wille J: 
'In general, a man cannot establish a right by lapse 
of time and acquiesence against his neighbour, unless 
he shews that the party against whom the right is ac-
quired might have brought an action or done some act 
to put a stop to the claim....' 
(80) (1873) LR 8 Ch App 467. 
(81) 'When this house was first turned into a stable it was 
in all probability a great inconvenience, and caused 
annoyance to the owners of the neighbouring houses; but 
until it became a nuisance, and an actionable nuisance, 
they would have had not remedy on account of that incon-
venience . No doubt the owner of the next house is , under 
such circumstances, in a position of great difficulty as 
to when he should commence his legal proceeding. If he 
commence them too early, when an actionable nuisance 
cannot be proved, he loses, and all the costs will be 
thrown upon him. He therefore naturally waits until 
there really is a nuisance which he can prove beyond all' 
question; and then the Defendant may plead that the 
nuisance has gone on for twenty years. It appears, there-
fore , to be quite correct to throw upon the Defendant 
the burden of proving very clearly that the nuisance has 
really continued during twenty years'. 
In the event the lord justices found that the defendant 
had not discharged this onus, and found for the plaintiff. 
(82) (1879) LR 11 Ch D 852. 
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that the defendant could only succeed upon proof that there 
had been an adverse use of the plaintiff''Js premises. Indeed 
Jessell MR thought it 'impossible' for the defendant to 
establish the easement in the light of the circumstances that 
the nuisance complained of was noise. ~" ' In the Court of 
Appeal Thesiger LJ adopted a similar view. The defendant's 
claim to have acquired an easement to send noise upon the 
plaintiff's land 'was in its nature such that it could not be 
physically interrupted; it could not at the same time be put 
a stop to by action'. This being so the questi0n became 
whether 'use which is neither preventible nor actionable 
[could] found an easement?' The answer was, Thesiger LJ said 
. +, (85) 
in the negative. 
The simple fact is that the nineteenth century judges 
while conceding the theoretical possibility of the acquisi-
tion of a prescriptive right to cause a nuisance to the per-
sonal sensibilities of a neighbour were not prepared to give 
practical application to the theory. " They Severely 
(83) 'The noise was made on the Defendant's owî  premises - in 
his kitchen. Of course you could not go into his kitchen 
without being a trespasser. You could not interrupt it 
there, nor could you interrupt it on your own land be-
cause you had no control over the waves ot sound; nor 
could you have interrupted it by action, because there 
was originally no actionable nuisance' (at 856). 
(84) (1879) LR 11 Ch D at 862. 
(85) See at 863: '... the laws governing the Acquisition of 
easements by user stands thus : Consent oi> acquiescence 
of the owner of the servient tenement lies at the root 
of prescription, and of the fiction of a lost grant, and 
hence the acts or user, which go to the pi>oof of either 
the one or the other, must be, in the language 0f the 
civil law, nee vi nee clam nee precario; for a m a n can-
not, as a general rule, be said to consent to or acquiesce 
in the acquisition by his neighbour of an easement through 
an enjoyment of which he has no knowledge> actual or con-
structive, or which he contests and endeavours to inter-
rupt, or which he temporarily licenses. It is a mere 
extension of the same notion, or rather it is a principle 
into which by strict analysis it may be reso]_vea; to 
hold, that an enjoyment which a man cannot prevent raises 
no presumption of consent or acquiescence'. 
(8.6) H G Wood, the American author of the first treatise on 
nuisance law, in surveying the state of the law towards 
the end of the nineteenth century could find only two 
cases in which the claim to an easement 't0 send a polluted 
atmosphere over another's premises ... has been sustained' 
(continued on the next page) 
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restricted the operation of the principle by insisting upon 
proof of adverse use and adopting a rigid approach to proof 
(87 ) 
of other essentialia. It seems fair to say that this 
attitude was predicated upon their revulsion for the idea that 
a man might by mere lapse of time impose nuisance harms upon 
his neighbours. They had rejected the idea in its guise of a 
. (88) 
doctrine of prior appropriation; their reluctance to imple-
ment the theory of prescriptive acquisition of rights to cause 
nuisances was an extension of this policy. At its deepest 
level this policy may be seen to represent an attempt to re-
move the restraints upon economic development of land that were 
implicit in the doctrine of prior occupation. 
(86) (continued) 
(2 Nuisances s 712 at 917). The cases cited were 
Scottish, Charity v Riddle (18 08) 3 1 M 6 and Duncan v 
Moray (18 09) FC. Cf the American decision of Matthews 
v Stillwater Gas & E L Co (1896) 65 NW 947 where it was 
said "The right is more theoretical than practical, be-
cause of the inherent difficulties in establishing such 
a right by proof1. 
(87) Cf Powell's remark: 'Practically, prescription plays a 
very limited role in the law of nuisance, because of the 
difficulty of establishing the requisite "adverse use" 
(5 Real Property s . 706 at 339). Cf Wood (op cit (n 82) 
at 91"87T 
'Proof that he has polluted the air is not enough; 
he must show that for the requisite period he has sent 
over the land an atmosphere so impure and polluted as 
to operate as an actual invasion of the rights of those 
owning the premises affected and in such a manner that 
the owner might have maintained an action therefor. 
Less that that is insufficient1. 
(88) See Flight v Thomas (supra 3 23); Roberts v Clarke (1868) 
18 LT TNS7 49. 
(89) Cf Powell op cit (supra n 83) ibid: 'By stiff require-
ments as to what constitutes a nuisance, the beginning 
of the running of the prescriptive period is delayed and 
. a too-early fixation of the character of a developing 
neighbourhood is prevented'. Cf Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 
LR 11 Ch D 852 where the court justified its rejection of 
a claim to have acquired an easement to perpetuate a 
nuisance by observing (at 865) that it would be 'from a 
public point of view, inexpedient that the use and value 
of the adjoining land should, for all time and under all . 
circumstances, be restricted and diminished by reason of 
the continuance of acts incapable of physical interrup-
tion, and which the law give no power to prevent ... 
[Recognition of the easement] would ... produce a preju-
dicial effect upon the development of land for residential 
purposes'. For a discussion of the stifling effects of 
the doctrine of prescription upon trade and economic de-
velopment generally, see Horwitz The Transformation of 
American Law 43//. 
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(c) The types of harm 
In the St Helens case Lord Westbury LC said he 
considered it 
'a very desireable thing to mark the difference between 
an action brought for a nuisance upon the ground that 
the alleged nuisance produces material injury to the 
property, and an action brought for a nuisance on the 
ground that the thing alleged to be a nuisance is pro-
ductive of sensible personal discomfort'. 
This distinction of course reflects a tacit recognition of the 
fact that the nuisance concept had come to protect not only 
proprietary interests in land but also interests of personality 
(91) 
of the occupier of real property. Lord Westbury's object 
in making the distinction was however to establish separate 
sets of rules for determining whether a nuisance could be said 
4 - T , . „ + A / , ( 9 2 ) • to have existed. 
In essence the effect of Lord Westbury's doctrine seems 
to be that where a nuisance causes material injury to property, 
the fact of material injury establishes the unlawfulness of 
the harm and thus there is no need for a consideration of 
whether the harm was 'reasonable' according to the circumstances 
(90) (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 at 650. Cf above 298-9. 
(91) Cf above 126 n 154. 
(92) Cf the analysis of Furlong CJ in Kent v Dominion' Steel 
and Coal Corp Ltd (1965) 49 DLR 241 at 248: 
'In general there are two classes of acts which may 
constitute nuisance, the first causing mateiral in-
jury to property, and the second where personal in-
convenience or discomfort in the use and enjoyment 
of property is caused. As to the first class of acts, 
it is fair to say that any material injury to property 
is a nuisance without reference to the circumstances; 
without enquiring as to the character of the activi-
ties carried out or the manner in which they are being 
carried out, or the neighbourhood or the reasonableness 
of use and so on. But these are factors to which re-
gard must be had in consideration of the class of acts 
which result only in discomfort or inconvenience ... 
[where material injury to property is in point it] is 
as though the Westbury proposition had imported into 
the law of nuisance a doctrine closely akin to res 
ipsa loquitur in the law of negligence', 
Cf above 300-1. 
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On the other hand where the injury is to personal comfort 
the mere fact that a plaintiff has suffered harm will not 
per se establish a cause of action and it is necessary to 
consider further whether the harm is unreasonable in the 
(93) light of the circumstances. 
Curiously enough the decisions following the St Helens 
case made little of these elementary principles. There was 
some consideration of what constituted 'material injury to 
(94) 
property' for purposes of the Westbury rule, but for the 
rest the courts did not find it necessary to expatiate on the 
(95 ) 
rule and, indeed, in some cases seemed to have ignored or 
overlooked it. 
(93) Cf the analysis in Kent's case (n 92 above). See also 
Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co [1961] 2 All ER 145. Cf 
Street Torts 216, 226. 
(94) In Gaunt v Fynney (187 2) LR 8 Ch App 8 Lord Selborne C 
seemed to suggest that material damage consisted in 
'the demonstrable effect of a visible or tangible cause 
... producing deleterious physical changes which science 
law trace and explain'. In Salvin v North Brancepeth 
Coal Co (1874) LR 9 Ch App 705 Jessell MR, in discussing 
the St Helens decision, took it to have established that 
the injury 'must be visible' and appears to have dis-
agreed with Lord Selborne's view by observing that the 
damage was not to be established 'by getting a scien-
tific man to say that, by the use of scientific appliances' 
that damage had occurred. On appeal James LJ approved 
this, saying that what Lord Wensleydale meant in the 
St Helens case was that there should be damage of the 
type described by Jessell MR: 'A present injury visible 
to ordinary persons conversant with the subject matter..,.' . 
These dicta indicate that the injury, in addition to 
being 'material' (cf Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co (supra) 
at 151F) must be of a sort that is visible or tangible. 
This would seem to preclude damage in the sense of de-
preciation in value or other economic loss (cf Street 
Torts 217). 
(95) There has been, for instance, no discussion of what 
constitutes 'property' for the purposes of the rule. 
See Street Torts 217. 
(96) See below 352 n 182. 
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2.2. The Element of Reasonableness 
Perhaps the most significant and in many ways the most 
radical modification to the traditional nuisance concept 
effected by the Victorian judges was their insertion to it 
of a test and standard of reasonableness. This flowed from 
their premiss that the law of nuisance was predicated upon a 
principle of the mutual limitation of rights of landownership 
demanded by the social fact of neighbourhood. In seeking to 
express this idea in juridically significant terms they opted 
for the expression 'reasonable'. By it they wished to express 
(97) . . . . 
the notion of proportionality by which the activities of 
neighbours had to be judged. 
Whether the judges were wise in employing so ambiguous 
a term to express such a specialised operation is perhaps 
questionable. Certainly their choice caused the law of pri-
vate nuisance to develop areas of obscurity. On the other 
hand their selection of the term must be seen in the context 
of the era and in the light of the need to preserve the his-
toric continuity of the law. 
The word 'reasonable' had been invoked in nuisance law 
to express a principle of proportionality as far back as 
(98) (99) . . 
1628. Baron Comyns used it in this sense in the 
• i.*. • j ' -u ( 1 0 0 ) .. . ... _ 
eighteenth century and, as we have seen, it was similarly 
relied upon in the highway nuisance cases of the early nine-
teenth century. In 1851 Parke B employed it in Embrey v Owen 
to describe the nature of riparian owners' rights in flowing 
(101) _ _ _ . ._.. , _ ... . • . , , (102) „ . , . waters. Erie J, in Rich v Basterfield, Byles J in 
Hole v Barlow, then employed it to express the nature of a 
i A « • w +. • (103) 
landowner's right to pure air. 
(97) See Powell 'The Unreasonableness of the Reasonable Man1 
1957 Current Legal Problems 104 at 111. 
(98) In Jones v Powell (1628) Hut 135. See above 135-6. 
(99) See Comyns Digest Acton on the Case for Nuisance (C) 
(quoted above 280 n 185). 
(100) See above 269 n 144. 
(101) See above 269. 
(102) See above 278. 
(103) See above 279. 
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The proprietry of the use of the term for these pur-
poses was questioned in the judgment of the majority of the 
court in Bamford v Turnley who appear to have understood the 
test to involve an enquiry whether a reasonable man would 
have established and conducted a trade in the manner that the 
defendant had done. If this was to be the enquiry, and the 
conclusion that the trade had been so conducted were to serve 
as a sufficient defence, the majority repudiated it since it 
would mean that 'however ruinous may be the amount of nuisance 
caused to a neighbour's property ... he is without redress if 
a jury shall ... find that the place where the trade is carried 
(104 ) 
on' was 'reasonable'. ' On the other hand use of the word 
reasonable in this connection was approved by Willes J 
and Pollock CB both of whom appreciated that it might be 
used to establish a principle of mutual limitation of rights 
(104) Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 67 at 77. The words 
quoted above were actually directed at the proposition 
that the trade was not a nuisance if carried on in a 
'convenient' place. That this was also the essence of 
their objection to the reasonableness standard is how-
ever suggested by the fact that Pollock CB (at 80) in 
arguing for the standard, took the occasion to say that 
a jury would never 'find that to be a reasonable act by 
a person which produces any ruinous effect upon his 
neighbours', a fact which, he said 'gets rid of the 
difficulty suggested in the judgment [of the majority 
of the court]'. A further indication of the approach of 
the majority is that in considering specifically the 
appropriateness of the test of a reasonable use of land 
as adopted by Cockburn CJ in Hole v Barlow (see supra 
2 82) they noted that if the 'true doctrine' was that a 
nuisance was determined by the degree of harm caused, 
then it would be improper to ask the jury whether the 
nuisance was caused by a reasonable use of the land. 
This suggests that they saw the test of reasonableness 
as being related to the conduct of the defendant rather 
than to the question whether it was reasonable that the 
plaintiff should endure the harm which the nuisance 
caused Cas suggested by Pollock CB (supra 292)). 
(105) In Hole v Barlow (1858) 4 CB (N"S) 334 at 345 where he 
observed that the 'common law right which every proprietor 
of a dwelling house to have the air uncontaminated and 
unpolluted' was qualified by the necessities of business 
life 'conducted in a reasonable and proper manner, and • 
in a reasonable and proper place'. 
(106) In" Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 67 at 80-1 where he 
said that 
'If the act complained of be done in a convenient 
manner, so as to give no unnecessary annoyance, and 
(continued on the next page) 
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in the ambient air. In Tipping v The St Helen's Smelting Co 
Mellor Jj while avoiding directing the jury in accordance with 
the principles enunciated in Hole v Barlow, and repudiated in 
Bamford v Turnley, nevertheless found it appropriate to intro-
duce a test of reasonableness into his formulation of the law 
in the form of a dictum that '[elverything must be looked at 
, (107) from a reasonable point of view'. In the House of Lords 
this dictum was cited with express approval by Lord Wensley-
C10 8) 
dale (the quondam Parke B of Embrey v Owen) while Lord 
Westbury LC also found it right to invoke the reasonableness 
of a defendant's conduct as a potential justification of a 
(109) 
nuisance. 
In Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co (18 67) Sir 
William Erie also used the term reasonableness in formulating 
the nuisance concept, as a criterion for determining the 
(110) 
materiality of the harm suffered, while Lord Selborne in 
(111) 
Gaunt v Fynney (1872) used it in a similar sense as de-
noting a measure of the degree of damage suffered by the 
plaintiff. 
Perhaps inevitably the presence of the word 'reasonable' 
in the terminology of the revised nuisance concept created a 
certain amount of confusion. The word had, coincidentally, 
(106) (continued) 
be a reasonable exercise of some apparent right, 
or a reasonable use of the land, house or property 
of the party under all the circumstances, in which I 
include the degree of inconvenience it will produce, 
then I think no action can be sustained, if the jury 
find that it was reasonable....' 
(107) See the passage from his judgment quoted at 297 above. 
(10 8) Cf above 300. 
(10 9) Saying that a landowner had no complaint if a neighbour's 
trade was "carried on in a fair and reasonably way"...' 
(11 HL Cas 642 at 650). 
(110) See above at 307. 
(111) (1872) LR 8 Ch App 8 at 12 : 'A nuisance by noise ... 
is emphatically a question of degree ... [Noises], to 
offend against the law, must be done in such a manner 
which, beyond fair controversy, ought to be regarded as 
exceptive and unreasonable'. 
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come at this time to be used in the tort of negligence as a 
measure of the culpability of conduct and there thus emerged 
a belief that in nuisance law the question was whether the 
defendant had acted as a reasonable man. This view, which 
was usually raised as a defence to the plaintiff's contention 
that the defendant had caused him harm, was quickly repudiated 
(112 ) 
by the judges, thereby making it clear that the question 
in nuisance cases was not whether the defendant had acted 
i- ^i (113) negligently. 
(112) Jessell MR in Broder v Saillard (1876) LR 2 Ch D 692 
at 701: 
'[It is] no answer to say that the Defendant is only 
making a reasonable use of his property, for there 
are many trades and many occupations which are not 
only reasonable, but necessary to be followed, and 
which cannot be allowed in the proximity of dwelling 
houses, so as to interfere with the comfort of their 
inhabitants'. 
Cf Kekewitch J in Reinhardt v Mentasti (1889) LR 42 Ch 
D 6 85 at 
'[Nuisance] does not depend on the question whether 
the defendant is using his own reasonably or other-
wise. The real question is, does he injure his 
neighbour?' 
See too t h e remark of t h e same judge in A t to rney -Gene ra l 
v Cole & Son (1901) 1 Ch D 205 
'Can a man reasonably create a nuisance?.. I think 
the answer to be derived from the case of Bamford v 
Turnley from which, so far as I am aware, there has 
never been any departure at all, is that he cannot. 
If he commits a nuisance, then he cannot say he is 
acting reasonably. The two things are self-contra-
i dictory'. 
(113) Cf Winfield 'Nuisance as a Tort' (193 0-2) 1 Camb LJ 189 
at 199: 
'[In nuisance] "reasonable" means something more 
than merely "taking proper care". It signifies what 
is legally right as between the parties taking into 
account all the circumstances, of the case.... . Knocking 
a man down carelessly Is a tort simpliciter; making 
a noise is a tort only sub modo. Thus it must often 
be a pure gamble whether I act lawfully in opening a 
particular business in a street. If I make an error 
of judgment in deciding whether the business is offen-
sive or not, I shall not escape liability by proving 
I took all reasonable care to prevent the business 
from being a nuisance'. 
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The clue to the sense In which the judges understood, 
and used the term 'reasonable' as a component of the nuisance 
concept is found in the way in which they coupled the term to 
(114) 
references to the 'circumstances' of the case, emphasi-
sing that the reasonableness of a land-use activity had to be 
(115 
determined by way of a consideration of these circumstances. 
In other words the test of reasonableness did not, as in 
negligence, relate exclusively to the nature of the defendant's 
conduct. Rather it related to, and had to be applied to, 
( *1 *1 £ ̂  
both the position of the plaintiff and the defendant. 
This of course follows from the fact that, in nuisance, the 
central question is the nature and extent of the restraints 
imposed by vicinage upon a landowner's notionally full rights 
to use and enjoy his property. Since in the nature of things 
enjoyment of these rights is predicated upon mutual limitation 
- Baron Bramwell's rule of give and take, live and . let live -
it is the court's function to determine in each given case, 
exactly the extent of the limitations that can be justified 
by this principle. To this end the test of reasonableness 
was employed as expressing both the need for limitation and 
the need to restrict the limitation. 
(114) Eg Mellor J (above at 29 7) Erie CJ (above at 307). 
Cf Lord Cranworth in Attorney-General v 'Sheffield Gas 
Consumers Co (1853) (cited above at 2 38). 
(115) This principle is well expressed in the judgment of 
Andrew CJ in the American case of Booth v Rome, W & 
0 Terminal Rwy Co (1893) 140 NY 267: "" " 
'The test ... is not whether the use or act causes 
injury to his neighbour's property, or that the in-
jury was the natural consequence, or that the act was 
in the nature of a nuisance; but the inquiry is, 
was the act or use a reasonable exercise of the domin-
ion which the owner of property has by virtue of his 
ownership over his property, having regard to all the 
interests affected - his own and those of his neigh-
bours - and having in view also public policy'. 
(116) Cf Pollock CB in Bamford v Turnley (186 2) 3 B & S 67 at 
81: " " ~ 
'... was [it] reasonable that the defendant should 
be allowed to do what he did, and reasonable that 
the plaintiff should submit to the inconvenience 
occasioned by what was done'. 
3 3 4. 
2.3. The Circumstances 
What the Victorian judges called the 'circumstances' of 
nuisance actions were relevant to the application of the test 
of reasonableness as the determinant of the actionability of 
an alleged nuisance. As such they constituted the raw data 
from which the court constructed its finding as to whether 
the 'nuisance' fell within the limits of toleration postulated 
by the principle of mutual limitation of property rights im-
posed upon adjoining landowners by the fact of vicinage. 
It follows from this that the circumstances did not 
simply consist in the facts which made up the contextual 
scene in which the 'nuisance' occurred. Rather they expressed 
the factual basis upon which the respective claims of the 
parties were based to be able to use their land. On the part 
of the plaintiff, the pertinent 'circumstances' were those 
factors which indicated that the nuisance harm inflicted upon 
him were such as to indicate that he could not be: expected to 
endure it in terms of the rule of give and take, live and let 
(117 ) 
live. From the point of view of the defendant the per-
tinent circumstances were those factors which indicated that 
in terms of the rule, he was entitled to inflict nuisance harm 
(118) 
of the type in question upon the plaintiff. 
The idea that in nuisance actions the courts should ex-
amine and evaluate the circumstances was first advanced in the 
(119 ) 
courts of equity. Byles J had sought to apply the same 
idea in a rudimentary way in common law when, in Hole v 
Barlow, he instructed a jury that it should take into considera-
tion the question of the place where the alleged nuisance had 
(120) . . . 
occurred. The idea received more explicit and rational (117) Cf the discussion of th  circumstance of 'time' bel w 3 48. 
(118) Cf the discussion of the circumstance of 'locality' 
below 3 42 . 
(119) Notably in Wood v Sutcliffe (18 51)(see above 23 8) and 
Attorney-General v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (1853) 
(See above 238). 
(120) See above 2 80. 
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expression m the judgment of Pollock CB in Bamford v 
(121) . . 
Turnley• Mellor J m his subsequently approved direction 
to the jury in the St Helens case required the jury to con-
(12 2) 
sider the various circumstances of the case, and Sir 
William Erie set the principle in its relation to the other 
elements of the nuisance concept in Brand v Hammersmith and 
D ., n (123) " ' " ~" 
Railway Co. 
(a) Locality 
In evaluating the harm suffered by a plaintiff in a 
nuisance action the context or physical milieu in which the 
harm occurred was seen by the Victorian judges to be an in-
(124 ) 
gredient of the test of reasonableness by which the 
actionability of the plaintiff's complaint fell to be deter-
mined. 
The emergence of the doctrine 
Recognition of the significance of the locality in which 
ance occurs is J 
public nuisance cases 
(125 ) 
a nuisance occurs is first apparent in English law in 
(121) See above 291. 
(122) See above 296. 
(123) See above at 307. Cf his earlier formulation of the 
relevance of the 'circumstances' in Cavey v Ledbitter 
(1863) 13 CB (NS) 476 at 477: 
'... the notion that the degree of discomfort which 
might sustain an action under some circumstances must 
therefore do so under all circumstances, is as un-
tenable as the notion that, if the act complained of 
was done in a convenient time and place, it must 
therefore be justified, whatever the degree of annoy-
ance that was occasioned thereby1. 
(124) Cf the rationalisation of the circumstance of locality 
put forward by counsel (later Lush J) in Bamford v 
Turnley (18 62) 3 B & S 67 at 71: 
'There is no proposition of law that every person has 
an absolute right to pure unadulterated air under all 
circumstances: on the contrary every person must en- • 
joy his own property subject to the inconvenience 
necessarily resulting from the reasonable use by his 
neighbour of his own land. That explains the dicta 
that what is a nuisance in one place may not be so in 
another, and whether a thing is a nuisance or not de-
pends on the state of the neighbourhood'. 
(12 5) Int-erestingly, the doctrine had received earlier and more 
(continued on the next page) 
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In R v Neville (1791) the accused was charged with 
perpetrating a public nuisance by the conduct of his business 
of 'melter of kitchen stuff and other grease1. There was 
however evidence that 'there had been manufactories which 
emitted disagreeable and noxious smells carried on in this 
neighbourhood for many years prior to the defendant estab-
lishing himself in the locality. 
Lord Kenyon CJ in the course of the proceedings observed 
that 
'certainly what is a nuisance in one situation is 
not so in another. In places where offensive trades 
have been long carried on they are not nuisances, 
though they may be so in any ... other places where 
such trades have not been exercised'. 
The principle enunciated in Neville's case was cited and 
(12 5) (continued) 
sophisticated recognition in Scot's law in Kinloch v 
Robertson (175 6) 31 Morison 13163 where the Court of 
Sessions, in holding a blacksmiths shop and forge 
situate in an urban area to be a nuisance, observed 
that 
'The connection of close neighbourhood in a burgh 
introduces new duties among the inhabitants. 
Neighbours in towns must submit to ordinary incon-
veniences from each other; but they must be pro-
tected against extraordinary disturbances, such as 
may render their property useless to them.... Close 
neighbourhood introduces this temperament in equity, 
but not in such a manner as to deprive his neigh-
bour of his property. The only difficulty in 
matters of this kind is to bring this temperament 
under a general rule'. 
C f Charity v Riddle (18 08) 31 Morison 6; and see ' 
Trotter v Farnie (1830) 9 Sess Cas 144 where there are 
dicta that-'[e]very nuisance depends on locality and 
degree' and '... everything depends on local situation, 
and the vicinity of other nuisances'. 
(12 6) (1791) Peake 125. 
337. 
applied by Lord Tenterden CJ ( 1 2 7 ) in R v Watts(128^(182 6) 
when he observed 
'that there was no doubt that this trade [that of 
'horse - boiler'] was in its nature a nuisance, said 
that, considering the manner in which the neighbour-
hood had always been occupied, it would not be a 
nuisance unless it occasioned more inconvenience 
as it was carried on by the defendants than it had 
done before'. 
The next occasion in which the significance of locality 
was adverted to was in the leading case on the doctrine of 
(12 9) 
'coming to a nuisance'. In Bliss v Hall (1838) the plain-
tiff set up residence on premises adjoining a candle-maker 
who had carried on this business for some three years already. 
The court held that the defendant could not rely upon his 
prior occupation to excuse the nuisance caused to the plaintiff. 
It would seem however that Vaughan J at least would have been 
prepared to take a different view if the defendant had pleaded 
that the locality was one devoted to industrial enterprise. 
(130) 
He is reported to have said that 
(127) Cf however the earlier case of R v Neil (1826) 2 C & P 
485 where as Abbott CJ the same judge refused to con-
cede that the fact that the defendant's varnish-making 
business was carried out in a neighbourhood which con-
tained other noxious trades (slaughter-houses, a 
brewery, a gas manufactory, grease-melters, and a blood 
boiler) constituted a defence, saying that 
'if there be smells offensive to the senses, that is 
enough, as the neighbourhood has a right to fresh and 
pure air. It has been proved that a number of other 
offensive trades are carried on near this place, 
knackers, melters of kitchen stuff etc. but the pre-
sence of other nuisances, will not justify any one of 
them....' 
(128) (1826) 2 C & P 486. 
(129) (1838) 4 Bing (NO 183; 7 LJ CP 122; 2 Jur 110. 
Also on this case see above 275-6. 
(13 0) (1838) 2 Jurist 110. There are different versions of 
the judgment of Vaughan J in this case. In 4 Bing (NC) 
185 he is reported as making some remarks abour pre-
scription while in the Law Journal report he is recorded 
as reiterating the seventeenth century doctrine that 
trades should be carried on in open places (see above 276). 
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'A thing may be a nuisance or not, according to the 
place in which it is situated...' 
adding that in this case 'any defence' arising 'out of such 
a state of circumstances' ought to have been specially pleaded. 
The real beginnings of the principle that locality might 
serve as a criterion for determining the reasonableness of 
defendant's conduct in relation to the question whether a 
nuisance existed are to be found in a dictum of Lord Cranworth 
(131) 
LC m Attorney-General v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co 
(132 ) (1853). In considering whether the digging up of a public 
highway could be regarded as a public nuisance, he observed 
that 
'All these cases of nuisance or no nuisance arising 
from particular acts, must, from the nature of things, 
be governed by particular circumstances. If a carriage 
were to drive up in Belgrave Square, and stand half the 
day at the door of a house ... I do not think that that 
could be made out to be a nuisance. Suppose, however, 
the same thing happened in a narrow part of the street 
that runs from Covent Garden to St Martins Lane, I do 
not know that that would not be a nuisance.' 
The propriety of employing locality as a factor in con-
sidering whether or not a plaintiff had suffered a nuisance 
(13 3) 
was crisply put xn issue by Byles J In Hole v Barlow. In 
that case, it will be recalled, he put it to a jury that no 
nuisance was committed where an activity was carried on in a 
(134) 
'convenient and proper place'. That he had the factor 
(135 ) 
of locality in mind appears from the following passage in 
(131) This was not apparently the first time he had considered 
the significance of the locality of a nuisance. In the 
St Helens case (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 at 652 he recalled 
that when (as Parke B) he was in the court of Exchequer 
he had tried a case of smoke nuisance in the town of 
Shields, and had instructed the jury that although the 
smoke was 'in some degree' a nuisance to the plaintiff, 
yet 
'I said "You must look at it not with a view to the 
question whether, abstractedly, that quantity of smoke 
was a nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance to a 
person living in the town of Shields1 
(132) (1853) 3 De G M & G 304 at 
, tr i 
(133) (1858) 4 CB NS 334 
(134) See above 278-9. 
(135) 27 LJ CB 207 at 208. 
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his direction in which he sought to explain to the jury what 
he meant by 'convenient and proper place': 
'Suppose the brick-burning was carried on ... in 
St James Park, or in the middle of Berkley Square, 
or in the grounds of the Marquis of Lansdowne close 
by, where the wind would carry the effluvia from the 
clamp over Berkley Square, that clearly is not a 
proper place.... But suppose a new neighbourhood, 
where houses are just beginning to be built, on the 
outskirts of London ... and one or two people in the 
neighbourhood are annoyed, you would probably say 
that it was a reasonable and proper place in which to 
carry on the business, for it must be carried on 
somewhere.(136) 
(137 ) 
In Bamford v Turnley, the majority of the court of 
Exchequer Chamber, in repudiating the decision in Hole v 
( -| q p \ 
Barlow, seemed also to repudiate the idea that locality 
was a relevant factor in considering whether a nuisance had 
( 13 9 ) 
been perpetrated. And although the question of locality 
was very much in issue in the St Helens case, Mellor J was 
careful not to invoke the concept in the form suggested by 
(140) 
Byles J m Hole v Barlow. 
(136) In the court of Common Pleas Byles J expressed the idea 
of locality more crisply in the sort of epigram that was 
to become the traditional judicial method of stating the 
significance of locality: 
'A swine-stye might not be a nuisance in Bethnal Green. 
It certainly would be in Grosvenor Square'. 
Hole v Barlow (1858) 4 CB (NS) 334 at 340. 
(137) (1861) 3 B & S 67. 
(13 8) See at 77 where the court seems to suggest that under 
what it called the 'true doctrine' an action would lie 
'whatever the locality may be'. 
(13 9) Cf however the dissenting judgment of Pollock CB who, in 
advancing his view that not one thing which caused dis-
comfort or inconvenience was necessarily a nuisance, 
illustrated his meaning by observing (at 79) 
'That may be a nuisance in Grosvenor Square, which, 
would be none in Smithfield Market'. 
(140) (1866) 35 LJ QB 66. While mentioning that locality was 
a factor to be taken into account (see above 29 7 n 256) 
Mellor J did not directly put it to the jury that since 
St Helens was a manufacturing district the standard of 
comfort which a landowner could expect in such a locality 
differed from that which he might expect to enjoy in a 
residential district. Cf the contention of the defen-
dants that Mellor J had misdirected the jury because he 
(continued on the next page) 
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However in the House of Lords the propriety of having 
consideration for the locality was confirmed, by Lord Cran-
(141) (142) 
worth and Lord Westbury, the latter however re-
stricting its role to the case of nuisances involving sen-
.., , ,. x. . (143) 
sible personal discomfort. 
With this imprimatur the relevance of locality in nui-
sance cases was assured and it became standard practice for 
the courts to invoke and apply it as a criterion for determin-
(144) 
ing whether a nuisance existed. 
(140) (continued) 
had told the jury that a nuisance was that which caused 
sensible personal discomfort 'without, at the same time, 
directing them as to the ... existence of the works at 
the time of purchase, the character of the locality1 
and that he had not directed the jury that 'having 
reference to the character of the locality and the trade 
... the same was carried on in a proper place', (33 LJ 
QB 66 at 69-70). 
(141) Who ((1865) 11 HL Cas 642 at 652) mentioned that he had 
applied it in a case tried by him in the town of Shields, 
noting that he had told the jury that they were to con-
sider whether the nuisance was a nuisance in such a 
locality (see above n 131). 
(142) (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 at 650: 
'If a man lives in a town, of necessity he should 
subject himself to the consequences of those opera-
tions of trade which may be carried on in his im-
mediate locality, which are actually necessary for 
trade or commerce'. 
(143) See above 298. 
(144) See Clark v Clarke (1865) 1 Ch App 15 (per Lord Cranworth) 
Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852. In the latter 
case Thesiger LJ Tat 865) formulated the doctrine in 
these terms: 
'... what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would 
not necessarily be so in Bermondsey; and where a 
locality is devoted to a particular trade or manufac-
ture carried on ... in a particular and established 
manner not constituting a public nuisance, Judges 
and juries would be justified in finding ... that the 
trade or manufacture so carried on in that locality 
is not a private or actionable wrong.' 
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Rationale 
The acceptance by the Victorian judges of the concept 
of locality as a pertinent factor in the determination of 
whether an actionable nuisance had been perpetuated, was in 
part a consequence of their tacit decision to depart from 
the traditional policy of rigid enforcement of landowners' 
claims to the domestic amenities of their habitations at the 
cost of industrial development. More particularly, it 
may be said that their admission of the relevance of locality 
lies in the recognition of the fact that nuisance law had 
never been applied so as to entirely prevent the use of land 
for industrial manufacturing and trading purposes and that 
indeed there were localities in which these noxious and nui-
sance-producing activities were habitually carried on. 
In the light of this fact it thus seemed legitimate to 
conclude that in these areas traditional standards of comfort 
(14 5) Cf the rationale of the doctrine of locality put forward 
by the Lord President in Maguire v Charles McNeil Ltd 
1922 SC 172 at 185: 
'The law of nuisance is designed to protect the use 
and enjoyment of property free from all interference 
and annoyance. But this plan has to be accommodated 
to the rule - inevitable in the natue of things -
which requires considerable sacrifice of individual 
comfort to be made as the price of the advantages 
which close neighbourhood to others, and to remunera-
tive employment, brings with it. The rule operates 
more or less severely according to the particular 
character which is impressed on a locality by the 
operation, conscious or unconscious, of the economic 
habits of the community.... [The doctrine's] charac-
ter was explained so long ago as 17 5 6 in Kinloch v 
Robertson [above n 125] as a "temperament in equity" 
wrung from the rigour of the law of nuisance by the 
social necessity out of which' close neighbourhood 
springs'. 
(146) Their recognition of this reality aan be gathered from 
their practice of mentioning localities notorious for 
their noxious industries ('Bethnal Green', 'Smithfield 
Market', ' Bermondsey.') in juxtaposition to equally well 
known residential localities ('Grosvenor Square1, 
'Berkley Square', 'Belgrave Square') when giving epi-
gramatic expression to the locality doctrine. 
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The locality principle however enabled the courts to refuse 
to suppress these activities at the instance of the plaintiff 
since 
'What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not 
necessarily be so in Bermondsey; and where a locality 
is devoted to a particular trade or manufacture carried 
on by the traders or manufacturers in a particular and 
established manner ... Judges and juries would be 
justified in finding ... that the trade or manufacture 
so carried on in that locality is not a private or 
actionable wrong.(152) 
Scope 
The extent to which the doctrine of locality could 
operate particularly as a defence to an alleged nuisance was 
circumscribed in two ways. 
In the first place, it would seem that the term 
'locality' did not connote an entire district but rather the 
( A r q "\ 
'immediate' neighbourhood in which the plaintiff's land 
(151) (continued) 
pointed out that it was reasonable for the company to 
establish the pens in 'populous places' and not 'in 
fields remote from any human habitations', adding 
(at 56) that 
'even if the company were to establish a cattle sta-
tion at a distance from any human habitation it seems 
possible, from the case of Sturges v Bridgman, that 
the law of nuisance might still pursue them there (un-
less protected from it ...) in the event of an ad-
joining landowner afterwards thinking fit to build a 
house upon his own property'. 
(152) Ibid. Cf the picturesque rationalisation of this prin-
ciple in the American case of Peck v Newburgh Light, 
Heat & P Co (1909) 116 NYS 433: '" " " 
'When the plaintiff selected his home within the sounds 
of the city he could not expect the silence of the 
country. He could not expect the circumambient air 
would be altogether free from the smoke and other 
pollutions from the houses, shops or factories. If 
like Lord Byron, he found 'the hum of cities horrible' 
nevertheless he had to recognise that he could not 
either quiet it or purify the air by halting men's 
business within the radius of his absolute comfort'. 
(153) This qualification appears in the judgment of Lord 
Westbury LC in the St Helens case (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 
at 650 (see above 298). 
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was situate. In other words the mere fact that there exis-
ted in a district a large number of nuisance activities which 
affected the plaintiff's property to a greater or lesser de-
gree could not per se serve as a defence where the defendant 
established his activity in close proximity to the plaintiff's 
(154) 
premises. 
Related to and arising out of this principle is the 
further limitation upon the locality doctrine that it does 
not operate to excuse nuisances which increase the amount of 
discomfort suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the nature 
of the locality. This principle was stated in the seminal 
decisions of R v Neville (1791)( 1 5 5 ) and in R v Watts (1826)(156^ 
and elaborately expounded in Rushmer v Polsue and Alfieri Ltd 
(1906).( 
this way 
157 )  Cozens - Hardy LJ there stated the principle in 
(154) This would appear to be the effect of the St Helens case. 
There although the defendants' enterprise was situate in 
an area notoriously of an industrial type it did not 
serve to exculpate them. They were held liable because 
within that locality they had caused substantial damage 
to the plaintiff. This at least seems to be the effect 
of the decisions in the Court of Queen's Bench (35 LJ 
QB 70). (In the House of Lords defendants failed because 
in terms of the Westbury doctrine (above 298-9) locality 
could not be taken into account where the nuisance caused 
material harm to property). Cf the judgment of Cockburn 
CJ which appears to suggest that a multiplicity of nui-
sances in an area cannot excuse a fresh one. Cf the 
remark of Lord Chelmsford LC in Cross ley and Sons' Ltd v 
Lightowler (1867) LR 2 Ch App 478 m repudiating an 
argument that plaintiffs could not complain of a nuisance 
since there were so many existing nuisances that even if 
the defendants were to cease their activities the plain-
tiffs would still suffer nuisance harm: 'The case of 
St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping is ... an answer to this 
defence'. 
(155) (17 91) Peake 12 5. There Lord Kenyon CJ after laying down 
the basic principle (see above 336) added the rider that 
'if another man comes [into the neighbourhood] and by 
his manufacture, renders that which was a little un-
pleasant before, very disagreeable and uncomfortable, 
though that would not amount to a nuisance by itself, 
still he is answerable for it'. 
(156) (1826) 2 C & P 486 (see above 337) 
(157) [1906] 1 Ch 234 at 250. 
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'It was strenuously contended ... that a person living 
in a district specially devoted to a particular trade 
cannot complain of any nuisance ... caused by the 
carrying on of ... that trade without carelessness and 
in a reasonable manner. I cannot assent to this argu-
ment. A resident in such a neighbourhood must put up 
with a certain amount of noise. The standard of comfort 
differs according to the situation of the property and 
the class of people who inhabit it.... But whatever 
the standard of comfort in a particular district may be, 
I think the addition of a fresh noise caused by the 
defendant's works may be so substantial as to create a 
legal nuisance. It does not follow that because I live, 
say, in the manufacturing part of Sheffield I cannot 
complain if a steam-hammer is introduced next door, and 
so worked as to render sleep at night almost impossible 
.... In short, if a substantial addition is found as a . 
fact in any particular case, it is no answer to say that 
the neighbourhood is noisy....' 
Coming to the Nuisance 
We have seen that at one time there were trades of an 
argument, based upon the notion of prior occupation, that a 
landowner sued in nuisance might raise as a defence the plea 
that that plaintiff had 'come to' the nuisance. This defence 
tended to arise in circumstances in which a noxious trade or 
activity had been established and carried on in some remote 
place where, neighbours being absent, it caused no harm to 
others. The defence suggested itself when subsequently another 
party entered the locality and set up residence there, thereby 
being subjected to the nuisance emanating from the prior occu-
pant's premises. 
/ A r o "} 
The defence, after being received in R v Cross (1826), 
(15^1 was categorically repudiated in Bliss v Hall (1838). . The 
doctrine of BTiss v HalI was reiterated by Byles J in Hole v 
Barlow(160) and Lord Romilly MR in Crump v Lambert(161)(1867) 
(158) (1826) 2 C & P 485 (see above 274). 
(15.9) (1838) 4 Bing NC 183 (see above '275-6). 
(160) In his charge to the jury (4 CB (NS) 334 at 336) where 
he observed that 
'it used to be thought that if a man knew there was a • 
nuisance and went and lived near it, he cannot recover, 
because it was said it is he that goes to the nuisance 
an not the nuisance to him. That used to be thought 
100 years ago to be the law. That however is not the 
law now'. 
(161) (1867) LR 3 Eq 409 at 413: 
(continued on the next page) -
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and authoritatively upheld by Lord Halsbury in London, 
Brighton & South Coast Ry Co v Truman and Fleming v 
Hislop. The rationale of the rule that coming to a nui-
sance is no defence, though not plainly spelt out by the 
English courts, is clearly based upon a repudiation of the 
doctrine of prior appropriation as a method for acquiring 
proprietary rights over land with its concomitant consequence 
(161) (continued) 
'... the owner of the adjoining or neighbouring tene-
'ment, whether he has or has not previously occupied 
it, - in other words, whether he comes to the nuisance 
or the nuisance comes to him - retains his right to 
have the air that passes over his land pure and un-
polluted . . . . ' 
(162) (1885) 11 AC 45 at 52: *... the old notion of people 
losing their rights of complaint because they come to 
a nuisance, has long since been exploded'. 
(163) In the court below (Hislop and Others v Kelvinside Estate 
Co (1883) 10 Crt Sess 4th Series 4267 the Lord Justice 
Clerk had observed that the defendants had alleged 
'that the complainers came and sought out the nuisance 
instead of it being inflicted upon them. I am not in 
the least disposed to sustain that plea. Indeed, I 
think it is entirely unapplicable to the circumstances 
of this case, and as a general proposition cannot be 
predicated of an urban suburb like this'. 
Adverting to this in the House of Lords (Fleming & Others 
v Hislop and Others (1886) 11 AC 686 at 696 Lord Halsbury 
observed: 
'If the Lord Justice Clerk means to convey that there 
was anything in the law which diminished the right of 
a man to complain of a nuisance because the nuisance 
existed before he went to it, I venture to think that 
neither in the law of England nor in that of Scotland 
is there any foundation for any such contortion. It 
is clear that whether the man came to the nuisance or 
the nuisance came to the man, the rights are the same, 
and I think that the law of England has been settled, 
certainly for more than 200 years ....' 
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that the first occupant may determine the uses to which 
subsequent occupiers may put their lands. 
It is perhaps worth noting that in rejecting a defence 
of coming to the nuisance the courts were tacitly supporting 
the doctrine of the primacy of rights of habitation insofar 
as the most of the cases wherein the defence was rejected 
the nuisances 'come to1 consisted in noxious and offensive 
(164) The rationale was elaborately stated in contemporary de-
cisions in American Courts upholding the rule that coming 
to a nuisance was no defence: See Taylor v People (1867) 
6 Park Crim Rep (NY) 34 7: 
'Such a doctrine would render the property of others 
subordinate to the purposes of him who might, before 
they had erected their dwellings, have devoted his 
own to an offensive and unwholesome business. There 
is no sound principle of law that will protect any man 
in thus depriving others of the substantial use and 
enjoyment of their property1. 
See also Weirs Appeal (1873) 74 Pa 230; Campbell v 
Seaman (1876) 6 3 NY 5 68: North Western Fertilizing Co 
v Hyde Park (187 8) 97 US 65 9. Perhaps the most elabor-
ate statement of the rationale is to be found in US_ v 
Luce (1905) 141 F 385: 
'A contrary doctrine [allowing such a defence] would 
be so unreasonable and oppressive as to work its own 
condemnation. If by way of illustration, one should 
purchase a lot of land 100 feet square in an unin-
habited section and erect and operate upon it a bone-
boiling establishment ... causing noxious ... odours 
or stenches to spread over the surrounding country 
within a radius of half a mile ... he would furnish 
the means of destroying the ordinary enjoyment of human 
existence throughout an area more than 2 18 8 times as 
large as the lot owned by him and devoted to the 
offensive business.... The establishment of the offen-
sive business in such a case could ... prevent the 
then owners of the residue of the land within the 
sphere of the noisome odors from building and occupying 
dwellings thereon... [and] deprive them of the right 
to have and enjoy reasonably pure air in and about 
their homes. Such right they would possess by virtue 
of their ownership and occupancy of the land ... [and] 
would be seriously impaired or, perchance, wholly 
destroyed, by the erection and operation of the offen-
sive business, and those succeeding to the title would 
be without remedy or redress of any kind for the con- • 
tinuance of the nuisance. But clearly such is not 
the law'. 
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trades. Further, it is worth noting also that in rejecting 
the defence the courts overlooked the fact that the plaintiff 
who had established his habitation next to an existing noxious 
industry and then successfully sued for the nuisance encoun-
tered, in a sense perpetrated a nuisance of his own by suc-
cessfully inhibiting the right of the defendant to pursue a 
trade which until that time he had lawfully carried on. 
The harshness of this latter consequence was to some extent 
ameliorated by the doctrine of locality which enabled the de-
fendant to resist the action if he could establish that the 
effect of his trade upon the plaintiff was not unreasonable 
4-T, i T * (166) given the locality. 
(b) Time 
The relevance of the time at which the nuisance occurred 
was indicated by Pollock CB in Bamford v Turnley: 
'... that may be a nuisance at midday which would not 
be so at midnight....'(16 8) 
The underlying premiss here is that an owner of land is en-
titled to constitute it as a place of quietude for his repose, 
(165) For a discussion of this point see below 428-.9 Cf 
Attorney-General v Corporation of Manchester [1893] 2 
Ch D 87 which seems to show seme sense of the possibly 
harsh effects of disallowing the defence of coming to a 
nuisance. There Chitty J in refusing to enjoin the 
establishment of a small-pox hospital noted the need to 
proceed with caution in cases such as these particularly 
'because the doctrine of coming to a nuisance has long 
since been excluded'. This seems to imply that he would 
have considered the defence - if it had been available -
to have been appropriate in this case. 
(166) See above 342-3. It is plain though that the doctrine of 
locality is not at variance with the rejection to the 
defence of coming to a nuisance. These two principles 
are reconcilable on the basis that an activity may be a 
nuisance in a given locality if it exceeds the standards 
of toleration of that locality and in such an event it 
sould not be open to the defendant to argue that since 
the locality was, say, industrial the plaintiff had no 
cause of action because he had come to the locality and . 
set up a habitation there. 
(167) (1862) 3 B & S 67 at 79. 
(16 8) Cf North J in Byass v Bettarn (1885) 2 TLR 88: '... Church 
bells might be rung in proper hours although a nuisance 
might be caused by ringing early in the morning'. 
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so that land-use activities which disturb that quietude and 
repose are prima facie nuisances. On the other hand the de-
mand that the quietude of land should not be disturbed, con-
stitutes a restraint upon the right of adjoining land owners 
to devote their land to noise-producing enterprises. A land-
owner ' s right to quiet cannot thus be allowed to unreasonably 
restrain such activities. Accordingly the question of the 
time when a noise nuisance is perpetrated can be seen to be 
central to any attempt to adjust these conflicting claims by 
the test of reasonableness. 
Thus in Byass v Bettam(169*(1855) it was held that the 
noise caused by machinery between the hours of 8 am and 8 pm 
was not a nuisance to a lodging house. So too in Moy v 
(170) 
Stoop (19 09) it was held that the noise emanating from a 
children's nursery during the day-time did not amount to a 
nuisance. On the other hand in Rushmer v Poslue & Alfieri 
(171) • 
Ltd (1906) it was held that the noise of machinery m an 
industrial locality constituted a nuisance insofar as it oc-
(172 ) 
curred during the night-time. And in De Keysers Royal 
Hotel (Ltd) v Spicer Bros (Ltd)(173^(1911) it was held that 
pile-driving 
'during the night seemed to go beyond the limit to 
which dwellers in the City of London had to submit1. 
(169) Supra (n 168). 
(170) (1909) 25 TLR 262. 
(171) [1906] 1 Ch 234. 
(17 2) Cf the dictum of Cozens-Hardy LJ (at 250): 'It does not 
follow that because I live, say, in the manufacturing 
part of Sheffield I cannot complain if a steam hammer 
is ... so worked as to render sleep at night almost 
impossible....' 
(173) (1914) 30 TLR 251. 
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(c) The Gravity of the Harm 
In order to give rise to a cause of action in nuisance 
the harm inflicted had to be of the sort which the judges 
(174) 
designated as material. In applying this elementary 
principle the judges developed a further rule to the effect 
that 'material' harm was not actionable if it was.not suffi-
ciently grave. This rule emerged as the judges began to in-
clude among the circumstances to be considered the factors of 
the duration of a nuisance; the sensitivity of the victim 
to the harm Inflicted and the motive of the defendant in in-
flicting the harm. 
Duration of harm 
The idea that it was only those interferences with rights 
which were of some duration and not, as Brett J was to put it 
in Benjamin v Storr " (187 4) 'fleeting or evanescent' was 
plainly derived from the principle that nuisance damage was 
not actionable under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex. 
The idea itself was well established in nuisance law 
having been applied to cases of obstruction of the highway by 
user to hold that it was only those uses which endured for an 
(17 
unreasonable length of time that amounted to public nuisances. 
The relevance of the duration of a nuisance as a factor 
in determining the gravity of the harm suffered was indicated 
(177 ) 
by Pollock CB m Bamford v Turnley where he noted that 
one of the circumstances to be considered was whether a nui-
sance was ' temporary or permanent, occasional or continual' 
and observed that that 
(174) See above 309-11. 
(175) (1874) LR 9 CP 400. 
(176) See above 175-6. See also R v Pappineau (1726) 2 Stra 
6 37. 
(177) (1861) 3 B & S 67 at 79. 
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'which is permanent and continual ... would be no 
nuisance if temporary and occasional only'.(178) 
(17 9 ) 
Harrison v Southwark and VauxhalT Water Co (18 91) 
demonstrates that a material injury which is of short dura-
tion will not be actionable. The nuisance complained of was 
the noise of pumping engines employed in the course of tem-
porary construction works. Vaughan Williams J, in refusing 
to enjoin the activities as a nuisance, made it plain that 
the defendant's activities, though the source of considerable 
damage, were excusable on the ground that they were of a 
temporary nature: 
'It frequently happens that the owners or occupiers 
of land cause, in the execution of lawful works in 
the ordinary user of land, a considerable amount of 
temporary annoyance to their neighbours; but they 
are not necessarily on that account held to be 
guilty of causing an unlawful nuisance. The busi-
• ness of life could not be carried on if it were so 
.... for the law, in judging what constitutes a nui-
sance, does take into consideration both the object 
and duration of that which is said to constitute the 
nuisance.'(180) 
Of course the mere fact that an injury is of short duration 
is by no means an infallible excuse; the central issue is 
the nature and extent of the harm and not simply the question 
~ +.- (181) of time. 
(17 8) Bramwell B in the same case (at 84) seemed to question 
the pertinence of this enquiry, observing that it might 
be said that an interference with another's rights 'if 
of a temporary character might be justified; but I 
cannot see why its being of a temporary nature should 
warrant it ... I cannot think then that the nuisance 
being temporary makes any difference'. 
(179) C1891] 2 Ch 409. 
(180) At 413. 
(181) See Fry J in Fritz v Hobson (1888) 14 Ch D 542 at 556: 
'... nothing can be deemed to be fleeting or 
evanescent which results in substantial damage, and 
... the .question, therefore, is to be answered not 
by time, but by the effects upon the plaintiff. 
Cf Knight v Isle' of Wight Electric Light and Power Co 
(1904) 7 3 LJ Ch 299. 
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Sensitivity to harm 
In considering the harm caused to the plaintiff as 
determining the actionability of the nuisance complained of 
the courts were in effect looking to the nature of the land-
use to which the defendant had devoted his property. The 
decision that the plaintiff had suffered a nuisance by reason 
of the damage caused to him, in effect meant that the defen-
dant was to be prohibited from carrying on the particular 
activity. The strategic importance of the test of reasonable-
ness as a basis for deciding whether an actionable nuisance 
had occurred is well-illustrated by the principle, applied in 
this connection, that a plaintiff could not succeed if the 
harm suffered by him was a consequence of his own abnormal 
sensitivity or the fact that his land was devoted to an ab-
normally sensitive use. The implication of this rule is thus 
that a landowner cannot, by reason of some high or abnormal 
sense of comfort or extraordinary enterprise, limit and re-
strain the many or usual land use activities of his neigh-
bours by showing that he had suffered harm which was, in his 
. • -, (182) terms, material. 
(i) Personal discomfort 
As long ago as Aldred's case it had been laid down that 
(183 
the law did not take account of individual sensitivities. 
This principle was however first expounded in express terms 
(18 2) As will appear below the courts seem to have applied 
this consideration as much to cases of personal dis-
comfort as to cases involving material injury to pro-
perty. This would seem to create an exception to the 
general rule (above 32 7) that the 'circumstances' are 
not to be considered when dealing with material injuries 
to property. The exception is explicable on the ground 
that to concede actions to abnormally sensitive plain-
tiffs would be to impose unconsiderable restraints upon 
the uses to which a defendant landowner might devote 
his land. 
(183) (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b where it was said 'Lex non favet 
votis delicatorum'. Cf Jones v Powell (162 8) Hut 13 5 
where Dodderidge J observed that 'if a man is so tender-
nosed that he cannot endure sea coal, he ought to leave 
his house'. See too Comyns Digest Action on the Case 
for Nuisance (C): 'If a man set up a school so near my 
study, who am of the profession of the law, that the 
noise interrupts my studies, no action lies'. (Cf above 
93 n 17). 
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in Walter v' Selfe. There the plaintiff complained of 
the personal discomfort suffered by him as a result of the 
noxious odours drifting onto his land from, a brick 'clamp' 
upon the adjoining land of the defendant- In considering 
whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction Knight-
Bruce VC considered whether the odours amounted to a 'material' 
interference with the plaintiff's comfort. In deciding this 
( 1 R 5) 
question he observed that an 'important point ... for 
decision' was 
'ought this inconvenience be .considered in fact as 
more than fanciful, more than one of mere delicacy 
or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially 
interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of 
human existence, not merely according to elegant 
or dainty modes and habits of living, but according 
to plain and sober and simple notions among the 
English people?' 
In other words the fact that an activity may cause material 
harm to the plaintiff will not give rise to a cause of action 
if what the plaintiff complains of would not be a cause of 
( A O C \ 
complaint by a plain, sober and ordinary person. 
(184) (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315. 
(185) At 322. 
(186) The point is well-illustrated by the contemporary American 
case of Rogers v Elliott (1888) 15 NE 708 where the sound 
of the bells of the defendant's church caused the plain-
tiff to go into convulsions. In refusing TO hold the 
defendant liable in nuisance, the court found that the 
ringing of the bells did not materially affect the health 
or well being 'of ordinary people in the vicinity' arid 
that, as the defendant's claim rested upon his 'peculiar 
condition', he could not 'demand as of legal right that 
the bell should not be used'. The court explained the 
principle involved as being that what had to be deter-
mined was 'the effect of noise upon people generally and 
not upon those, on the one hand, who are peculiarly sus-
ceptible to it, or those, on the other, who by long ex-
perience have learned to endure It without inconvenience; 
not upon those Whose strong nerves and. robust health 
enable them to endure the greatest disturbances without 
suffering, nor upon those whose mental or physical con-
dition makes them painfully sensitive to everything about 
them'. The court also usefully explained the rationale . 
of the rule that ultra-sensitive individuals could not 
enjoy the protection of the law in these terms: 
'If one's right to use his property were to depend 
upon the effect of the use upon a person of peculiar 
(continued on the next page) 
" 
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(ii) Damage to property 
(18 7 ) 
In' Cooke v Forbes (1867) it was intimated that the 
principle laid down in Walter v Selfe was relevant in connec-
tion with a nuisance causing material harm to property. In 
this case the plaintiff complained that the bleaching process 
employed by him was harmfully affected by gases emanating 
from the defendant's property. In the event he failed in his 
attempt to obtain an injunction on the ground that the injury 
complained of occurred only occasionally. However the defen-
dant had argued the case on the ground that the plaintiff's 
process was 'unusual, not according to the custom of the trade' 
and that, a court would not interfere if the plaintiffs carried 
on their business in an 'extraordinary way'. They suggested 
that the plaintiff was standing on 'extreme rights' which, as 
the' St Helens case had established, could not render a nuisance 
actionable. Page Wood VC conceded the point, observing that 
this was 
(18 6) (continued) 
temperament or disposition, or upon one suffering 
from an uncommon disease, the standard for measuring 
it would be so uncertain and fluctuating as to para-
lyze industrial enterprises. The owner of a factory 
containing noisy machinery, with dwelling houses all 
about it, might find his business lawful as to all but 
one of the tenants of the houses, and as to that one, 
who dwelt no nearer than the others, it might be a 
nuisance. The character of his business might change 
from legal to Illegal or illegal to legal, with every 
change of tenants of an adjacent estate; or with an 
arrival or departure of a guest or boarder of a house 
near by; or even with the wakefulness of the tranquil 
repose of an invalid neighbour on a particular night. 
Legal rights to the use of property cannot be left 
to such uncertainty. When an act is of such a nature 
as to extend its influence to those in the vicinity, 
and its legal quality depends upon the effect of that 
influence, it is as important that the rightfulness 
of it should be tried by the experience of ordinary 
people, as it is, in determining a question as to 
negligence, that the test should be the common care of 
persons of ordinary prudence, without regard of the 
peculiarities of him whose conduct is on trial.' 
(187) (1867) LR 5 Eq 166. 
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'an instance of a person carrying on a manufacture, 
which, if his neighbour had not happened to have 
another manufacture of great delicacy, probably 
would not have caused any injury to his neighbour.C188) 
The sense of this dictum was approved and followed in-
(189 ) 
'Robin'son v Kilvert (1889). There the complaint was that 
heat emanating from the defendant's premises affected the 
paper used by the plaintiff in his trade rendering it less 
useful. The Lord Justices rejected plaintiff's contention 
that the heat constituted a nuisance, resting their decision 
essentially on the ground that plaintiff's trade was of a 
delicate and extra-ordinary nature. 
(190) . Cotton LJ said it would be wrong 
'to say that the doing of something not in itself 
noxious is a nuisance because it does harm to some 
particular trade in the adjoining property, although 
it would not prejudicially affect any ordinary trade 
carried on there....' 
(191) 
Lopes LJ put the principle more directly: 
'A man who carries on an exceptionally delicate trade 
cannot complain because it is injured by his neighbour 
doing something lawful on his property, if it is some-
thing which would not injure anything but an excep-
tionally delicate trade'.(192) 
(188) At 173. It should be noted that the head-note to this 
case in the Law Reports is to the effect that it 'is no 
answer to a complaint by a manufacturer of a nuisance 
to his trade to say that the injury is felt only by the 
delicate nature of his trade'. Lindley LJ in Robinson 
v Kilvert (1889) 41 Ch D 88 at 96 however observed that 
the head-note 'goes too far, further than is warranted 
by the case'. 
(189) (1889) 41 Ch D 88. 
(190) At 94. 
(191) At 97, 
(19 2) Lindley LJ (at 96) adopted a similar view mainly by way 
of rejecting plaintiff's reliance upon the principle 
stated in the head-note to Cooke v Forbes (see previous 
note). He distinguished 'Cooke'1 s case from the present 
by pointing out that the defendant there had discharged 
a noxious gas into the atmosphere thus injuring the 
plaintiff's bleaching process, saying that in such cir-
cumstances 'it may well be that he is liable for any 
damage done ... though such damage would not accrue if 
the neighbour's manufacture were not of a delicate des-
cription'. The present case was different in that there 
(continued on the next page) 
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Motive 
The judges in considering whether nuisance harm was 
material on occasion treated the motive behind the harm in-
flicted as a circumstance which might determine whether a 
cause of action would lie in nuisance. The seminal case is 
Christie v Davey (1893 ) where North J held that the noise 
complained of by the plaintiff, while not of such a degree as 
to be material, was actionable by reason of the fact that the 
defendant had caused it maliciously: 
'I am satisfied that they [the noises] were made 
deliberately and maliciously for the purpose of an-
noying the Plaintiffs. If what had taken place had 
occurred between two sets of persons both perfectly 
innocent, I should have taken an entirely different 
view of the case. But I am persuaded that what was 
done by the Defendant was done only for the purpose 
of annoyance, and ... it was not a legitimate use of 
the Defendant's house to use it for the purpose of 
vexing or annoying his neighbours'.'194) 
Conversely, it would seem, the fact that a nuisance harm was 
a result of activity motivated by the public interest or wel-
fare would render the harm, though material, not actionable. 
(d) Social Utility 
Perpetrators of nuisances persistently attempted to 
justify the nuisance harms they caused to their neighbours or 
the public at large by the contention that their activities 
(192) (continued) 
was no noxious gases discharged and involved no more than 
'doing something not in itself noxious, and which makes 
the neighbouring property no worse for any of the ordin-
ary purposes of trade'. 
(193) [1893] 1 Ch 316. 
(194) At 3 26. Cf the dictum of Lord Selborne in Gaunt v 
Fyriney (1872) LR 8 Ch 8 at 12: • 
'... nuisance by noise (supposing malice to be out 
of the question) is ... a question of degree'. 
(195) See Harrison v Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co [1891] 2 . 
Ch 409 (discussed below 360). 
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contributed to the public advantage. The argument was raised 
particularly in the nineteenth century when innovations in 
the field of transportation systems and the improvement of 
towns caused states of affairs which technically amounted to 
nuisances. 
Arguments to this effect of course amounted to the pro-
position that the private citizen as a landowner should be 
expected to endure interferences with his proprietary rights 
in order that the welfare of the general public should prosper. 
Such arguments when first advanced in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century were received with hostility as denying 
basic premises of eighteenth century individualism and the 
4--+- * • 4- 4. • (196) 
sanctity of private property. 
Thus as we have seen, the judges repudiated the doctrine 
(19 7) 
enunciated xn R v Ru s s e11 (18 27) that considerations of 
the public advantage might excuse nuisances in navigable 
(19 8) 
rivers. So too they refused to admit that the public 
(196) Classically expressed by Blackstone's (1 C'omm 139): 
'So great, moreover, is the regard of the law for 
private property, that it will not authorize the 
least violation of it; no, not even for the general 
good of the whole community. If a new road, for in-
stance, were to be made through the grounds of a 
private person, it might perhaps be extensively bene-
ficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or 
set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of 
the land. in vain may it be urged, that the good of 
the individual ought to yield to that of the community; 
for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, 
or even a public tribunal, to be the judge of this 
common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or 
no. Besides, the public good is nothing more essen-
tially interested, than in the protection of every 
individual's private rights, as modelled by the 
municipal law'. 
(19 7) See above 194. 
(19 8) For reasons classically expressed, by Derman CJ in' R_ v 
Ward (183 6) 4 Ad & E 384 at 404-5: 
"In the infinite variety of active operations always 
going forward in this industrial community, no greater 
evil can be conceived than the encouragement of capi-
talists and adventurers to interfere with known public 
rights, from motives of personal interest, on the 
speculation that the changes made may be rendered law-
ful by being thought to supply the public with some-
thing better than what they actually enjoy. There is 
(continued on the next page) 
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interest could justify nuisance harms to private property 
(199} 
arising from works carried out under local improvement acts. 
In the field of private nuisance however the appeal to 
the public utility was advanced rather more successfully, 
albeit in a somewhat different guise. In Hole v Barlow Byles J 
had contended for a principle of limitation of the rights of 
private property owners on the grounds that this advanced 
trade and commerce generally. This thesis, which closely 
(201) 
coincides with that advanced m R v Russell, although 
(202 ) 
vigorously attacked by Baron Bramwell in Bamford v Turnley 
(19 8) (continued) 
no practical inconvenience in abiding by the opposite 
principle, for daily experience proves that great and 
acknowledged public improvements soon lead to a corre-
sponding change in the law, accompanied, however, with 
the just condition of being compelled to compensate 
'any portion of the public who may suffer for their 
advantage." 
(199) See Leader v Moxton (1773) 3 Wils KB 461 (a case tried 
by Blackstone himself) and Attorney-General v The Council 
of the Borough of Birmingham (1858) 4 K & J 528 where 
Page-Wood VC enjoined the operation of sewerage works 
serving the city of Birmingham on the ground of the nui-
sance caused to the estate of the relators, observing 
(at 540) that as far as the courts were concerned 
'it is a matter of almost absolute indifference whether 
the decision will affect a population of 25 000, or a 
single individual .... The rights of the Plaintiff 
must be measured precisely as they have been left by 
the Legislature. I am not sitting here as a committee 
for public safety ... to prevent what, it is said, will 
be a great injury not to Birmingham only, but to the 
whole of England'. 
For a gradual retreat from this position see however 
Lillywhite v Trimmer (1867) 36 LJ Ch 525 and Attorney-
General v Corporation of Manchester [1893] 2 Ch 87. 
(200) See above 251 (and cf ibid n 81), 280. 
(201) Cf above 193-4. 
(202) (1861) 3 B & S 67 at 84-5: 
'But it is said that, temporary or permanent, it is 
lawful because it is for the public benefit. Now, in 
the first place, that law to my mind is a bad one which, 
for the public benefit, inflicts loss on an individual' 
without compensation. But further, with great respect, 
I think this consideration misapplied in this and in 
many other cases. The public consists of all the in-
dividuals of it, and a thing is only for the public 
benefit when it is productive of good to those indivi-
duals on the balance of loss and gain to all. So that 
(continued on the next page) 
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(203 ) 
in terms of sturdy Blackstonian individualism, was 
nevertheless adopted in the form of a proposition that the 
rights of landowners could be subject to mutual and reciprocal 
(204 ) 
limitations in order to advance the welfare of each. ' ' By 
putting the principle in these terms the judges of course 
glossed over the consideration of the public welfare although 
there can be no doubt that this was a consideration they had 
in mind when formulating the principle. The judges then 
(202) (continued) 
if all the Toss and all the gain were borne,.and re-
ceived by one individual, he on the whole would be a 
gainer. But whenever this is the case, - whenever a 
thing is for the public benefit, properly understood, 
- the loss to the individuals of the public who lose 
will bear compensation out of the gains of those who 
gain. It is for the public benefit there should be 
railways, but it would not be unless the gain of 
having the railway was sufficient to compensate the 
loss occasioned by the use of the land required for 
its site; and accordingly no one thinks it would be 
right to take an individual's land without compensation 
to make a.railway. It is for the public benefit that 
trains should run, but not unless they pay their ex-
pences. If one of those expences is the burning down 
of a wood of such value that the railway owners would 
not run the train and burn down the wood if it were 
their own, neither is it for the public benefit they 
should if the wood is not their own. If, though the 
wood were their own, they still would find it compen-
sated them to run trains at the cost of burning the 
wood, then they obviously ought to compensate the 
owner of such wood, not being themselves, if they burn 
it down in making their gains. So in like way in this 
case a money value indeed 'Cannot easily be put on the 
plaintiff's loss, but it is equal to some number of 
pounds or pence, 101., 501. or what not: unless.the 
defendant's profits are enough to compensate this, I 
deny that it is for the public benefit he should do what 
he has done; if they are, he ought to compensate.' 
(203) Burn The Age of Equipoise 102 cites the passage quoted in 
the previous note as an illustration of Bramwell's 'un-
failing grasp on the philosophy of individualism, in its 
purest form', noting his 'simple faith in individual 
rights, freedom of contract and the efficacy of the test -
does it pay? - with his refusal to regard society as more 
than the aggregate of the individual persons who compose 
it....' 
(204) See above 304-5. 
(205) See Willes J in Hole v Barlow (18 58) 4 CB NS 33 4 cited 
above at 2 82. 
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gave expression to their underlying concern for the public 
interest by including in the set of 'circumstances' to be con-
sidered in determining whether an actionable nuisance had 
occurred, the consideration of the social utility of the de-
fendant's activities. 
The consideration of the social utility of the nuisance 
causing activities was initially expressed by implication 
from, the fact that the courts were unwilling to suppress law-
( o o p. \ 
ful and useful trades merely because they were productive 
of some measure of interference with a neighbour's comfort and 
(207) 
convenience. 
The principle was given explicit recognition in Harrison 
(208) 
v Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co (1891) where Vaughan 
Williams J in considering the nuisance caused by pumping works, 
pointed out that the use of land often involves a certain 
amount of harm to neighbours, and observed that it did not 
necessarily have to follow that an actionable nuisance existed. 
(209) 
'The business of life could not be carried on if it were so'. 
Thus, he went on to say, a nuisance caused as. a result of 
the demolition of a house did not necessarily give rise to an 
action. This would be the case where the nuisance was 'created 
for the purpose of demolition' as opposed to 'sheer wantoness'. 
All of this followed, the learned judge concluded, because 
'the law, in judging what constitutes a nuisance, does 
take into consideration ... the object ... of that 
which is said to constitute the nuisance1. 
Cf Byles J's reference to the manufacturing and social 
interests of the community in Hole v Barlow (supra) 
(cited above 251). See also Mellor J's remark in the 
St Helens case ((1866) 35 LJ QB 66 at 68) that 'where 
great works have been created and carried on, and are the 
means of developing the national wealth, you must not 
stand on extreme rights and allow a person to say, I will 
bring an action against you for this and that, and so on. 
Business could not go on if that were so'. See too the 
discussion of the circumstance of locality above at 34-1-3. 
Of course the mere fact that a trade was lawful or neces-
sary was per se no excuse. In the light of Bamford v 
Turnley and the St Helens case, the question was whether 
the damage caused to others by the carrying on of such a 
trade was unreasonable. 
[1891] 2 Ch 409. Also on this case see above 351. 
(209) At 413. Cf Mellor J as cited above 297. 
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II LIABILITY FOR NUISANCE 
1. Nuisance in the era of Fault liability 
The era in which the concept of private nuisance was 
revised and re-formulated in Bamford v Turnley and the cases 
descended therefrom was one which saw the rise in English law 
of the doctrine that there should be no liability for tor-
(210) 
tious harm without proof of fault. This doctrine was 
manifested by the rise of the concept of negligence as a 
(211) . . determinant of liability for tortious harm. In addition 
there grew up a distinct tort, denominated as the tort of 
(212 ) 
Negligence, which came to be the appropriate form of 
action for a wide range of harms and applied the criterion of 
( 213 ) 
negligence (or culpa) as the determinant of liability. 
The judges, in re-formulating the nuisance concept in 
Bamford v Turnley and the cases which built on that decision • 
refusedj as we have seen, to adopt the concept of negligence 
as the standard for determining liability for the harm caused 
(214) by an actionable nuisance. 
(,210) See Fleming Torts 8. 
(211) Fleming (op cit 103) relates the rise of negligence to 
the advent of the Industrial Revolution. The courts, 
he writes, 'responded to the call for a new pattern of 
loss-adjustment by fastening onto the concept of negli-
gence. The axiom 'no liability without fault' was 
quickly raised to a dogmatic postulate of justice, because 
it was best calculated to serve the interests of expanding 
industry ....' (op cit ibid). 
(212) For the history of the tort of negligence see Winfield 
'History of Negligence' (1926) 42 LQR 184; Fifoot 
History and Sources Chap 8. 
(213) Fleming Torts 102-3. 
(214) See above 332. The essential attitude of the judges was 
perhaps indicated by Lord Denman CJ in Bell v Twentyman 
(1841) 1 QB 7 66. There an action was brought for damage 
caused by water invading premises. It appeared that the 
flooding was due to a failure to scour the water-course, 
a duty resting upon the defendant. The defendant pleaded 
that he had been unaware of the state of the water-course 
and, upon being notified, had immediately repaired it. 
Lord Denman, in holding him liable, dismissed these pleas 
with the remark (at 774) 
'The action is not founded on malice, or the breach of 
any moral duty, but is for compensation for damage 
(continued on the next page) 
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On the other hand the revised concept developed in 
Bamford v Turnley was not entirely unresponsive to the idea 
that economic enterprise should be released from the con-
straints of the medieval doctrine that a man acted at his 
peril in causing harm to others. Nuisance doctrine, as we 
have seen, had tended to deal harshly with commercial and in-
dustrial enterprises which corrupted the air, requiring them 
( 9 i R ") 
to either cease operations or to re-locate. The dispen-
sation established by Bamford v Turnley and the St Helens case 
while not allowing industry to avoid liability for nuisance 
harm by showing that it had acted without negligence, 
nevertheless did enable it to avoid liability by showing that 
the nuisance complained of was not actionable given the cir-
cumstances of the harm, the locality, the duration of the harm 
and so on. 
Highway nuisances 
There was however one area of the law of nuisance where 
the concept of negligence gained some foot-hold. Traditionally 
obstructions in the public highway were denominated as instances 
(217 ) 
of nuisance. As we have seen, no action could lie at the 
instance of a member of the public harmed by such a nuisance 
( o \ Q \ 
except where special damage-was incurred. For these pur-
poses the concept of special damages had come to include per-
sonal physical harm suffered in consequence of the obstruction 
(219) 
in the highway. In other words, an action in 'nuisance' 
might lie in respect of what could be described as an accident 
in the public highway. The question of liability for accidents 
was however a prime growth point for the concept of no liability 
(220 ) without fault and for the tort of negligence. Thus it was 
(211) (continued) 
sustained by the neglect of a legal duty: and, if 
damage has been so sustained, the defendant is not the 
less bound to compensate for that because he has very 
promptly repaired his fault'. 
(215) See above 125-6. . 
(216) See above 332. 
(217) Above 24-6, 164//. . 
(218) Above 144//.-
(219) Above 148. 
(220) Cf Fleming Torts 8,103 
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that in the late eighteenth century we begin to encounter 
cases in which what would normally have been treated as actions 
in nuisance for special damages are treated and disposed of as 
(221) 
actions for negligence. 
For a while it seemed as if this practice meant that the 
special action for damages for nuisances in the highway would 
(222 ) 
be replaced by actions brought for negligence. However 
in the 184-0' s the accident cases suddenly cease to be treated 
as actions brought in negligence and are brought as actions for 
(223) 
nuisance. 
(221) See Bush v Steinman (1799) 1 Bos & P 404 (see below 
Sly v Edgley (1806) 6 Esp 6; Butterfield v Forrester 
(1809) 11 East 60; Flower v Adam (1810) 2 Taunt 314; 
Leslie v Pounds (1812) 4 Taunt 64 9; Coupland v Hardingftaa 
(1813) 3 Camp 39 8. See also Newark 'The Boundaries of 
Nuisance' (1949) 65 LQR at-485-4. Butterfield v 
Forrester for instance was a classic instance of special 
damages arising from a highway nuisance (cf Lord Atkin 
in Caswell v Powell Dufferin Associated Collieries Ltd 
[1940] AC 152 at 165) and argued by Serjeant Vaughan as 
such (see 11 East 60 at 61 )• Yet it was disposed of 
by the court on the grounds that the plaintiff had been • 
contributarily negligent. 
(222) Newark op cit 485. 
(223) See Burgess v Gray (1845) 1 CB 578; Barnes v Ward (1850) 
9 CB 392; Peachey v Rowland (1853) 13 CB 182; Cooper v 
Walker (1862) 2 B & S 770. 
Newark op cit 485 suggests that the reason for this may 
have been 'that a new fashion was set by the fact that 
in the third edition of Chitty's Pleadings in 1831 the 
only precedent for a declaration in an action of the 
type we are considering was of the nuisance type'. An 
alternative reason suggested by the learned writer was 
that the profession perceived certain advantages flowing 
from declaring a nuisance rather than negligence. These 
were that to declare in negligence in cases where the 
action was brought against the owner of premises for a 
nuisance created by a contractor would mean that the 
plaintiff would fail as a result of the decision in 
Quarman v Burnett (1840) 6 M & W 49 9 which intimated that 
there could be no vicarious liability in negligence for 
the act of an independant contractor. On the other hand 
the exception to this rule in the case of torts in the 
nature of a nuisance suggested by Littledafe J in Laughter 
v Pointer (1826) 5 B & C 547 and approved in Quarman v 
Burnett and, later, Reedie v L N W Railway (1849) 4 Exch 
244 made it preferable to sue in nuisance rather than 
negligence (see further below 3 68). 
The result of this development was as Newark points out 
(op cit 486) to introduce a principle of strict liability 
into the tort of negligence where it concerns injury to 
(continued on the next page). 
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One effect of these developments was to institutionalize 
the heresy 'equally offensive to the legal historian and the 
(224 ) 
jurisprudent' that the action for 'nuisance' is a remedy 
( o o c ) 
for recovering damages for personal injury. Another 
consequence was that a number of principles and doctrines de-
veloped in relation to the tort of negligence came to be 
carried over into the field of nuisance law where they infected 
the old law and stimulated the growth of some new principles. 
Thus there grew up the idea that contributory negligence was a 
( 227 ) 
defence in a nuisance action; the concept of a duty of 
(223) (continued) 
highway users from the condition of premises abutting 
onto the highway. Millner Negligence 187 remarks that 
though there may be good reasons for such an exception 
to the general principle of fault liability ' the use 
of an anomalous rule in nuisance to achieve this ... is 
an exceedingly haphazard way of providing for a recognised 
social need ....' Cf Friedman 'Incidence of Liability 
in Nuisance' (1943) 59 LQR 63 at 67-9. 
(224) Newark op cit 488. 
(225) See Newark op cit 488-9. Cf at 486. 
(226) See also Newark op cit 486-490. 
(227) See eg Fenna v Clare & Co (1894) 64 LJ QB 238. 
Butterfield v Forres te"r~Tl8 09) 11 East 60 is the source 
of this idea. The decision in fact establishes the de-
fence of contributory negligence in actions for negli-
gence but since the action was for special damages arising 
from a public nuisance (cf n .2'21 above) it seems to 
establish that contributory negligence is a defence in 
nuisance actions generally. In fact the defence of con-
tributory negligence is hardly relevant in an action for 
nuisance where the gist of the action is a nuisance in 
the Bamford v Turnley sense (cf Winfield 'Nuisance as a 
Tort' (1930-2) 4 Camb LJ 189 at 200; Seavy 'Nuisance: 
Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries (1951-2) 65 
Harvard LR 984 at 988; Fleming Torts 368-9). The closest 
thing to a defence of contributory negligence in this 
area of nuisance would be the defence of 'coming to' a 
nuisance and, as we have seen (above 345) the Victorian 
judges steadfastly refused to recognise such a defence. 
Cf Seavy op cit 988 n 17. See however Lawrence v Obee 
(18 41) 3 Camp 514 where a plaintiff failed in an action 
for nuisance by the stenches from a privy, the court 
finding that it was by her own act (the opening of a win-
dow) that the odours were able to invade her house. 
Whether this decision amounts to the application of a 
principle of contributory negligence is doubtful. It 
would seem more likely that the court saw case as one in 
which the nuisance was caused by the plaintiff rather 
than the defendant. In any event the decision would seem 
to be wrong: it is difficult to see why the plaintiff 
was not entitled to open a window in her wall and also to 
be free of the discomfort caused by noxious odours then 
entering the house. 
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care resting upon occupiers of land to prevent nuisance harm, 
(229) 
and a doctrine of vicarious liabilty for nuisances. 
The effect of these developments was to throw the whole 
matter of the nature and incidence of liability for nuisance 
in the Bamford v Turnley sense into a state of confusion almost 
impossible to disentangle. 
2. The Incidence of Liability 
2.1. Introduction 
The law of nuisance we have seen traditionally assigned 
liability for nuisance harm according to an elementary test of 
causation which was expressed in the form of the principle 
that the action for nuisance lay against 'him, who creates the 
(230) 
nuisance'. This basic principle had been somewhat ampli-
(231) 
fied in the seventeenth century by the addition of a fur-
ther principle that the action could also lie 'against him, 
(23 2) 
who continues the nuisance erected by another'. This 
latter proposition tended to transcend the simple considera-
tions of causation which underlay the first proposition and 
suggested that liability for nuisance might well lie based on 
a responsibility derived from the fact of control of the 
premises upon which a nuisance existed. 
2.2. The Liability of the Creator of a Nuisance 
The most elementary principle of liability for nuisance 
was that he who .created that which caused the nuisance harm 
(233 ) 
was the person liable to make compensation. This prin-
ciple rested upon simple considerations of c'ausation and, as 
( 234 ) 
such, determined liability without considerations of fault. 
(228) See below 386. 
(229) See below 3 66. 
(230) Comyns Digest 'Action upon the Case for Nuisance' (B) 
(231) See above 95-7. 
(232) Comyns op cit ibid. 
(233) Cf above 49-51. 
(234) Cf above 3 61. See also Rapier v London Tramways Co 
[1893] 2 Ch 599. 
3 66 . 
Indeed so strictly was the test of causation applied that 
the author of a nuisance was held liable even though he no 
longer occupied the premises from which the harm emamated. 
Vicarious liability 
A development of some importance that occurred during the 
nineteenth century was the establishment of a doctrine that a 
man could vicariously incur the liability of the author of a 
nuisance. This doctrine made its appearance in the collateral 
area of liability for nuisances in the highway. The seminal 
/ r\ Q c \ 
case was that of Bush v Steinman (17 99). The case involved 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff when using a public high-
way when his chaise overturned after colliding with a heap of 
lime placed in the highway by a third person employed to carry 
out repairs to the defendant's premises which adjoined the 
highway. Counsel for the plaintiff argued the case on the 
(237 ) 
basis that there had been a nuisance for which the defen-
dant as an employer could be held liable. The court agreed 
with this, holding the defendant to be liable. Eyre CJ in 
particular confessed to 'great difficulty in stating with 
accuracy the grounds' why this should be so. The defendant, 
he observed, 'appeared to be ... far removed from the immediate 
author of the nuisance'. . However he cited authority which 
(235) This appears from Lord Holt's dictum in Rosewell v Prior 
(1701) 12 Mod 635 at 634: 'if a wrongdoer conveys his 
wrong over to another, whereby he puts it out of his 
power to redress it, he ought to answer for it'. This 
proposition was later approved in Thompson v Gibson (184-1) 
7 M & W 456. There it was argued that the defendants 
could not be held responsible for a nuisance erected by 
.them because they no longer controlled the land upon which 
it stood. Parke B dismissed this contention with the 
remark 
'that is a consequence of their own original wrong; 
and they cannot be permitted to excuse themselves from 
paying damages for the injury it causes, by shewing 
their inability to remove it, without exposing them-
selves to another action'. 
(236) (1799) 1 Bos & P 404. 
(237) Clearly the idea here was that the action was one for 
special damages arising from a public nuisance. Sig-
nificantly however there was no effort made to show that 
special damage had been incurred so as to bring the case 
within the rule that allowed private individuals to sue 
for a public nuisance. The truth is of course that the 
case was really an action for negligence. Cf above 3 63. 
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which suggested that the owner of premises might be liable to 
be indicted for a public nuisance for acts carried out by his 
servants or agents ° *' and reasoned that the same principle 
could apply where the nuisance was created by a contractor 
employed by the owner. This he thought was a principle 'highly 
convenient, and beneficial to the public1 suggesting that it 
was neither necessary nor desirable that the plaintiff should 
be required to proceed against the actual author of the nui-
(239) 
sance. Heath J founded liability on the relation of 
master and servant saying that English law recognised a vicar-
ious liability arising out of that relationship. He cited 
Rosewell v Prior in support of his view saying that that case 
established that one who 'was benefitted by. the nuisance com-
plained o f could be held liable to third parties injured by 
( 240) 
the nuisance. Rooke J too rested liablity on the nature 
of the relationship between the defendant occupier and the 
person who was the actual author of the nuisance: 
'The person from whom the whole authority is originally 
derived, is the person who ought to be answerable, and 
great inconvenience would follow if it were otherwise 
.... The plaintiff may bring his action either against 
the person from whom the authority flows, and for whose 
benefit the work is carried on, or against the person 
by whom the injury was actually committed'.(241) 
(238) 'According to ... Blackstone's Commentaries if one of a 
family "layeth or casteth" any thing out of the house 
which constitutes a nuisance the owner is chargeable. 
Suppose then that the owner of a house, with a view to 
rebuild or repair employ his servants to erect a hord 
in the street (which being for the benefit of the public 
they may lawfully do) and they carry it out so far as to 
encroach unreasonably on the highway, it is clear that 
the owner would be guilty of a nuisance....'(at 407-8). 
(239) 'Where a civil injury of the kind now complained of has 
been sustained the remedy ought to be obvious, and the 
person injured should have only to discover the owner of 
the house which has been the occasion of the mischief; 
not be compelled to enter into the concerns between that 
owner and other persons....' (at 408). 
(240) At 409. 
(241) At 410. 
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Bush v Steinman thus asserted the vicarious liability 
of a principal for not only the nuisances created by a servant 
but even those of an independant contractor. The proposition 
that a master could be held vicariously liable as the creator 
of a nuisance established by his servant was endorsed in 1824 
(242 ) 
in Laughter v Pointer and since then has never been in 
(243 ) 
doubt. On the other hand the proposition that he might 
be vicariously liable for nuisances created by an independant 
contractor was not quite so simply settled. 
Quite early in the nineteenth century the English judges 
in settling the law of vicarious liability in relation to 
masters and their 'servants' concluded that the principle 
should not apply where the 'servant' was an independant con-
tractor. This view contradicted that expressed in Bush v 
Steinman and thus, in propounding it, the judges had to over-
rule Bush v Steinman. Significantly, however, in the course 
of repudiating the principles laid down in the case, the 
judges chose to specifically uphold it insofar as it related 
to the law of nuisance. 
(244 ) 
^n Laughter v Pointer (1826) Littledale :J in con-
sidering Bush v Steinman noted that it was a case in which 'the 
injury was done upon or near and in respect of the property 
of the defendant', a fact which suggested to him that there 
was a 'rule of law' that 
(242) (1826) 5 B & C 547 (see below 369.1 
(243) See Garrett Nuisances 242. Express judicial authority 
for the proposition is mainly found in cases of public 
• nuisance. In R v Medley (1834) 6 C & P 292 at 299 Lord 
Denman CJ instructed a jury that the directors of a 
company could be held liable for a nuisance by way of 
polluting a public river: 
1... if persons for their own advantage employ servants 
to conduct works, they must be answerable for what is 
done by those servants'. 
See too R v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702. 
(244) (1826) 5 B & C 547 at 560. 
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1... in all cases where a man is in possession of 
fixed property he must take care that his property 
is so used and managed, and that, whether his own 
property be managed by his own immediate servants or 
by contractors or their servants. The injuries done 
upon land or buildings are in the nature of nuisances, 
for which the occupier ought to be chargeable when 
occasioned by any acts of persons whom he brings upon 
the premises. 
(245 ) This dictum was approved in Qua)rman v Burnett (1840) 
Rich v Basterfield ) (1846 ) and Reedie v London & N W Rwy 
C2~47 ) 
Co (1849). In the latter case Rolfe B rationalised it for 
the law of nuisance by suggesting it to be an application of 
(o lip,) 
the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas principle and 
expressing 
'the principle on which parties possessed of fixed 
property are responsible for acts of nuisance occa-
sioned by the mode in which the property is enjoyed'. 
The effect of Reedie's case was to suggest that a land-
owner could be vicariously liable for 'nuisances' caused by 
the acts of an independant contractor. This doctrine certainly 
appeared in cases involving the removal of lateral support for 
(249) . . . . 
land and cases involving public nuisances perpetrated in 
a highway. Whether it also applied in respect of private 
(245) (1840) 6 M & W 499 at 510-511. 
(246) (1847) 4 CB 783 at 802. 
(247) (1849) 4 Exch 244 at 256. 
(248) See below 287-8 
(249) See Bower v Peate (1876) LR 1 QB 321; Dalton v Angus 
(188lT~6~AC 740; hemaitre v Davis (1881) LR 19 Ch D 281; 
Jolliffe v Woodhoule (1894) 10 TLR 55 3. Technically the 
removal of lateral support may be classified as a 'nui-
sance' (cf above 113n9.6>) it is hardly a nuisance in the 
sense of the decisions in Bamford v Turnley and the St 
Helens case. Thus Atiyah Vicarious Liability 352 observes 
of these cases that it 'is not entirely clear whether they 
are properly regarded as cases of nuisance, nor even if 
they are, is it clear whether they illustrate any general 
principle'. The underlying premiss of these cases, 
notably Bower v Peate, is that a landowner may be held 
vicariously liable by reason of the fact that he had in-
structed the contractor to undertake work which was 
inherently dangerous (cf Atiyah op cit 33-2). The con-
cept of the 'extra-hazardous' activity hardly invokes the 
idea of a nuisance in the Bamford v Turnley sense. 
(250) See Ellis v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (1853) 2 E & B 767 
(the ratio of the case being that the nuisance was a 
(continued on the next page) 
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nuisances properly so-called was however never clearly 
( O C A \ 
established during the nineteenth century. 
2.3. Landlord's liability 
Introduction 
The idea, promoted in Bush v Steinman and Laughter v 
Pointer, that a man might be held liable for a nuisance of 
which he was not the author was taken up with particular vigour 
in the nineteenth century in cases where the nuisance harm was 
perpetrated by one who was the tenant of premises held under a 
lease. 
(250) (continued) 
result of the contractor doing what the employer in-
structed him to do); Hole v Sittingbourne & Sheerness 
Rwy Co (1861) 6 H & N 488 (the nuisance being the obstruc-
tion of a navigable river by works carried out by the 
contractor. Again this was a case of the contractor 
doing what he was employed to do and thereby perpetuating 
the nuisance. Pollock CB (at 497) rested the employer's 
liability on the principle qui facit per alienum facit 
per se. Wilde B (at 5 00) treated it as a case in which 
it was as if the employers had created the nuisance them-
selves, adding that it was 'not distinguishable from the 
case where a landowner orders a person to erect a building 
upon his own land which causes a nuisance'.) The effect 
of these decisions was that there was no vicarious lia-
bility for the actions of an independant contractor 'ex-
cept where the defendant had actually authorized the 
creation of a public nuisance' (Atiyah op cit 3 52). As 
to the subsequent confusion which crept into this branch 
of the law (cf Tarry v Ashton (1876) LR 1 QB 314) see 
Atiyah op cit 353-5 who submits that the true rule is that 
the vicarious liability for the acts of independant con-
tractors can exist in respect of public nuisances. 
(251) Cf Atiyah op cit 355 who writes that apart from the sup-
port cases 'which are probably sui generis and not per-. 
haps strictly cases of nuisance at all - it is a matter 
of some doubt whether the tort of private nuisance always 
involves liability for independant contractors'. The 
principle that such liability might exist was first 
stated clearly in Mantania v National Provincial Bank Ltd 
[1936] 2 All ER 633 at 645-6 where Slesser LJ held 
'We are here concerned with the annoyance such as may 
found an action for nuisance, but the principles in my 
opinion are the same as regards the liability of a 
person who employs an independant contractor, that is 
to say, that if the act done is one which in its very 
nature involves a special danger of nuisance being com-
plained of, then it is one which falls within the ex-
ception for which the employer will be responsible if 
there is a failure to take the necessary precautions 
that the nuisance shall not arise'. 
(continued on the next page) 
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In Rosewell v Prior (17 01) a landlord had been held 
liable•for nuisance harm emanating from premises let by him 
on the ground that he had actually created the nuisance and 
could not avoid liability simply by reason of the fact that 
he no longer occupied the premises. Later in the century, in 
Cheetham v Hampson (17 91). it was held that a landlord 
could not be held liable for nuisances created by his tenant. 
(2 54) 
Then a few years later, in Payne v Rodgers (17 94), an ac-
tion brought for personal injuries suffered as a result of a 
defective cellar flap in the highway, the landlord of the 
premises was held liable since he had undertaken to repair the 
defect which had caused the harm. 
R v Pedley (1834) 
The nature of a landlord's liability next came up for 
consideration in the nineteenth century in the case of R v 
(255) ~~ 
Pedley (1834), a prosecution for a public nuisance. 
The defendant was prosecuted for the public nuisance 
caused by certain privies in houses of which he was the owner 
but which were let by him to various tenants on an annual 
lease. 
The houses had been built by the defendant's predecessor 
in title from whom the defendant had purchased the properties. 
The nuisance arose as a result of the privies not being 
cleansed. Previously the tenants had cleansed these, but 
recently had failed to do so. The defendant had been requested 
to abate the nuisance so caused, but had not done so. The 
indictment was then preferred. 
(251) (continued '. 
Cf Darling J in O'Dell v Cleveland House Ltd (1910) 102 
LT 602 who observed that 'it is not the law that a man 
can say, 'I admit I am bound to love my neighbour as my-
self, but I am not going to do it because I have hired 
another man to do it for me, an independant contractor'. 
(252) (1701) 12 Mod 635. See also above 98-100.. 
(253) (17 91) 4 TR 318. Lord Kenyon CJ said (at 319) it would be 
'deplorable' if landlords were to become 'liable to be 
harrassed with actions for the culpable neglect of their 
tenants'. Rosewell v Prior was distinguished as a case 
in which the landlord ';s liability was based on his own 
'misfeazance'. 
(254) (1794) 2 H Bl 350. 
(255) (1834) 1 A & E 822; 3 LJMC 119. These reports of the case 
do not always agree as to what was said by the judges. 
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For the defendant the point was taken that the nuisance 
was not created by him but rather by his tenants. Rosewell v 
Prior was distinguished on the ground that there it was held 
that the landlord's liability flowed from the fact that he had 
created the nuisance before letting the premises with it there-
on. 
The court of the King's Bench however found the defendant 
to be liable, though for reasons which are not entirely clear 
and which seem to have gone beyond principles already laid 
down. 
Lord Denman CJ purported to apply the rule in Rosewell v 
Prior. For the rest it is difficult to establish exactly 
why Lord Denman considered the defendant liable. His main 
theme seems to have been that the defendant profited by his 
ownership of the premises and thus ought to be liable for the 
nuisances thereon. ' He seems to have thought that there 
was a duty upon the landlord to cleanse the buildings and that 
he was thus liable for the omission to ensure that they were 
. (258) cleaned. 
(256) In the Adolphus and Ellis' report Lord Denman is quoted 
(at 826) as holding the defendant liable on the prin-
ciple of the 'earlier case which shews that the receipt 
of rent is an upholding and continuing of the nuisance 
....' The Law Journal report quotes him as saying simply 
'The receipt of rent by him is an upholding of that 
nuisance' (at 121). 
(257) 'He has for his own profit, become the owner of property 
the natural consequences resulting from the use whereof 
is a public nuisance' (3 LJMC at 121). 'Had the use 
of the buildings by which the nuisance is produced been a 
matter of independent contract, no one could have doubted 
that the person receiving a profit from the use would 
have been answerable for the nuisance' (1 A & E at 827). 
(258) It had been argued that the defendant could not be held 
liable because the tenants were contractually bound to 
cleanse. Lord Denman held that there was no contract to 
this effect and added that even if there were it merely 
established 'that the landlord considered himself bound 
to provide for the cleansing' and he would thus be liable 
for his failure to enforce the contract (1 A & E at 826). 
373. 
The judgment of Littledale J is usually cited as ex-
pressing the ratio of R v Pedly. The judgment appears to be 
( 259 ) 
an exegisis of Rosewell v Prior though in fact it consists 
in little more than the enunciation of a series of propositions 
for which no authority is cited. Its gist appears to be that 
/ o c n \ 
a landlord must not let premises with a nuisance upon them. 
However it is not plain how Littledale J arrived at this prin-
ciple. His judgment begins with the statement that one who 
acquires land with a nuisance upon it is liable therefor even 
though he lacks the power to abate it. This principle he 
-adds does not apply where the nuisance is created after the 
/ r\ n Q \ 
letting of the premises unless the landlord has had the 
opportunity to abate and has failed to do so. On the 
facts he held that the defendant was liable since the tenancies 
in the instant case were determined annually and thus the de-
fendant had had the opportunity to abate the nuisance and had 
* -i A +. A (264) 
failed to do so. (259) Adolphus and Ellis do not report Littledale J as citing 
Rosewell v Prior. However, the Law Journal's version of 
the case reflects him as beginning his judgment with the 
words 'The law seems to be laid down in Roxwell [sic] v 
Prior' (at 121). 
(260) 1 Ad & El at 827. Littledale J is reported as saying in 
the course of his decision: 'He is not to let the land 
with the nuiance upon it'. In Rich v Basterfield (1846) 
4 CB 7 83 at 804 Cresswell J in analysing R v Pedly ob-
served that 'Littledale J seems to have rested his judg-
ment upon the principle ,• that the landlord was not to let 
the land with the nuisance upon it ....' 
(261) 'If a nuisance be created, and a man purchase the premises 
with the nuisance upon them, though there be a demise of 
it for a term at the time of the purchase, so that the 
purchaser has no opportunity of removing the nuisance, 
yet by purchasing the reversion he makes himself liable 
for the nuisance' (1 Ad & El at 827). 
(262) '... if, after the reversion is purchased, the nuisance 
be created by the occupier, the reversioner incurs no 
liability....' (1 Ad & El at 827). 'Where he buys a 
property without a nuisance, and the tenant erects a nui-
sance upon it, if there be a term of years, the landlord 
is not liable') (3 LJMC at 121). 
(263) This is implicit from the decision on the facts. See 
the next note. 
(264) 'If there be a tenancy from year to year, as he can re-
move his tenant, and thus put an end to the nuisance he 
will be liable if he makes a new lease' (3 LJ MC at 121). 
'Here the periods are short, so that there has been a 
(continued on the next page) 
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Tainton J disposed of the matter on the ground that the 
defendant was under a duty to maintain the premises in such a 
way as to prevent the nuisance occurring and was thus liable 
for his failure to discharge this duty. There was no 
authority for this proposition and it was later expressly 
dissented from. ' Williams J too seems to have held that 
the defendant's liablity arose from the fact that he ought to 
( 0 f\ 1 *\ 
have abated the nuisance and had failed to do so. 
The Nature of the Landlord's Liability 
Insofar as anything about "the decision in R v Pedly is 
clear, it would seem that the case represents an attempt to 
apply to landlords the same broad principle of vicarious 
liability for nuisances which had been established by Bush v 
/ O C Q \ 
Steinman. It is not without significance that it was 
Littledale J who gave the leading judgments in Laughter v 
( 9 R Q ̂  
Pointer (1826) and R v Pedly. In the former case this 
judge had formulated the proposition that an occupier 'ought 
to be chargeable [for nuisances] ... occasioned by any acts of 
(27 0) 
persons brought upon the premises'. ' Although he does not 
refer to this principle in R v Pedly it would seem that he had 
this same principle in mind when finding the landlord (as one 
who was responsible for the presence of the tenants upon the 
premises) liable for the acts of the tenants. The judgment 
(264) (continued) 
reletting; and that has taken place after the user of 
the buildings has created the nuisance. This is, there-
fore, a case in which the reversioner is liable' (1 Ad & 
El at 817). 
(265) 'It is the duty of the landlord to exact from his tenants, 
that they will cleanse from time to time as may be 
requisite, or reserve to himself a right to enter to do 
so' (1 LJ MC at 121). 
(266) See Rich v Basterfield (1847) 4 CB 783 at 804. 
(267) '... he appears by his own expressions to have admitted 
that it lay in his own power to remove the nuisance' 
(1 Ad & El at 828). 
(268) See above 366 
(269) Above 368 
(270) See above 369 
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of Tainton J too seems to proceed on a tacit idea that the 
landlord, like the occupier, can be liable by reason of the 
control he exercised over the premises upon which the nuisance 
(271) 
existed, while the judgment of Denman CJ by its emphasis 
upon the 'profit' derived by the landlord hints at liability 
based upon the rationale employed in holding occupiers vicar-
iously liable for nuisances of servants and contractors. 
But whatever the intention of the judges in R v Pedly, 
the case was not subsequently treated as imposing a blanket 
liability upon landlords for nuisances caused by their tenants. 
Indeed Lord Denman himself, in the next case of Russell v 
( 272 ) 
Stenton (18 42) stated categorically that a landlord was 
not, as such, liable for nuisances brought about by the non-
feasance of his tenants. The action in this case arose from 
the omission to cleanse drains upon premises occupied by ten-
ants. The plaintiffs however sued the defendant as 'owner and 
proprietor' of the premises, citing Rosewell v Prior and 
Payne v Rodgers. Lord Denman held that the plaintiff's plea 
disclosed no cause of action, since it 
'charges no act on the part of the defendant, either 
of making or continuing the nuisance. It merely states 
him to be the owner and proprietor of the drains, and 
seeks to cast upon him, as such, a legal obligation to 
make good the damage ensuing to his neighbour .... 
There is no authority in support of such a claim, but 
several against it; Brent v Haddon, Cheetham v 
Hampson.(2 73) 
(271) Cf below 377 
(272) (1842) 3 QB 449. 
(273) R v Pedly was cited in argument - 'Rosewell v Prior shews 
that the defendant, even if he had demised ... might have 
been subject to liability, as here alleged, for not 
cleansing and repairing' - but Lord Denman (at 459) con-
sidered it no further than to describe its ratio in the 
following terms: 
'5 v Pedly was an indictment against the owner of 
houses and privies, which had been built for the very 
purpose of being so used as to create a nuisance un-
less the owner took effectual means to prevent it. 
These means not having been adopted, the owner, who 
received rents for both, was held liable for the public 
nuisance which arose....' 
376. 
The effect of R v Pedly upon the concept of the land-
lord's liability was more fully considered in the clourt of 
(274 ) 
Common Pleas in 1847 in the case of Rich v Basterfield 
This case is significant for the manner in which Cresswell J, 
who delivered the judgment of the court, sought to set the 
decision in Pedly in the general context of the principles 
relating to the incidence of liability for nuisances. 
The facts of the case were very similar to those in R v 
Pedly. .The defendant had previously erected upon his land a 
shop in which he installed a stove and chimney. He then let 
the premises to tenants who, by lighting fires in the stove, 
caused a smoke nuisance. The plaintiff then sued the defen-
dant whose case rested mainly on R v Pedly which, it was argued, 
'decided, that, if a landlord erects a building which is a 
nuisance, or of which the occupation is likely to produce a 
nuisance, and lets the land with the building so erected, he 
(275 ) 
is liable....' The plaintiff on the other hand argued, 
in effect, that he as landlord could not be held vicariously 
/ r\ r-t p \ 
liable for the acts of his tenants. 
Cresswell J approached the matter by establishing first 
whether the defendant could be liable on the principle of 
Rosewell v Prior in that he, by erecting the chimney, could be 
regarded as the author of the nuisance. On the facts he found 
that since the chimney was not per se a nuisance, the rule in 
Rosewell v Prior could not apply. The question thus resolved 
itself to an enquiry whether the subsequent use of the chimney 
by the tenant could make the defendant, his landlord, liable. 
(277 ) 
There were cases, Cresswell J observed, 'in which 
owners of fixed property have been held liable for the conse-
quences of acts done upon it by persons not strictly their 
(274) (1847) 4 CB 783. 
(275) This was how Cresswell J (at 800) summarised the defence 
contentions. 
(276) Cresswell J summarised the argument thus: '... it was 
contended, that, inasmuch as the fires ... were made not 
by the defendant or his servants, but his tenants, he 
was not responsible1, (ibid). 
(277) At 801. 
377. 
servants or agents'. These cases rested on the rationale 
(278) 
laid down by Littledale J in Laughter v Pointer, showed 
that an owner was under a duty to 'take care that his property 
is so used or managed that other persons are not injured'. 
(279) 
This principle Cresswell J said, explained all the cases 
except Pedly. 
The judgment of Littledale J in that case 'seems to have 
rested ... on the principle that the landlord was not to let 
the land with the nuisance upon it'. To this proposition 
(280) 
Cresswell J expressed the court's entire assent. It was 
also 'probably [what] Lord Denman meant ... when he said the 
receipt of rent was upholding and continuing the nuisance'. 
Tainton J, however, had held the landlord liable on the 




to cleanse. To this proposition Cresswell J stated the 
court's dissent 
f O Q O \ 
Cresswell J thus came to the conclusion that if 
R v Pedly 
'is to be taken as the decision that a landlord is 
responsible for the act of his tenant in creating a 
nuisance, by the manner in which he uses the premises 
demised, - we think it goes beyond the principle to 
be found in any previously decided cases; and we 
cannot assent to it.'(284) 
(278) See above 368-9 
(279) At 802. 
(280) At 804. 
(281) See above 
(282) At 804. 
(283) At 805. 
(284) This dictum represents the court's rejection of the 
judgment of Tainton J in R v Pedly. Anent that Cresswell J 
said earlier in his judgment Tat 804) 
'it appears to us, that, if a landlord lets premises, 
not in themselves a nuisance but which may or may not 
be used by the tenant so as to become a nuisance, and 
it is entirely at the option of the tenant so to use 
them or not, and the landlord receives the same benefit 
whether they are so used or not: the landlord cannot 
be made responsible for the acts of the tenant: and a 
fortiori he would not be liable, if he had taken an 
obligation from the tenant not to use them so. as to 
create a nuisance, even without reserving a right to 
enter and abate a nuisance, if created'. 
378. 
The result of Rich v Basterfield was thus to establish 
that a landlord's liability for nuisances upon demised premises 
was in no way vicarious in its nature, nor was it premised 
upon the same principle as determined the liability of the 
( o o C ^ 
occupier of land. The conclusion seems to be based on 
the fact that the landlord being not in control of the premises 
cannot be held liable for nuisances created upon them by other 
persons, a proposition which is broadly consistent with 
principle, laid down at this time, upon which an occupier was 
visited with liability. 
(285) Earlier in his judgment Cresswell J (at 800) had inti-
mated that the ratio of Bush v Steinman could not apply 
to the case of a landlord since 'such liability attached 
only upon persons in possession; ... the defendant in 
this case not being in possession at the time when the 
nuisance complained of was created, could not be made 
liable. And such now is the opinion of the court'. 
(286) That this was the principle involved was made clear in 
the later case of Gandy v Jubber (1864) 5 B & S 78 by 
Crompton J who pointed out (at 87) 
'it certainly seems hard that if a man lets his 
premises, and so divests himself of all power of 
control over them, he should be made liable for 
the default of the tenant. The owner ought not 
to be liable for subsequent nuisances which did 
not originate with himself, and which he cannot 
prevent - for these so long as the tenant is in 
possession the owner is irresponsible'. 
Mellor J (at 91 £ explained the principle in the light 
of the decisions which had held a landlord to be liable 
for nuisances upon the demised premises 
'It is unquestionably the duty of the owner of 
premises to let them £ree from nuisance; and if 
he does so, and the tenant enters into possession 
and subsequently creates one, he and not the land-
lord is liable, so long at least as the landlord 
is unable to regain possession of the premises, 
and thereby to abate the nuisance'. 
(287) Cf below 388 
379. 
The Incidence of Landlord's Liability 
^n Rich v Basterfield ~ Cresswell J in the course of 
his analysis of the effect of the decision in R v Pedly took 
the opportunity to expound the grounds upon which such lia-
bility did arise: 
"If, then, The Ki ng v Pedly, is to be considered as 
a case in which the defendant was held liable because 
El] he had demised the buildings when the nuisance 
existed; or [2] because he had relet them after the 
user of the buildings had created a nuisance; or, 
[3] because he had undertaken the cleansing, and had 
not performed it; - we think the judgment right....' 
This dictum must be read more as a summation by Cresswell 
J of the existing law as to a landlord's liability than as a 
statement of the precise effect of the judgments allowed in 
— v Pe<31y. The first and third grounds of liability in fact 
• (O QO ) 
express the rationes of Rosewell v Prior ' and Payne v 
(790) 
Rodgers respectively while the second ground is probably 
as correct a statement of the ratio of R v Pedly as can be 
achieved. 
[1] liability for letting premises with nuisance upon them. 
I n Rosewell v Prior(291}(1701) the landlord who let 
premises with an existing nuisance upon them was held liable 
basically because he had been the author of a continuing nui-
(292) 
sance. In Cheetham v Hampson (17 91) Buller J explained 
the decision in slightly different terms 
'... there the owner let the premises with the nuisance 
complained of, which had been before erected upon them. 
That therefore was a misfeazance of which he himself 
had been guilty; and, say the Court, his demise af-
firmed the continuance of the nuisance, and therefore 
might be said to be a continuation of it by himself.... 
(288) (1847) 4 CB 783 at 805. 
(289) See above 371 
(290) See above 371 
(291) (1701) 12 Mod 635. See above 98-100 
(292) (1794) 2 H Bl 350. See above 371 
380, 
Buller J by eliding over the fact that the defendant 
i n Rosewell v Prior was the actual author of the nuisance 
thus tended to present the ratio of the case in the form of 
a proposition that the letting amounted to a continuance for 
which a landlord (whether author or not) became liable. 
(293) 
In Bush v Steinman (17 99), the next case in which 
(294) 
Rosewell v Prior was considered, Heath J described the 
ratio of the case as being that the landlord 'affirmed the 
continuance by his demise, and received rent as a considera-
tion for it', suggesting that the landlord was properly liable 
(295) to be sued because he was profiting by the nuisance. In 
/ r\ Q n \ 
R v Pedly (1834) Denman CJ treated Rosewell v Prior as 
deciding that 'receipt of rent is an upholding and continuing 
of the nuisance'. Cresswell J in Rich v Basterfield 7)(1847) 
also considered Rosewell v Prior as determining that a land-
lord should not let premises with any existing nuisance upon 
them for 'if he had, by letting and receiving rent for them 
in that condition he would have been liable for continuing 
(298) 
and upholding the nuisance....' In Todd v Flight (1860) 
Erie CJ although mentioning that the defendant in Rosewell v 
Prior had created the nuisance, nevertheless explained his 
liability as being 'because [the nuisance] existed at the time 
(299) 
of the demise'. And in Gandy v Jubber (18 69) Crompton J 
stated that Rosewell v Prior held that 'if a man lets or relets his lands with a nuisance upon it, he is responsible for such 
nuisance, notwithstanding the tenancy1. He added that no 
doubt the defendant had had notice of the existence of the 
nuisance at the time of letting but that 'notice was not there 
the foundation of liability'. 
(293) (17.99) 1 Bos & P 404. 
(294) At 409. 
(295) Indeed he cited Rosewell v Prior as supporting by;analogy 
the principle which he was laying down, that an occupier 
of land could be vicariously liable for nuisances created 
by independant contractors. Rosewell v Prior, he said, 
'is analogous to the present; the ground of decision 
having been that the Defendant was benefitted by the 
nuisance complained o f . 
(296) (1834) 1 Ad & El 822 at 826. 
(297) (1847) 4 CB 783 at 801. 
(298) (1860) 9 CB (NS) 377 at 389. 
(299) (1864) 5 B &':'S 78 at 87. 
381. 
[2] Liability upon re-letting 
It was never abundantly clear what was the actual effect 
of the decision in R v Pedly• Clearly it did not amount to 
a simple application of the rule in Rosewell v Prior. The 
facts of the cases were not on all fours since in Rosewell 
the nuisance clearly existed at the time the landlord let the 
premises while in Pedly the nuiance arose after the letting 
when the tenants failed to cleanse the privies. Insofar as 
the result of Pedly was that the landlord was held liable, 
the case seemed to suggest that liability could rest upon a 
landlord for nuisances created by his tenants. Dicta in the 
justments, especially that of Littledale J, suggested that 
the liability was not vicarious but rather a result of the 
fact that the landlord had let the premises with the nuisance 
upon them. In the circumstances that the tenancies in 
that case were renewed annually, the result of the decision 
seemed to be that although a landlord could not be liable for 
a nuisance created by a tenant during the term of the tenancy, 
he could be held liable if at the end of the term he did not 
abate such a nuiance but re-let the premises with it still 
extant. 
This at least seemed to be the construction placed upon 
. ~ (301) 
R v Pedly by some of the later cases. In Rich v Basterfield 
(1842) Cresswell J said(3 0 2 ) that Little J had 
'rested his judgment on the principle, that the land-
lord was not to let the land with the nuisance upon 
it .... He assume[d] that there was an existing nui-
sance at the time of the letting, which had not after-
wards been removed. To his judgment, proceeding on 
that ground, we entirely assent'. 
Erie CJ in Todd v Flight (1860) seemed to regard R v Pedly 
as establishing such a principle of liability. The landlord's 
(304) 
liability arose there, he said, because he had let the 
premises 'when [the privy] had become a nuisance'. The ratio 
( Q n r s 
of the case was however most fully analysed in Gandy v Jubber J"' 
(1864). 
(3 00) See above 373-4 
(301) Supra (n 2 97). 
(302) At 804. 
(303) (1860) 9 CB (NS) 377'. 
(304) At 390. 
(305) (1864) 5 3 & S 78. 
382. 
The question in this case was whether a landlord whose 
premises were let on an annual tenancy could be held liable 
for a nuisance upon the premises of which he was not the 
author (and indeed of whose existence he had no notice). 
The court of the Queen's Bench decided that he could be 
held liable. 
Crompton J held that it was clear on authority and 
principle that a landlord who let or relet premises with a 
(3 07) 
nuisance upon them could be held liable. Since, in this 
case, the landlord had not been a party to the original demise, 
he could only be liable if he could be said, in the circum-
stances, to have relet the premises. In considering this point 
Crompton J adverted to the decision in R v Pedly. 'I take it1, 
he said 
'to be clear ... that where a tenant having a long 
lease of premises so uses them as to create a nui-
sance, the landlord, having no power or right of 
interference, incurs no responsibility; but if having 
regained possession of the property the landlord re-
lets it with the nuisance thereupon remaining, in 
such case he is liable; and for this Rex v Pedly is 
an authority'. 
Mellor J without referring to Pedly nevertheless approved of 
(308) 
the proposition enunciated by Crompton J, pointing out 
that where a tenancy is from year to year the landlord can by 
giving notice regain possession of the premises in order to 
(306) At 87. 
(307) This he deduced from Rosewell v Prior which he said 
'held ... that, if a man lets or relets his land with 
a nuisance upon it, he is responsible'. As a matter of 
principle he added, the owner 
'being liable for nuisances and obstructions in 
existence at the date of demise, it seems clear 
that he would be equally responsible for reletting 
the premises with the nuisance upon them, and in 
this I see no hardship, notwithstanding the absence 
of notice to him ....' 
(308) At 92. 
383. 
abate the nuisance. If he fails to do so arid the premises 
are thus relet the landlord thus can be taken to have con-
firmed the nuisance. He had 'in his hands a power which he 
might and should have exercised [and] must be held responsible 
for the consequences of not having done so.' 
Gandy v Jubber thus appears to confirm the proposition 
enunciated by Cresswell J in Rich v Basterfield that R v 
Pedly was a case in which a landlord was considered liable 'be-
cause he had relet [premises] after the user of the [premises] 
had created a nuisance1. 
Indeed Gandy v Jubber appears to extend the scope of 
this form of landlord liability in that the judges of the 
Queen's Bench there held that liability arose even where a 
(309 ) 
lease was tacitly relocated. Crompton J held that the • 
defendant was liable in the instant case because 
'his permitting the tenant to remain in occupation 
year after year without taking steps for the termina-
tion of the tenancy is, I think, equivalent to a new 
letting at the termination of each year'. 
Blackburn J too held liability to arise on this basis, citing 
the judgment of Littledale J in R v Pedly. There, he said, 
the case of a tenancy from year to year had been dealt with 
'from a conviction that, if such a tenancy were suffered 
to continue, it was practically the same thing as the 
renewal of a tenancy for a short period ....' 
The decision of the court on this point was taken on appeal to 
(311) 
the Exchequer Chamber where after argument the plaintiff 
accepted a stet processus and no judgment was delivered. The 
(312 ) 
judgment of the court was however prepared and it makes 
it plain that the Exchequer Chamber proposed to overrule the 
(313) 
decision of the Queen's Bench. The court said it differed 
from the Queen's Bench on the point whether liability arose 
where a lease was tacitly relocated. 
(309) At 89. 
(310) At 91. 
(311) Gandy v Jubber (1865) 5 B & S 485. 
(312) And subsequently published in 9 B & S 15-11 
(313) 9 B & S 16. 
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[3] Undertaking to repair 
(314 ) , 
Payne v Rodgers (1794) held a landlord liable for 
a nuisance upon the leased premises even though it arose after 
the letting. The ground of liability was given as the fact 
that the landlord had entered into a covenant with the tenant 
to effect repairs to the premises. The only explanation given 
as to why such a contract should render the landlord liable to 
v / q -i c "\ 
third parties was that of avoiding circuity of action. 
The principle was followed in Leslie v Pounds (1812) 
-(.although without citation of Payne v Rodgers) and the case 
(317 ) 
apparently approved m Russell v Stenton and Todd v 
(318) 
Flight. Indeed the rule in Payne v Rodgers has never been 
(319) 
dissented from and was much fallowed in the twentieth 
century in a line of cases which extended the landlord's lia-
bility for damage caused to members of the public by nuisances 
upon his premises. 
3. The liability arising from the control of premises 
Continuing a Nuisance 
We have seen that in the seventeenth century the ele-
mentary principle that the author of a nuisance was liable 
therefor was amplified by a principle that liability for a 
nuisance could be visited upon one who was not the actual 
(314) (1794) 2 H Bl 350. 
(315) Bohlen 'Fifty Years of Torts' (1936-7) 50 Harvard LR 
725 at 747 n 41 suggests that a better reason for the 
decision 'seems to be that the owner of land is required 
as such to keep the structures thereon in such condition 
as not to be dangerous.... Putting the tenant in exclu-
sive possession of the land makes it unlawful for the 
landlord to enter to make such repairs as he learns to 
be necessary. The covenant to repair carries with it an 
implied right of entry for that purpose and thus the duty 
otherwise suspended remains in force'. Cf Beven Negligence 
498 n (h) who offers a similar explanation of the decision: 
'This liability of the landlord is perhaps to be explained 
on the ground that, as an incident of his obligation to 
repair, he retains a certain amount of control over the 
premises'. 
(316) (1812) 4 Taunt 649. 
(3i7) (1842) 3 QB 449 at 458. 
(318) (1860) 9 CB (NS) 377 at 389. 
(319) Bohlen op cit 747 describes it as establishing 'univer-
sally accepted law . . . . ' . . 
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author of the nuisance but who could be said to have continued 
. . (320 ) 
the original wrong. This principle, although originally 
presented as an instance of the creation of a 'fresh' nui-
(321) 
sance, plainly rested upon the consideration that the 
occupier of premises upon which the nuisance existed ought to 
have prevented it causing harm to others. The inarticulate 
premiss of this idea was that the occupier, by virtue of his 
power of control of the premises, was in a position to abate 
the nuisance. 
The principle that a person could be held liable for 
continuing a nuisance seemed to be predicated on the fact of 
his control of the premises from which the nuisance harm 
(322) (3 23) 
emanated and his 'fault' in not abating the nuisance. 
The Victorian judges though paying some lip service to 
the traditional formula that a man was liable for 'continuing' 
(324) 
a nuisance made no real attempt to define what the term 
(320) Above 95-7 
(321) Ibid. 
(322) Cf R v Watts (1702) 1 Salk 357. There a tenant was 
indicted for maintaining a ruinous house. The court 
held him liable 
'... for it is not only charged, but found, that the 
defendant was occupier, and in that respect he is 
answerable to the public; for the house was a nui-
sance as it stood, and the continuing of the' house 
in that condition is continuing the nuisance'. 
'Precisely the same reason applies to the case of a 
private nuisance by a ruinous house' (per Parke B in 
Chauntler v Robinson (1849) 4 Exch 163 at 170. 
(3 23) Rosewell v Prior (17 01) 12 Mod 63 5 hints at this. There 
.. Holt GJ (at 640) held that a lessee might be sued for a 
nuisance, of which he was not the author, upon the pre-
mises occupied by him 'for it was the lessee's fault to. 
contract for an interest in land on which there is a 
nuisance'. 
(324) See Thompson v Gibson (1841) 7 M & W 456. Cf Russell v 
Shelton (1842) 3 QB 449 (cited above 375 ). See too 
Saxby v Manchester and Sheffield Rwy Co (1869) LR 4 CP 
198 where Montague Smith J, in the course of argument, 
observed (at 201) that 'Persons coming into possession 
of land after the creation of a nuisance upon it have 
been held responsible for its continuance'. 
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actually meant. This can be attributed to the fact that 
they were in fact engaged in elaborating the underlying prin-
ciple in other terms and contexts. 
Occupier's liability 
The idea that the occupier of land was under some sort 
of obligation to ensure that conditions existing upon his land 
did not cause harm to others was first explicitly expressed in 
the nineteenth century in the context of nuisance actions for 
damages incurred in the public highway. A seminal decision 
was that in Coupland v Hardingham (1813). The plaintiff 
suffered injuries as a result of falling into an unguarded 
space on the defendant's premises, which adjoined the public 
highway. The accident had occurred because the space was not 
fenced, and the defendant took the point that it had been in 
this condition for many years and certainly long before he 
came into possession of the premises. This argument, which in 
effect said that the defendant had not created the 'nuisance', 
was rejected by Lord Ellenborough CJ with the observation that 
the defendant was 
'bound to guard against the danger to which the public 
had been exposed; and that he was liable for the con-
sequences of having neglected to do so, in the same 
manner as if he himself had originated the nuisance•... 
[l]t is a duty which the law casts upon the occupier 
of the house to render it secure'. 
(325) See Saxby's case (supra) where the court seems to have 
considered the nature of the defendant's liability for 
continuing a nuisance. The facts of the case are compli-
cated and the effect of the judgments (which cite no 
authorities) is difficult to gather. Lord Wright in 
Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880 at 908 
found it 'most difficult to understand' and thought it 
should never have been reported. In Barker v Herbert 
[1911] 2 KB 633 Vaughan Williams LJ said that the effect 
of the judgments in the case was 'that to impose a lia-
bility upon the possessor of land ... there must be 
either the creation of a nuisance by him or a continuation 
by him of a nuisance'. In Sedleigh-Denfield's case (supra) 
Viscount Maugham thought it 'suggests that if the occupier 
"adopts" or "continues" the nuisance, he will be liable 
if damage is caused' (at 891). Lord Romer thought it 
favoured the idea of 'the liability of an occupier of 
land for continuing a nuisance created by another' (at 9.13) 
(326) (1813) 3 Ca.mp 398. 
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(327 ) 
In Proctor v Harris (1830) a case also involving 
injuries sustained as a result of a cellar flap in the pave-
(328) 
ment being left open Tindal CJ reiterated the duty of 
care to be displayed by the occupier of premises: 
'He is not bound to resort to every mode of security 
that could be surmised, but he was bound to use such 
a degree of care as would prevent a reasonable person, 
acting with an ordinary degree of care, from receiving 
any injury'. 
The idea of an occupier's duty of care next appears in 
(329 ) 
dicta in Laughter v Pointer. There Littledale J in 
expounding the nature of a master's vicarious liability for 
the acts of his servants, suggested that where the harm suf-
fered was 'in the nature of nuisances' then the occupier of 
-premises might well be vicariously liable since 
'... the rule of law may be that in all cases where a 
man is in possession of fixed property he must take 
care that his property is not so used and managed that 
other persons are not injured'. 
( 330) Abbott CJ expressed a similar view: 
'I have the control and management of all that belongs 
to my land or my house; and it is my fault if I do 
not so exercise my authority as to prevent injury to 
another'. 
The extent to which these principles could be related 
to the nuisances of the conventional sort was suggested by 
(331) Rolfe B in Reedie' s case (18 47) when, in considering the 
judgments in Laughter v P.6 later he observed 
(327) (1830) 4 C & P 337. 
(3 28) Tindal CJ treated the flap as a nuisance, putting it to 
the jury that the question for decision was 'whether ... 
this flap was in the nature of a nuisance'. 
(329) (1826) 5 B & C 547 at 560. 
(330) At 576. Cf Littledale J's remark (at 562): 'Houses and 
land come under the fixed use and enjoyment of a man for 
his regular occupation and enjoyment in life; the law 
compels him to take care that no persons come about his 
premises who occasion injury to others'. 
(331) (1849) 4 Exch 244 at 256. 
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'If, for instance, a person occupying a house or a 
field should permit another to carry on there a 
noxious trade, so as to be a nuisance to his neigh-
bours, it may be that he would be responsible, 
though the acts complained of were neither his acts 
nor the acts of his servants. He would have violated ,-.,, 
the rule of law, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"'. 
These dicta hinted that the.liability for nuisances upon 
premises followed from the fact that the occupier was in con-
trol of the premises. That control was a crucial element in 
determining liability for nuisances was made plain in the line 
of cases dealing with the liability of a landlord for nuisances 
(333) 
upon the leased premises. Those cases emphasised that, 
as a general rule, liability for nuisance could not be visited 
upon an owner not in possession of the premises but rather fell 
(334) 
upon the occupier actually in possession. 
These authorities thus all suggested a principle that 
the occupier of premises could be held liable for nuisances of 
which he was not the author if he was in possession of those 
premises. Thus when the point came up crisply for decision 
the Victorian judges did not hesitate to hold an occupier who 
had neither created, nor authorized the creation of a nuisance 
to nevertheless be liable for nuisance harm suffered by a 
neighbour. This principle was.clearly laid down in equity in 
(3 32) For an application of this principle see White v Jameson 
(1874) LR 18 Eq 30 3 where Jessell MR held that the 
occupier of lands who authorized another to establish a 
brick-kiln which proved to be a nuisance to the defen-
dant was 'liable to be sued in equity as well as at law'. 
(333) See above 375-77 
(334) See Cheetham v Hampson (17 91) 4 TR 318 ('[an action for 
nuisance] cannot be supported against the owner of the 
inheritances when it is in the possession of another1); 
Russell v,Shenton (1842) 3 QB 449 (cited above 375) 
Rich v Basterfield (1847) 4 CB 783 at 800 ('[some cases 
have occurred in which] the owners of fixed property were 
held liable- for injuries arising from acts done upon 
that property by persons not strictly their servants or 
agents ... [S]uch liability attached only upon persons 
in possession . . . . ' ) ; Chauntler v Robinson (1849) 4 
Exch 163 at 170 ('It does not follow that the owner of 
the estate, as distinguished from the occupier, may not 
be made liable, but not simply because he is owner'). 
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187 6 in the case of Broder v Saillard. The nuisance in 
question was noxious matter which penetrated the plaintiff's 
permises. It was a result of a defective pipe of which the 
defendant, who had only recently come into occupation of the 
premises, was entirely unaware. Jessell MR conceding that 
the defendant had 'done nothing at all except occupy the 
/ Q Q C \ 
house ... in the usual way' nevertheless held that that 
(3 37) 
was 'quite irrelevant on a question of law' and gave 
(338) 
judgment against him. 
The apotheosis of this line of development occurred in 
(339 ) 
Humphries v Cousins. The action was for damages for 
injuries suffered as a result of the escape of noxious matter 
from a defective drain on the defendant's premises. The de-
fendant did not know of the drain or the defect but notwith-
standing this he was held to be liable. Denman J explained 
the sources of this liability in these terms: 
'The prima facie right of every occupier of a piece of 
land is, to enjoy that land free from all invasion of 
filth or other matter .... Moreover, this right ... is 
an incident of possession and does not depend on the 
acts or omissions of other people; it is independent 
of what they may know or not know of the state of their 
own property, and independent of the care or want of 
care which they may take of it.... [H]as the defendant 
infringed those rights and is he the person liable for 
the infringement?.^?. ' [I]t was the defendant's duty to 
keep the sewage ... from passing from his own premises 
to the plaintiff's premises.... This duty is incidental 
to the defendant's possession of land and is the neces-
sary consequence of the right of the plaintiff. That 
duty, like its correlative right, is independent of 
negligence on the part of the defendant, and independent 
of his knowledge or ignorance of the existence of the 
drain'.(341) 
(335) (1876) LR 2 Ch 692. 
(336) At 697. 
(337) At 6981 
(33 9)'The action was for an injunction and it should be borne in 
mind that the award of such a remedy is less sensitive to 
considerations of fault than where the action is for 
damages (cf Winfield and Jolowicz Tort 32 0; Kenworthy 
'The Relationship between Nuisance Criteria in Equity and 
Damages' (1949) 54 Dickinson LR 109. This fact would 
partially explain the strictness of the approach of the 
Master of the Rolls. 
(339) (1877) LR 2 CP 239% 
(340) At 243-4. 
(341) At 245. 
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Ill THE NUISANCE REMEDIES 
1. Action for Damages 
The action for damages as a means of remedying nuisances 
(341) was, as we have seen, defective in the sense that it 
made no direct provision for the abatement of the conditions 
causing the harm complained of. In practice this meant that 
a wrongdoer might well perpetuate that which had been judged 
to be an actionable nuisance. This deficiency in the action 
was to some extent overcome by the practice of allowing the 
victim of a continuing nuisance successive actions for the 
(342 ) 
same source of nuisance harm until the wrongdoer was com-
pelled by economic pressure to put an end to the source of the 
harm. The practice was for a jury to award nominal damages 
in respect of the initial action and then, If the harm contin-
( 343 ) ued, to 'give such damages as may compel him to abate it...' 
One consequence of this approach was that it became clear 
that in actions for damages the courts would not allow a plain-
(344) tiff to obtain damages for prospective harm from the nuisance. 
(341) Above 102. 
(342) See Battishill v Reed (1856) 18 CB 696 where this 
principle for the first time was clearly laid down. It 
is interesting to note that the main source of authority 
cited in court was Blackstone (see above 101 n 45) and 
a passage from Sedwick's Damages which drew heavily upon 
American case law In stating the rule (see 18 CB 696 at 
7 07-8). The judges in this case stated the rule as 
follows: 'Every day the defendant continues the nuisance, 
he renders himself liable to another action' (per Jervis 
CJ AT 714); 'There is no doubt, upon the authorities, 
that an action might be maintained for continuing the 
erection after judgment recovered in the first action' 
(per Cresswell J at 716); "... fresh actions may be 
brought as long as the nuisance is continued' (per 
Williams J at 716) . 
(343) See Jervis CJ in Battishill v Reed (supra) at 714: 
'I think the jury did right to give, as they generally 
do, nominal damages only in the first action; and, 
if the defendant persists in continuing the nuisance 
then they may give such damages as may compel him to 
abate it....' 
(344) Since such damages were the subject of any future action 
for the continuance of the nuisance. Thus as Williams J 
pointed out in Battishill v Reed (supra) at 717: 
(continued on the next page) 
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2. Self-help 
'There is.no doubt' Lord Denman CJ said in 184-6(3145^ 
'that a person whi is injured by a private nuisance may abate 
it.' This willingness to allow abatement of nuisances as 'an 
exception to the general law of England, that a man has no 
right to take the law into his own hands' was not only 
(347 ) 
historically justified but necessary in view of the de-
ficiency of the common law action for damages in ensuring the 
(348) 
abatement of nuisances. At the same time however the 
judges, no doubt influenced by the consideration that the vic-
tim of a nuisance could obtain abatement through the award of 
(349 ) 
an injunction, began to take a more rigid view of the 
propriety of recourse to self-help. 
(344) (continued) 
'It would clearly have been a misdirection to have 
told the jury, that, in estimating the damages, they 
might take into consideration the diminuition in 
value of the plaintiff's premises, if he might after-
wards have brought a fresh action from day to day for 
the continuance of the nuisance.... It is impossible, 
that, after the plaintiff has once recovered the full 
value, the defendant is to be liable to a succession 
of actions for the continuance of the nuisance'. 
Cf Willes J (at 718): 'To hold that the plaintiff 
could recover a full compensation for the injury done to 
his reversion in the first action, when he may have re-
peated actions for the continuance of the nuisance, 
would be manifestly inconsistent and absurd'. The court 
of Chancery however had the power, under the Chancery 
Procedure Amendment Act 185 8 (see below n 3 64) to make 
an award of prospective damages in lieu of awarding an 
injunction (see eg Jenks v Clifden [1897] 1 Ch 694. 
(345) Perry v Fitzhowe (1846) 8 QB 757 at 775. 
(346) Per Wilde B in Jones v Jones (1862) 1 H & C 1 at 5-6. 
(347) Cf above 55, 103. 
(348) Cf above 101. 
(349) Cf above 231. 
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This attitude is clearly seen as early as 17 97 in 
Kirby v Sadgrove where Eyre CJ expressed the view that . 
'[A]batement ought only to be allowed in clear cases 
of nuisance where the injury is apparent on the first 
view of the matter. The abater makes himself his own 
judge, and proceeds at his own hazard to destroy the 
thing which he considers an infringement of his right; 
whereas in an aciton, the invasion of his property 
meets with a fair discussion, and obtains for him a 
proper recompence, without the previous destruction of 
the thing in dispute. We ought not to strain a point 
to let in this species of remedy....' 
(351) 
In Earl of Lonsdale v Nelson (1823) Best J observed 
that, subject to one exceptional type of case, the vic-
tims of nuisances 'should not take the law into their own 
hands, but follow the advice of Lord Hale and appeal to a 
(353 ) Court of Justice'. The general limitation nature of the 
right to resort to self-help was stated in these words in 
Roberts v Ros_e (3 5 4 }(1865 ) by Blackburn J: 
'We are all agreed that where a person attempts to 
justify an interference with the property of another 
in order to abate a nuisance, he may justify himself 
as against the wrongdoer so far as his interference 
is positively necessary. We are also agreed that, in 
abating the nuisance, if there are two ways of doing 
it, he must choose the least mischievous of the two. 
We also think that if, by one of these alternative 
methods some wrong would be done to an innocent third 
party or the public, then that method cannot be justi-
fied at all, although an interference with the wrong-
doer himself might be justified. Therefore where the 
alternative method involves such an interference it 
must not be adopted; as it may become necessary to 
abate the nuisance in a manner more onerous to the 
wrong doer'. 
(350) (1797.) 3 Anst 892 at 896. 
(351) (1823) 2 B & C 302 at 312. 
(352) For which see below n 358. 
(353) Best J reference is to Hale De Portibus c 7 where the 
author refers to the power to abate obstructions to 
navigation in ports, adding that 'because this many 
times occasions tumults and disorders, the best way to 
reform public nuisances is by the ordinary Courts of 
Justice'. 
(354) (1865) LR 1 Exch 82 at 89. 
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In the seventeenth century it had been established that self-
help could not be resorted to without prior notice to the 
offending party. In Lonsdale v Nelson Best J 
glossed this rule, stating that nuisances caused by acts 
of omission could not be abated by self-help without previous 
(358) 
notice. 
The seventeenth century sources of the rule that a nui-
sance could be abated by self-help without notice seemed to 




was not the actual author of the nuisance. The rul was 
considered and approved by Parke B in Jones v Williams 
(1843): 
'It is clear that if the plaintiff himself was the 
original wrong-doer ... [the nuisance] might be re-
moved by the party injured, without any notice to the 
plaintiff ... but if the nuisance was levied by another, 
and the defendant succeeded to the locus in quo after-
wards, the authorities are in favour of the necessity 
of a notice being given ... before the party aggrieved 
can take the law into his own hands.... We think that 
a notice or request is necessary ... in the case of a 
nuisance continued by an alienee....' 
(355) See above 105. 
(356) (1823) 2 B & C 302 at 311. 
(357) The suggestion that there was a distinction for these 
purposes between nuisances by omission and commission 
was advanced by James Parke, (counsel for the plaintiff, 
and later Parke B and Lord Wensleydale) in an ingerious 
argument based on the nature and purpose of the Assize 
of Nuisance (see 2 B & C 302 at 305-6). As Parke B he 
approved of the proposition in Jones v Williams (1843) 
11 M & W 17 6 at 181. 
(3 58) To this rule he made one exception. Where the branches 
of trees overhung a public road or private property 
these could be cut back without previous notice. This 
exception he explained as being based on the danger 
threatened by over-hanging branches: 'The security of 
lives and property may sometimes require so speedy a 
remedy as not to allow time to call on the person on 
whose property the mischief has arisen, to remedy it. 
In such cases an individual would be justified in abating 
a nuisance from omission without notice (at 312)'. 
Best J's dictum concerning the notice required in the 
case of overhanging boughs was expressly approved by 
the House of Lords in Lemon v Webb [189 5] AC 1. For an 
analysis of Best J'-s dictum see also the judgment of 
Kay LJ in Lemmon v Webb [1894] 3 C h D 1 at 22, 24. 
(359) Above 105. 
(360) (1843) 11 M & W 176 at 182. 
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3. Injunction 
The injunction, effectively introduced as a remedy for 
( Q C *1 ^ 
nuisance at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
rapidly proved to be the most efficient and flexible mode of 
redressing nuisances. In the course of the century the remedy 
was made more readily available by the removal of the rule 
that the existence of the nuisance had to be established by . 
/ o r> r\ \ 
an action at law before an injunction could issue, and 
the establishment of the principle that a court of common law 
. . . *. . , . . . . (363) in certain circumstances might award an injunction. 
The great merit of the remedy, in addition to its flexi-
bility, lay in the fact that it provided the means for obtaining 
judicial abatement of a nuisance, a form of redress which, we 
have seen, was not available after the demise of the Assize of 
Nuisance. The equity judges were well aware of the advantage 
of the injunction as a nuisance remedy as is revealed by their 
attitude towards the principle that damages might be awarded 
in lieu of an injunction. This power was conferred in 1858 
(361) Above 231. 
(362) Under the influence of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 
(17 & 18 Vict c 12 5) (which gave the courts of common law 
a certain power to award injunctions) and the Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict c 27) (which gave the 
court of Chancery a certain power to award damages in 
addition to or in lieu of an injunction (se? further be-
low n 364)). Bacon VC in Roskell v Whitworth (1871) 19 
WR 804 observed that in any event it was 
'the clear and paramount duty of the court, not less 
in obedience to the statutory enactments [noted above] 
than to the dictates of good sense and justice (which 
is the perfection of good sense) to decide at once 
any question for the decision of which it has satis-
factory materials, without sending the parties litigant 
to some foreign extramural tribunal, there to undergo 
the dilatory, expensive, uncertain hazards of an en-
quiry which this court possesses the full means of 
deciding....' 
(3 63) By s 79 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (17 & 18 
Vict c 12 5) which provided that where 'the party injured 
is entitled to maintain and has brought an action, he may 
claim a writ of injunction against the repetition or con-
tinuance of such ... injury'. 
(3 64) By Lord Cairns' Chancery Procedure Amendment Act 185 8 
(21 & 22 Vict c 27 s 2) which provided that in 'all cases 
in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to 
(continued on the next page) 
395. 
( o c c \ 
but seldom exercised, the Chancery judges pointing out 
that to award damages was to enable a wrong-doer to buy the 
right to inflict a nuisance upon another person. 
IV THE NUISANCE CONCEPT AND THE COMFORT OF HUMAN EXISTENCE 
1. Introduction 
We have seen how the nuisance concept, originating in the 
idea of protecting an occupier's possessory interests in real 
property, corporeal and incorporeal, v had come to recog-
nise and protect more refined interests of the physical well-
being of the occupier. These interests, identified as 
the amenities of domestic habitation, in essence expressed 
(364) (continued) 
entertain an application for an injunction ... against 
the commission or continuance of any wrongful act ... 
it shall be lawful for the same court, if it shall think 
fit, to award damages to the party injured, either in 
addition to or in substitution for such injunction....' 
(3 65) Between 1858 and 1894 the power was exercised on fourteen 
occasions only. See Shelfer v City of London Electric 
Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 303, 319. 
(366) Lindley LJ in Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting 
Co (supra) at 315 said that 
'... the Court of Chancery has repudiated the notion 
that the Legislature intended to turn that court into 
a tribunal for legalizing wrongful acts; or in other 
words, the court has always protested against the 
notion that it ought to allow a wrong to continue simply 
because the wrong-doer is able and willing to pay for 
the injury he may inflict'. 
A L Smith LJ in the same case (at 322) made the same 
point: 
'Many judges have stated, and I emphatically agree with 
them, that a person by committing a wrongful act ... is 
not thereby entitled to ask the court to sanction his 
doing so by purchasing his neighbour's rights by asses-
sing damages in that behalf, leaving his neighbour with 
the nuisance, or his lights dimmed, as the case may be'. 
(367) Above 39. 




certain claims of personality relating to the integrity, 
comfort and convenience of the person of those in occupation 
of real property. 
Although, technically speaking, interferences of this 
sort were merely one of a galaxy of offences which went under 
(371) 
the title 'nuisance', after the decisions in Bamford v 
Turnley and the St Helens case there was a clear tendency to 
understand the substantive meaning of the term 'nuisance' as 
being that which interfered with the ordinary comfort of 
( 37 2 ) 
human existence. 
(370) Cf above 126 n 154. 
(371) The exact meaning of the term 'nuisance was never satis-
factorily settled in the nineteenth century (nor, indeed, 
in the twentieth). It continued to be used in a techni-
cal sense to denote such disparate activities as failure 
to repair a highway (cf above 166); obstructions to 
highways and navigable rivers (Chap 4 above); indecent 
exposure of the person (above 17 3 n 64); open cellar-
flaps and other dangerous conditions in a highway (above 
3 62); encroachments into the air-space above land (cf 
above 102 n 50 and see Fay v Prentice (1845) 1 CB 828; 
Earl of Lonsdale v Nelson (1823) 2 B & C 302; Lemmon v 
Webb L1895J AC 1) ; obstructions of natural light (cf 
above 120); the establishing of rival markets, fairs 
(see above 14 5) and ferrys (cf n 44 3 below). 
(37 2) A tendency perhaps promoted by the legislature's choice 
of the term to denote the sanitary offences dealt with 
under the public health legislation being enacted at this 
time (cf above 208). The opinion of Lord Westbury in 
the St Helens case that the test of reciprocal reason-
ableness developed for nuisance law in Bamford v Turnley 
should be restricted to actons where 'sensible personal 
comfort' was affected would also suggest the tendency. 
It is however perhaps best illustrated by the cases in 
which the judges were called on to give a meaning to the 
word 'nuisance' when it occurred in covenants regarding 
the occupation of land. In Tod-Heatly v Benham (1888) 
LR 40 Ch 8 0 Bowen LJ observed (at 97-8) that 
'[i]f guided by the Common Law we know what nuisance 
is I will assume ... that "nuisance" in this 
covenant means only a nuisance at Common Law: that is 
in the language of Vice Chancellor Knight-Bruce in 
Walter v Selfe [(1851) 4 De G & Sm 315 at 322] »an 
inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary 
comfort physically of human existence...." Any material 
interference with the ordinary comfort of existence: 
that would be a nuisance'. 
See also Martin B in Fletcher v Rylands (1865)3 B & C 774 
at 792 (cited below 424 n 27). 
Sir Frederick Pollock in his treatise The Law_of Torts_,firs 
published in 1887, noted that the 'conception of private 
nuisance' included 'direct interferences with 
(continued on the next page) 
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As Fleming has pointed out this conception of the 
character of nuisance establishes it as a bridge 'between torts 
of the conventional pattern concerned primarily with personal 
injury and property damage, and torts such as defamation and 
malicious prosecution which reach out to vindicate more sophis-
ticated interests of personality, like reputation'. The con-
cept of nuisance as a remedy for interferences with the or-
dinary comfort of human existence constitutes the law's way of 
protecting interests which 
'standing alone, are still outside the pale of legal 
protection as being altogether too refined and 
precious *.(374) 
2. The Comfort of Human Existence 
The Victorian judges although committed to the principle 
that the comfort of human existence ought to be protected, 
tended to take a somewhat narrow view of what exactly fell 
within the concept. Essentially their attitude was that human 
existence was tendered uncomfortable by offensive odours and 
/ o n c. \ 
noise. ' '' Other phenomena which could have the effect of 
(372) (continued) 
the rights of the possessor' hardly distinguishable from 
trespasses ( an idea based on 'the old authorities, and 
the course of procedure on which [the action was] foun-
ded' ) ; obstructions (viz interferences with ancient 
lights) and 'annoyances 1 ('the continuous doing of some-
thing which interferes with another's health or comfort 
in the occupation of his property'). This latter species 
of nuisance, Pollock observed, is 'that which is most 
commonly spoken of by the technical name....' 
(373) Introduction to the Law of Torts 186. 
(374) Fleming op cit ibid. So for instance 'smell and noise 
may well be actionable although neither would qualify 
as 'personal injury' in a negligence action....' (ibid). 
(375) An interesting light is thrown on this attitude by the 
modern studies of 'proxemics' (theories of man's cultural 
use of space). Man, these studies show, responds to 
violations of the space which he occupies, either as a 
territory or an egocentric preserve in which the organism 
exists ('personal space') (see generally Hall The Hidden-
:; Dimension; Goffman Relations in Public). Violations of 
these spaces are effected b-'y various modalities, espe-
cially odour, sounds and vision (Goffman op cit 68-74). 
These modalities acquire the character of an 'offence' 
against individual claims to space (Goffman op cit 7 4-84) 
(continued on the next page) 
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disturbing the repose or tranquility of mind of the occupier 
of land tended to be regarded as 'too refined and precious1 
to enjoy even the protection of the law of nuisance. 
2.1. Olfactory nuisances 
The seminal instance of a nuisance affecting the comfort 
of existence was that of causing stenches, odours, stinks or 
smells to invade a neighbour's house or lands. 
The idea that that which was offensive to the olfactory 
sense could constitute an actionable nuisance was a well estab-
lished principle in medieval times when stenches, odours, 
stinks or smells had been regarded as 'corrupting' the air and 
were suppressed usually by way of primitive sanitary legisla-
tion. ( 3 7 6 ) in Aldred's case( 3 7 7 ) (1611) the court of King's 
Bench allowed an action for nuisance on the ground of the 
stench emanating from a pig-sty. For the most part however 
these early precedents did not more than lay down that stenches 
could be actionable as nuisances. In particular they provided 
no guidance on the circumstances or factors which rendered 
( 3 7 8 ) 
stenches an actionable nuisance. 
This point seems to have been first considered in public 
( 379 ) 
nuisance cases. In R v White and Ward (17 57) the defen-
dants were charged with a public nuisance in that they had 
(375) (continued) 
because they are the means by which men can perceive 
space. That is to say man's perception of spaces, either 
territorial or personal, is effected through the olfactory, 
auditory and visual senses (Kail op cit chap 4) and, for 
this reason odours, noise and sights can be offensive to 
human beings as indiciae of invasions by others of their 
spaces which are the source of physical and mental repose 
and tranquility. The interesting point is that olfaction 
and hearing are the two earliest and most basic means of 
communication, while sight was the last, though most 
specialized sense, developed in man (Hall op cit 40). As 
we will see below the law of nuisance, as a device for 
protecting the comfort of human existence has more readily 
recognised olfactory and auditory offences as 'nuisances' 
and has been reluctant to admit visually offensive con- . 
ditions as constituting an actionable nuisance. 
(376) See above 73. 
(377) (1611) 9 Co Rep 57. 
(378) Jones v Powell (1628) Hut 135; Palm 536 is a significant 
exception. See the discussion of this case above at 135. 
(379) (1757) 1 Burr 333. 
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created 'noisome and offensive stinks and smells''. The de-
fence took the point that the indictment was bad because it 
C380' 
did not indicate why the stenches were harmful to the public. 
f O g 1 ) 
The Crown on the other hand argued that 
'an offensive stench is of itself a nuisance; even 
though it should not be strictly hurtful. An indict-
ment merely for a stench would have been good; even 
without any epithets. It depends upon rendering the 
property of other persons incommodious and uncomfort-
able to them'. 
The court seems to have accepted this contention, Lord Mans-
(382) 
field disposing of this part of the case with the observa-
tion that 
'it is not necessary that the smell should be unwhole-
some; it is enough, if it renders the enjoyment of 
life uncomfortable'. 
M O O ] 
In R v Davey (180 5) where the complaint concerned a 'sul-
phurous smell' Heath J directed the jury that it must appear 
'that the grievance was either destructive to the 
general health of the inhabitants, or rendered their 
dwellings uncomfortable or untenantable''), 
He pointed out that the witnesses who had been subjected to 
the odour were 'in health' and there was no evidence that the 
noxious vapours which would endanger the health of people. 
The jury duly acquitted. 
This direction appeared then to make the actionability 
of the stench parasitic to danger to health. However in the 
next case of R v Neil (1826) Abbott CJ followed the ratio 
of White and Ward and held that it was not necessary to show 
injury to health, adding that 
(3 80) Citing precedents and authorities which suggested that 
the stench had to be 'contagious' or 'infectious' or 
'unwholesome' or 'insalubrious' (at 335). 
(381) At 336. 
(382) At 337. 
(383) (1805) 5 Esp 217. 
(384) (1826) 2 C & P 485. 
400. 
'if there be smells offensive to the senses that is 
enough, as the neighbourhood has a right to fresh 
and pure air'. 
Bliss v Hall(385)(1838) was the first nineteenth century 
case to allow an action for private nuisance arising from 
( 3 R fi ) 
stench. Echoing Rankett's case, it involved the odours 
arising from candlemaking. Tindal CJ rested the plain-
tiff's right to an action upon the broad principle that 
'[w]hen a person becomes occupier of a house, he is 
entitled, by common law, to all reasonable rights, 
easements, and appurtenances, amongst which good 
wholesome air is of course included'. 
The leading nineteenth century case on the nature of 
(388) 
odours as a nuisance was Walter v Selfe (1851). There 
/ o o q \ 
Knight Bruce VC explained the actionability of stenches 
as deriving from a claim to one of the basic media of human 
existence, namely the claim of persons 
'to an untainted and unpolluted stream of air for the 
necessary supply and reasonable use of himself and 
his family ... for the ordinary purposes of breath and 
life'. 
This claim, he intimated, rested not so much upon the interest 
(390 ) 
of physical health or damage to property but rather upon 
the interest in physical comfort as a normal incident of the 
(3 91) 
occupation of land. 
(385) (1838) LJ MC 122. 
(386) See above 12 5. 
(387) At 123. 
(388) (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315. 
(389) At 321. 
(390) Knight Bruce VC (at 323) did not consider it necessary 
to decide whether stenches had to be shown to be 'nox-
ious to human health, to animal health, in any sense, or 
to vegetable health'. However he did add that it was not 
'incumbent upon the Plaintiff to establish that vegetable 
life or vegetable health, either universally ox1 in par-
ticular instances, is noxiously affected by the contact . 
of vapours and floating substances....' 
(391) The Vice-Chancellor made it plain that the essential 
question was whether the stench 'will be an inconvenience 
to the occupier' of the premises, and, indeed, concluded 
that the stenches complained of would 'abridge and diminisr 
seriously and materially the ordinary comfort of existence' 
(continued on the next page) 
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By 18 67 Lord Romilly MR considered 
'it to be established by numerous decisions ... that 
offensive vapours alone, though not injurious to health 
may ... constitute a nuisance to the adjoining or 
neighbouring property. ...'(392 ) 
2.2. Noise 
The great increase in the incidence of machines and 
mechanical manufacturing devices associated with the Industrial 
Revolution threw up the question whether noise and vibration 
constituted a nuisance. 
Prior to the nineteenth century the question had been 
little considered but such authority as there was suggested 
(393) 
that noise was indeed regarded as a species of nuisance. 
(391) (continued) 
of the defendant (at 323). 
It is interesting to note that Knight-Br.uce VC recog-
nised (at 323) the stenches to be a cause of actual 
physical discomfort: 
'Ingredients may, I believe, be mixed with air of such 
a nature as to affect the palate disagreeably and 
offensively, though not unwholesomely. A man's body 
may be in a state of chronic discomfort, still re-
taining its health, and perhaps even suffer more 
annoyance from nauseous or fetid air for being in a 
hale condition'. 
(392) Crump v Lambert (1867) LR 3 Eq 409 at 412. Cf the state-
ment of principle in the contemporary American case of 
Cleveland v Citizens Gas Light Co (13 69) 2 0 NJ Eq 201: 
'Unpleasant odors, from the very constitution of our 
nature, render us uncomfortable, and when continued 
or repeated, make life uncomfortable.... [Wjhatever 
is offensive physically to the senses, and by such 
offensiveness makes life uncomfortable, is a nuisance'. 
(393) In R v Smith (1726) 2 Stra 7 04 the accused was convicted 
of a public nuisance 'for making great noises in the 
night with a speaking trumpet ... which the court held 
to be a nuisance....' In R v Lloyd (1802) 4 Esp 200 the 
noise of a tin-mans trade was held not to be a public 
nuisance though the court intimated that in the circum-
stances it might well have amounted to a private nuisance 
(see above 22 5 ). Martin v Nutkin (1724) 2 P Wms 26 6 is . 
an interesting case which suggests that a peal of bells 
was considered to be a nuisance. The case is interesting 
in that the plaintiff instead of proceeding in nuisance 
'purchased' the defendant's undertaking not to toll the 
bells at certain times. When the defendant breached 
this agreement the court issued an injunction to restrain 
the ringing. 
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The question first came up for consideration in the nine-
(394) teenth century in Elliotson v Feetham (1835). There the 
plaintiff complained of 'divers loud, heavy, jarring, varying, 
agitating, hammering and battering sounds and noises' caused 
by the defendant's machinery. The defendant did not deny that 
there was a nuisance but pleaded prior occupation. This de-
fence failing,judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The 
(395) 
matter was more fully considered in Soltaq v De Held (1851) 
There the plaintiff complained of the nuisance caused by the 
ringing of bells. His complaint was upheld both at common :. 
(396) , . .. (397) law and m equity. 
In Scott v Firth \ 1864) the plaintiff succeeded in 
an action for nuisance arising from the 'vibrations' and 'noise' 
emanating from a rolling mill on adjoining premises. Indeed it 
seems that by this stage there was no question that noise could 
be considered to be the basis of an action for nuisance, a 
proposition spelt out by Romilly MR in 1867 in Crump v 
T K * (399) Lambert: 
'I consider it to be established by numerous decisions 
that ... noise alone ... may ... constitute a nuisance 
to the owner of adjoining or neighbouring property'. 
From this time forward there are numerous instances of successful 
(394) (1835) 2 Bing (NO 134. 
(395) (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 133. 
(396) The proceedings at common law were not reported. However 
it appears from the reports of the case in equity that 
the plaintiff instituted an action for damages 'for the 
nuisance committed to him by means ... of ... the bells' 
and a verdict was found for him and damages awarded. 
(397) Kindersley VC granted an injunction upon the facts of the 
case. However he observed (at 143) that the ringing of 
the bells could not be regarded as a nuisance per se: 
1... a chime of bells may be, and no doubt is, an ex-
treme nuisance, and perhaps an intolerable nuisance, 
to a person who lives within a very few feet ... but 
to a person who lives at a distance from them, though 
he is within the sphere of their operations ... so far 
from its being a nuisance, or inconvenience, it may be. 
a positive pleasure. For I cannot concur with the 
proposition that in all circumstances and under all 
conditions, the sound of bells must be a nuisance'. 
(398) (1864) 4 F & F 349. 
(399) (1867) LR 3 Eq 409 at 412. 
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actions in nuisance for noise. Remedies were granted for 
c . , , . , .. (400) c 
noises arising from industrial operations, from trades 
(U01) 
and occupations ' from construction works and building 
(402) . . . . (403) . -. (404) , operations, enteriamments, animals and var-
.. (405) 
IOUS other sources. 
(400) Gort (Viscountess) v Clark (1868) 18 LT 343 (saw, steam 
engine); Roskell v Whitworth (1871) 19 WR 804; Goose 
v Bedford (1873) 21 WR 449 (steam Hammer); Gaunt v 
Fynney (1872) Ch App 8; Beaumont v Emery [1875]~WN 106 
(steam engine); Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852 
(mortar and pestle). 
(401) Crump v Lambert (1867) LR 3 Eq 409; Baxter v Bower (1875) 
44 LJ Ch 625 (foundry); Gullick v Tremlett (1872) 20 WR ' 
3 58 (forge):; Heather v Pardon (18 77) 37 LT 393; Byass v. 
Bettam (1886) 2 TLR 88; Smith v Jaffray (1886) 2 TLR 480; 
Polsue & Alfieri v Rushmer [1907] AC 121 (printing trade)j 
Tinkler v Aylesbury Dairy Co (18 88) 5 TLR 52, Fanshawe v 
London & Provincial Dairy Co (1888) 4 TLR 694 (dairies). 
(402) Harrison v Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co [1891] 2 Ch 
40 9, Webb v Barker [1881] WN 185; Howland v Dover Harbour 
Board (1898) 14 TLR 355; Shelfer v City of Lond. Electric 
Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
(403) Inchbald v Robinson (1869) 4 Ch App 388 (circus):; 
Barham v Hodges fT8~7 6] WN 234 (skittle alley); Walker 
v Brewster (18 67) LR 5 Eq 2 5 (fair); Bostock v North 
Staffs Rwy Co (1852)(regatta); Bellamy v Wells (1890) 
60 LJ Ch 156 (boxing contests). 
(404) Ball v Ray (1873) 3 Ch App 467, Rapier v London Tramways 
Co [18 9TJ~2 Ch 588, Broder v Saillard (187 6) 2 Ch D 692 
Thouses in stables); London, Brighton & South Coast 
Rail Co v Truman (1885) 11 AC 45 (cattle). 
(405) Jenkins v Jackson (1888) 40 Ch D 71 (dancing lessons); 
Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316 (music lessons; 
Moy v Stoop (1909) 25 TLR 262 (nursery). 
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It is interesting to note that the Victorian judges in 
holding noise to be a species of nuisance did not insist upon 
the complaint being parasitically attached to some other more 
obvious proprietary harm. In Soltau v De Held the de-
fendant sought to rebut the plaintiff's claim that there was 
an actionable nuisance by arguing that the plaintiff while 
citing noise as the harm involved in fact was complaining of 
the depreciation in value of his land consequent upon the 
presence of the peal of bells. And, the argument went, since 
• , , - . . - . • . (407) 
mere economic loss was no ground for an action in nuisance, 
the plaintiff could not succeed in his claim. Significantly 
Kindersley VC, while agreeing that there could be no action 
for mere depreciation, allowed the injunction, thus suggesting 
that the noise alone, by reason of its physiological effect 
upon auditors, amounted to a nuisance. 
2.3. Other interferences with the Comfort of 
Existence 
It is fairly clear that the courts in admitting odours 
or noise as species of nuisance were protecting interests of 
personality or, in other words, harms which impinged upon the 
person of a landowner rather than upon his corporeal property. (408 
(406) (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 133. 
(407) See below 
(408) That the Victorian judges were alert to this distinction 
is revealed by decisions concerning compensation for 
'injurious affectation' of land under the Lands Clauses 
Colsolidation Act 1845. The Act spoke about injurious )Y[) 
affectation of land and when landowners came to claim 
compensation for the effects::of noise and smoke (emana-
ting usually from railways) the judges refused to award 
it on the basis that the injury involved was to the per-
son of the landowner rather than to his land. Hammer-
smith Railway Co v Brand (1867) LR 4 HL 171 seems to be 
the source of this rule. It was applied in City of 
Glasgow Union Railway Co v Hunter (18 70) LR 2 Sc & Div 
7 8 though not without some reluctance on the part of 
Lord Westbury who there said (at 86) 
'Another vice or error was introduced [into the law 
on the point] ... when it was decided that the par-
ticular loss sustained by the inhabitants of a house 
... which did not touch the house, but most materially 
affected the comfort of the inhabitants thereof and 
their enjoyment of the property, was not an injury to 
property'. 
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However having so recognised that' the nuisance concept might 
protect interests of personality, they evinced considerable 
reluctance at extending this protection to the full range of 
these interests. In particular they refused to allow actions 
for nuisance brought on the ground that the defendant's 
activities induced fear in the mind of the plaintiff, or inva-
ded his sense of privacy, or offended his aesthetic sensi-
bilities. 
(i) Fear 
In 17 5 2 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke was asked to enjoin 
(409) 
the construction of a small-pox hospital. The ground 
upon which the injunction was sought was, it seems, in part 
the 'terror' that the existence of such an institution 'occa-
(4.10 ) 
sioned in the neighbourhood'. ' Lord Hardwicke refused 
the injunction, apparently on the ground that the establishment 
(411 ) 
of such institutions was 'of great advantage to mankind 
and, further, on the ground that the institution was no nui-
sance because 
'the fears of mankind, though they be reasonable ones, 
will not create a nuisance',. (412 ) 
However so potent was the dread of small-pox that when, 
in the late nineteenth century, provision was made for the 
establishment of parochial small-pox asylums, local inhabi-
tants quickly resorted to the law of nuisance in order to pre-
vent their erection. Although there can be little doubt that 
(409) The case is reported as Baines v Baker (1752) Amb .158 « 
and as Anon (1752) 3 Atk 75 0. Both reports, Kindersley 
VC remarked in "Sbltau v De Held (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 13 3 
at 148 'are jejune' and 'very unsatisfactory'. 
(410) See Ambler's report (supra). '[a]s far as one can 
collect from the reports of the case ... the intended 
erection of the small-pox hospital spread dismay and 
terror through the neighbourhood' Kindersley VC in 
Soltau v De Held (supra) at 148). 
(411) See Ambler's report. 
(412) These words appear only in Atkins' report of the case. 
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these attempts were motivated by.fear of the spread of the 
disease they were usually presented in the form that the 
hospital in fact constituted a real threat to public health, 
an argument that relied heavily upon the theory of the 'aerial 
dissemination' of the disease. 
In 1878 a jury found a small-pox hospital to be a nui-
(413 ) 
sance. The managers sought to challenge this decision 
on the basis that they had statutory authority to maintain the 
(414) hospital. When this contention was finally rejected by 
(415 ) 
the House of Lords, the hospital was closed down. 
However this case did not have the effect of subverting 
the principle laid down by Lord Hardwicke. Its correctness 
was confirmed and the courts, sceptical of the aerial 
(417 ) 
theory of the dissemination of small-pox, made it plain 
(413) Hill and others v Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum 
District (1878) 48 LJ QB 562. 
(414) See also the decision of the Court of Appeal in this 
case, reported in (1879) 49 LJ QB 22 8. 
(415) Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (1881 1 
6 AC 193. 
(4.16) In the Hill case (supra) Lord Blackburn observed that 
Lord Hardwicke had stated 'what is undoubtedly law, 
that loss arising from the fears of mankind though rea-
sonable, would not create a nuisance at law'• (1881) 6 
AC 193 at 2 06. Cf Bendeiow v Guardians of Wortley Union 
(1887) 57 LJ Ch 762 where counsel for the Union argued 
that the injunction could only issue where there was 
proof of imminent danger to health: '... these principles 
have been applied to hospitals from the time of Lord 
Hardwicke ....' It is interesting to note that in this 
case, which is one of the few in which the hospital was 
enjoined, the court relied upon evidence of a medical 
practitioner who had been instructed to report on the 
circumstances and dangers involved with the instant 
hospital, his report expressly leaving out of account 
'any mental anxiety caused to the plaintiffs by the 
proximity of the hospital'. 
(417) See Fleet v Metropolitan_Asylums Board (1886) 2 TLR 361; 
Attorney-General v Rathmines (below n 418); Attorney-
General v Nottingham Corp~~Tl904] 1 Ch 673. 
407. 
that they would only act against such institutions where the 
complaint rested upon something more substantial than the 
(418) . (419) 
traditional dread of the disease, an attitude that 
broadly confirmed that mere mental distress or anxiety 
arising from another's use of his land would not give rise to 
(420) an action in nuisance. 
(418) Cf FitzGibbon LJ in Attorney-General v Rathmines & 
Pembroke Joint Hospital Board [1904] 1 I-R 161: 'It 
seems probable that the dread of small-pox is to a great 
extent the result of tradition. That scourge of the 
eighteenth century retains its terrors for those who do 
not realise that it has been deprived of most of its 
dangers. Vaccination is not only a preventive, but it 
also modifies the disease'. Cf the discussion of the 
legal history of vaccination by Lord Blackburn in the 
Hill case (1881) 6 AC 193 at 206. 
(419) Attorney-General v Manchester Corp [1893] 2 Ch 87; 
Attorney-General v Guilford (1895~T 12 TLR 54 ('The 
question is, is there here a real apprehension of a 
real danger, not a sentimental or fanciful once?'); 
Rathmines case (supra) where FitzGibbon LJ said that 
'A sentiment of danger and dislike, however natural or 
justified ... proof that it will abridge a man's pleasure 
or make him anxious' would justify an injunction. 
(420) This principle was followed in America in 1887 when, 
i n Westcott v Middleton (1887) 43 NJ Eq 478, 11 Atl 490, 
it was held that an injunction could not issue against 
an undertaker's establishment on the ground of the 
anxiety it induced in the plaintiff by reminding him of 
death. However in Densmore v Evergreen Camp (1910) 112 
Pac 2 55; 31 LRA (NS7 608 it was held that an undertaker's 
establishment by its 'mute reminders of mortality, the 
hearse, the chapel, the ... bodies, autopsies' - 'cannot 
help but having a depressing effect upon the mind of the 
average person', and the court issued the injunction. 
In Saier v Joy (1917) 198 Mich 295;164 NW 507, the court 
held that reminders of morality and the consequent de-
pression of mind 'deprive the home of that comfort and 
repose to which its owner is entitled' and enjoined an 
undertaker's establishment. The result of these and 
other decisions has been to establish a general doctrine 
of the American law of nuisance that places such as 
cemeteries, funeral homes, insane asylums and the like 
may qualify as nuisances by reason of their psychological 
effect upon neighbouring landowners. Cf Noel, 'Unaesthetic 
Sights as Nuisances' (1939) 25 Cornell LQ 1; Note 
'Aesthetic Nuisances : An Emerging Cause of Action' (1970) 
4 5 New York U LR 1075; Silverstone 'Visual Pollution'(1974) 
12 Alberta LR 542. 
408. 
(ii) Privacy 
The notion that an invasion of the privacy of a man's 
home might constitute a nuisance was, as noted above, not 
(421) (422) 
unknown xn the medxeval law. In' Ch erring ton v Abney 
(1709) the existence of a right to privacy was indirectly 
asserted in holding that 'ancient lights' could not be sub-
stituted in a re-built house in a position other than that 
which they had occupied in the old structure lest they be 
made higher so as to overlook a neighbouring house 'for 
privacy is valuable'. 
(423 ) 
However xn Chandler v Thompson (1811) Le Banc J 
said that although 'an action for opening a window to disturb 
the plaintiff's.privacy was to be read of in the books' he had 
never known such an action. He added that when he was in the 
court of Common Pleas Lord Chief Justice Eyre used to say 
'that such an action did not lie'. This hardning of opinion 
against the recognition of an action in nuisance for an in-
( 424 ) 
vasion of privacy is reflected by the decision in Re Penny 
(1857) that a landowner could not obtain compensation under 
the Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1846 for injurious affec-
tation of land by reason of it being overlooked. Then in 1861 
(42 5) 
Kindersley VC in Turner v Spooner provided the quxetus 
for the old view: 
'... no doubt the owner of a house would prefer that a 
neighbour should not have the right of looking into his 
window or yard, but neither this court nor a court of 
Law, will interfere on the mere ground of invasion of 
privacy; and a party has a right even to open new win-
dows , although he is thereby enabled to overlook his 
neighbour's premises, and so interfering, perhaps, with 
his comfort'. 
(421) See above 119. 
(422)-(1709) 
(423) (1811) 3 Camp 80. 
(424) (1857) 7 El & Bl 660. 
(425) (1861) 1 Drew & Sm 467 
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The question was touched on by the common law judges in 
Tapling v Jones (186 2) who made it clear that while they 
recognised that an invasion of privacy might well amount to 
an interference with the comfort and convenience of a house, 
no action in nuisance could lie. ° So fixed did this, 
principle become that the courts refused redress even where a 
defendant set up mirrors so as to be able to spy upon the in-
(427 ) 
tenor of the plaintiff's home. 
The only instance where the courts seem to have been 
prepared to concede some claim to privacy lies in the case of 
Lyons and Sons v Wilkins (1899) where 'watching and besetting* 
v v. -u .u *.•- , -i • (428) 
a house was held to constitute a common law nuisance. 
(426) In the Exchequer Chamber (Jones v Tapling (1862) 31 LJ 
CP 342) Blackburn J stated the proposition quite ex-
plicitly: 
1 It is quite true that the opening of a new window 
looking into the grounds of another may not only annoy 
the neighbour, but may often affect the value of his 
property. I suppose that the marketable value of a 
villa, with a garden enclosed by trees and secluded 
from public view, would be seriously affected if a 
fresh story were raised in a neighbouring house, so 
as to overtop the trees and expose the garden to the 
view of neighbours; but the law of England considers 
this no injury. No action lies against him who puts 
up the new window, there is no equity to restrain him 
... he has done an act perfectly legal, though it may 
be annoying to his neighbour'. 
In the House of Lords (Tapling v Jones (1865) 11 HL Cas 
290 at 305) Lord Westbury LC affirmed the principle, ob-
serving that "'invasion of privacy by opening windows" 
... is not treated as a wrong for which any remedy is 
given'. Lord Chelmsford too conceded that the opening 
of a window might 'materially interfere with the comfort 
and enjoyment of his neighbour, but of this species of 
injury the law takes no cognizance. It leaves every-one 
to his own self-defence against an annoyance of this 
description....* 
(427) Balham Dentist case (1904) see Kenny Cases on Tort (4 ed 
(1929) 40 5-6 who records this unreported case. 
(428) [1899] 1 Ch 255. The case involved an interpretation of 
the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 187 5 (38 & 
3 9 Vict c 86) which made it unlawful for members of a 
trade union to 'wrongfully' 'watch and beset' (ie picket) 
premises, (s 7) In considering whether in the instant 
case picketing had been carried out wrongfully, members 
of the Court of Appeal held the activities contravened 
the statute since they constituted a common law nuisance 
and were thus unlawful: 
(continued on the next page) 
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(iii) Prospect 
The seventeenth century judges had categorically stated 
that interference with the prospect from a building constituted 
(429) 
no nuisance. 
This principle was followed in the eighteenth century by 
(430 ) the courts of equity. In the Fishmongers Company case 
(1752) Lord Hardwicke LC refused to enjoin the construction of 
a wall saying that although the plaintiff's property might de-
preciate in value by the wall 'rendering the prospect less 
pleasant ... that is no reason to hinder a man from building 
on his land'. In the same year he stated the principle more 
(431) directly in Attorney-General v Doughty (17 52) in refusing 
to enjoin^buildings which would have intercepted the prospect 
from Gray's Inn gardens. 'I know' he said 
'no general rule of common law, which warrants that, 
or says, that building so as to stop another's pros-
pect is a nuisance. Was that the case, there could 
be no great towns; and I must grant injunctions to 
all the new buildings in this town'. 
This dictum was approved (obiter) by Lord Blackburn in Dalton 
(432 ) 
v Angus (1881). There he remarked that the distinction 
between the right to light and the right to prospect as being 
that between necessity and delight was 'more quaint than satis-
factory'. The reason why there could be no right to prospect, 
he said, was that such a right 'would impose a burden on a 
very large and indefinite area' and thus should not be allowed 
(43 3) 
to be created 'except by actual agreement'. 
(428) (continued) 
'Such conduct seriously interferes with the ordinary 
comfort of human existence and ordinary enjoyment of 
the house beset, and such conduct would support an 
action on the case for nuisance at common lav;' (per 
Lindley MR at 2 67); 
'To watch or beset a man's house for the length of 
time and in the manner and with the view proved would 
undoubtedly constitute a nuisance....' (per Chitty LJ 
at 271-2); 
'At the common law watching and besetting ... might or-
might not be so conducted as to amount to a nuisance' 
(per Vaughan Williams LJ at 273). 
(429) Above 118-9. 
(430) (1752) Dick 164. 
(431) (1752) 2 Ves 453. 
(432) (1881) 6 AC 740 at 824. 
(433) It became the practice to covenant for a right of prospect 
(continued on the next Dacre) 
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Indeed not only did the Victorian judges refuse to ad-
mit a right of prospect from a house, they refused also to 
recognise the right of prospect of a house or premises. In 
(43 4-) 
Smith v Owen (1866) the plaintiff complained that a struc-
ture erected by the defendant obstructed the public's view of 
his shop-window. However Wood VC refused an injunction, 
plainly regarding this case as no different to that where a 
landowner's view from his premises was obstructed. 
The dicta of Lords Hardwicke and Blackburn suggest that 
judicial reluctance to extend the protection of the law of 
nuisance to a landowner's interest in the prospect from his 
premises lies in a concern for the consequences that would 
follow from the recognition of an easement of prospect. The 
decision in Campbell v Paddington Corporation (1911) indi-
cates that where there is no question of the landowner claiming 
a right in the nature of an easement, the judges were prepared 
to recognise prospect as an incident of landholding. In that 
case the plaintiff sued for special damages resulting from a 
public nuisance. The nuisance was an obstruction of the high-
way and the special damage alleged was the obstruction of the 
(433) (continued) 
from a house. Where a right so acquired was interfered 
with no action lay in tort but had to be brought on the 
covenant: Western v MacDermott (18 66) 2 Ch App 72; 
Manners v Johnson (187 5) 1 Ch D 67 3. 
(434) (1866) 35 LJ Ch 317. 
(435) '... there was nothing to prevent a neighbour building on 
his own ground in such a way as to obstruct the distant 
view of ... a sign'. See also Butt v Imperial Gas Co 
(1866) LR 2 Ch App 158 where it was complained that a 
gasmeter newly erected obscured the public view of the 
plaintiff's place of business. Lord Chelmsford LC was 
certain that this constituted no nuisance 
'..-. if the building of a wall which merely intercepts 
the prospect of another ... is not a legal injury, it 
... [is] very difficult to see how a building, which 
merely obstructed premises from the view of passers-by, 
could be the subject of an action' (at 161). 
See however Cobb v Saxby [1914] 3 KB 822 where it was held 
that an unlawful obstruction of the highway which obscured 
the public view of the plaintiff's premises, entitled the 
plaintiff to a remedy. 
(436) [1911] 1 KB 869. 
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view from the plaintiff's premises. The court of King's 
Bench held for the plaintiff on the ground that although there 
could be no easement of prospect, an interference with the 
view from premises caused by an unlawful act entitled the owner 
(437 ) 
to damages resulting therefrom. 
It is plain that nineteenth century attitudes to what 
qualified as a nuisance were nothing if not inconsistent. 
Proceeding from a basic premiss that a landowner was entitled 
to demand an interest in the comfort and convenience of his 
home the courts admitted actions in nuisance for the discomfort 
and inconvenience caused by noise and odour while refusing ac-
tions where the discomfort or inconvenience took the form of 
mental distress or an interference with aesthetic sensibilities. 
The roots of this inconsistency probably lie in nuisance's 
primordial connection with the disseisin and the consequent 
idea that a nuisance was a form of physical invasion of the 
victim's land. Noise and odour while undoubtedly affecting 
personal rather than proprietary interests, nevertheless had 
the appearance of being invasions of the lands of the victim. 
Anxiety and aesthetic distress on the other hand seemed not to 
involve any invasion of matter from without but to be indigen-
ous in their origins and thus hardly in the traditional nui-
,. (438) 
sance mould. 
(437) 'I agree that the law does not recognise a view or pros-
pect from a house as a right in the nature of an ease-
ment which can belong to anybody as of right.... But 
that is not this case. This is a case of a person ... 
unlawfully erecting a structure in the public street 
which seriously interferes with the enjoyment by the 
plaintiff of her house. That is enough to give the plain-
tiff a right of action on the case for disturbing her in 
the enjoyment, use, and occupation of her house....' (per 
Avory J at 875-6). See too Lush J at 87 8-9. 
(438) Cf Ellickson 'Alternatives to Zoning : Covenants, Nui-
sance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls' (19 73) 40 
U Chi LR 681 at 734-5: 
'When an unneighbourly land use decreases surrounding 
property values, the traditional objections to recovery 
in the absence of physical invasion are not persuasive. 
Damage from aesthetic blight may be difficult to mea-
sure, but so may damage from noise, smoke, vibration 
or other spillovers readily accepted as nuisances. Nor 
does there seem to be any physiological or psychological 
reason to distinguish visual harm from other types of 
sensory discomfort. Idiosyncratic tastes of complaining 
(continued on the next page) 
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3. Economic Harm 
Often the complaint that a landowner had suffered a 
nuisance to the comfort of his existence was motivated by the 
economic harm (in the sense of the depreciation in value of 
the land) brought about by the presence of the condition or 
(439 ) 
state of affairs alleged to be a nuisance. 
However since Bracton's time it had been the established 
principle of common law that mere economic loss arising from 
the manner in which another used his land was damnum sine 
. . . (440) 
injuria. 
The closest that the common law had come to recognising 
that economic loss might give a cause of action for nuisance 
was the doctrine that one who suffered loss of income from his 
(441) ( 442 ) 
franchise to hold a market or fair or maintain a ferry 
(438) (continued) 
landowners are not more likely to arise in aesthetic 
cases than in olfactory cases and can be eliminated 
by ... recognising a defence of hypersensitivity 
[cf above 3 52] '. -
(439) Cf Fleming Introduction to the Law of Torts 186-7: 
'Most often of course economic values are primarily 
involved, as when unnecessarily noisy building opera-
tions drive away the patrons of a hotel next door, or 
when the advent of a factory or small-pox hospital in 
a predominantly residential neighbourhood treatens to 
impair property values....' 
(440) Bracton illustrated the concept of damnum sine injuria 
by the example of a mill-owner who lost custom by reason 
of his neighbour attracting away clientele by establish-
ing a mill upon his own land. See above 4 3 n 44. 
(441) See above 45. 
(442) The emergence of new methods of transportation in the 
early nineteenth century seems to have stimulated a rash 
of cases for disturbance of the franchise of maintaining 
a ferry (see Huzzey v Field (1835) 2 Cr M & R 432; Pirn 
v Cure11 (1840) 6 M & W 234; North and South Shields 
Ferry Co v Barker (1848) 2 Exch 136; Chamberlaine v 
Chester & Birkenhead Rwy Co (1848)-1 Exch 87 0; Newton 
v Cubitt (1862) 12 CB (NS) 32; R v Cambrian Rwy"Co (1871) 
LR 6 QB 42 2; Hopkins v Great Northern Rwy Co (187 7) LR ' 
2 QBD 2 24). 
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was entitled to obtain redress by an action for 'nuisance'. 
The judges however explained this type of action for nuisance 
as being based not upon the loss of profits but rather on the 
fact that the establishment of a rival market, fair or ferry 
violated the incorporeal property right which was the fran-
,. (444) chise. 
(443) The nature of an action for nuisance for disturbance of 
a ferry was extensively examined by the House of Lords 
in Hammerton v Dysart [1916] AC 57. There Viscount 
Haldane observed that there were two theories as to the 
nature of this right of action: 
'According to one theory there is no right of action 
excepting for protection against the infliction of 
nuisance consisting in actual loss of tolls caused by 
obstruction of traffic. On this view the cause of ac-
tion is nuisance strictly so-called and nothing more, 
and accordingly a substantial interference and conse-
quent pecuniary injury must be proved. The cause of 
action on this footing resembles that for obstruction 
of ancient lights (at 68-9).... [The other theory is] 
that at the foundation there must be a substantive 
title of a proprietary character, and that the principle 
applies which was explained in the judgment of Holt CJ 
in Ashby v White [(1703) 2 Ld Raym 938 at 955], that 
"a damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury im-
parts a damage, when a man is thereby hindered of his 
right"' (at 7 0). 
(444) See especially Hammerton v Dysart (supra). The earlier 
sources suggested that the action lay because the ferry-
man was obliged by law to maintain the ferry and was 
thus entitled to the profits of his enterprise: Prior 
of St Nedeport's case (1442) YB 22 Hen 6 f 14 pi 23 (see 
Fifoot History and Sources 96); Blackstone 3 Comm 219 
(ci-ted with approval in Letton v Goodden (1866) LR 3 Eq 
123 at 132-3). On this ground, it was said, the case of 
the ferry differed from that of the mill-owner mentioned 
by Bracton. Cf Lord Parker of Waddington in Hammerton v 
Dysart (supra) at 84-5: 
'As an instance of damage which gives rise to no cause 
of action, that is, of damnum sine injuria, Bracton 
mentions the case of a mill, the profits of which 
might be seriously damaged by the competition of a 
rival mill without giving rise to any action for nui-
sance . The mill owner has no right to immunity from 
damage to his profits by reason of competition on the 
part of others. In the case of an action for distur-
bance of a ferry the damage alleged has invariably 
been that the profits of the ferry had been diminished 
or impaired.... So much is clear, but why does the 
ownership of a ferry confer a right to immunity from 
damage by competition, whereas the ownership of a mill 
does not? The answer is ... [that the] right, of the 
ferryman involves an obligation to keep up the services 
(continued on the next page) 
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The courts of equity also refused to recognise that 
economic harm might constitute a nuisance entitling an appli-
(445 ) 
cant to an injunction. In Fishmongers Co v East India Co 
(1752)/Lord Hardwicke in refusing an injunction against a 
building which obstructed ancient lights, remarked 
'It is true the value of the plaintiff's house may be 
reduced by rendering the prospect less pleasant, but 
that is no reason to hinder a man from building on 
his own ground'. 
( 4146 ) 
-*-n Attorney-General v Nichol (18 09) Lord Eldon approved 
'the observation of Lord Hardwicke, that a diminuition of the 
value of the premises Is not a ground'. Kindersley VC in 
Soltau v De Held (1853 Jspelt out the rule quite clearly: 
1... it is said that part of what is alleged by the 
plaintiff as the mischief arising to him is the dim-
inuition in value of his house; and it is said, and 
with perfect truth, by the defendant's counsel, that 
diminuition in value does not constitute nuisance....' 
(H48 ) So too in Jones v Tapling (1862) Blackburn J, recognising 
that the plaintiff's property might be depreciated in value 
as a result of being overlooked by defendant's house, observed 
(449 ) 
that no action could lie on this ground. In Harrison v Good 
Bacon VC in formulating the nature of a nuisance observed that 
there is no 
'... authority for the proposition that, because a 
depreciation in value would take place, the owners 
of adjoining property suffering depreciation have 
therefore a right to call that a "nuisance" .... 
The law upon that subject I take to be clear and 
plain'. 
(444) (continued) 
of the ferry for the benefit of the public, but the 
right of the mill owner involves no such obligation. 
The ferryman has undertaken a public burden in con-
sideration of the Crown's grant of the right to take 
tolls, and he would have a legitimate grievance if 
the public, while enjoying the benefit of the obliga-
tion, were allowed to destroy the consideration for 
which it was undertaken. This ground of distinction 
between the franchise ferry tolls and the mill has 
always been recognised....' 
(445) (1752) 1 Dick 164. 
(446) (1809) 16 Ves 338 at 342. 
(447) (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 133. 
(448) (1862) 31 LJ CP 342 (see n 426 above). 
(449) (1871) LR 11 Eq 338 at 353. 
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NUISANCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY : AN OVERVIEW 
The history of the nuisance concept in the twentieth 
century is largely a story of decline and neglect. As an 
instrument of social administration nuisance has lost the 
central and strategic position it had come to occupy in the 
nineteenth century. As a consequence it has not enjoyed much 
in the way of substantial judicial elaboration nor has it been 
the subject of any major scholarly and critical analysis. Yet 
for all this it would be premature to dismiss the concept to 
a museum of legal antiquities for there are signs that this 
eight hundred year old institution of English law may yet have 
a useful and significant role to play in the future. 
Decline 
The historical explanation for the decline in importance 
of nuisance law in the twentieth century is to be found within 
the concept itself. 
A chief function of the common law of nuisance over the 
many centuries of its existence was to regulate the manner in 
(1 ) which men used, exploited and enjoyed their real property. 
But even while it was achieving an apothesis in Bamford v 
(2 ) 
Turnley and the St' Helens case the seeds of its demise were 
germinating. In the nineteenth century the British parliament 
intent upon reforming the sanitary conditions of English urban 
life, introduced a comprehensive system of land-use controls 
in the form of statutory devices for compelling the owners of 
private property to maintain and administer their land in a 
way which either eliminated or prevented insanitary conditions 
(3 ) 
which treatened the public welfare. The violations of the 
sanctity of the right of private property inherent in these 
schemes were disguised and made more palatable by the legisla-
ture's adoption of the word 'nuisance' to describe the insani-
(4) tary conditions which it sought to repress. 
(1) Haar Land Use Planning 95; Williams The Structure of 
Urban Zoning 11-12. See also above 195 ff 
(2) Above Chap 6. 
<C3) Above 19 5 ff. 
(<+) Above 208-9. Cf Mc Auslan Land, Law and Planning 37-46. 
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The success of the public health legislation spawned 
a movement for more extensive regulation of the ways in which 
men used their land. It was reasoned that the permanent pro-
tecton of public health and welfare lay in an urban environ-
ment in which the many factors which went to make up a healthy, 
prosperous, progressive and satisfying style of human existence 
could be ensured by the scientific planning and organisation 
of patterns of land use with the urban core. This move-
ment realised its ambition when, in 1909, the British parlia-
ment enacted the Housing Town Planning Etc [sic] Act which 
empowered local authorities to undertake town planning schemes 
in respect of land being developed for building purposes 'with 
the general object of securing proper sanitary conditions , 
amenity, and convenience in connexion with laying out and use 
(7 ) 
of the land, and of any neighbouring land'. 
By the middle of the century town planning or (in 
America) zoning had pervaded all aspects of the city life and 
become the premier method of controlling and regulating the 
ways in which men might use and enjoy their land. 
Ironically enough this alternative system, which substi-
tuted bureaucratic administration for private litigation under 
nuisance law as the system of land use control, rose to emi-
(8 nence on the shoulders of the common law concept of nuisance. 
(5) Cf Hall Urban and Regional Planning 42; Mumford The 
City in History 584// 9 Ed 7 c 44. For the history of 
town planning in England as developed out of his seminal 
enactment see Heap The Land and the Development; 'New 
Developments in British Land Planning Law' (19 55) 20 
Law and Contemporary Problems 493; Griffith 'The Law of 
Property (Land)' in Ginsberg (ed) Law and Opinion in 
' England in the Twentieth Century 127//. 
(6) 9 Edw 7 c 44 
(7) S 54(1). 
(8) Cf Heap (op cit nl'5): 'On the old common law maxim, 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (the basis of the 
doctrine of good neighbourliness), statutory planning 
... has now built a great edifice ....' (at 493). The 
main line of connection lay, of course, in the field of 
public nuisance where the nineteenth century public health 
legislation had demonstrated that the term, and indeed 
the concept of, nuisance could usefully be employed in 
(continued on the next page) 
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Mr Justice Sutherland of the American Supreme Court in Village 
(9) 
of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co (1926), in approving zoning, 
made obeisance to the common law of nuisance: 
'In solving doubts, the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas, which lies at the foundation of so much of 
the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a 
fairly helpful clue. And the law of nuisances, like-
wise, may be consulted, not for the purposes of con-
trolling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in 
the process of ascertaining the scope of, the power. 
Thus the question whether the power to forbid the erec-
tion of a building of a particular kind or for a par-
ticular use, like the question whether a particular 
thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an 
abstract consideration of the building or of the-thing 
considered apart, but by considering it in connection 
with the circumstances and the locality'. 
But for all this lip-service to the common law of nuisance, 
zoning and planning were to subvert the old institution, ex-
posing its limitations, and causing it to fall into dis-
(11) 
repute and desuetude. 
(9) (1926) 272 US 365 at 387. 
(10) Cf Williams The' Structure of Urban Zoning 12: 
'As a technique for modern land use control, nui-
sance law suits have all sorts of disadvantages. The 
legal questions which have not been definitely settled 
are rather remarkable: whether (and how) the list of 
common-law nuisances can be expanded, and whether 
there are different degrees of protection for tenant-
occupied and owner-occupied residential areas. More-
over, criteria for consistent policy are notably ab-
sent: and there is practically no way for judges to 
coordinate their decisions with long-term land-use 
planning, even if they wanted to - which they don't. 
However, the. most serious limitations come from the 
last point mentioned above - that the remedy is retro-
active only, and so its use often involves destruction 
of existing investments without compensation. In 
brief, the remedy is erratic, and often too drastic 
to be usable'. 
(11) See Ellickson 'Alternatives to Zoning : Covenants, 
Nuisance Rules and Fires as Land Use Controls' (1973) 
40 U Chi LR 681 at 722: 
1... administrative flaws of nuisance law combined 
with its doctrinal weaknesses to fuel the belief that 
public regulation systems such as zoning would be 
superior. As zoning began to flourish, nuisance law 
became less important'. 
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A further reason for the decline of nuisance was its 
(12 ) 
confused and sprawling condition. Scholars in particular 
despaired of reducing its amorphous mass to some sort of 
(13 ) 
rational order and structure, an attitude which, in the 
1930's, led to a proposal that the use of the term nuisance 
(14) should be avoided altogether and that, as it were, a 
fresh start should be made in constructing a set of rules to 
regulate the various harms huddled under the rubric 'nuisance 
(12) Cf Fleming Torts 338-9; Prosser Torts 571. See also 
the analysis in Restatement of Torts 216 ff and the 
commentary thereon in Paton 'Liability for Nuisance' 
(1942) 37 Illinois LR 1. 
(13) Cf the opening words to Prosser's chapter on nuisance 
in his Law of Tort s: 
'There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in 
the entire law than that which surrounds the word 
"nuisance"' (at 571). 
See also Fleming's Law of Torts (at 338): 
'Few words in the legal vocabulary are bedevilled 
with so much obscurity and confusion as 'nuisance'. 
Once tolerably precise and well-understood, the 
concept has eventually become so amorphous as well-
nigh to deny rational exposition'. 
Newark 'The Boundaries of Nuisance' (1949) 65 LQR 480, 
also introduced his discussion with the complaint that 
while in most of the law of tort one at least knows 
where one is, while 
'in nuisance it is very different : the subject as 
commonly taught comprises a mass of material which 
proves so intractable to definition and analysis that 
it immediately betrays its mongrel origins'. 
(14) By the American Law Institute.which in its Restatement 
of Torts Chapter 40 suggested that in dealing with 'the 
protection which the law gives to interests in the pri-
vate use and enjoyment of land' it was 'desirable to 
avoid the use of a term ['nuisance'] attended with so 
much confusion and uncertainty of meaning' (op cit 215). 
It is interesting to note that the Institute proposes 
to use the term 'nuisance' in its Restatement (Second) 
of Torts (see Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tentative 
Draft) Chap 40). 
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A symptom of the declining importance of nuisance in 
the twentieth century is the paucity of academic studies of 
the concept. The monographs devoted to the topic are elderly, 
(15 ) 
and of little merit and the more recent scholarly accounts 
of nuisance law are confined to chapters in general texts on 
the law of torts and a scattering of articles in learned 
, (16) 
journals. 
Perhaps even more depressing is the fact that twentieth 
century judges have 'hesitated to commit themselves to meaning-
ful propositions of a rationalizing character in administering 
(17 ) 
this area of the law. To a large extent they have simply 
continued the tradition of earlier centuries in allowing 
causes of action to be framed in 'nuisance' when there exists 
no particular reason, except history, for bringing an action 
under this rubric. 
(15) The first monograph on the subject appeared in England 
only in 1890 (to a rather naive expression of surprise 
in the Law Quarterly Review (see (1908) 24 LQR 348). In 
that year E W Garrett a metropolitan police magistrate, 
published his single-volumed treatise The Law of Nuisances 
a work which, a review in the Law Quarterly Review (190 8) 
45 LQR 348) pointed out, was lacking 'as a scientific and 
literary study of a branch of the law' being 'a mere 
simple enumeration of cases in the manner of the old 
text-books, without any very manifest co-ordinating prin-
ciple'. Garrett's book ran two editions, the last 
appearing in 190 8. 
An earlier treatise on nuisance had appeared in America in 
1875 when Horace Gay Wood published A Practical Treatise 
on the Law of Nuisances in their Various Forms, including 
Remedies therefor in Law and Equity (xxvi & 9 3 7pp (Albany) 
A second edition appeared in 18 8 3 (1071pp) and a third in 
189 3 (2 vols (San Francisco)). There is no evidence that 
this work was employed by English lawyers and it certainly 
was not cited in any of the English cases. Prosser 
(Torts 571 n 5) dismisses both Garrett and Woods' books 
as being 'of dubious value'. 
(16) Of particular merit are Newark 'The Boundaries of Nuisance 
(1949) 6 5 LQR 480; Fleming Torts Chap 15; Street Torts 
Chap 11; McLaren 'Nuisance in Canada' in Linden (ecD 
Studies in Canadian Tort Law Chap 13. 
(17) McLaren op cit (n 16 above) 321. 
(18) Cf McLaren op cit ibid: 
'So often have the judges, in the most indiscriminating 
manner, mouthed the magic word "nuisance" as the appar-
ent solvent of a novel or difficult case, and so ten-
aciously have they clung to the word when it is obvious 
that its only association with the factual situation is 
an historic and semantic one, that the term has taken 
(continued on the next page) 
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Thus for instance there has been no significant attempt 
in the twentieth century to explore and analyse the relation-
ship in the traditional dichotomy of 'public' and 'private' 
(19) (20) 
nuisance, or the mystery of the true nature of the 
(18) (continued) 
on a chameleon-like quality which defies simple defini-
tion. This element of self-inflicted complexity seems 
to have persuaded the judiciary that explanation is best 
avoided'. 
(19) For thoughtful and helpful discussion of the relationship 
see Street Torts 240-1; McLaren op cit (n 16) at 324-
3 32. 
(20) The tendency to regard a public nuisance as a species of 
private nuisance which affects a multiplicy of individuals 
(see above 222-6) was enhanced by dicta in Attorney-
General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169. There 
Denning LJ (as he then was) in considering (at 19 0) 'the 
difference between a public nuisance and a private nui-
sance' observed: 
'The classic statement of the difference is that a 
public nuisance affects Her Majesty's subjects gener-
ally, whereas a private nuisance only affects particu-
lar individuals. But this does not help much. The 
question, "When do a number of individuals become Her 
"Majesty's subjects generally?" is as difficult to 
answer as the question "When does a group of people 
become a crowd?" Everyone has his own views. Even 
the answer "Two's company, three's a crowd" will not 
command the assent of those present unless they first 
agree on "which two." So here I decline to answer the 
question how many people are necessary to make up Her 
Majesty's subjects generally. I prefer to look to 
the reason of the thing and to say that a public nui-
sance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its 
range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it 
would not be reasonable to expect one person to take 
proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop 
to it, but that it should be taken on the responsi-
bility of the community at large. 
See also the judgment of Romer LJ at 180-4 where the 
authorities are reviewed. From these the learned lord 
justice deduced that 'any nuisance is "public" which 
materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience 
of life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects' (at 184). 
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concept of public nuisance. Nor has the exact nature of 
the internal relationship of the various components of the 
concept of private nuisance been the subject of much strict 
(22) 
juridical analysis. Nor has much progress been made in 
determining the proper scope of the remedy by way of the ac-
* • + (23) 
tion for private nuisance. 
(21) The most important contemporary.discussion of the matter 
has occurred in the American Law Institute in the course 
of the drafting of sections for the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts. The reporter for Tentative Draft No 16 offered 
the definition of a public nuisance as 
'a criminal interference with a right to common to 
all members of the public'. 
Members of the ALI Council questioned the proposition 
that a public nuisance was always a crime. A revised 
version of the draft met with the approval of the ALI 
and is likely to become the official restatement of 
the law on this topic. Tentative Draft No 17 defined a 
public nuisance as 
'an unreasonable interference with a right common 
to the general public'. 
Commentators (Bryson and Macbeth 'Public Nuisance, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law' 
(1972) 2 Ecology LQ 241) on these tentative drafts have 
supported the view that a public nuisance should not be 
considered to be always a crime. They have pointed out 
(at 246-7) that there has been a gradual movement to 
separate the concept of public nuisance from its criminal 
origins, both by way of the emergence of the injunction 
for public nuisances (cf above 218) and the tendency to 
reduce the traditional instances of indictable nuisances 
to statutory form. They conclude 1(at 247) that 
'it can be argued that public nuisance is an action 
which never developed many typically criminal charac-
teristics and is now growing away from its broad 
criminal sources toward, on the one hand, increasingly 
specific definition as a criminal offence and, on the 
other hand, toward a broad cause of action in tort 
which has fewer criminal aspects'. 
(22) But see Street Torts 215 ff whose account of the con-
cept is closely analytical. 
(23). There is still debate on the question whether the action 
for nuisance lies for interferences with easements. 
Salmond contended that the interference with an easement 
was not a nuisance (Salmond Torts (7 ed) Chap 8), a 
view which Winfield (op cit (n 25) 190 n 12) condemned 
as 'unhistorical' and which was not followed in the next 
edition of Salmond's book. Cf Winfield and Jolowicz 
Torts 319. So too there is still obscurity about the' 
concept that an action for material damage to property 
(cf above 327-8) is actionable as a nuisance (see Street 
Torts 216-7) and Millner (Torts 182)has suggested thai-
actions for this type of harm could 'found upon negligence 
rather than nuisance'. 
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This is not to say that twentieth century nuisance law 
has not had occasion to gloss or perfect principles laid down 
in the nineteenth century and before. Significant attempts 
(2U have been made to delimit the true boundaries of nuisance, 
to mark out the differences between nuisance and the torts of 
( n c \ ( 9 R "} 
trespass, negligence as well as the relationship be-
• • (27 ) 
tween nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 
(24) Notably by Newark 'The Boundaries of Nuisance' (1949) 
65 LQR 480. 
(25) Kine v Jolly [1905] 1 Ch 480 at 487; Southport Corp v 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182; L1956] AC 218. 
Winfield 'Nuisance as a Tort' (193 0-2) 4 Camb LJ 189 at 
201; Newark 'Trespass or Nuisance or. Negligence' (1954) 
17 Mod LR 579; Hudson 'Trespass or Nuisance' (1960) 
19 Mod LR 188-190. 
(26) Winfield op cit (n 25) 197-201; Newark 'The Boundaries 
of Nuisance1 (1949) 65 LQR 480; Newark op cit (n 25 • 
above); Buxton 'The Negligent Nuisance' (1966) U Malaya 
LR 1; 'Nuisance and Negligence Again' (19 66) 29 Mod _ LR 
67 6; Millner Negligence 13 0 if; Winfield and Jolowicz 
Torts 320 if; Williams and Hepple Foundations 104; 
Clerk and Lindsell Torts para 1411. 
(27) In the same year as the House of Lords gave judgment in 
the case of St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HL 
Cas 642, the court of Exchequer entertained the case of 
Fletcher v Rylands (1865) 3 H & C 774. The action arose 
from water escaping from a reservoir upon the defendant's 
land and flooding the plaintiff's adjoining mine-works. 
The case was argued as if it involved nuisance principles 
but Martin B (at 792) held that the case was not one of 
nuisance 'in the ordinary and generally understood meaning 
of that word, that is to say, something hurtful or in-
jurious to the senses'. Nor could it be said to involve 
a trespass and thus, he held, the defendant could not be 
liable. Pollock CB agreed with Martin B, Bramwell B dis-
senting. The court of Exchequer Chamber (in Fletcher v 
" Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265) reversed this finding (a 
decision affirmed by the House of Lords in Rylands v 
' Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330) in terms which apparently 
confirmed that the matter was not one of nuisance (or 
trespass) but came under a head of liability which was 
sui generis. Since then it has been traditional to regard 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and the sort of factual 
situations coming within its scope as distinct and dis-
tinguishable from nuisance. The exact points of distinc-
tion are however unclear and their demarcation has been 
a matter of some dispute. For formulations of the dis-
tinction between the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and nui-
sance , see especially Winfield OD cit (n 25) 192-7; 
Street' Torts 2 55-7. Cf Newark 'Boundaries of Nuisance' 
(1949) 65 LQR 480 at 487-8 who argues that Rylands v 
Fletcher was in truth 'a simple case of nuisance'. 
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The central idea that nuisance law involved a balancing 
( 28 ) 
of conflicting interests has been classically restated by 
Lord Wright in Sedleigh-Denfield v 0'Callaghan(29)(19 40), 
while the judges have demonstrated a pleasing willingness to 
extend the protection of the physical comfort of human exis-
tence into areas not previously within the ambit of the nui-
sance concept. In particular there has been something of 
a departure from the nineteenth century tendency to restrict 
the concept of harm to the comfort of human existence to 
(31) 
auditory or olfactory types of interference. Thus in 
(3 2) 
Thompson-Schwab v Costaski Lord Evershed MR, in holding 
a house of prostitution to be a private nuisance, said of the 
activities of the defendants: (28) Cf above 3 04-5. 
(29) [1940] AC 880 at 903. 
'A balance has to be maintained between the rights of 
the occupier to do what he likes with his own and the 
right of the neighbour not to be interfered with. It 
is impossible to give any precise or universal formu-
la, but it may broadly be said that a useful test is 
perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary 
usages of mankind living in society, or, more correctly 
in a particular society'. 
(3 0) 'The forms which nuisance may take are protean' Lord 
Wright pointed out in Sedleigh-Denfield's case (supra) 
ibid. 
(31) Cf above 3 97. 
(32) [1956] 1 All ER 652 at 654. Interferences with physical 
comfort by affecting the temperature of premises has also 
been held to constitute an actionable nuisance (see 
Dublin (South) City Market Co v McCabes Ltd [1953] IR 
283 at 311). On the other hand the courts have tended 
to cling to the old notion that an interference with that 
which is 'a matter of delight' (cf above 118) cannot con-
stitute a nuisance. Thus the old rule (see above 410) 
that interference with the prospect from a house still 
stands (cf Mayo v Seaton UPC (1903) 68 JP 7) though not 
without some expression of disapproval ('English law has 
long recognized the duty of occupiers of land not to 
offend their neighbour's sense of smell or hearing, but 
has left them lamentably free to offend their neighbour's 
sense of sight,' per Scott LJ in McVittie v Bolton . Cor-
poration [1945] 1 KB 281 at 283)T. So too in Bridlington 
Relay Ltd v Yorkshire Electricity Board [1965] Ch 4 36 it 
was held to be no nuisance to interfere with television 
broadcasts since these were a 'recreational facility' -and 
Buckley J could find no authority in which interference 
with a 'purely' recreational facility had been held to 
constitute a legal nuisance. For the case for considering 
'unaesthetic' sights as nuisances see the literature 
cited above 410 n 420. 
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'... it does not follow at all that their activities 
should ... be regarded as free from the risk or 
possibility that they cause a nuiance, in the proper 
sense of that term, to a neighbour merely because they 
do not impinge on the senses - for example the nose or 
the ear - as would the emanation of smells or fumes or 
noise. The test which I adopt ... is ... whether what 
is being done interferes with the plaintiff in the com-
fortable and convenient enjoyment of his land, regard 
being had, to borrow Lord Wright's language, to the 
usages in this matter of civilised society....' 
For all this the law of nuisance remains in considerable 
confusion. Its historic and essential concern - the relation-
ship between neighbouring landowners - is obfuscated by a 
judicial tendency to use the word nuisance as descriptive of 
types of harm not related to neighbour relations. This ob-
scurity is confounded by the fact that behind this semantic 
veil the judges 'do make substantive decisions between groups 
of cases, applying different criteria of liability in reaching 
. . . . . . , (33) 
their decisions': 
'In most instances the invocation of the word "nuisance" 
conceals a deliberate thought process which is especially 
geared to the type of problem exercising the court. In 
some situations the process of reasoning and the criteria 
applied are those of another head of tortious liability 
producing an ostensible degree of functional overlap 
between nuisance and the other tort'.(34) 
All of this makes it plain that nuisance law needs rethinking 
(35 ) 
'on both the high analytical and sober practical levels'. 
Happily it seems.that the time when this enterprise will be 
undertaken may not be far off. 
Renaissance 
Of recent years there has been something of a renaissance 
in the study of nuisance law. The principal cause of this has 
been a rising concern for the integrity of the natural environ-
ment. The realisation that technological advances in this 
century seriously threaten the capacity of the natural media 
(33) McLaren op cit (n 16) at 321-2. 
(34) McLaren op cit 322. 
(35) Note 'An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts' (1969) 
21 Stanford LR 293 at 315. 
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of existence to continue to sustain vegetable and animal life 
has led scholars to examine a variety of devices and strategies 
for abating the threat of environmental pollution. Nui-
sance law, traditionally concerned with the natural amenities 
of light, air. and water and moulded in the nineteenth century' 
in the crucible of the Industrial Revolution, offered histori-
cal precedents for legal devices by which land-uses might be 
controlled in the interests of preventing wholescale pollution 
( 37 ) 
of rivers, lakes, the soil and the atmosphere. 
At the same time economists began to study the economic 
implications of attempts to regulate industrial enterprise in 
(38) 
the interests of environmental protection. The thrust of 
(39) 
these studies was towards devising the most 'efficient' 
methods of regulating the use of 'property rights' in the . 
natural media of existence. Perhaps inevitably, economic 
theorising came to focus on nuisance law as one of the existing 
social mechanisms for regulating human exploitation of natural 
resources. 
(3 6) See eg Dales Pollution Property and Prices. 
(37) See eg Comment: 'The Rule of Private Nuisance Law in 
the Control of Air Pollution' (196 8) 10 Ariz LR 107; 
Note: 'Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance' CT967) 24 
Wash & Lee LR 314; Note: 'A Trend towards Coalesence 
of Trespass and Nuisance : Remedy for Invasion of 
Porticulates' 1961 WashU LQ 62; Jeurgensmeyer 'Common 
Law Remedies and Protection of the Environment' (1971) 
6 UBC LR 215; McLaren 'The Common Law Nuisance Action 
and the Environmental Battle' (19 72) 10 Osgoode Hall LJ 
505. 
(38) See eg Dales op cit (n 36 above);' Kneese Economics and 
the Environment Pearce Environmental Economics; Kohn 
Air Pollution Control; Walters Noise and Prices. 
(39) In the economic sense of achieving optimal", allocation 
of resources. See Po.sner Economic Analysis of Law 4, 
11, 17-18. 
(40) Economists use the term 'property right' in the sense of 
the 'right to benefit or harm oneself or others' and 
thus see property relationships as involving transactions 
in which the parties bargain to modify the harms or en-
hance the benefits flowing from their rights of property. 
See Demsetz 'Toward a Theory of Property Rights' (19 67) 
57 Am Econ Rev 347. Cf Posner op cit Chap 2. 
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In 1960 R H Coase published his immensely influential 
(41) 
study of 'The Problem of Social Cost'. Devoted to demon-
strating a fallacy in classic economic theory the article 
focused on the question of the efficient allocation of re-
sources. In the course of his article Coase sought to illus-
trate his theory by an analysis of some nineteenth-century 
(42 ) (43 
nuisance cases notably Sturges v Bridgman; Cook v Forbes 
(44) 
and Bryant v Lefever. . 
In the course of his discussion of these cases Coase 
made a number of provocative and instructive points. The 
cases illustrated, he demonstrated, that the problem of the 
costs of exploiting resources was inevitably reciprocal in 
(45 ) nature and thus had to be resolved by determining which of 
(41) Coase 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 Jo Law & 
Economics 1-44. 
(42) (1879) 11 Ch D 852. See on this case above 342-3. 
(43) (1867) LR 5 Eq 166. See on this case above 354. 
(44) (1879) LR 4 CPD 172. 
(45) Coase (op cit 11-13) demonstrated this by analysing the 
case of Bryant v Lefever (supra). There the plaintiff, 
until 187 9, was able to light fires in the fire places 
of his dwelling and the smoke was drawn off by the chim-
ney. In that year the defendant, his neighbour, increased 
the height of a wall on his land so that it affected the 
air currents and caused the chimneys to cease to draw off 
the smoke, which debouched into plaintiff's dwelling. 
The Court of Appeal held that there was no nuisance since, 
it said, the harm complained of by the plaintiff was 
caused by him as a result of his choosing to light fires. 
Coase however observes (at 13) that it was not the plain-
tiff but rather both parties who caused the nuisance: 
'Who caused the nuisance? The answer seems fairly 
clear. The smoke nuisance was caused both by the man 
who built the wall and by the man who lit the fires. 
Given the fires, there would have been no smoke nui-
sance without the wall; given the wall there would 
have been no smoke nuisance without the fires. Elimi-
nate the wall or the fires and the smoke nuisance 
would disappear .... [I]t is clear that both were re-
sponsible and both should be forced to include the 
loss of amenity due to the smoke as a cost....' 
Sturges v Bridgman established the same point (Coase 
op cit 8-10). Up until a certain date the defendant, a 
confectioner had carried on his business, without the 
noise of it being a nuisance to anyone. Then his neigh-
bour, a doctor, extended his consulting room to a part 
of his premises where the noise from the confectioner's 
kitchens was annoying. He sought and was granted an 
(continued on the next page) 
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the various possible methods of dealing with the problem was 
the most efficient in an economic sense. As Coase put it, 
in the situations revealed by cases such as Bryant v Lefever 
and Sturges v Bridgman 
'[t]he real question that has to be decided is: 
should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed 
to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious 
harm'. 
(47 ) The courts, in the nuisance cases, Coase conceded, often 
(45) (continued) 
injunction. These facts, Coase points out, (at 13) 
demonstrate that both parties were responsible for the 
harm: 
'The doctor's work would not have been disturbed if 
the confectioner had not worked his machinery; but 
the machinery would have disturbed no one if the 
doctor had not set up his consulting room in that 
particular place'. 
(46) Op cit 2. 
(47) '... it is clear ... that the courts have often recog-
nised the economic implications of their decisions and 
are aware (as many economists are not) of the reciprocal 
nature of the problem. Furthermore, from time to time, 
they take these economic implications into account, 
along with other factors, in arriving at their deci-
sions.... [at 19] The doctrine that the harmful effect 
must be substantial before the court will act, is no 
doubt, in part a reflection of the fact that there will 
almost always be some gain to offset the harm.... In 
... Sturges v Bridgman, it seems clear that the judges 
were thinking of the economic consequences of alterna-
tive decisions [at 20].... The courts do not always 
refer very clearly to the economic problem posed by the 
cases brought before them but it seems probable that in 
the interpretation of words and phrases like "reason-
able" or "common or ordinary use" there is some recogni-
tion, perhaps largely unconscious and certainly not very 
explicit, of the economic aspects of the questions at 
issue [at 22]'. Coase summarised his analysis of the 
nuisance cases with the observation that the 'problem 
which we face in dealing with actions which have harmful 
effects is not simply one of restraining those respon-
sible for them.... [T]he courts are conscious of this 
and ... they often make, although not always in a very 
explicit fashion, a comparison between what would be 
gained and what lost by preventing actions which have 
harmful effects' (at 27-8). Cf the doctrine of the 
balancing of interests developed by the courts of equity 
(above at 240). 
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attempted to achieve exactly this albeit crudely and with an 
imperfect understanding of what they were about. 
Coase then turned to elaborate his own theorem as to 
the proper mode of avoiding the most serious harm. In this 
connection he developed an argument that it mattered not to 
whom a property right was initially allocated since the mar-
ket forces in the economy would lead the parties involved to 
strike a bargain which would result in the most economically 
efficient result. 
Legal scholars, relying upon economic concepts of 
efficiency in the allocation and distribution of wealth, have 
used Coase's theorem to analyse the conflicts of interests 
(49 'i involved in the use and exploitation of adjoining land units. 
(48) Coase (op cit 9 ff) illustrated his point by reference 
to Sturges v Bridgman (supra). The issue here, he noted, 
in a sense was whether the doctor was to have a noisless 
environment at the cost of suppressing the confectioner's 
trade or vice versa. The court by enjoining the con-
fectioner's activities 'entitled' the doctor to a nois-
less environment. Coase's point was that the confec-
tioner might well however purchase from the doctor that 
entitlement (ie acquire the right to disregard the in-
junction) and so continue his trade (for an actual 
example of such bargaining see the case of Martin v 
Nutkin (1724) 2 P Wms 266 discussed above 401 n 3 93). 
Whether or not the parties would come to such an agree-
ment depended upon their respective evaluations of the 
costs and benefits involved (ie the doctor would not 
waive the injunction if the confectioner did not offer 
to pay more than it would cost the doctor to practice 
in noisy conditions; the confectioner would not offer 
an amount which would make it unprofitable for him to 
carry on his trade). If in these circumstances the 
parties concluded an agreement the allocation of rights 
would be of optimal economic efficiency since both 
parties benefitted and neither lost. It should be poin-
ted out that this is a gross over-simplification of 
Coase's basic theorem which is considerably more sophis-
ticated particularly.as regards the process by which a 
bargain would be reached and the hurdles ('transaction 
costs') which might prevent an agreement. See Coase 
op cit lb ff. Cf Posner Econmic Analysis of Law 16-21. 
For closer analysis of Coase's theorem in this regard 
see Demsetz 'When does the Rule of Liability Matter' 
(1972) 1 Jo Legal Studies 13; Calabresi 'Transaction 
Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules' (1968) 
11 Jo Law and Economics 67. 
(49) A stimulating example of the application of this tech-
nique is provided by Ellickson 'Alternatives to Zoning : 
Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls' 
(continued on the next page) 
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lead to results which were more 'efficient' and thus more 
(51 ) acceptable to litigants. 
Nuisance law, now some eight hundred years old is alive 
but not well. The prescriptions for restoring it to full 
health are however at hand. All that is required is that they 
be administered. 
(51) For proposals for enhancing the efficiency of nuisance 
law see Ellickson op cit (n 49 above) at 722//. • See 
also Michelman 'Pollution as a Tort' (19 71) 8 0 Yale<LJ 
64 7; Calabresi and Melamed 'Property Rules, Liability 
and Inalienability - One View of the Cathedral' (197 2) 
Harvard LR 1089. These latter articles, after analysing 
in Coasian terms the considerations.of efficiency in 
relation to the solution of pollution/nuisance-type 
situations, demonstrate that there are at least four 
possible methods by which the law might respond to a 
nuisance in order to achieve the most satisfactory re-
sult: (i) to abate the nuisance by the award of an 
injunction (ii) to award damages but not an injunction 
(ie allow the nuisance to continue but at a price) 
(iii) neither enjoin the nuisance nor award damages 
(iv) to enjoin the nuisance but award damages to the 
defendant (cf the Spur Industries case (n 50 above)). 
Ellickson (op cit 738-9) points out that while traditional 
nuisance law customarily relies upon options (i) and (ii), 
in terms of efficiency, it would be preferable to employ 
options (ii)-and (iv). 
